D. 22 - What follows from the death of Christ

Division of the text

Having considered the things that pertain to Christ’s death, that is, according to what notion he is said to have died, here the Master considers the things that follow upon Christ’s death. It is divided into two parts:

in the first, he considers Christ’s death through its relation to his humanity absolutely;

second, through its relation to place, at here it is asked whether in death Christ was a man anywhere. (Sent. III, 22.2(71).1.)

As regards the first he does three things:

first, he asks the question whether Christ was a man during the three days;

second, he states the opinion of others, at to some this does not appear to be the case; (Sent. III, 22.1(70).2.)

third, he states his own opinion, at to them we answer. (Sent. III, 22.1(70).3.)

Here it is asked whether in death Christ was a man anywhere. (Sent. III, 22.2(71).1.) Here he asks about the death in its relation to the place in which it occurred, and he does two things.

First, he shows that he was both in the tomb and in hell in virtue of his humanity, and everywhere in virtue of his divinity.

Second, he asks whether one can say of the man that he was everywhere, at it is also usual to ask whether it may suitably be said that the Son of man . . . is everywhere. (Sent. III, 22.4(73).1.)

As regards the first he does two things:

first, he shows that Christ was in diverse places in diverse ways;

second, he asks whether he was in those places as a whole, at in any case, the whole Christ was at the same time in hell, in heaven, and everywhere. (Sent. III, 22.3(72).1.)

Here there are three questions:

the first, about Christ’s death in its relation to his humanity; (Q. 1.)

the second, about his descent into hell; (Q. 2.)

and the third, about his Ascension into heaven. (Q. 3.)

Question 1

Christ's death in relation to his humanity

As regards the first, two things are asked:

first, whether Christ was a man during the three days of his death;

second, whether the man was everywhere at that point—or even before this, or even now.

Article 1

Whether Christ could be called a man during the three days in which he lay in the tomb

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST III.50.4; Quodl. II, q. 1, a. 1; III, q. 2, q. 2; Compendium theol., ch. 229.) It appears that Christ was a man during the three days.

Obj. 1: For “rational” is the difference that completes man. But Christ could be said to be rational during the three days, since the rational soul was united to him. Therefore he could be called a “man.”

Obj. 2: Furthermore, every person subsisting in a human nature can be called a “man.” But the person of the Son of God subsists in a human nature, because he had all the parts of the human nature united to it. Therefore he could be said to be a man.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, if someone is said to be a man, his a soul and body must be united to him. But during the three days the soul and the body were united in the one hypostasis of the Son of God. Therefore he could be called a “man.”

Obj. 4: Furthermore, every priest is a man. But Christ was a priest during the three days, for it is said in Psalm 109:4, you are a priest for ever. Therefore Christ was a man during the three days.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, since all things desire to exist, as the Philosopher says in On Generation and Corruption 2, (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 2.10, 336b27.) no one desires not to exist, but always to truly exist. But the saints desire death, as is clear from Philippians 1:23: my desire is to depart and be with Christ. Therefore after death they do not cease being what they were, but begin to exist more truly, and thus, after death they can be said to be men.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, “Peter” is the name of a certain individual of a human nature. But after Peter’s death we invoke him, saying, “Saint Peter, pray for us.” Therefore after death he can be said to be a man, and thus it appears that so can Christ, for the same reason.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, the Philosopher says in the Ethics 9 that a man is his intellect. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.8, 1168b31.) But a man’s intellect endures after death. Therefore he can be said to be a man after death.

On the contrary, the part is not predicated of the whole, nor vice versa. But after Christ’s death only the parts of his human nature remained. Therefore Christ could not be said to be a man by reason of those parts.

Furthermore, “man” is the name of a species. But species and genera are taken from the form of the whole, and the form of the whole results from the composition of the parts. Therefore, since the soul and the body were not composed with each other during the three days, Christ could not be said to be a man.

Furthermore, the living is [generically] higher than man, as is said in the Book of Causes, (Proclus (pseudo-Aristotle), Liber de causis, prop. 1.) whereas the dead is opposed to the living. But Christ was dead. Therefore he was not a man.

I answer that it was the opinion of the Master and even of Hugh of Saint Victor (Hugh of Saint Victor, De sacramentis, bk. 2, pt. 1, ch. 11 (PL 176:192).) that Christ was a man during the three days. However, they were moved to this by diverse paths.

For Hugh said that the entire personhood of a man is in his soul, and the man properly speaking was in it; therefore the soul after death can be said to be a man not only for Christ but for other men as well. Now, this position cannot be true, since after something is complete in its own species and personhood, nothing else can be added to it such that it would compose with it any nature. Rather, either it is joined to it in the person and not in the nature, which is uniquely the case in Christ, or it is joined to it accidentally. Whence, from this position it follows that either a single nature is not brought about by the soul and body—and thus the soul will not be the form of the body, nor will it vivify the body formally—or again, that the soul is joined to the body accidentally, like a sailor in a ship or a man in his clothes. This is as the ancient philosophers said, among which Plato said, according to Gregory of Nyssa, (Nemesius, De natura hominis, ch. 3 (PG 40:594).) that man is not something composed of soul and body, but is a soul using a body.

And because these are problematic, therefore the Master did not want to say that other souls were still men after their death, but only Christ was, for even after his death the soul and the body in a certain way remained united in Christ, inasmuch as each remains united to the Word. But for two reasons not even this position can stand, if the name “man” is being taken properly. First, because for something to be a man the soul and the body must be joined so as to constitute one nature, which occurs through [the body] being informed by the soul, which was not so during the three days. Second, because upon the withdrawal of the soul, that flesh was called “flesh” only equivocally, and so too was that body called a “human body” only equivocally.

And therefore all recent thinkers hold that Christ during the three days was not a man. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the Master wanted to call Christ a “man” during the three days only equivocally; this is why he says that it was not according to the same notion that he was said to be a man after his death as he was before, or as are other men. And in virtue of this no real problem follows from the Master’s opinion. For according to the Philosopher in the Metaphysics 4, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.4, 1106b13–20; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 4, lect. 7, nn. 616–19.) it is not a problem that what we call a man others call not-man according to a [mere] convention of the name; rather, this is only an impropriety in the manner of speaking. For it is not in accordance with the usage of the name “man” that it signify the divided body and soul.

Reply Obj. 1: “Rational,” meaning the difference, belongs to the composite itself, as Avicenna says, (source) although it is taken from the soul. And therefore after death, just as he was not a man, so too he was not rational—insofar as “rational” names the difference of man. But he was rational only insofar as this names the power of the soul.

Reply Obj. 2: [The person of the Son of God] did not subsist in a human nature, because not all the parts of human nature were in him. For there was not flesh and bone, except equivocally, as was said, and further, there was no union of the soul and body.

Reply Obj. 3: For him to be a man not only must the soul and the body be united in the person, but also they must do so such that they constitute one nature.

Reply Obj. 4: Christ is said to be a priest forever because his priesthood is not followed by another priesthood. Or it can be said differently that Christ, as is said in Hebrews 9:11, was the high priest at the service of future spiritual goods, and therefore that priesthood belongs to Christ’s soul even when separated from the body.

Reply Obj. 5: Paul desired to exist more truly as regards the soul, which was more noble, than to exist in a mortal body.

Reply Obj. 6: Those ways of speaking are synecdoche, since the whole is being placed for the part.

Reply Obj. 7: The Philosopher is speaking figuratively, and not properly. Whence he himself says that the intellect is said to be the man just as the king is said to be the city, for all that is in the city depends on the will of the king.

Article 2

Whether Christ the man was everywhere

To the second we proceed as follows. It appears that Christ the man was everywhere.

Obj. 1: For according to Damascene, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 3 (PG 94:994).) the natures share their properties with each other. But Christ is everywhere God. Therefore he is everywhere a man.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, for whatever things are one in supposit, wherever one is the other is. But the man and the Son of God are the same in supposit. Therefore where the Son of God is, there too will be the man.

Obj. 3: Just as Peter is truly a man, so too is Christ. But wherever Peter is, there too is a man. Therefore wherever Christ is, there too is a man. But Christ is everywhere. Therefore the man is everywhere.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, everything that is is either a man or not a man. Therefore if Christ is not everywhere a man, somewhere he will not be a man—which is false.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, to exist everywhere is not more remote from created things than is to exist from eternity. But we say that this man was from eternity. Therefore likewise we can say that this man is everywhere.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, the wholeness of a thing is spoken of in reference to the things from which the thing is composed. But the whole Christ is said to be everywhere, as is said in the text, and as Damascene says. (Sent. III, 2.3(72).2 and John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 7 (PG 94:1011).) Therefore, since the whole pertains to the person, and the person is composed from the divinity and the humanity, it appears that Christ’s humanity is everywhere, and thus the man is everywhere.

On the contrary, Christ’s humanity consists only in the soul and body. But neither Christ’s body nor his soul are everywhere. Therefore he is not everywhere in virtue of his humanity.

Furthermore, everything that moves from place to place has a determinate place and is not everywhere. But Christ as man moved from place to place. Therefore he was not everywhere.

Furthermore, to be everywhere belongs to God alone. But no such thing belongs to Christ insofar as he is a man. Therefore he is not everywhere insofar as he is a man.

I answer that Christ’s human nature is not everywhere—neither when his soul and body were divided, nor when they were joined. Rather, that person by his own notion and by reason of the divine nature is everywhere. Now, for the truth of an expression, as was said above, (Above,* d. 10, q. 1, a. 2, resp. 3; d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, ad 6.)* it is not required that the predicate in virtue of its whole self belong to the subject; rather, it is sufficient that it belong to it by reason of the supposit. And therefore, because “man” signifies the supposit of a human nature, this is why “Christ is a man everywhere” is false. For it does not belong to him everywhere to have humanity. Now, the adverb “everywhere” determines “is a man” in the predicate position in reference to the whole indicated in “man”—and even more so as regards the nature, insofar as terms placed in a predicate are taken formally. But this is true: “This man is everywhere.” For being everywhere belongs to the person. However, “Christ insofar as he is a man is everywhere” can be true and false, for insofar as it can import the condition of the nature, it is false, but insofar as it imports the unity of the supposit, it is also true.

Reply Obj. 1: The sharing of properties occurs insofar as the natures are united in the person or supposit. And therefore this sharing must be considered insofar as the name signifying each nature is asserted as the subject, and not insofar as it is asserted as the predicate. For this does not follow: “he was made man, therefore he was made God.” Nor does this follow: “God is everywhere, therefore the man is everywhere.”

Reply Obj. 2: Wherever God is, this man is in that place, but still the human nature is not there, and therefore it need not be that the man is there.

Reply Obj. 3: Peter has only a human nature, so wherever he is that nature also must be. But Christ has more than one nature, and therefore it need not be that wherever he is, there he has both natures, just as it need not be that wherever a whole is, there too are all its parts. Rather, someone can be in one place in virtue of his hand, and in another in virtue of his foot.

Reply Obj. 4: When it is said that “the Son of God is not a man everywhere,” this expression is not true insofar as the negation is applied to the man absolutely, but insofar as it is applied to the man along with being everywhere. But when this is added to it through a composition, the negation is not applied beyond that term; and then it does remove humanity absolutely, and not in respect to his being said to be everywhere or anywhere. And on account of this, this is false: “Christ is not anywhere a man,” whereas this is true: “he is not a man everywhere.”

Reply Obj. 5: This is similar to the case of the eternal. For this is true: “this man was from eternity,” but this is false: “Christ was from eternity a man,” as was said about “everywhere.”

Reply Obj. 6: The divine person is not properly said to be composed of the natures, as was said above. (Above, d. 6, q. 2, a. 3.) Whence “whole” is not applied to the person insofar as what has parts is called a “whole,” but insofar as what is perfect—that to which nothing is lacking—is called a “whole.” And in this respect, the whole is said to be everywhere, since nothing of his personhood is absent, in virtue of which he is everywhere. For “whole,” since it is of the masculine gender, pertains to the person. However, insofar as he is everywhere there is absent from him some of what pertains to his human nature; for in virtue of his human nature he is not everywhere. And therefore it is said that the “whole thing is not everywhere,” since “whole thing,” because it is of the neuter gender, pertains to the nature.

Question 2

Christ's descent into hell

Next, it is asked about Christ’s descent into hell; and regarding this, two things are asked:

first, about Christ’s descent into hell;

second, about the effect that he brought about there.

Article 1

Whether Christ descended into hell

Quaestiuncula 1

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST III.52.1; Compendium theol., ch. 235; In Symbolorum Apostolorum, a. 5.) It appears that Christ should not have descended into hell.

Obj. 1: For, as Augustine says in To Dardanus, (Augustine, Epistulae, epist. 187: Ad Dardanum, para. 2 (CSEL 57:84; PL 33:834).) the name “hell” in scripture always is taken as a bad thing. But that which is always taken as bad does not befit Christ. Therefore neither should he descend to hell.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Christ descended into the world only to free the world. But through his Passion he freed not only those who were in the world, but even those who were detained in hell, having paid the price for sin, on account of which they were detained. Therefore it appears that he should not have descended into hell.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, to descend into hell indicates the penalty of damnation for sin. But in Christ there was no sin. Therefore neither does damnation belong to him. Therefore he should not have descended to hell.

On the contrary, it is said in the Creed, he descended to hell.

Furthermore, Acts 2:24 says, God raised him up, having loosed the pangs of hell. (RSV says “pangs of death.”) Therefore it appears that he went into hell.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that he descended all the way to the hell of the damned. (Parallel: ST III.52.2.) For by his death he freed the human race not only from original sin, but also from actual sin. But the hell of the damned is the place of punishment corresponding to actual sin, just as the limbo of the patriarchs the one owed to original sin. Therefore it appears that he should have descended even to that hell, just as he descended to limbo.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Christ’s Ascension corresponds to his descent, since he who descended is he who also ascended (Eph 4:10). But he ascended about all the heavens. Therefore he ought to have descended even as far as the lower hell.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Sirach 24:45 says, I will penetrate all the lower parts of the earth and I will look upon all those sleeping. (This is part of the expanded text of Sirach, not included in the RSV.) But the “lower parts of the earth” refers to the hell of the damned, in which some are “sleeping,” that is, the dead. Therefore it appears that he descended into that hell.

On the contrary, in Luke 16:26 it is said that between us and you a great chasm has been fixed, in order that those who would pass from here to you may not be able. But that chasm was fixed even more firmly between Christ, who was already a comprehensor, and the damned than between the saints who were in limbo waiting for beatitude and those in hell. Therefore Christ did not descend to them.

Furthermore, just as the empyrean heaven is the place of eternal glory, so too hell is the place of eternal misery. But no one damned can be in the empyrean heaven. Therefore it belongs to no one who is blessed to be in hell, and thus neither to Christ.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that he should not have spent a period of time in limbo. (Parallel: ST III.52.4.) For he descended to hell so that he might free the saints who were detained there. But immediately upon his descending there the saints were freed. Therefore it appears that he should not have spent any space of time there.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as someone is excluded from heaven due to sin, so too one is freed from hell through his cleansing from sin. But the devil, who sinned immediately, fell from heaven. Therefore it appears that the saints, insofar as they were immediately cleansed from sin, were led forth from hell, and thus so too Christ immediately departed.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Christ’s soul was able to be in diverse places at once. But on the day of his death Christ was in paradise; for while hanging on the cross, he told the thief, today you will be with me in paradise (Luke 23:43). Therefore it appears that on that same day he departed from hell.

On the contrary, Acts 2:24 says, God raised him up, having loosed the pangs of hell. (The RSV says, “pangs of death.”) Therefore it appears that he was in hell until the hour of his Resurrection.

Furthermore, the place of a separated soul is hell or heaven. But Christ’s soul did not ascend to heaven before the day of the Ascension, and so before his Resurrection he was not in heaven. Therefore he remained in hell until the day of the Resurrection.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that Christ, so that he might free us from all defects, wished to receive into himself the defects that were universally present in all of us and did not indicate a lack of grace. Now, it was common to all men before Christ’s Passion that they were descending into hell because of the debt of original sin. But in the name “hell” two things are indicated: namely, the place and the penalty—either that of loss or that of the senses, that is, the punishment of torment. Now, the punishment of loss—that is, the lack of the divine vision—indicates a lack of grace, because consummated grace—that is, glory—could not be in those [who lack this vision]. Likewise, the punishment of the senses does not make satisfaction after this life, because those [who experience it] are not in the state of meriting; rather, it is either a purification or a damnation. But purification is owed for some impurity, and damnation is owed for mortal sin, so the punishment of the senses also after this life indicate a lack of grace. And therefore it was fitting that Christ descend into hell insofar as “hell” indicates a place, but not insofar as it imports a penalty.

Reply Obj. 1: The name “hell,” insofar as it indicates a place, does not express only something bad, and in this way it can befit Christ. However, insofar as it indicates the penalty of loss or of the senses, in this way it cannot befit Christ, since then it expresses also the evil of fault. Or it should be said that “descending into hell” expresses something bad as meaning falling under the power of infernal things, but “descending into hell” expresses the greatest dignity if it occurs for the sake of despoiling it after the manner of its lord; and it befits Christ in this latter way.

Reply Obj. 2: Through his Passion the price was paid for, so the impediment by which the saints were held back from the vision of God was removed, and therefore they immediately saw God. Nevertheless, he needed to descend into hell as a place as regards their liberation from a place of punishment, and again, so that he might receive into himself all defects.

Reply Obj. 3: Christ is not said to have descended into hell insofar as the name “hell” imports the penalty of the senses and that of loss, but insofar as it names only the place.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that hell has four parts. One is the hell of the damned, in which there is darkness—both with respect to the lack of the divine vision and with respect to the lack of charity—and there is also a sensible punishment there; and this hell is the place of the damned. Another is the hell above this one, in which there is darkness—both on account of the lack of the divine vision and on account of the lack of grace—but there is no sensible punishment there; and this is called the limbo of the children. There is another above this, in which there is the darkness as regards the lack of the divine vision, but not as regards the lack of grace, but there is a punishment of the senses there; this is called “purgatory.” And there is another yet above this, in which there is the darkness as regards the lack of the divine vision, but not as regards the lack of grace, nor is there a sensible punishment; and this is the hell of the holy patriarchs. And Christ descended into this one only, as regards place, but not as regards the experience of darkness.

Reply Obj. 1: By his Passion Christ freed from mortal sin those who are on the path, either so that they might not commit it, or so that they might be absolved for what they have committed, if they wish it. However, he did not free those who already had descended with their mortal sin, to whom that hell of the damned is owed.

Reply Obj. 2: The Ascension befit Christ by reason of himself, for because he is the highest he should ascend above all the heavens. But to descend belongs to him only on our behalf, for he descends only as far as was expedient for our liberation, and did not go beneath all things, simply speaking.

Reply Obj. 3: The places wherein the holy patriarchs were are also called the “lower parts of the earth,” and those who were contained there were said to be “sleeping” on account of their hope for a glorious resurrection. But this is not so for those who were damned in hell.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that, since the soul and the body are proportionate, his soul should be in hell just as his body should be in the grave, so that thereby he might become like his brothers in both respects—and also so that in his Resurrection a new life might begin, both as regards the liberation of souls and as regards the resurrection of bodies, being begun in his own body.

Reply Obj. 1: Christ wished to free us while bearing in himself our defects. And therefore as long as he was dead he wished to be in hell as regards his soul, just as he wished to be in the tomb as regards his body.

Reply Obj. 2: It was brought about by a dispensation that Christ was dead for so long a time so that the truth of his death might be made manifest. And his soul was in hell and his body was in the tomb for the same duration as he was dead, as was also the case for others before his Resurrection.

Reply Obj. 3: Paradise is of three sorts. One is the earthly paradise in which Adam was placed; another the bodily heavenly paradise, that is, the empyrean heaven; and another the spiritual paradise, that is, the glory of the vision of God. And one should understand the Lord to have spoken to the thief of this latter paradise, for immediately after completing his Passion both the thief himself and all who were in the limbo of the patriarchs saw God through his essence.

Article 2

Whether Christ illuminated the limbo of the patriarchs

Quaestiuncula 1

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST III.52.5; Compendium theol., ch. 235; In Symbolorum Apostolorum, a. 5; Super Ephes. 4, lect. 3.) It appears that Christ did not illuminate the limbo of the patriarchs.

Obj. 1: For it is of the notion of hell that it appear dark, just as light is of the notion of paradise. Therefore being illuminated does not befit hell.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, if some place is illuminated, all who are in that place perceive the light. But there were some in hell who should not perceive the light of Christ, such as the demons. Therefore it appears that he did not illuminate that place.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Psalm 107:14 says, he brought them out of darkness, the darkness of death. (RSV has “out of darkness, utter darkness.”) But if Christ illuminated that place, there would be no darkness there. Therefore Christ did not illuminate that place.

On the contrary, Damascene says, he descended into hell with his deified soul so that in some way the sun of justice might dawn on those who were in the earth, and thus he might shed light over those who sat in hell, and darkness, and the shadow of death. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 29 (PG 94:1102).)

Furthermore, Ambrose says, he poured forth the light of eternal life in hell. (Ambrose, De incarnationis dominicae sacramento, ch. 5, para. 41 (CSEL 79:244; PL 16:828–30); quoted in Sent. III, 22.2(72).4.)

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that Christ drew souls out even from the hell of the damned. (Parallels: ST III.52.7; In Symbolorum Apostolorum, a. 5.) For he himself said, thou hast delivered my soul from the depths of Sheol (Ps 86:13), and Job 17:16 says, my bones will descend into the deepest hell. (RSV here has “will it go down to the bars of Sheol?”) But the depths of hell into which Job descended, and from which he was led forth, was certainly the lower hell, and the lower hell is the hell of the damned. Therefore he led souls forth from the hell of the damned.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, as for you also, because of the blood of my covenant with you, I will set your captives free from the waterless pit (Zech 9:11), and a Gloss says, you have set free those who were held captive in prison, where no mercy refreshed them, for which the rich man pleaded. (Jerome, Commentarii in prophetas minores, bk. 2, In Zechariam, ch. 9 (CCSL 76A; PL 25:1485).) But such were damned in hell. Therefore they too were freed.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, against wisdom evil does not prevail (Wis 7:30). But this would not be the case if not all who had, through their wickedness, descended into hell were freed by the wisdom that is Christ. Therefore all have been freed, even from the hell of the damned.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, they will be gathered together as prisoners in a pit; they will be shut up in a prison, and after many days they will be visited (Isa 24:22), (RSV says “they will be punished.”) and it is speaking of the damned, as is clear from the fact that he called them the host of heaven just before [in v. 21]. Therefore it appears that even the damned were visited and freed by Christ.

On the contrary, their fire shall not be quenched (Isa 66:24).

Furthermore, in hell there is no redemption. Therefore no one was freed from there.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that he freed those who were in the limbo of the children. For they were detained only for original sin, as were the holy patriarchs. But the latter were led forth. Therefore so were the children.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in them there was only the sin of another. Therefore they should have been freed by another.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the greatest lack of power merits indulgence. But the children were not able to avoid original sin. Therefore they most of all should have attained liberation.

On the contrary, no one is freed by Christ unless he is a member of Christ. But the children were members of Christ neither through a sacrament of faith nor through faith. Therefore they were not freed by Christ.

Furthermore, after this life grace is given only to one who has grace. But the children did not have grace when they descended. Therefore he cannot give it to them after this life, and thus they cannot be led to glory.

Quaestiuncula 4

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that he freed those who were in purgatory. (Parallel: ST III.52.8.) For the impediment of original sin was greater than that of venial sin. But he liberated those who were in limbo from the impediment of original sin. Therefore much more so did he liberate those with the impediment of venial sin, and thus it appears that he led souls forth from purgatory.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Christ’s Passion does not have less efficacy than does the sacrament of the Passion. But through the sacrament of Christ’s Passion, that is, baptism, someone is freed from every penalty that is owed in purgatory. Therefore it appears that much more fully did Christ free through his Passion those who were there.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, what Christ cured in this life he cured totally. But those who were in purgatory Christ cured from the original debt. Therefore likewise he cured them from the debt of venial sin, and so it appears that he freed them from purgatory.

On the contrary (4), Christ’s Passion has a power now equal to what it had then. But all who are in purgatory now are not freed by the power of the Passion. Therefore neither was it then.

Furthermore (5), one ought to suffer through himself the purification for a sin that he committed through himself. But a man endures the punishment of purgatory for sins that he committed from his very self. Therefore he should be purified through the punishment that he himself endures, and not only through Christ’s punishment.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that, the exterior darkness of hell corresponds to an interior darkness. Due to this Christ, through the demonstration of his Godhead, expelled every interior darkness from the patriarchs who were in limbo. Therefore it was fitting that even through the presence of his humanity, as regards his soul, he also would exclude from them the exterior darkness by illuminating the place of hell.

Reply Obj. 1: This hell should now be empty, since after that time no one descends to that limbo. And therefore it was becoming that there be something in it that is against the notion of hell.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as the fire of hell, insofar as it acts as an instrument of divine justice, afflicts only those who have the debt of punishment, even if someone else might be there, so too that light, acting an instrument of divine mercy, illuminated externally only those whom were being illuminated within.

Reply Obj. 3: He led them from darkness when he illuminated them, and leading them from that place is said to be leading them from the darkness that that place before had from its own nature.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that a punishment cannot be taken away while the fault remains. Now, those who are damned in hell are obstinate in their malice, like the demons, and therefore they were not able to be freed from their punishment. And this was not due to an insufficiency of the one causing the freedom, but to their indisposition.

Reply Obj. 1: The limbo of the patriarchs is called the “lower hell” not simply speaking, but in reference to the abode from which David’s soul and even that of Christ were led forth. So too that place can be called the “deepest hell” comparatively, such that it is deep in relation to the fiery air of the heavens, in which are the demons, and the place where we abide now is deeper, but the limbo of the patriarchs, from which Job was freed, was the deepest.

Reply Obj. 2: That Gloss is improper, for it is speaking of hell in a common way, insofar as it includes all the above stated divisions of hell, and this is why it attributes one thing to hell by reason of one of its parts, and another to it by reason of another. Now, when it says that no mercy refreshed them, this should be understood in reference to those who were in the other part of hell, or it is being said of the wholly absolving mercy that even the rich man desired greatly, although he did not ask for the other [mercy].

Reply Obj. 3: In and of itself, wisdom conquers every wickedness, but the fact that it is not conquered in certain ones is due to their indisposition.

Reply Obj. 4: This is speaking of the visitation that will occur in the general resurrection, when they are led forth from hell, and are to be taken back forever.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that Christ’s redemption had place only in those who were Christ’s members. Whence, since the children who were in limbo were never members of Christ, either through their own faith or through the sacrament of faith, which now is baptism but then was circumcision or sacrifice, it is certain that they were not freed.

Reply Obj. 1: Unlike with the children, there was grace in the patriarchs, through which they were members of Christ. And therefore they partook of the effect of his redemption, but this was not so for the children.

Reply Obj. 2: The sin of the children, although it could be expiated by another as regards the genus of the sin, nevertheless they did not have in themselves the faith and charity through which they would be joined to him, through whom they would have been able to be freed as regards the genus of that sin.

Reply Obj. 3: Although as regards the genus of the sin their sin could be propitiated, nevertheless from their lack of disposition, they could not be partakers of this propitiation—as it is clear for a venial sin in those who have sinned mortally.

Response to Quaestiuncula 4

To the fourth question, it should be said that, although this is not found to have been determined by the saints, still it can be said that those who were in purgatory were not freed. For because the punishment of purgatory is owed to actual sin, it must be expiated through the proper acts or suffering of the one who sinned, or that of another specific person acting on their behalf. Now, in purgatory a fault cannot be expiated through any meritorious act, since these souls are not in the state of meriting. Whence, their fault must be expiated through a punishment that they themselves endure, unless they be freed through the suffrage of those who are in the state of meriting. Now, Christ’s Passion immediately removes the impediment arising from original sin, which was contracted from another. But its efficacy extends to removing the punishment owed to an actual sin that someone has committed of himself, by the mediation of a sacrament offered for the person or by some act of that person, or that of another related to that person. And therefore it was not becoming that they be freed from purgatory through Christ’s Passion alone—unless it is said that in their life they merited that they be freed through Christ’s Passion. Or it was from a special grace that those who were found in purgatory were absolved through Christ’s Passion, although now those who are in purgatory do not attain the effect of full liberation from Christ’s Passion alone.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the impediment of original sin is more grave, still it can be totally destroyed by another, which is not the case for the impediment of venial sin, for the stated reason.

Reply Obj. 2: Punishment is forgiven by the power of Christ’s Passion only insofar as someone is conformed to the Passion. This can happen in three ways: in one way, sacramentally, as occurs in baptism; in another way, through the merit of the love and faith arising from the Passion; in a third way, through likeness of punishment. Now, the first two modes cannot be in purgatory, since [these souls] are not in the state of receiving the sacrament or in the state of meriting. Whence, if the Passion were to free them from venial sin, they must be conformed to the Christ who had suffered through suffering punishment.

Reply Obj. 3: Whatever in them was curable by another cured them wholly, but purifying punishment in them could not be wholly removed by another, as was said.

Reply Sed Contra 4–5: To the contrary objections, the solution is clear from the things said.

Question 3

Christ's Ascension

Next, one asks about Christ’s Ascension, and regarding this three things are asked:

first, whether Christ ascended;

second, how he ascended;

third, the terminus of his Ascension.

Article 1

Whether Christ should have ascended

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST III.57.1; Compendium theol., ch. 240; In Symbolorum Apostolorum, a. 6.) It appears that Christ did not ascend.

Obj. 1: For every motion, since it is a going forth from potency to act, is the act of the imperfect, and happens on account of a need. But ascension is a motion. Therefore, since there was no imperfection or need in Christ, who had already been wholly glorified through his Resurrection, it appears that he did not ascend.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in Christ there are only the two natures, the divine and the human. But ascending as regards his location does not belong to Christ in virtue of his divine nature—since insofar as he is God he is everywhere; and neither does ascending in reference to his divinity—since his divinity cannot improve. Likewise, it does not belong to him to ascend as regards his location in virtue of his human nature—since he did not descend from heaven; moreover, John 3:13 says, no one has ascended into heaven but he who descended from heaven; nor again, does ascending as regards his divinity [belong in virtue of his humanity]—since its glory did not grow further after the Resurrection. Therefore it appears that Christ in no way ascended.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it befits other saints to ascend to the empyrean heaven, because their joy is increased by such a place befitting their glory. But the joy of Christ’s soul could not grow any further, just as neither could his grace or glory. Therefore it appears that he did not ascend.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, everything that Christ did in his assumed flesh for our sake ought serve our utility. But nothing accrues to us through his Ascension, since before this, through his Passion and descent into hell every impediment had been removed, and the gates had been opened through his Passion, and likewise through baptism when the heavens were opened. Therefore it was unnecessary that Christ ascend.

Obj. 5: Every action of Christ is ordered to our salvation. But his bodily presence would more favor our salvation than would its absence. Therefore it appears that he should not have left us through his Ascension.

On the contrary, in the Creed it is said, he ascended into heaven.

Furthermore, to the noblest body is owed the noblest place. But the empyrean heaven is the noblest of places. Therefore Christ’s body, which is the noblest body, ought to have ascended to that place.

Furthermore, in Christ the glory of resurrection promised to his members is demonstrated in advance. But a heavenly place is also promised to Christ’s members; this is why Lucifer fell. Therefore it appears that he should have ascended first, as is said in Micah 2:13: he who opens the breach will go up before them.

I answer that his ascending into heaven was fitting both for Christ himself and for us. It was fitting to Christ because everything that pertains to glory is owed to him; this is why, since the empyrean heaven is a place befitting glory, and is, as it were, an incidental reward, it was also owed Christ that he would ascend to that place. Moreover, it was fitting for us for three reasons: first, so that he might, as it were, bring us into a bodily possession of heaven, which he bought for us at the price of his blood. Second, so that he might strengthen our hope for heaven; for when he carried the human condition into the stars, he showed that he was able to open the heavens to believers, as Augustine says. (Sermones, serm. 176: In ascensione Domini, attributed without certainly to Augustine (PL 39:2081).) Third, so that we, now knowing Christ no longer lives according to the flesh, might be joined to him only spiritually, and thereby we are made fit for receiving the gifts of the Holy Spirit, as it is said in Ephesians 4:8: when he ascended on high . . . he gave gifts to men.

Reply Obj. 1: Local motion, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Physics 8.7, 261a20; Aquinas, In Physic., bk. 8, lect. 14, n. 10.) does not change a thing as regards what is within it, but only as regards what is outside it; this is why local motion does not assert anything internal to a thing going forth from potency to act. And on account of this, local motion indicates no imperfection of the sort that the thing lacks anything that should be in it; rather, it indicates an imperfection in a certain respect, insofar as while it is in that place it is not in another. Likewise, it should be said that Christ’s Ascension was not on account of any need, in virtue of which he needed on his own part to have something in himself, but on account of our need—and so that he might be in a place befitting him, in which place he was not yet present.

Reply Obj. 2: To “ascend” and “descend” can be said properly, and thereby they signify local motion; whence they do not belong to Christ in virtue of his divine nature, but in virtue of his human, in virtue of which he descended to hell and ascended, locally, to the heavens. He is also said metaphorically to have “descended” in virtue of his divine nature, inasmuch as he emptied himself, taking the form of a servant (Phil 2:7), and inasmuch as there was now a new effect on earth, in virtue of which something was there that before now was not. Moreover, he is said to have “ascended” [metaphorically in virtue of his divine nature] inasmuch as it entered the awareness of others. Likewise, he ascended as regards his human nature insofar as it was exalted to the glory of resurrection, and the awareness of the peoples, and he descended in virtue of the ignominy of the Passion. However, when it is said that no one has ascended into heaven but he who descended from heaven, this should be referred to the person to whom it belongs to descend from heaven, in virtue of one nature—that is, the divine—insofar as he joined flesh to himself in his person, and to ascend in virtue of the other, the human.

Reply Obj. 3: No joy in Christ increased in his Ascension, whether as regards its intensity or as regards the number of things over which he should rejoice. For he had a perfect joy about all things from the instant of his conception. Rather, a new mode of rejoicing grew for us, for what he rejoiced over before as about something to come, he now rejoiced as about something present.

Reply Obj. 4: Through Christ’s Passion all impediments were removed from us and all goods given to us, as regards merit, because through his Passion Christ merited these things for us. But it was still necessary that we be led by him to those goods effectively, as to the bodily possession of those things that he had already bought for us. Now, the gifts of glory consist in three things. First, in the divine vision, which is the beatitude of the soul, and he conferred this effectively by descending to hell. The second is the glory of the body, and this began in his Resurrection. The third is a fitting place, and this he presented in his Ascension. Now, in baptism the heavens are “opened” to signify that through baptism, which began when his Passion occurred, the access to heaven was fully made clear for us.

Reply Obj. 5: The bodily presence of Christ was dangerous for us in two ways: first, as regards faith, since those who see him in the form in which he was less than the Father would not easily believe him to be equal to the Father, as is clear in a Gloss on John, (Augustine, In Iohannis euangelium tractatus, tract. 94, 95 (CCSL 36; PL 35:1869–71).) and second, as regards love, since we who converse with him bodily would love him not only spiritually but also carnally, and this belongs to an imperfection of love.

Article 2

Whether the motion of the Ascension was violent

Quaestiuncula 1

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST III.57.3; Compendium theol., ch. 240.) It appears that the motion of the Ascension was violent.

Obj. 1: For Acts 1:9 says, he was lifted up. (The verse as St. Thomas gives it—literally, he was carried by hand into heaven"—does not correspond to the Vulgate as we have it now; the quotation we have given in its place comes the closest in the sense to the relevant sense of being "carried." Also see 1:11: This Jesus, who has been taken up from you into heaven, . . . The Moos edition points out that the phrase ferebatur in caelum is found in Luke 24:51.) But being carried, as is said in the Physics 7, (Aristotle, Physics 7.2, 243a10; Aquinas, In Physic., bk. 7, lect. 3, nn. 2–4.) is a species of violent motion. So his Ascension was a violent motion.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, because his body was solid, in it earth was predominant. But every such body naturally moves downward, and upward only through violence. Therefore this Ascension was violent.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, every natural motion is caused by the motion of the heavens. But the heavens exerted no causality over Christ’s body. Therefore that motion was not natural.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, every motion that is toward a place foreign to the mobile is an unnatural motion. But Christ’s Ascension was of this sort, since Gregory comments on the parable in Matt 25:14, a man going on a journey, that one’s flesh is led on the journey when, through the Redeemer, it is given a place in heaven. (Gregory the Great, Homiliae in Evangelia, bk. 1, hom. 9, para. 1 (CCSL 141:158; PL 76:1106).) Therefore that Ascension was a violent motion.

On the contrary, every violent motion causes tiredness. But Christ’s Ascension did not. Therefore it was not a violent motion.

Furthermore, no violent motion is done through the mobile’s own power. But Christ ascended by his own power, as is clear from Isaiah 63:1: marching in the greatness of his strength. Therefore his Ascension was not a violent motion.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that the motion of ascent was not sudden. For Augustine says, among the questions about the resurrection, (Augustine, Epistulae, epist. 102, para. 6 (CCSL 31B:11; PL 33:372).) that the motions of glorified bodies are as the motion of the rays of the sun. But the motion of a ray is instantaneous. Therefore so too was the motion of Christ’s glorified body.

Obj. 2: Christ’s glorified body was wholly subject to his spirit’s will. But the will can move instantaneously from place to place. Therefore so too could Christ’s glorified body.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the power of Christ’s glorified body is disproportionate to the power of any non-glorified mobile body. But the proportion of time a motion takes follows the proportion of the mover’s power, for a greater power moves a thing in less time. Therefore if a certain power moves a thing in so much time, the power of Christ’s glorified body will move that very body in an instant, and an instant is not proportionate to a time.

On the contrary, since it is divisible, Christ’s body has one part outside of another. But where one part is the other is not. Therefore part must succeed part, and therefore that motion is not sudden.

Furthermore, a sudden motion cannot be perceived. But the apostles saw Christ’s Ascension. Therefore it was not sudden.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that he should have ascended immediately after his Resurrection. (Parallels: ST III.57.1.ad 4.) For his Ascension was the exemplar for that of the other saints. But the other saints are going to ascend after the resurrection of their bodies. Therefore so should Christ.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as he ought to prove the truth of his Resurrection, so he ought to prove the truth of his death. But in order to prove the truth of his death, he deferred his Resurrection until the third day. Therefore likewise he should have ascended on the third day after the Resurrection.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, there is no place for souls other than hell or heaven. But the souls of the holy patriarchs who were in limbo were led forth from hell by the risen Christ. Therefore they immediately ascended into heaven. But no one should ascend into heaven before Christ, just as no one should rise before him. Therefore Christ too should have ascended into heaven immediately after his Resurrection.

On the contrary, Acts 1:3 says, to them he presented himself alive . . . during forty days.

Furthermore, the divine consolations exceed human tribulation. But the apostles were in anguish for three days after the death of Christ. Therefore much more fully ought they to be given joy on account of his Resurrection.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that a motion is called “natural” whose principle is the thing’s nature. Now, “nature” is said in two ways: namely, of the form, which is the active principle of the motion, and of the matter, which is its passive principle. Therefore in virtue of this a motion called “natural” in two ways: in one way, because the active principle of the motion is within what is moving, and in this way heavy and light bodies move naturally, and in another way, because there is a natural disposition within what is moving, through which disposition the thing is mobile due to another moving it. And this latter happens in two ways. It happens either because there is in it an aptitude to being moved by that mover along with an inclination to a contrary motion, as is the case in an animal’s body; and then this motion is called “violent” as regards the nature of the body as body, but “natural” as regards the nature of the body as animate, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Physics 8.4, 254b18; Aquinas, In Physic., bk. 8, lect. 7, n. 3.) Or there is no aptitude inclining to the contrary, as is the case in the motion of the celestial bodies, which are moved by a separated substance and yet are said to be moved “naturally,” as the Commentator says in On the Heavens 1. (Averroes, Commentary on On the Heavens and the Earth, bk. 1, text. 89.) In this latter way, the motion of Christ’s Ascension was natural, since, because the glorified body is wholly subject to the soul, there cannot be any inclination to the contrary of what the soul wills. Whence any inclination of heaviness or levity in it repugnant to the will is removed, just as the inclination of hot of cold toward mutual corruption.

However, some say that it was also a natural motion from the fact that the active principle was in the nature of his body, as happens in the motion of heavy and light things, for in a glorified body the nature of the empyrean heaven reigns, which body belongs to the composition of the human body. But this is impossible. For if something of the empyrean heaven were part of our body, it would have to be mixed with the elements—otherwise it would be distinct from them and would not be a part of [the body], as it would be one only by aggregation. Furthermore, if it were a part, it would not incline to motion in a straight line, but toward none at all. For it is of the nature of the empyrean heaven to move only with circular motion, which is natural to the fifth essence.

Reply Obj. 1: He was carried by the angels in deference to his dignity, not as a needing their help, the way kings and bishops are carried [by servants]. Whence it does not follow that it was a violent motion.

Reply Obj. 2: That motion is not natural to the body insofar as it is a body, but insofar as it is an instrument of a glorified soul, through which the inclination of the contrary qualities to their actions and motions was destroyed.

Reply Obj. 3: This is understood of bodies while they are in the state of generation and corruption, not of glorified bodies.

Reply Obj. 4: That place is foreign to flesh insofar as it is flesh, but not insofar as it is an instrument of the glorified soul.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that the opinion that is easier to sustain is that at the Ascension Christ’s body moved over a perceptible time by his own will, but it was able to move in an imperceptible time—though not in an instant. For in its Ascension Christ’s body must traverse what is in between, since through its substance it would have been determined to place, and it is impossible that it be in diverse places simultaneously. And thus, it was necessary that he be in diverse intermediate places in diverse instants, and thus that that motion had to be successive.

Reply Obj. 1: The likeness is being considered here in reference to its perceivability, not in reference to the genus of the motion. For the motion of rays is not a motion of alteration, as is said in On Sense and the Sensed. (Aristotle, On Sense and the Sensible 6, 446b27; Aquinas, Sent. De sensu, lect. 16, nn. 240–41.) This is why it can be sudden. However, the motion of glorified bodies is a local motion, and therefore it must be successive.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the body is subject to the spirit, nevertheless it cannot be that the body is converted into the nature of a spirit.

Reply Obj. 3: That argument follows for a power moving a thing out of a necessity of its nature, not for a power moving through will, which moves the mobile according to the requirements of the latter.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that the things done surrounding Christ were accomplished in dispensations for the sake of some benefit. And therefore to show the truth of his Resurrection it was necessary that he not ascend immediately after his Resurrection, but instead he conversed with the apostles for a period, so that every doubt might be destroyed by their extensive familiarity with him. For if he were to have appeared to them only once, it could have seemed to them that it was just an illusion, so instead he appeared to them many times during those forty days. The Ascension was delayed also for the consolation of the apostles, who were so grieved over his death; this is why the Gloss on Acts 1 says that just as there were forty hours of the death of Christ, so there were forty days in which he conversed with them after the Resurrection. (Glossa ordinaria, at Acts 1:3, 6.969 (PL 114:426).) For the divine consolation exceeds human grief.

Reply Obj. 1: It will not be necessary to prove the resurrection of the other saints, since it will be manifest to all. Therefore it is not necessary that it be deferred.

Reply Obj. 2: One can have a greater doubt about the Resurrection than about his death, and therefore it was necessary that the former be confirmed over a longer time.

Reply Obj. 3: In the interim the souls of the saints were with Christ, such that they rejoiced over his bodily presence—or they were in the earthly paradise, although that place is not properly the place of spirits, but they were there for a time as a dispensation.

Article 3

Whether Christ ascended above all the heavens

Quaestiuncula 1

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallels: above, q. 2, a. 1, resp. 2, ad 2; ST III.57.4; SCG IV.87.) It appears that Christ did not ascend above all the heavens.

Obj. 1: For Christ’s body is necessarily in a place. But according to the Philosopher in On the Heavens, (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.9, 279a9; Aquinas, De Caelo, bk. 1, lect. 21, n. 1.) there is no place outside all the heavens. Therefore he could not have ascended above all the heavens.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, two bodies cannot be in the same place. Therefore, since motion cannot go from one extreme to another without going through what is in between, it appears that he could ascend above all the heavens only if the heavens were divisible—which is impossible.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the empyrean heaven is the place of spirits. But of diverse bodies there are diverse places. Therefore neither Christ’s body nor any other other body ascended to the empyrean heaven, which is the last heaven.

On the contrary, he was exalted above the heavens (Heb 7:26), and moreover, he ascended on high (Eph 4:8), and a Gloss adds, in place and in dignity. (source)

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that he did not ascend to the right hand of the Father. (Parallels: ST III.58.1–3; Compendium theol., cc. 240, 246; In Symbolorum Apostolorum, a. 6; Super Eph. 1, lect. 7; Super Heb. 1, lect. 2, 6; 8, lect. 1; 10, lect. 1.) For right and left are differences of site or position. But God has no position, since he is most spiritual. Therefore he has no right or left.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Son is said to be metaphorically at the right of the Father, as the Psalter says, your hand shatters your enemies. (This may be a psalter by Gregory the Great; but see also Exod 16:6.) But this preposition “at” denotes distinction, since prepositions are transitive. Therefore, since the Son is not distinguished from himself, it appears that to sit at the right of the Father does not befit him.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Proverbs 3:15 says, long life is in her [Wisdom’s] right hand; in her left hand are riches and honor. But Christ has the fullness of all the goods of the Father. Therefore he should be no more said to be seated to the right than to the left.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, in John 1:18 he is said to be in the bosom of the Father. Therefore he is not on his right.

On the contrary, he sat down at the right hand of the Majesty on high (Heb 1:3).

Furthermore, in the Creed it is said, he ascended into heaven, and sits at the right hand of God the Father Almighty.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that it does not belong to Christ alone to sit at the right hand of the Father. (Parallel: ST III.58.4.) For according to Ephesians 2:6, he made us sit with him in the heavenly places in Christ Jesus. Therefore if Christ sits at the right hand, he also makes us sit at the right hand.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, [the Father] made him sit at his right hand (Eph 1:20), and the Gloss says, that is, in eternal beatitude. (Glossa ordinaria, at Ephesians 1:20, 6.532 (PL 114:590).) But eternal beatitude is communicated to all the saints. Therefore it befits all the saints to sit at his right hand, not only to Christ.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it befits the Blessed Virgin, who has been exalted over all the choirs of the angels, to be more powerful in the gifts of God; whence also she is even said to stand at the right hand: at your right hand stands the queen (Ps 45:9). Therefore not to Christ alone does it belong to sit at the right hand.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the right hand of the Father is equality with the Father. But the Holy Spirit is as equal to the Father as the Son is. Therefore it belongs to him to sit at the right hand.

On the contrary, to sit on the right belongs to Christ in virtue of his human and divine natures. But in no one else is there found a divine and a human nature together. Therefore to no one else does it belong the way it does to Christ.

Furthermore, equality is in the Son by appropriation, as Augustine says. (Augustine, De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 74 (CCSL 44A; PL 40:85).) But the right hand imports equality. Therefore it appears that to sit on the right belongs to the Son alone.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that the terminus of Christ’s Ascension is both a place and a dignity, though not a dignity that he at that time newly acquired, but one that he at that time made known. Now, insofar as the terminus is a place, thereby he is exalted up to the highest of bodily places. This does not mean that he could not depart from there; rather, the most elevated place is owed to him as befitting him, wherever he might be, but he was actually exalted then to that [place] owed to him in congruence.

Reply Obj. 1: He is not said to have ascended above the heavens because he is beyond the empyrean heaven, but because he ascended into the most elevated part of the empyrean heaven.

Reply Obj. 2: Although it is of the nature of body that it cannot be in the same place as any other body, nevertheless God is able to do this by way of miracle, just as he made Christ’s body go forth from the womb of the Virgin, as Gregory says. (Gregory the Great, Homiliae in evangelia, bk. 2, hom. 26, para. 1 (CCSL 141:218; PL 76:1197).)

Reply Obj. 3: Although a bodily nature is beneath the nature of spirit, still the nature of Christ’s body transcends all spirits insofar as it is united to the divinity, which is a greater and more dignified union than that which arises through fruition. And therefore the higher place is owed to Christ’s body than is owed even to created spirits. This is why the Gloss on Hebrews 7:26, exalted above the heavens, says, that is, above every rational creature. (source)

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that the right side is the nobler part of the body, so one who sits to the right of another is joined to him in a nobler way. Now, the noblest way that someone can be joined to the Father is either noblest simply speaking—and thus he is equal to him, and this belongs to the Son in virtue of his divine nature—or it is the noblest that is possible for a created thing—and this is to be joined to him in the union of the person of his Son, and thus to sit at the right hand belongs to Christ in virtue of his human nature. For the “sitting” signifies the firmness of this union.

Reply Obj. 1: This is not “being to the right” said properly, but metaphorically.

Reply Obj. 2: It is not unfitting that the Son be spoken of as “on his right” and as “sitting on his right” in virtue of diverse likenesses. For each is said metaphorically. For he is said to be “on his right” insofar as the Father works through him, and he is said to “sit on his right” for the reason already stated.

Reply Obj. 3: Although both the Father’s greater and lesser goods belong to Christ, nonetheless he is placed among the greater ones, and therefore he is said to sit on his right.

Reply Obj. 4: Insofar as he goes forth from the Father through generation, Christ is said to “sit in the Father’s bosom,” by which is signified [the Father’s] generative power. But insofar as he is equal to the Father, and reigns with him, he is said to “sit at his right hand.”

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that being equal to the Father belongs to nothing created, and neither does being joined to his Son in the unity of the person, in virtue of which Christ is said to “sit at the right hand.” And therefore this belongs to nothing created.

Reply Obj. 1: [The Father] causes us to sit together with him insofar as he has made us stable in glory and has given us judicial power, but he does not make us sit at his right hand. Or it should be said that he makes us sit together with him even at his right hand, but he does not do so in ourselves, but in Christ, inasmuch as he is of one nature with us, which nature—insofar as it is in Christ—he has placed at the right hand of the Father.

Reply Obj. 2: Not just any beatitude can be said to be “at his right hand” simply speaking, but only one that is owed to the assumed nature. Or if all beatitude can be said to be “at his right hand,” this will not be in virtue of the most excellent way possible for something created, but what is possible for something created that is not united [to the divine person]. And this is [being at the right hand] only in a certain respect.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the Blessed Virgin has been exalted above the angels, nonetheless she has not been exalted all the way to equality with God or union in person. And therefore she is not said to “sit at the right,” but to “stand to the right,” insofar as the honor of the Son overflows to her in a way by participation, not fully, insofar she is said to be the Mother of God, but not God.

Reply Obj. 4: The Holy Spirit can be said to “sit at the right hand of the Father,” insofar as he is truly equal to the Father. But this equality is not appropriated to him but to the Son, and therefore neither is sitting on the right hand.

Exposition of the text

The mystery of faith is free from philosophical arguments, (Sent. III, 22.1(70).3.) because they can neither be proved or disproved by them.

Perhaps he was a man in this way too before his death, and then again after the Resurrection. (Sent. III, 22.1(70).3.) He says this on account of the third opinion, which had not yet been condemned in his time, which said that even before his death he was a man in this way.

Because it was by one and the same union, (Sent. III, 22.2(71).2) on the side of the one assuming, not on the side of the things assumed.

To which we say. (Sent III, 22.2(71).3.) He says this not because the statements made above should be simply conceded, but so that he might show the reason for the truth that they have.

No one ascended to heaven, unless he who descended from heaven. (Sent. III, 22.4(73).2, quoting John 3:13.) Therefore other men do not ascend into heaven. It should be said to this that others do not climb to heaven by their own power, which is what ascending is. Or it is speaking of the heaven of the Holy Trinity, to which he ascended by reason of his divine nature. Or it should be said that it is speaking in virtue of the fact that the head and his members are one person.

Let these things about the binding of the Lord’s shoe suffice, lest 'the bones of the king of Idumea' be consumed 'even unto ashes.' (Sent. III, 22.4(73).3, quoting Amos 2:1.) The “shoe” is the humanity touching the “foot,” that is, the Word, by which all things are, as it were, supported, as in Hebrews 2:8. The “binding” itself is the union. The “king of Idumea” is Christ, who shares in flesh and blood, as in Hebrews 2:14. For “Idumea” is understood to mean blood. His “bones” are the more powerful and difficult to understand aspects of the mysteries of his humanity, the least elements of which should not be looked into with the fire of a curious study, but rather should be honored with silence, as exceeding our understanding. This is how Amos 2:1 should be taken.