D. 15 - Defects assumed with human nature of Christ

Division of the text

After the Master has considered the things that Christ assumed with his human nature pertaining to its dignity, here he considers the things that he assumed pertaining to its defect. This is divided into two parts:

first, he considers the defects that Christ assumed with his human nature;

second, he considers the mode in which defects of this sort were in Christ, in Distinction 16, at here arises a question which draws its origin from the foregoing. (Sentences III, 16.1(45).1.)

The first is divided into two:

first, he considers the truth;

second, he excludes an error, at a few are found to have thought wrongly concerning sensation in the suffering of the humanity of Christ . . . Let us remove all doubt from what we said above. (Sent. III, 15.1(41).9.)

The first of these is also divided into two:

first, he shows what defects Christ assumed with his human nature;

second, he shows what was the cause of this assumption, at and he took on these defects not by the necessity of his condition, but by the will of his compassion. (Sent. III, 15.1(41).8.)

Again, the first is divided into two parts:

first, he shows that Christ received the penal defects in our nature, not the defects of fault;

second, he shows which of the penal defects he did not assume, at authority hands on that 'our Lord assumed in himself all that pertained to our infirmity, apart from sin.' (Sent. III, 15.1(41).4.)

Regarding the latter, he does two things:

first, he shows which penal defects on the side of the soul he did not take on;

second, he shows which bodily defects he did not take on, at for there are several kinds of illnesses and defects of the body from which he was entirely free. (Sent. III, 15.1(41).7.)

Regarding the first, he does two things:

first, he shows that Christ did not take on ignorance or any difficulty in doing the good;

second, he shows that these things are not a fault, but a penalty, at but perhaps someone will say that these are sin. (Sent. III, 15.1(41).6.)

A few are found to have thought wrongly concerning sensation in the suffering of the humanity of Christ . . . Let us remove all doubt from what we said above. (Sent. III, 15.1(41).9.) Here he is excluding an error, and he is doing two things:

first, he objects against those in error;

second, he resolves the things that they bring forth in favor of their error, at but some statements are found in the treatises of the saints which appear to oppose the foregoing. (Sent. III, 15.1(41).13.)

And the latter is divided into two:

first, he resolves objections about the passions, which they said belonged to the soul alone, such as grief and things of this sort;

second, he resolves those that belong to the soul through the body, such as sensible pain, at and yet some words of Hilary appear to be more troublesome and to pose a more difficult question. (Sent. III, 15.3(43).1.)

Regarding the first, he does three things:

first, he lays out the objection;

second, he resolves it, at but lest it be thought that there is any irreconcilable contradiction in the sacred texts, we say that the words of these authorities are to be taken in the following way; (Sent. III, 15.2(42).1.)

and third, he confirms this resolution, at: hence Augustine, wishing to interpret some statements in accordance with these reasons, asserts. (Sent. III, 15.2(42).4.)

And yet some words of Hilary appear to be more troublesome. (Sent. III, 15.3(43).1.) This part is also divided into two:

first, he lays out the objection;

second, he resolves it, at but set aside all opinionated and impious obtuseness. If you note with diligence what was written, you will then be able to understand as best as you can the reason and power. (Sent. III, 15.3(43).5.)

There are two questions here:

the first about these defects in general, (Q. 1.)

the second specifically about the passions of the soul. (Q. 2.)

Question 1

The defects in general

Regarding the first, three things are asked:

first, whether Christ ought to have assumed a human nature with infirmities of this sort;

second, whether he ought to have taken on all our defects;

third, whether these defects he assumed, he contracted.

Article 1

Whether Christ ought to have received a human nature with defects and infirmities

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallels: ST III.14.1; SCG IV.54, 55; Compendium theol., ch. 226.) It appears that Christ ought not to have taken on a human nature with infirmities and defects of this sort.

Obj. 1: For through his Incarnation Christ fulfilled the promises of the patriarchs. For Isaiah 51:9 expresses the desire of the holy patriarchs: awake, awake, put on strength, O arm of the Lord. Therefore he should not have come invested with the infirmity of the flesh.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, defects of this sort are punishments. But a punishment is just only where there is guilt. Therefore if he was without any guilt, it appears that he should not take on punitive defects.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, contrary things cure contrary things. But Christ came to cure our infirmities. Therefore he should assume their contraries, namely, vigor and strength.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, he came to conquer the devil. But conquest is a work of strength. Therefore he should not have assumed infirmity.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, just as fault diminishes justice, so infirmity diminishes power. But Christ should not assume the defect of guilt, lest he diminish divine justice. Therefore likewise neither should he take on punitive infirmities, lest it diminish divine strength.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, he came for the sake of leading men to divine knowledge. But through infirmities he rather led us away from knowledge of him, as it says in Isaiah 53:2: he had no form or comeliness that we should look at him, and it follows, we esteemed him not. Therefore he should not have assumed infirmities of this sort.

On the contrary, Hebrews 2:18 says: because he himself has suffered and been tempted, he is able to help those who are tempted. But Christ came to help mankind. Therefore he should have taken on these defects.

Furthermore, Christ came to redeem the human race. But he could fittingly complete the work of redemption only through suffering, as will be explained later. (Below, d. 16, q. 1, a. 1.) Therefore he needed to assume defects in virtue of which he would be able to suffer.

Furthermore, Christ came for the sake of being a mediator between us and God. Therefore he should have something in common with both. But in common with God he has justice. Therefore in common with us he should have our punishment.

I answer that Christ came for this: that he might lead the human race back to God, from whom it was led away through sin. And therefore as a mediator, he carries across to us the things that are of God, namely grace and justice, and to God in a way those things that are ours. However, the latter are not those things that are from us alone, and not from God, namely sins—for through these things we are not ordered to God, but rather are ordered away from him—but the things that are in us from God, all of which are in themselves ordered and order us to him. And therefore the things that God made in us, he carries across to God—not into the divine nature, but into the divine person assuming them. However, God made the nature in us, and the nature’s perfections, and its punitive defects, and even certain natural properties, like the need for food, that man had even in the state of innocence. And therefore in his person he took on these defects together with the nature, for in taking these within his person, he presents them to God again to please him on our behalf.

Reply Obj. 1: The desire of the holy fathers was that he would come in spiritual strength—namely, that of grace and knowledge and power—which is not impeded by the defects that Christ assumed.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the fault did not come first in him, still it did come first in human nature, which is what he came to reconcile to God. And therefore insofar as he is considered as bearing the role of the entire nature in making satisfaction for it, whatever pertaining to a defect in human nature has the notion of a just punishment, and he has this in himself.

Reply Obj. 3: Infirmity is cured best through a cure of its cause, and consequently through things contrary to the cause. However, the cause of these defects in us is our fault, and therefore he should cure these defects through things contrary to fault—namely, through grace and the virtues.

Reply Obj. 4: He came to conquer the strong through justice, by making satisfaction, and therefore he needed to have the defects in virtue of which he could make satisfaction. And furthermore, the devil is not conquered through a strength contrary to these defects, but through the strength of virtue and grace.

Reply Obj. 5: Fault is repugnant to God not only because it does not occur in him, but also because it separates one from him, for it is the perversion of the will, in virtue of which the soul is naturally apt to be joined to God. But although infirmity does not occur in God, yet it does not separate from God. So the reasoning is not similar.

Reply Obj. 6: Christ did not come to manifest himself according to his human nature, but according to his divine. This is why he says, yet I do not seek my own glory, but that of he who sent me (John 8:50). (The last clause of the quote is not accurate; John 8:50 continues “there is One who seeks it and he will be the judge.”) However, he made God’s glory more transparent through the assumed infirmity, insofar as the weakness of God is more powerful than men (1 Cor 1:25).

Article 2

Whether he should have received all defects other than sin

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallels: below, d. 22, q. 2, a. 1, resp. 1; ST III.14.4; Compendium theol., cc. 226, 231.) It appears that Christ should not have assumed all the defects other than sin.

Obj. 1: For in Hebrews 2:17 it says that he had to be made like his brethren in every respect, so that he might become a merciful and faithful high priest. But mercy looks to every misery. Therefore he ought to have assumed all our defects.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, as Damascene says, (John Damscene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 6 (PG 94:1006).) what cannot be assumed cannot be cured. But he came to cure all our defects, so he ought to have taken on all of them.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Christ’s humility is manifested in taking on our defects. But he is humbled to the extent in which he could be humbled, as Bernard says. (Bernard, Sermones de diversis, serm. 60 (PL 183:683).) Therefore he should have taken on all our defects.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, all our defects are equally unseemly for God’s majesty. Therefore if he took on certain ones, then for the same reason he should have taken on all of them.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, he cured our nature through the grace and infirmity that he received. But he received every grace. Therefore he ought to have taken on every defect.

On the contrary, Christ, who came to cure the whole of human nature, ought to have an integral human nature. But there are certain defects that are repugnant to the integrity of the nature, such as blindness and any lack of members. Therefore he should not have all our defects.

Furthermore, Christ should have been perfect in grace. But some defects are repugnant to the perfection of grace, such as ignorance and difficulty in doing the good. Therefore he should not have all defects.

Furthermore, contraries are not naturally apt to come to exist in the same thing. But some infirmities are contrary to each other because they are caused by contrary causes. Therefore he could not have all our infirmities.

I answer that, as Damascene says, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 20 (PL 94:1082).) Christ had in himself all natural passions and those insusceptible to detraction. Now, those passions are called “natural” that universally follow on human nature, whether from the constitution of the nature, such as the need of food and drink, or ones that, due to the sin of the first parents, came upon the whole nature, caused by the principles of the nature left to itself, such as hunger, thirst, labor, pain, and the like. However, passions insusceptible to detraction are the ones that do not indicate any lack of grace, such as those that indicate a propensity to evil, and a difficulty in doing the good, and things of this sort that arise from a lack of grace or perfection. For the praise of Christ would be diminished if he were not perfect in the virtues, in reference to which praise is given, whereas scorn or detraction are given in reference to their opposites.

Whence he did not assume two kinds of defect: namely, those that do not universally follow on human nature, such as leprosy, blindness, fever, and the like, since they arise from particular corruptions in individual persons, and he should not have assumed these defects, since he came to cure the sickness of our nature—and further, he did not assume those that pertain to an imperfection of grace, such as ignorance, difficulty in doing the good, and the like, since he came so that we would receive all things from the fullness of his own grace.

Reply Obj. 1: He ought to have become like his brothers with respect to those things in which all his brothers are alike, which do not pertain to a lack of grace. For he was like his brothers only in the nature of the species, and therefore he should have become like his brothers with respect to the acts and defects that follow on the whole species.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as God cured all men in that he assumed the nature that all men share, so too he cured all their defects in that he assumed those defects that all men share, the ones from which as though from primordial causes the others arise. For from the ability of the nature to suffer, which he assumed, follows fevers and all the others of this sort.

Reply Obj 3: He ought to be humbled as far as he could be in a seemly way. Now, it was not seemly that he who came to lead others into grace would suffer a defect or imperfection of grace, nor that he who came to reintegrate the nature in others would himself suffer a defect in those things in which others are integral.

Reply Obj. 4: Although all defects are equally unseemly to the divine majesty, with respect to his own nature, nonetheless this is not so with respect to the nature he assumed, as is clear from the things said.

Reply Obj. 5: Some defects are repugnant to the fullness of grace, and therefore because he had every grace one should rather conclude that he did not have all the defects that he in fact had. Or it should be said that, because he came to reintegrate others, he should have been more powerful than others in perfections, not in defects, since it is more unfitting that he be reformed than that he reform others. And therefore he had every grace, yet not every defect.

Article 3

Whether he took on defects of this sort, or contracted them

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallels: below, d. 21, q. 1, a. 2; ST III.14.3; Compendium theol., ch. 226.) It appears that he contracted defects of this sort.

Obj. 1: For what properly is “con-tracted” is “drawn-with” another. But he drew these defects along with the nature. Therefore he contracted them.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, what is had by reason of one’s origin is properly contracted. But Christ had these defects by reason of his origin, since by reason of his origin he is naturally like his mother, who was subject to these defects. Therefore he contracted these defects.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, what is caused by the principles of the nature is contracted with the nature. But defects of this sort, such as hunger, thirst, and the like, are caused by the principles of the nature, since they are caused by the acts of contraries on each other, from which a man is naturally constituted. Therefore he contracted these defects.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the word “contracting,” as we are using it now, it appears to import transmission. But Christ had defects of this sort through a transmission from body to body, not from a condition of the soul. Therefore Christ contracted these defects.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, just as original sin is contracted from the father, so also are such punishments contracted from the mother, as was said in Book II. (In II Sent., d. 31, q. 1, a. 1; d. 33, q. 1, a. 1.) But because of his mother Christ was able to suffer, even though his Father was not a sinner. Therefore he contracted punishments of this sort.

On the contrary, what is assumed voluntarily is not contracted. But Christ voluntarily assumed these defects, just as he did the nature itself. Therefore he did not contract them.

Furthermore, we are said to “contract” these defects because they are owed to us on account of original sin. But there was no original sin in Christ. Therefore Christ did not contract these defects.

I answer that what is necessarily drawn when something else is drawn is properly said to be “contracted.” And because on account of the very fact that we draw our human nature from our parents through a wounded origin, it follows necessarily that we have these defects, and therefore we are said to “contract” these defects. Now, Christ was able to assume human nature without these defects, just as he assumed it with defects. And therefore they were not in him from the very fact that he drew a human nature from parents; rather, just as he voluntarily assumed a human nature, so also he assumed these defects; and on account of this he is said to have “assumed” these defects, not to have “contracted” them.

Reply Obj. 1: The conjunction “with” (con) indicates not merely a simultaneity in time when something is said to be “contracted,” but an order of necessary consequence of one thing on another.

Reply Obj. 2: What is generated as such becomes like what actively generates it, since an agent makes its patient like itself. Now, that one is sometimes born like his mother, from whom he is materially begotten, arises from a defect in an active power that cannot draw the matter into a likeness of it. Whence the motions of the matter overcome and make the offspring like the mother. But it was necessary that Christ become like his mother in neither of these ways, both because his mother was not the agent in the generation, but only provided the matter, and because there was no defect on the side of the agent’s power, namely that of the Holy Spirit. Therefore the fact that he became like his mother in these defects was only on account of his will.

Reply Obj. 3: Defects of this sort were caused by the principles of the nature left to itself—that is, deprived of the gift of grace that was given to the nature in its first constitution, as was said in Book II. (In II Sent., d. 29, 30.) But Christ was able to receive human nature with that perfection that human nature had gratuitously received in its constitution. Therefore he did not contract them of necessity, but assumed them voluntarily.

Reply Obj. 4: The word “contracting” brings in not merely a transmission, but a necessary order to the other thing drawn, as was said.

Reply Obj. 5: This contains truth in those who are born according to the law of nature, but Christ was not born from the Virgin in this way, but supernaturally. And therefore the argument does not follow.

Question 2

The assumed passions

Next, one asks about the sufferings that he assumed on the side of the soul. And regarding this three things are asked:

first, whether Christ’s soul was able to suffer, and to what does suffering belong, properly speaking;

second, about the animal sufferings that follow upon the interior apprehension, such as grief and the like;

third, about the sufferings relative to bodily senses, as is pain.

Article 1

Whether his body was able to suffer

Quaestiuncula 1

To the first we proceed as follows. It appears that every body can suffer.

Obj. 1: For everything that moves suffers, since suffering is motion in what moves, as is said in the Physics 3. (Aristotle, Physics 3.3, 202b21; Aquinas, In Physic., bk. 3, lect. 5, n. 13.) But every body moves. Therefore every body suffers.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, everything that receives suffers, since “suffering” (pati) is said from “bearing” (patim), which is a receiving. But heavenly bodies receive something, namely, illumination. Therefore they suffer, and therefore much more do things that are beneath them.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, everything that is more powerful is naturally apt to act on what is less powerful. But there is something more powerful than every body and than every created substance. Therefore suffering belongs to every created thing.

On the contrary, everything that can suffer is corruptible, since suffering made greater makes a thing lose its substance, as is said in the Topics 6. (Aristotle, Topics 6.6, 145a3–4.) But not every body is corruptible. Therefore not every body can suffer.

Furthermore, as is said in On Generation and Corruption 1, (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1. 7, 324a3‒20; Aquinas, In de generatione et corruptione, bk. 1, lect. 19, n. 6.) every agent is contrary to its patient. But not every body has a contrary. Therefore also not every body suffers.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it is asked whether the soul is able to suffer. (Parallels: In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 3, a. 1, resp. 2, ad 1; ST I.20.1.ad 1; I-II.22.1–3; De veritate, q. 26, aa. 1–3; In De divinis nominibus, ch. 2, lect. 4; Sent. Ethic. II, lect. 5.) And it appears that it is not. Just as acting belongs also to form, so does suffering belong to matter. But the soul is not composed from matter, as was said in Book I. (In I Sent., d. 8, q. 5, a. 2.) Therefore it cannot suffer. If it is said that it suffers accidentally, on the suffering of the body, then

on the contrary: the terminus of suffering is corruption. But the soul is not corrupted with the corruption of the body. Therefore neither does it suffer when the body suffers.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the soul moves locally incidentally, on the motion of the body, because it is in the body’s place incidentally. But in no way does it have a bodily quality, either essentially or incidentally. Therefore in no way is it altered when the body is altered incidentally. But “suffering” is properly said in a motion of alteration, as was said. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.4, 319b6‒12.) Therefore the soul does not suffer incidentally upon the suffering of the body.

On the contrary (3), on the motion of the whole the part moves incidentally. But the soul is a part of the whole composite, which suffers. Therefore it too in some way suffers.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that Christ’s soul was not able to suffer. (Parallels: In III Sent., d. 33, exposition of the text; ST III.15.4; De veritate, q. 26, a. 8; Compendium theol., ch. 232; Super Ioan. 12, lect. 5; 13, lect. 4.) For nothing is of greater dignity than Christ’s soul. But an agent is of greater dignity than a patient, according to Augustine. (Augustine, Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 12, para. 16 (CSEL 28.1:402; PL 34:467).) Therefore Christ’s soul was unable to suffer.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, virtue renders the soul at rest from the tumults of the passions, and to the degree that a virtue is more perfect, so much less do the passions dominate the soul. But in Christ there was perfect virtue. Therefore in no way was there any suffering in his soul.

Obj. 3: The inability to suffer is of the notion of beatitude. This is why it is placed among the dowries given the [glorified] body. But Christ’s soul was blessed. Therefore it was not able to suffer.

On the contrary, John Damascene says (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 26 (PG 94:1094).) that when the body is cut, the soul suffers with, and is pained with it, and this is because it is united to a body that can suffer. But Christ’s soul is joined to a body that can suffer. Therefore his soul was able to suffer, sicne nothing that cannot suffer suffers with another.

Furthermore, Christ assumed the defects in our nature that follow upon the whole nature that do not import any imperfection of grace. But the soul’s ability to suffer is of this sort. Therefore Christ assumed a soul that can suffer.

Furthermore, Christ came to cure in us the soul’s defects more than the body’s defects. But he took on a nature that can suffer so that he might acquire for us an inability to suffer. Therefore he should have assumed a soul that can suffer, so that thereby we would receive an inability to suffer in our soul.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that, when Damascene says (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 22 (PG 94:941).) that suffering is the motion from one thing into another, not every motion is a suffering, but only alteration, properly speaking, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.4, 319b10‒20; Aquinas, De generatione, bk. 1, lect. 10, nn. 2‒5.) For in this motion alone is something expelled from a thing and something impressed on it, which is of the notion of suffering. For local motion is with respect to what is outside a thing, its place, and the motion of growth is with respect to what already exists being augmented by something, namely food, into a greater quantity. Now, for there to be an alteration it is required that there be something subsisting through itself, for otherwise there could not be something subject to the motion, and that it be a body, since only such moves, as is proved in the Physics 6, (Aristotle, Physics 6.4, 234b10; 8.5, 257b1; Aquinas, In Physic., bk. 6, lect. 5, n. 10; bk. 8, lect. 10, n. 2.) and further, that it have a nature subject to contrariety, since alteration is a motion between contrary qualities. And on the side of the termini of the alteration, it is required that one quality be expelled and another be introduced, for thereby it goes from quality to quality.

But further, the notion of suffering requires that the quality introduced be foreign, and the expelled be connatural. This occurs because “suffering” imports a certain conquest of the agent over the patient, but everything that is conquered is, as it were, drawn out of its proper boundaries and into foreign boundaries. Therefore alterations that occur outside the nature of the thing altered are more properly called “sufferings,” such as becoming ill rather than healing, as is clear from Damascene (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 22 (PG 94:941).) and the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.21, 1022b15; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 5, lect. 20, n. 1067.) Whence it is clear that suffering, properly, is something only of those bodies that can be drawn out of their own nature, and these are corruptible.

Reply Obj. 1: Not every moving is a suffering, unless it be taken commonly and expansively, as even all moving is a certain way of being corrupted, according to Augustine and the Philosopher in the Physics 8. (Aristotle, Physics 8.1, 252a1‒20; Aquinas, In Physic., bk. 8, lect. 2, n. 15.)

Reply Obj. 2: In illumination no quality is expelled, but one is only received. And therefore this is not a suffering.

Reply Obj. 3: God, who is superior to every created substance, influences things for the perfection of their nature. And therefore insofar as they receive from him, they are not properly said to “suffer,” nor do they suffer insofar as bodily things receive from certain spiritual things.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that, from the things said, it readily becomes apparent how there can be suffering within the soul. For because the soul is something incorporeal, suffering does not properly happen to it except insofar as it is applied to the body. Now, it is applied to the body in virtue of its own essence, insofar as it is a bodily form, and according to the activity of its own powers, inasmuch as it is its mover. However, insofar as it is applied to the body as its form, it is not considered as something subsisting, but as something befalling another; whence, in this way it does not suffer essentially, but incidentally, just as other forms move with the composite subjects moving. However, in the soul’s powers, with respect to activity, only the powers of the sensitive and nutritive parts are applied to the body. But because the activity of the powers of the nutritive part is in moving something, not in being moved, therefore the soul does not suffer with respect to them, but rather acts.

Therefore what remains is that suffering is properly of the soul with respect to its sensitive part, as is said in the Physics 7. (Aristotle, Physics 7.3, 284a6‒10; Aquinas, In Physic., bk. 7, lect. 6, n. 7.) But since powers of this sort are not subsistent, but are forms of bodily organs, therefore they are not said to suffer essentially, nor does the soul with reference to them, but incidentally, insofar as the composite suffers, as is said in On the Soul 1. (Aristotle, On the Soul 1.4, 408a30‒b5; Aquinas, Sent. De anima, bk. 1, lect. 9, n. 547.) But because the sensitive powers are apprehensive only in the receiving of the [sensible] species, which is not received in the sense through the mode of the thing [itself], but through the mode of an intention, therefore in the activity of these powers there is indeed, in a certain way, a suffering—insofar as they are material powers, and insofar as something is received; and on account of this it is said in On the Soul 2, (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.11, 424a1; Aquinas, Sent. De anima, bk. 2, lect. 23, n. 547.) that sensing is a certain suffering. But a sense is not moved by the sensible in virtue of the condition of the thing moving is, since the sensible form is not received in the sense according to a material existence, as it is in the sensible, but according to a spiritual existence that is proper to the sense; this is why it does not hold a contrariety relative to the sense, but rather is its perfection, except inasmuch as it exceeds the proportion of the sense. Therefore it is not properly called “suffering,” except inasmuch as the excess of the sensibles corrupts or weakens the sense.

Therefore what remains is that “suffering” properly is said with reference to the appetitive sensitive powers, since these powers are both material and are moved by things according to what is proper to the thing. For the appetite is not for the intention but for the thing itself. And in virtue of this a thing has a fitness for the soul or a contrariety to it, and therefore the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.5, 1105b23; Aquinas, Sent. Ethic. bk. 2, lect. 5.) that suffering is what follows delight or grief, and Remigius says (This is not found in Remigius; however, in ST I-II.22.3 it is attributed to John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 22 (PG 94:939).) that suffering is a motion of the soul through a reception of the good or evil. But because delight happens in virtue of the joining of what is fitting and connatural, therefore still more properly are those sensitive affections called “sufferings” that grief follows upon, or even those that those that are felt with vehemence, whether of delight or of grief, as the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics 5. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.21, 1022b20; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 5, lect. 20, n. 1067.) For thus the soul is drawn outside its natural mode. And this is how we mean “sufferings” here.

But in the powers of the intellectual part—although there is no suffering properly, since they are immaterial—there is still something of the notion of suffering there. For in the apprehension of the created intellect there is a receiving, and according to this it is said in On the Soul 3 (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 429a13‒15; Aquinas, Sent. De anima, bk. 3, lect. 7, nn. 675‒76.) that understanding is a certain way of suffering. Now, in the intellectual appetite there is still more of the notion of suffering, since the will is moved by a thing insofar as it is good or evil, which are conditions of the thing. However, the intellect is moved according to the apprehension of the true or false, which do not belong to the thing through itself, but insofar as they are in the soul. For good and evil are in things, but true and false are in the soul, as is said in the Metaphysics 6. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 6.4, 1027b25‒27; Aquinas, In Metaph., bk. 6, lect. 4, nn. 1230‒40.)

Whence the soul receives from a thing more so in virtue of affect, and is moved more vehemently, than it receives or is moved in virtue of intellect; as Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 2, n. 9 (PG 3:647).) by suffering Hierotheus learned divine things, that is, he comes to understanding from affect about divine things. And since the affect is moved by the thing according to a property of the things, which the thing has in its very self, therefore it happens in this way that a thing has a contrariety or fitness to the soul. But insofar as it is apprehended by the intellect, everything has a fitness [to it], insofar as it is apprehended as true. And therefore in the activity of an apprehensive power there is always delight, whereas in the activity of an affective power there is delight and grief. And so too grief is still more properly called a “suffering,” as was said of a sensible affect. And “suffering” is being taken here in a similar way.

However, we will speak of the suffering of the soul insofar as it suffers hell fire in Book IV; (In IV Sent., d. 50, q. 2, a. 3.) for in this way the soul suffers through itself.

Reply Obj. 1: That argument follows for suffering when it is said properly, and it concludes that the soul in this mode of suffering does not suffer essentially but incidentally.

Reply Obj. 2: Although by the corruption of bodies the soul is not corrupted simply, with regard to its substance, still the composition, in virtue of which it is the form of the body in act, is corrupted. And so are the powers affixed to organs, as some say.

Reply Sed Contra 3: The soul is said to be in place incidentally, insofar as it is part of a composite, which is in place essentially. And thus it moves in place incidentally, and so also health, which is something of the composite, is incidentally something of the soul, insofar as it is part of the former. And so also it suffers incidentally at the suffering of the body.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that Christ’s soul was a mean between the divinity and the flesh. And because due to the divinity beatitude was within that soul, but his body was able to suffer, therefore the ability to suffer was present in that soul on the part of its ability to be joined to the body, but the beatitude was in it on the parts of its being joined to the divinity. Now, it was joined to the body in two ways: namely, in virtue of its essence, insofar as it is a form, and in virtue of its powers, yet not all of them, but only some. This is why Christ’s whole soul, in virtue of its essence, suffered from suffering of the body’s wounds, but with respect to its powers it suffered by the suffering of imperfection, in virtue of the activities of the powers affixed to organs; how it suffered with respect to the other powers, by which the soul was turned to God, will be addressed below. (See below, a. 3.)

Reply Obj. 1: Although there is nothing of greater dignity than Christ’s soul, still this does not prevent it from being able to suffer incidentally when something else is suffering.

Reply Obj. 2: Perfect virtue does not wholly destroy the passions, since it even sometimes uses them, as fortitude uses anger, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.8, 1116b30–31; Aquinas, Sent. Ethic., bk. 3, lect. 17.) But virtue makes it that no passion in it that impedes reason surges up. However, in Christ this was more fully so, for because the obedience of the lower powers with respect to the superior ones was perfect, therefore no passion surged up in him except from an order of reason.

Reply Obj. 3: Christ’s soul had both states—that of a wayfarer and that of a comprehensor. This is why he was blessed in one respect and in another he was not blessed. For on the side of the fact the soul is naturally apt to be joined to the body, he was not beatified, otherwise the brilliance of glory would have descended from the soul into his body, as was the case in others who have been glorified. And therefore on that side, he was able to suffer, and he had the state of a wayfarer. But on the side of the fact that he was joined to the Word through fruition, he was glorified, and had the state of a comprehensor.

Article 2

Whether Christ had grief

Quaestiuncula 1

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallels: below, exposition of the text; ST III.15.6; De veritate, q. 26, a. 8; Compendium theol., ch. 232; Super Matth. 26.) It appears that Christ did not have grief.

Obj. 1: For it is said in Isaiah 42:4 that he will not be sad (The RSV has “he will not fail.”) or be discouraged.

Obj. 2: Every grief is a certain disturbance. But disturbance is not found in wisdom. Therefore neither was there grief in Christ, who was the wisest man. Seneca proves the second premise in three ways. (Seneca, Epistolae, epist. 85.)

First, as follows: the stronger is not disturbed by the weaker, but virtue is stronger than malice; therefore it is not disturbed by it, nor by a virtue, since one virtue is not contrary to another; therefore it is not disturbed by it in any way.

The second is as follows: one is disturbed only by his good being lost or diminished; but the wise man does not lose his good, nor can he lose the goods of his soul, since the goods of his body he does not consider his own; therefore he is not disturbed.

Third, as follows: fortune takes away only what it has given, but it did not give virtue, so it cannot take it away; thus, the same as before follows.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the Philosopher says that the same thing should be chosen without grief rather than with grief. (Aristotle, Topics 3.1, 117a24.) But Christ, because he was the wisest man, knew how to choose best. Therefore he did not choose to suffer with grief.

On the contrary, my soul is very sorrowful, even to death (Matt 26:38).

Furthermore, weeping is a sign of grief. But Christ wept, according to John 11:35. Therefore he was grieved.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that there was no anger in Christ. (Parallels: ST III.115.9; Compendium theol., ch. 232.) For anger is a vice. But in Christ there was no vice, but the greatest gentleness: learn from me; for I am gentle and lowly in heart (Matt 11:29). Therefore there was no anger in Christ.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, as Gregory says, (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob, bk. 5, para. 45 (CCSL 143; PL 75:726).) the anger of vice blinds the mind’s eye and the anger of zeal disturbs it. But in Christ the mind’s eye was neither blinded nor disturbed. Therefore in Christ there was no anger.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher (Aristotle, Rhetoric 2.2, 1378a31.) and Damascene, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 16 (PG 94:931).) anger is an appetite for vengeance. But Christ did not do anything for vengeance. Therefore there was no anger in Christ.

On the contrary, in Christ there was the anger of zeal, as is clear in John 2:15–17. Therefore there was anger in him.

Furthermore, no virtue was absent in Christ, nor any perfection of virtue. But anger belongs to the perfection of certain virtues, such as fortitude, as is said in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.8, 1116b30–31; Aquinas, Sent. Ethic., bk. 3, lect. 17.) Therefore there was anger in Christ.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that there was no fear in Christ. (Parallels: below, exposition of the text; ST III.15.7; De veritate, q. 26, a. 8; Compendium theol., ch. 232.) For fear is opposed most of all to fortitude. But there was the most perfect fortitude in Christ. Therefore there was no fear in him.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Augustine says (Augustine, De diuersis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q. 36 (CCSL 44A; PL 40:25).) that a sign of perfection is to be without fear. But Christ was the most perfect man. Therefore there was no passion of fear in him.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, one might say that fear was in him in virtue of his senses.

On the contrary, fear is about a future evil. But the sensitive powers in Christ could not comprehend the future. Therefore in Christ there could not be fear, but only pain concerning the present.

On the contrary, Jesus began to be greatly distressed and troubled (Mark 14:33). Therefore and so on.

Furthermore, fear and pain are about the same thing. But there was true pain in Christ, and therefore also true fear.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that this is being asked about grief insofar as it is an animal suffering in the sensitive part of the soul. And therefore it should be said that Christ voluntarily assumed our nature so that he might redeem us through it, and therefore he assumed it such as it needed to be for the end of our redemption.

Whence, although in the other blessed even the lower powers were glorified through a certain overflow from the glorification of the higher powers, and the body’s glory descends from the soul’s glory, nonetheless it was not this way in Christ. For the glory that was in him from the enjoyment of God did not impede his soul’s ability to suffer, insofar as it was a part of his human nature. And likewise the joy that was in the higher part of the soul through this enjoyment, did not overflow into the lower parts. And therefore since things contrary to the delight of the lower parts happened to him, there was grief about these things. Yet it happened otherwise in him than in us, since in us the lower powers are not perfectly subject to reason, and therefore sometimes the sufferings of grief rise up in us outside the order of reason, sufferings that, in virtuous men, a virtue would restrain, but in others they would prevail even over reason. But in Christ the motion of grief never rose up except according to the dictate of the higher reason—namely, when reason dictated that his sense powers be grieved, in accord with what is fitting to his nature. And therefore there was no grief in him subverting reason, nor was it necessary, but was in a certain way voluntary.

Reply Obj. 1: The authority cited from Isaiah excludes from Christ a grief that impedes reason.

Reply Obj. 2: To be “disturbed” is said from “total turbulence,” and this is when the turbulence of the lower part reaches the higher, such that its order is disturbed. And this is not the case in any wise man, nor was it in Christ. And in this way Seneca’s arguments are sound.

Reply Obj. 3: As it says in the Ethics 7, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.13, 1153b2; cf. 10.2, 1172b20.) every grief, in itself, should be fled as much as one can. Yet grief can be chosen, insofar as one orders it to some good, just as the grief of the penitent is ordered to salvation. And in this way Christ chose grief, inasmuch as it was useful for redeeming the human race.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that anger is spoken of in three ways. For sometimes “anger” is taken as the habit or act of the vice that is opposed to gentleness, and this is called “irascibility”; (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.5, 1126a13.) this happens because a virtue, as it says in the Ethics 2, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.8, 1109a2.) sometimes is more opposed to one of its extremes, the way gentleness is more opposed to excessive anger than to the shortage of it, and therefore that opposed vice is named “anger.” And such anger was not in Christ. In another way, the will of taking vengeance on some evildoer is called “anger.” And such anger is not a passion, properly speaking, nor is it in the irascible part of the soul, but in the will. And such anger is in God and the blessed, and was in Christ. In a third way, and properly, the passion of the irascible power is called “anger.” This arises when the irascible power inclines toward the destruction of something that is apprehended as contrary to what is willed or desired. And if it rises up from reason's ordering, or along with an ordered reason, then it is called the anger of zeal, and such was in Christ; but if it is disordered, then it will be the anger of vice, which in no way was in Christ.

Reply Obj. 1: That argument follows for anger according to the first mode of speaking, for in that way it is opposed to gentleness. However, insofar as it is a passion, it is not opposed to it, but is the matter about which it is concerned, since even one who is gentle is angered when he must be.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as in Christ the delight of the higher part did not destroy the grief of the sensitive part, so too even the anger of the sensitive part did not impede the use of reason, in him. For when the divinity permitted each part of Christ’s humanity to do the things that are proper to it, as Damascene says, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 19 (PG 94:1079).) one part did not impede the other, as in us it does happen that one part impedes the other.

Reply Obj. 3: Disordered anger rests in vengeance, but ordered anger orders vengeance to justice—namely, such that it does not seek vengeance but justice, and punishes only as far as the order of justice permits.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that “fear” is said in many ways. In one way, it names the habit of either the gift, or the vice that is opposed to fortitude, and this latter is called timidity. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.7, 1115b34‒1116a2; 3.12, 1119a21; Aquinas, Sent. Ethic., bk. 3, lect. 15, 22.) In this way the habit of the gift was in Christ, though not the habit of the vice. In another way, it can be taken for the act of either the vice or the gift, and in this way the same thing should be said as before. In yet another way, “fear” names a certain emotion in the irascible power that rises up because the sensitive appetite flees what is apprehended as something harmful. It is in this last way that we are speaking about fear here. Whence we should say that in this way there was fear in Christ, in the same way as we said of grief and anger—namely, insofar as the sense appetite, due to the dictate of reason and the Godhead joined to it, fled things that were contrary to it.

Reply Obj. 1: That argument follows for fear insofar as it is a vice, since the emotion of fear is the matter fortitude concerns itself with.

Reply Obj. 2: Every fear is due to a certain imperfection insofar as something can be injured by something else on account of an imperfection. Now, Christ, although he was most perfect in virtue of his soul, nevertheless could be injured on account of his body. Therefore he suffered imperfection on this side, and was able to fear.

Reply Obj. 3: In a human being, the sense appetite is moved immediately by the apprehension of the imagination or estimation, but in a mediated way by even the apprehension of reason, insofar as its conception is impressed on the imagination. Therefore when Christ’s reason foresaw the wounding of his body, the species of the harmful thing arose in his imagination, and the sense appetite was moved to fear it.

Article 3

Whether in Christ there was true pain in the senses

Quaestiuncula 1

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallels: below, exposition of the text; ST III.15.5; De veritate, q. 26, a. 8, ad 7, 8; Compendium theol., ch. 232.) It appears that in Christ there was no true pain in the senses.

Obj. 1: For however much a power can resist what can wound it, so much is the pain coming from the wound diminished. But in Christ there was an infinite power to resist wounding, namely, the power of the divinity. Therefore there could be no pain in him.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, pain is not among things that are voluntary. But Christ sustained his Passion voluntarily. Therefore there was no pain of the Passion in him.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Christ saw God more perfectly than did Paul. But Paul in his rapture, on account of his vision of God, did not sense the things that happened in his body. Therefore neither did Christ have pain due to the body’s wounds.

On the contrary, surely he . . . carried our sorrows (Isa 53:4).

Furthermore, for true pain only a wound and sensation are required. But Christ’s body was wounded, and he had sensation of the wound. Therefore there was true pain in him.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that his pain did not reach his higher reason. (Parallels: ST III.46.7, 8; De veritate, q. 26, a. 9; Compendium theol., ch. 232.) For to make a judgment about a pain is not to suffer the pain. But in the saints there is only a judgment of their pains, in virtue of reason, as is clear from Dionysius in his letter to John the Evangelist. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Epistolae, ep. 10: Ad Ioannem Evangelistam (PG 3:1118).) Therefore, since Christ was perfect in sanctity, he did not have pain in reference to the higher part of his reason.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 429a22‒30; Aquinas, Sent. De anima, bk. 3, lect. 7, nn. 677‒86.) the intellect is the act of no part of the body. But the pain of the Passion was in the soul only from the union of the soul and body. Therefore there was no pain of the Passion in his intellectual part.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Topics 1.15, 106a38.) there is nothing contrary to the delight that arises in the intellect. But pain is contrary to delight. Therefore it is not in the intellectual part.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the soul is disturbed when a passion reaches all the way to the reason. But in Christ there was no disturbance. Therefore his pain did not reach to his reason.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, it is impossible for contraries to be in the same thing in the same respect. But pain is contrary to delight. Therefore it is impossible that he feel pain in his higher part, by which he rejoiced in the vision of God

On the contrary, the connection of the soul’s powers to each other is greater than that of the members. But when one member suffers, so do the others (1 Cor 12:26). Therefore when one power of the soul suffers, much more so the others as well.

Furthermore, the soul’s powers are nearer to its essence than the soul is to the body. But his soul in its own essence suffered with the suffering of his body. Therefore also all its powers suffer together with his essence.

Furthermore, on Psalm 88:3, my soul is full of troubles, a Gloss explains this as about Christ: that is, full of pains. Therefore his pain was in reference to all the parts of his soul.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Moreover, it appears that Christ’s pain was not greater than all pains. (Parallel: ST III.46.6.) For to the degree that suffering is more bitter and longer lasting, so much more so is the suffering resulting from the pain greater. But some saints endured a longer-lasting and more bitter suffering, as is seen with saints Laurence and Vincent. Therefore Christ’s pain was not the greatest.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in other saints the pain was mitigated by the contemplation and love of divine things, as is sung of St. Stephen: the stones of the torrent were sweet. But in Christ there was the greatest charity and the perfect contemplation of God. Therefore his pain was mitigated the most, and so it was the least.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the sufferer’s innocence diminishes the pain of the suffering; this is why the little ones in Limbo are not afflicted by the lack of the divine vision, since it is not withheld from them on account of any fault that they had committed themselves. But Christ suffered without any fault. Therefore it appears that his sorrow was the mildest.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the greater is the recompense for a good given up, the more lightly is borne the loss of giving it up. But Christ had the greatest recompense for giving up his bodily life through his Passion, namely the salvation of the human race. Therefore that pain was the least.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, to the degree that what is given up is more precious, so much the greater is the pain of giving it up. But God, whom man gave up through sin, is of greater dignity than Christ’s bodily life. Therefore the pain that arises from giving up God is greater than the Christ’s pain from giving up his bodily life.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, something is more disposed to suffering to the degree that it feels less pain from the suffering. But Christ’s body was more disposed to suffering than was Adam’s body. Therefore Adam would have felt greater pain, had he been wounded.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, to the degree that a nature is more able to perceive, so much greater is its pain. But the soul’s nature is more able to perceive than is any body’s nature. Therefore the soul’s pain due to the suffering of hell, which suffers from the fire in its very self, is greater than Christ’s pain.

On the contrary, all you who pass by . . . look and see if there is any sorrow like my sorrow (Lam 1:12), as if to say, no, there is not. Therefore his pain was the greatest of all pains.

Furthermore, Christ had the best bodily makeup, which is clear insofar as he had the noblest soul, to which would correspond the balance of his bodily make up. But to the degree that a man has a better makeup in his body, so much better does he sense the wounds of the body, since his sense of touch is better. Therefore since pain is the sensation of a wound, it appears that there was the greatest pain in Christ.

Furthermore, it belongs to the virtuous man to love his own life; this is why even sinners hate themselves to the extent of killing themselves, as the Philosopher shows in the Ethics 9. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.4, 1166b12–13; Aquinas, Sent. Ethic., bk. 9, lect. 4.) But Christ was the most virtuous man. Therefore he most of all loved his own life, and therefore his pain at giving up his life was the greatest.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

To the first question, I answer that, just as sensible delight is caused by one being joined to what is fitting as regards sensation, so too is sensible pain caused by one’s joining to what is not fitting as regards sensation. But among all the other senses, only touch discerns those things in which the body’s temperament consists; this is why what is fitting for the sense of touch befits the very temperament of the body. And on account of this, complete sensible delight happens in the perception of touch alone, and likewise, what is unfitting to touch is contrary to the body’s temperament; thus the Philosopher says, in On the Soul 3, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.13, 435b7‒10; Aquinas, Sent. De anima, bk. 3, lect. 18, nn. 869‒72.) that the things that corrupt touch corrupt the animal, unlike things that corrupt hearing, unless at the same time it happens accidentally that touch is corrupted too, which latter happens from a wounding of the very temperament of the body.

Whence, since in Christ’s body there was a true wounding—since its continuity was divided by the nails—and there was also a true sense of touch, one must say of necessity that there was true pain. However, how Hilary’s words should be explained will be stated at the end.

Reply Obj. 1: Although in Christ’s body there was the strength of the Godhead, having an infinite power to resist; nevertheless he did not resist, but handed over his flesh to suffer whatever was proper [to the flesh], as Damascene says. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 14, 15 (PG 94:1059).) Therefore there were wounds here, and consequently, pain.

Reply Obj. 2: Reason’s will does not exclude the pain of sense, just as someone can wish, in virtue of his reason, to be burnt so that he might be healed, but still he experiences sensible pain in the burning. This was how it was in Christ.

Reply Obj. 3: There cannot be so great a strength of contemplation that it destroys the sensible pain caused by a wound of the body, if the body is being wounded, unless the lower powers are wholly withdrawn from their acts, in the way in which one power is so intensely active that it withdraws another from its own act. This is what happened in Paul’s rapture. But in Christ one power took another away from its act only insofar as his reason and conjoined Godhead ordered it. Therefore the perfection of his contemplation did not destroy the sensible pain.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the second question, it should be said that in pain and grief two things are found: the contrariety of what is grievous and inflicts pain on the one being grieved and feeling the pain, and the perception of the former. And they differ in three ways, in reference to these two things. First, in reference to the contrariety, which in pain looks to the very nature of the one pained, which is one who is being corrupted by a wound, whereas in grief it looks to the repugnance of one’s appetite relative to what someone hates. Second, they differ in reference to the perception, which in pain is always relative to the sense of touch, as was said, but in grief it is relative to an interior apprehensive power. Third, they differ in reference to the order of these two, since pain begins in the wounding and is finished in the perception of sense—for there the notion of pain is completed—but the notion of grief begins in the apprehension and is finished in the affection. Whence pain is in sensation as in a subject, but grief is in the appetite. From this it is clear that grief is an animal passion, but pain is more a bodily passion.

Nonetheless, sometimes grief, when taken in a broad sense, is called “pain.” This is why Augustine (Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, Ps 42, para. 6 (CCSL 38; PL 36:480).) distinguishes the pain of the soul according to itself, which is properly called “grief,” and the pain of the soul through the body, which is properly called “pain.”

Therefore, speaking of “pain” in its proper usage, in this way, with respect to the wounding, which is material in pain, it extends to all of the soul’s powers in Christ, insofar as they are rooted in the essence of his soul, to which even the body’s wound reaches, inasmuch as the soul is its form. But with respect to the perception of the wound, which is formal in pain, in this way it consists only in the sense of touch, to which alone belongs perceiving what wounds as wounds—that is, insofar as it connected to it in a bodily way.

Now, when speaking of “pain” in a broad way—such that even grief is called “pain,” as is clear from the things said— grief cannot be in reason as in its subject, but only as in what presents the thing that is repugnant to the will—unless “reason” is also being taken such that it embraces both the apprehensive and affective powers, wherein grief is as in its subject. Though this is not the grief that is an emotion, which latter is only in the sensitive part, as was said before.

However, an apprehensive power presents only its own object. But the objects of the higher reason are the eternal goods, and there was nothing contrary to Christ’s will among them. Whence, in the higher reason, insofar as it is compared to its object, there could not be any grief in Christ. However, it could be there with respect to the lower reason, the objects of which are temporal things, among which there could in some way happen to be something contrary to his will; this will become clear below. (Below, d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, resp. 2.) In this way, the wound itself was contrary to a certain will of Christ, by which it naturally opposed death, and likewise also the evils of the human race were displeasing to him. This is why there could be grief in the lower reason, even insofar as it is compared to its own objects.

And because every power pertains to the nature insofar as it is rooted in the essence of the soul—which is the essential part of the nature of the whole—but it has the notion of a power in virtue of its relation to its objects, therefore some say that the suffering of pain reached all the way to the higher reason insofar as it is a nature, inasmuch as the body’s wound reached the soul’s essence—and further, to all the powers, inasmuch as they are rooted in the soul’s essence. However, it did not reach the higher reason insofar as it is reason, because insofar as it is related to its own object, it felt no harm due to the body’s suffering; for it would not be impeded in the contemplation of divine things.

And this others also say with other words—namely, that it suffered insofar as it is the nature of a body, but not insofar as it is the principle of human acts. And in this way they also say that the lower reason suffered both insofar as it is a nature and insofar as it is reason.

However, the distinction by which one distinguishes reason as nature and reason as reason can also be understood in another way. For “reason is said as nature” insofar as it makes a judgment about what is in virtue of itself good or evil, befitting or noxious to a nature, but “reason is said as reason” insofar as it makes a judgment about what is good or evil in an order to something else. For sometimes something considered in itself is noxious to the nature, yet in its order to a certain end it should be chosen, such as cauterizing for the sake of health. And in this way, even Christ’s death was indeed evil in itself, insofar as it was injurious to his nature, but in its ordination to the end of the redemption of the human race, it was best. And in this way, even the lower reason, as reason, was not grieved about his death, but only as nature. And speaking in this way, we will distinguish reason insofar as it is related to its object.

Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius’s intention was to say that the saints, with respect to their reason, were in no way moved away from the rectitude of reason present in all virtuous men, or even from the tranquility of mind that belongs to the perfect. And therefore he says that, insofar as they do not suffer with respect to reason, in a way the experience of the pain does not reach their reason; and he names this experience the “judgment of the sufferings.”

Reply Obj. 2: The intellect can be considered in two ways: either insofar as it is a certain power—and in this way the power is determined to its act because, since the intellect’s activity is not exercised by the mediation of a bodily organ, it is said that the intellect is not the act of any part of the body. Or it can be considered insofar as this power is rooted in the soul’s essence—and in this way, because the soul in virtue of its essence is the form of the body, the intellect and all the other powers are also acts of the body, and it suffers accidentally, at the suffering of the body. This happens in two ways: from reason’s order to the essence, and from the intellect’s order to the other powers that operate through a bodily organ, due to an impediment in which an impediment arises in the activity of the intellect, as is clear in those who are delirious.

Reply Obj. 3: The "intellect’s delight” is spoken of in two ways. In one way such that it belongs to the intellect both with respect to its subject and with respect to its object; and this is that delight by which the intellect is delighted in what is being understood. And since each of two contrary things is understood insofar as it is intelligible and a perfection of the intellect, nor can it bring any wound to the intellect, as it can with sensation, therefore there is no grief contrary to this delight. In another way, the intellect’s delight is spoken of with respect to the subject, but not with respect to the object, because the intellect is not delighted through what it understands, but from some delightful that is apprehended—namely, when the intellectual part is delighted about something in things themselves that happens to be consonant with the will. And in this way, this delight is not about one of two contraries insofar as it is in the soul—in virtue of which it does not have a contrary, since the intentions of contraries in the soul are not contrary, since they are together—but as it is in reality, in virtue of which it does have a contrariety. This is also why in such a delight of reason there can be a contrary grief in the intellectual part, as is the case with the demons and the souls of the damned.

Reply Obj. 4: A man is said to be disturbed when the suffering reaches all the way to his reason, changing it internally out of its balance, but not when the experience of the pain or suffering reaches the reason.

Reply Obj. 5: The fruition of the Godhead, and the joy consequent on it, was in the higher part of his reason in its order to its object. However, the pain did not reach the higher reason, as was said, except insofar as it is founded in the soul’s essence. But in the lower reason, both in the sensuality and in the sense, there was grief and pain, even with respect to their objects, insofar as it was pained about the body’s suffering, and other things of the sort, in virtue of these powers. Yet this pain was in a certain manner the matter of the joy of fruition, insofar as that joy extended to all the things that are apprehended as pleasing to God.

And thereby it is clear that the pain that was in Christ’s soul in no way impeded the joy of fruition, neither through the mode of contrariety nor through the mode of overflow. For grief impedes a contrary joy, just as every contrary is impeded by its contrary.

However, the grief that was in Christ’s soul was in no way contrary to the joy of his fruition, and this is clear from three things. First, because they were not in the same thing in the same respect, but were either in diverse powers, or even in the same one in virtue of a diverse relation. Second, because they were not about the same thing. And third, because the one was the matter of the other, as happens in the penitent who sorrows but rejoices over his sorrow. But further, every grief, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 7, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.13, 1153b2‒5; Aquinas, Sent. Ethic., bk. 7, lect. 13.) impedes every delight through a certain overflow, insofar as the harm of one power overflows to another. However, such overflow, as was said, was not present in Christ except when he himself wished it. Whence the joy that was in his higher reason through its relation to its object did not overflow to the lower powers such that the pain and grief would be taken away from them—nor did it overflow further to the body such that it would be immune from harm, nor consequently did it overflow to the soul or the powers insofar as they are rooted in the soul’s essence, insofar as the body’s wound reaches the soul’s essence and the powers rooted in it.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the third question, it should be said that the magnitude of Christ’s sensible pain can be considered on three sides.

First, from the very nature of the suffering, and in this way it had the greatest bitterness. This was first on the side of the bodily makeup of the one suffering, which was the most balanced; this is why he had the best sense of touch, and consequently there was a vehement sensation of the wounds in him, for the goodness of touch is a witnesses to both the makeup’s goodness and the mind’s goodness, as is said in On the Soul 2. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.9, 421a21‒29; Aquinas, Sent. De anima, bk. 2, lect. 19, nn. 483‒86.) It is also due to the genus of the pain, since the wounding was in the most sensible places, in the hands and feet. And even because of the multitude of the sufferings, since he sustained wounds throughout his whole body.

Second, it can be considered from the purity of the pain, since in others who suffer the sensible pain is mitigated by the influence of the higher powers on the lower ones, or on account of the contemplation that withdraws the lower powers in some measure from their acts, or even on account of the contentment of the will due to the love of that for the sake of which he suffers. However, in Christ this relation of the powers to each other was not present, as was said; rather, each of them was permitted to do what was proper to itself, as Damascene says, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 14 (PG 94:1059).) so his pain was without any admixture of anything mitigating it.

Third, it can be considered from the will of the one suffering. For because he suffered willingly, so that he might make satisfaction for the sin of the entire human race, therefore he assumed a pain exceeding all other pains. Likewise, even the "animal pain" that is called “grief,” which was in the sensitive appetite, or in reason as nature, had magnitude from these last two, and from the ugliness of the death—from the love of his bodily life, which was the best, from the ingratitude of the ones who wounded him, and from the defects of the human race, by which he suffered with the greatest charity.

Reply Obj. 1: A saint’s suffering can be found that was more painful in some respect, whether as regards duration or something like this, but not one that is greater simply speaking, all things considered.

Reply Obj. 2: In Christ the joy of his contemplation was not allowed to pour back into his senses, as happens in others, as was said.

Reply Obj. 3: The innocence of the one suffering diminishes the pain in number, since he does not feel as many pains as does the sinner who feels both the pain and a wounded conscience. But the pain is increased with respect to the intensity of the pain, speaking of the essential meaning, and inasmuch as he apprehends it as more undeserved. But the children are not afflicted from a lack of the divine vision, since this is not a lack of something proportioned to them, as was said in Book II. (In II Sent., d. 33, q. 2, a. 2.) For they did not have grace, nor was it because of them that they did not have it.

Reply Obj. 4: Recompense causes joy in the reason, considered as reason, which apprehends this evil in an order to something else that it is good. And inasmuch as his joy pours back into the other powers, in this respect the pain of the other powers is mitigated. However, this was not the case in Christ, and therefore the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 5: Just as the joy of the comprehensor exceeds every joy of the wayfarer, so too the pain or grief of the damned exceeds every pain of a wayfarer. Whence, since Christ assumed only the pain of the wayfarer, the pain of the damned—whether that which he has with respect to the pain of loss or what he has with respect to the pain of the sense—is greater than was Christ’s pain. For such a pain makes the one damned wretched, which wretchedness is absent in speech about Christ. But the pain that any wayfarer has over sin is not as great as was Christ’s pain, both because it is mitigated by a hope of forgiveness, and because the perception of the one feeling the pain is not as great, even though he has given up a great good.

Reply Obj. 6: Although in Christ there was a greater disposition to suffering than there had been in Adam, still in him there was also a greater sense of wounds than had been in Adam, and therefore a greater pain.

Reply Obj. 7: This is the same as to the fifth objection.

Exposition of the text

It is not the flesh that senses, but the soul. (Sent. III, 15.1(41).2.) On the contrary, sensation belongs to the composite, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, On Sleep and Sleeplessness 1, 454a7.) so it not something of the body or of the soul, but of the man.

It should be said that, of things that belong to the composite, some are present in the whole by reason of the soul, such as sensing and things of this sort, and they are attributed to the soul in the manner of speaking in which heat is said to heat something, since it is the principle of the heating. But some are present in the whole by reason of the body, such as sleeping and things of this sort, and they are attributed to the body, and not the soul

But it feels some other evils not through the body, indeed even without the body. (Sent. III, 15.1(41).2.) On the contrary, in On the Soul 1 (Aristotle, On the Soul 1.4, 408b27.) it is said that when the body is corrupted, the soul does not remember or love, and the account of the things considered here is similar.

It should be said that “love,” “fear,” and such are taken equivocally, for sometimes they name the emotion, properly said, and in this way they are in the sensitive part, and therefore cannot be without the body; but sometimes they are taken for the act of the will choosing or rejecting something, and in this way they can be without the body just as the will can.

He took on the ancientness [of our nature]. (Sent. III, 15.1(41).3.) Against this: A thing does not consume what is like it. Therefore ancientness cannot consume ancientness.

It should be said that the ancientness is of two sorts: namely, that of the fault and that of the penalty, both of which pertain to the old man. Therefore the ancientness of the penalty is not opposed to the newness of grace, in fact it is related to it as its matter, inasmuch as a merit consists in a penalty endured in a seemly way. And thus, the ancientness of the penalty with the newness of grace is opposed to the ancientness of the fault, and destroys it; consequently, in the state of glory it consumes the ancientness of the penalty caused by the ancientness of the fault. On account of this, the simple ancientness was able to destroy the double ancientness, which the double ancientness had not been capable of, since it did not have the newness joined to it.

For he did not take on any ignorance. (Sent. III, 15.1(41).4.) On the contrary, Damascene says, he received an ignorant and servile nature. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 21 (PG 94:1083).) Furthermore, Pope Leo, in Fourth Sermon on the Epiphany, says, they adored an infant in no way different from other babes, (Leo the Great, Sermones, serm. 34: In Epiphaniae Solemnitate IV, ch. 3 (PG 54:247).) and therefore he took on ignorance the way others do.

It should be said, to the first, that Damascene explains himself, for he calls the assumed nature “ignorant” if the assumed were separated from the one assuming with respect to the intellect; that is, if that assumed nature be considered as though it had not been assumed, and then it would have been ignorant, just as it is with other men. To the second it should be said that this meant with respect to bodily things, or with respect to appearances.

Would these be a defect and punishment in him? (Sent. III, 15.1(41).6.) Namely, a defect of fault. Otherwise the authority would not prove the Master’s intention.

As for the defects which he did have, he took them on either to demonstrate his true humanity . . . or to fulfill the work for which he had come . . . or to raise our hope from our despair of immortality. (Sent. III, 15.1(41).7.) And it appears that the first cause is not valid, since a true humanity could have been without these defects, as was in the first state and will be in the last.

Further, it appears that neither is the second, since the work of redemption, for which he came, was fulfilled by his death, so he did not need to assume hunger, thirst, and the like.

Further, it appears that neither is the third, since his infirmity more appears to induce those whom he came to save toward a despair of salvation.

To the first it is said that the truth of his humanity needed to be shown, since his being God and man was needed to accomplish the redemption. Nor was humanity in the first state or the last known to us, but only humanity in the second state, and therefore it was necessary that he assume the defects that are present in us in virtue of this state. To the second it should be said that the other defects that he assumed are founded on the same cause—namely, the nature’s ability to suffer—so they were assumed together with the defects by which the work of redemption was accomplished.

To the third it should be said that the infirmity of his flesh does not induce despair, thanks to the power of the divinity joined to it. Rather, it more raises our hope, since as was the case in him, so too in us the infirmity will be taken away.

And so, Lord Jesus, you suffer my wounds, not your own. (Sent. III, 15.1(41).11, quoting Ambrose, De fide libri V, ad Gratianum Augustum, bk. 2, ch. 7 (CSEL 78; PL 16:571).) On the contrary, he even felt the pain of his own wounds, as was said. Further it is asked, if he felt his own and our wounds, which was the greater pain.

It should be said to the first that his reason as reason did not feel the pain of his wounds, on account of the good that followed them, but he his sensuality did feel the pain, as did his reason considered as nature.

To the second it should be said that the bodily pain of Christ’s Passion and the animal pain, which is called “grief”— in virtue of which he suffered with our defects—are not of one notion. And therefore they are not comparable. However, if the pain of the animal suffering is taken, then it should be said that the pain of the compassion was greater than the pain of the suffering, since the charity by which he felt the pain of our evils was heavier than the evenness of his bodily makeup by which he felt the pain of his own suffering, and the divine honor, which was wounded by our faults, inasmuch as it was from us, was more precious to him than was his bodily life. And he endured that pain even as a sign of this, so that he might take it away.

One is saddened in one way by propassion, in another way by passion. (Sent. III, 15.2(42).3.) It appears that there was no propassion in Christ. The Gloss on Matthew 7 says that a propassion is a sudden motion to which one does not consent. (Glossa ordinaria, at Matthew 5:28, 5.110 (PL 114:94).) Now, this is a venial sin. Further, grief always appears to be a passion, since it is in the genus of passion. Further, it appears that it is never a passion, as Damascene says, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 22 (PG 94:939).) but the sensation of a passion.

It should be said that “passion” imports an internal change of the one suffering. Now, someone is not said to be internally changed, simply speaking, when what is rules in him remains unchanged. Therefore, speaking simply, when reason is not internally displaced from its balance or evenness, there is not said to be a passion, but rather a propassion—as it were, an imperfect passion. And this is how it was in Christ.

And therefore it should be said to the first that a propassion, properly speaking, is the internal change of a lower part only, and when such an internal change happens in us, it is not ordained by reason. This is why the Gloss, speaking in reference to the state of the powers in us, calls a sudden motion a “propassion.” Now, in Christ it was otherwise, as is clear from things said. Nevertheless, it is not true that every sudden motion of sensuality is a venial sin, but only when it is a tendency toward something illicit, which never happened in Christ.

To the second, this is said not to be a passion because it is not a perfect passion, although it belongs to the genus of passion; this is like how things that are small are treated as though nothing. As Damascene says, a thing is properly a passion when it has some perceptible magnitude. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 22 (PG 94:939).
)

To the third it should be said that Damascene is speaking about the bodily passions, not animal passions.

The only-begotten God, without ceasing from his divinity, took true humanity according to the likeness of our humanity. And although a blow struck him, or a wound befell him, or ropes bound him, or he was lifted up, and these carried the force of the Passion, yet they did not inflict the pain of the Passion. (Sent. III, 15.3(43).2, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 23 (CCSL 62A; PL 10:361).) These words of Hilary appear to exclude from Christ the pain and fear of the Passion. They are resolved in three ways.

For some say Hilary retracted this; and William the bishop of Paris said that he saw the letter of his retraction, and it was written out for him by someone who read it. And this is probable, given the authorities that the Master introduces in the text, one of which begins, at I ask what it means; (Sent. III, 15.4(44).1, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 36 (CCSL 62A; PL 10:371).) and the other is the little note that begins at although these kinds of suffering, (Sent. III, 15.3(43).6, quoting Hilary Liber de synodis, seu Fidem Orientalium, bk. 12, n. 49 (PL 10:516).) wherein he explicitly says that Christ’s humanity was subject to these infirmities. Nevertheless, the text denies this, it appears.

Others say that it is speaking about Christ with respect to his Godhead, since in these words it is disputing with those who said the Son of God is something created. But the words of the authority are not consonant with this, since they refer to Christ’s flesh.

However, the Master’s solution consists in this: [Hilary] did not want to remove pain from Christ simply speaking, but just three things that surround pain.

First, pain’s dominion; this is clear when he says, and so what weakness do you believe to have overcome this body, whose nature had such great power? (Sent. III, 15.3(43).3, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 27 (CCSL 62A; PL 10:367).)

Second, the merit of pain; this is clear when he says, yet the form of our sinful weakness was not in the body. (Sent. III, 15.3(43).4, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 35 (CCSL 62A; PL 10:371).)

Third, the necessity of the pain; this is clear when he says, let us see whether the sequence of his sufferings allows us to discern in the Lord the weakness of bodily pain. (Sent. III, 15.3(43).3, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 26 (CCSL 62A; PL 10:366).)

And in virtue of this three difficulties that appear to be in his words are resolved. The first is when he says, that body’s power bore the force of pain that savagely struck it without feeling it; (Sent. III, 15.3(43).2, quoting Hillary, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 23 (CCSL 62A; PL 10:361).) and he says this is beyond the nature of suffering, which implies the sensation of the suffering, which is pain. This cannot be understood of the exterior sensation, since then his body would be asserted to be insensitive; rather, it must be understood in reference to the sensation of reason, which was not internally changed from its balance by passions of this sort. On account of this it is said that the suffering within him did not have dominion. Or also it can be be said that the Word himself is not affected by passions of this sort, following the second solution, as he appears to say in the appended little note.

A second difficulty is when he says, he did not have a nature able to feel pain. (Sent. III, 15.3(43).2, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 23 (CCSL 62A; PL 10:361).) This is said because in that nature there was no order to pain as the price of sin, as there is in us. And in this way it was said above that it is the nature of the Lord’s body alone to be borne in the waters; (Sent III, 15.3(43).2, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 23 (CCSL 62A; PL 10:361).) for this does not belong to the nature of the body considered in itself, but from the power of the divinity joined to it.

The third difficulty is when he says, for it cannot be that his words signify fear whose deeds demonstrate such confidence, (Sent. III, 15.3(43).3, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 10 ch. 26 (CCSL 62A; PL 10:366).) where he appears to exclude fear and the consequent grief from him. But either this should be solved as was done with the above authority—namely, such that he is speaking of fear insofar as it is a passion, not insofar as it is a propassion—or it should be said that he is excluding the need for fear. For he had in his reason why he might exclude fear and grief from his sensuality, if he would have wanted to; for, as was said above, sensuality is naturally apt to be moved to grief and fear, and to their opposites, not only due to the apprehension of the imagination, but even due to an apprehension of reason.

He was able to suffer, and yet was not able to be passible. (Sent. III, 15.4(44).1, quoting Hilary, Liber de synodis, seu Fidem Orientalium, bk. 12, n. 49 (PL 10:516).) On the contrary, the Philosopher in On Sleep and Sleeplessness says*, what the power belongs to, the act belongs to*. (Aristotle, On Sleep and Sleeplessness 1, 454a9.) Therefore what suffers is passible.

It should be said that “to suffer” signifies passion in the manner of an act; whence, it is referred to the supposit as a supposit of whatever nature. And because the Passion is in him by reason of his human nature, therefore it is said that he was able to suffer. However, “passible” signifies the potency for the suffering as forming that of which it is said; and because the Word in virtue of himself was not formed by a potency for suffering, therefore it is said that he was not able to be passible in virtue of himself, although he was passible by reason of the assumed nature.