Lecture 2 — Definition of Violent Action

People doing such actions are at times praised for enduring something dishonorable or painful to achieve great and good results. But, when they do the opposite of this, they are blamed, for only a perverse man suffers very dishonorable things in exchange for little or no good. [392]

Some actions do not deserve praise, but only pardon—for example, if a person does things that are wrong because he fears evils beyond human endurance that no one would undergo in any case. [394]

Yet it is probable that there are actions that a man cannot be forced to do, and he ought to undergo death of the cruelest kind rather than do them. The reasons that constrained Euripides’ Alcmaeon to kill his mother seem to be ridiculous. [395]

Sometimes it is difficult to judge what is to be chosen for the price and what is to be endured for the gain. [396]

It is still more difficult to abide by our decisions. As often happens, the expected results are painful but the compulsory acts are disgraceful. Hence, we receive praise and blame according as we yield or stand firm against the constraint. [397]

What sort of actions, then, are to be called compulsory? Those actions are simply compulsory that have their cause from the outside, with the person involved contributing nothing. Some actions that in themselves are involuntary become voluntary in particular circumstances. Although of themselves involuntary, if their principle is in the agent who seeks them at this time and in these circumstances, they are voluntary. They are then more like the voluntary because they take place in particular cases that are voluntary. It is not easy to assign the sort of things we must choose in such circumstances, for particular cases admit of many differences. [398]

If someone should say that pleasurable and good things are the cause of violence (they are external to us and influence us), all our actions will then be compulsory, because men perform all their actions for the sake of something pleasing and good. [400]

Those who act by violence act involuntarily and with sadness, but those who act to attain something enjoyable act with pleasure. [402]

It is ridiculous that a man blame external goods and not accuse himself for being snared by such pleasures, [403]

while he takes to himself the credit for virtuous deeds and lays the blame for his shameful deeds upon pleasure. [404]

It seems that the compulsory action is one whose origin is external in such a way that one who suffers violence contributes nothing to the action. [405]

392. People doing such actions. After the Philosopher has solved the doubt raised about the actions done because of fear, showing that such actions are voluntary, he now clarifies the solution by explaining that praise and blame, honor and punishment, are due to voluntary actions of this kind.

On this point, he does two things.

First, he discloses in what way these actions merit praise and blame, honor and punishment.

Second, at sometimes it is difficult (1110a29; [396]), he makes known the pending difficulties about this.

In regard to the first, he distinguishes three grades of these actions performed by reason of fear as far as they merit praise or blame.

393. Considering now the first grade, he shows that, regarding such actions, which he says are a mixture of the voluntary and the involuntary, some persons are praised for suffering something dishonorable—not indeed of a sinful nature, but a kind of ignominy—or even something saddening or grievous in order to persevere in certain great and good things, such as virtuous actions. When the opposite happens, they are blamed, since it seems that only a perverse man suffers very dishonorable things—that is, great disorders—in exchange for little or no good. No one suffers any evil to preserve a good unless that good is of greater value in his estimation than the other goods to which the evil he suffers are opposed. It belongs to a disordered desire to prefer small goods to great ones that are destroyed by greater evils. Therefore, he says this pertains to a perverse man, that is, one who has a disordered desire.

394. At some actions (1110a23), he sets down the second grade, stating that some actions performed because of fear do not deserve praise, but only pardon. A person should not be blamed very much for doing certain things he ought not do, such as actions unbefitting his state. These actions should not be considered seriously binding, on account of the fear of evils beyond human endurance. No one would undergo such evils especially for the reason alleged—for example, if someone is threatened with punishment by fire unless he tells a jocose lie or he performs some lowly menial tasks unbecoming his dignity.

395. At yet it is probable (1110a26), he treats the third grade. He states that other actions are so evil that no amount of force can compel them to be done, but a man ought to undergo death of the cruelest kind rather than do such things, as St. Lawrence endured the roasting on the gridiron to avoid sacrificing to idols. The Philosopher affirms this either because glory remains after death for one dying for the sake of virtue or because courageous perseverance in virtue is so great a good that continuance of life—which a man loses by death—cannot equal it. He says, therefore, that Alcmaeon, or the poems about Alcmaeon written by Euripides, seem to be satirical. These poems narrate the story of Alcmaeon, who was forced to kill his mother by the command of his father. The father had ordered this when dying in the Theban War, to which he had gone by the advice of his wife.

396. Then, at sometimes it is (1110a29), he brings forward two difficulties that threaten the above-mentioned activities. The first of these pertains to the judgment of reason. Sometimes it is difficult, he says, to judge what is to be chosen so that one may avoid evil and what evil is to be endured so that one may not be lacking in some good.

397. The second difficulty, which he gives at it is still more (1110a30), pertains to the stability of the affection. He says that it is even more difficult to be steadfast in a reasonable decision that has been made than to make a right judgment. He assigns the reason for the difficulty, saying that, as often happens, the things that are expected are painful—that is, afflicting or sorrowful—but those to which men are forced because of fear are disgraceful. It is difficult, however, for a man’s affections not to be moved by fear of pain. Since those actions to which one is forced by a motive of this kind are disgraceful, it is fitting that, for those who are forced to do such things by fear of painful effects, blame should be forthcoming. But those who cannot be forced to do them are worthy of praise.

398. Next, at what sort of actions, then (1110b1), he sums up in conclusion the things that have been said and assigns a reason for them.

First, he reviews the principal question, what sort of actions are to be called violent.

Second, he sums up the answer so far as concerns the absolutely compulsory actions, the cause of which is from the outside, such that the person involved contributes nothing because of violence.

Third, he gives a list of mixed actions. He says that those actions that in themselves—that is, absolutely and universally considered—are involuntary become voluntary at a definite time and by reason of certain events. Although they are involuntary in themselves, their principle is in the agent. Therefore, they should be called voluntary at this time and for these reasons. Thus, it is evident that these actions are more like the voluntary than the involuntary, because they are voluntary when we consider the particular circumstances in which the actions are performed.

399. Fourth, he recapitulates what he had stated about the difficulty occurring in things of this kind. He says that it is not easy to assign the sort of thing we must choose in such circumstances. He assigns as the reason that many differences are found in singulars. Hence, the judgment of them cannot be comprised under an exact rule, but they are to be left to the evaluation of a prudent man.

400. At if someone (1110b9), he rejects an error of certain philosophers concerning actions done as a result of violence. Because man is what he is by reason, it seemed to some that man of himself, and (as it were) voluntarily, does only that which he performs according to reason. But, when it happens that man acts contrary to reason, on account either of the desire of some pleasure or greed for some external good, he acts in a violent manner. They say, therefore, that pleasurable and external goods, such as riches, cause forced actions, inasmuch as, being external things, they force man to act against his reason. Aristotle shows this to be false for five reasons.

401. The first reason is this. If external things, precisely as they are pleasurable and seemingly good, cause violence, it would follow that all actions we perform in human affairs are forced actions and none is voluntary. All men do what they do for the sake of these things, that is, for something that is pleasurable or good under a certain aspect. But this is unreasonable. Therefore, the first statement (that these external things cause violence) is also untenable.

402. He sets down the second reason at those who act (1110b11). All who act as a result of violence act involuntarily and with sadness. Hence, in the Metaphysics, (Metaphysics 5.5.1015a26–33; see Aquinas, In V metaph., lec. 6, nn. 829–31.) it is well said that necessitation is saddening because it is opposed to the will. But those who act to acquire something enjoyable act with pleasure. They do not, then, act by violence and involuntarily.

403. He gives the third reason at it is ridiculous (1110b13). He says it is ridiculous that a man plead an excuse or blame external goods and not accuse himself that he was snared, that is, permitted himself to be overcome by such pleasures. Our will is not of necessity moved by these desirable things, but it can cling to them or desert them. None possesses the nature of a universal and perfect good, as happiness (which everyone necessarily wishes) does.

404. He assigns the fourth reason at while he takes (1110b14). It is ridiculous, he says, that a person should call himself the cause of his good and virtuous works, but pleasurable things the cause of his shameful deeds inasmuch as they induce desire. Aristotle says it is ridiculous because directly opposed operations are referred back to the same power as a cause. Consequently, it is necessary that, as reason operating according to itself is the cause of virtuous action, so also in following the passions, it should be the cause of vicious action.

405. He gives the fifth reason at it seems that (1110b15), saying that the forced action is one whose source is from the outside in such a way that he who suffers by reason of it contributes nothing to the action. But the man who acts on account of external goods does contribute something to the action. Accordingly, although the principle inclining his will is from outside, his action is forced neither simply—because he contributes something to the action—nor by some mixture, because, in mixed actions, a thing is not rendered simply voluntary, as happens here. Therefore, a man acts in that case with sadness, and not with pleasure, as has been stated [402].