Lecture 4 — Definition of the Voluntary

Since the involuntary comes about on account of force and ignorance, the voluntary seems to originate within the agent who has knowledge of the circumstances of the action. [425]

Perhaps it is not accurate to call involuntary the things that are done on account of anger or sensual desire. [426]

The main reason is that neither animals nor children would then act voluntarily. [427]

Are none of the things done by reason of sensual desire or anger done voluntarily? Are the noble actions done voluntarily but the evil involuntarily? The latter view seems ridiculous, since there is one cause of all our actions. Likewise, it seems unreasonable to call involuntary the things we ought to seek. We ought to be angry under certain circumstances, and we ought to desire certain things, such as health and learning. [428]

Involuntary things seemingly are accompanied by sadness. But what is done in agreement with sensual desire seems to be done with pleasure. [429]

Further, what difference is there, from the viewpoint of involuntariness, between sins committed after reflection and sins committed on account of anger? It is our duty to avoid both. [430]

The irrational passions seem to be truly human. So too, then, are the actions of man proceeding from anger and sensual desire. It is unreasonable, therefore, to regard these as involuntary. [431]

425. Since the involuntary comes about. After the Philosopher has considered the involuntary, he next turns his attention to the voluntary.

First, he shows what the voluntary is.

Second, at perhaps it is not accurate (1111a24; [426]), he dismisses an erroneous view of it.

On the first point, we must consider that, although the term “involuntary” seems to indicate the removal of the voluntary, nevertheless the causes lead us to understand that a thing is called voluntary by reason of the removal of the things causing an involuntary action, such as violence and ignorance. Because everything is known through its cause, he gives the definition of the voluntary by taking away the cause of the involuntary. He says that, since the involuntary comes about through physical compulsion and ignorance, as has been determined previously [386], the voluntary seems to be that which the agent himself originates (thus violence is excluded) in such a way that the agent knows the individual circumstances that concur with the action. Thus, ignorance as the cause of the involuntary is excluded.

426. Then, at perhaps it is (1111a24), he rejects an error.

First, he explains it. Certain people were of the opinion that not everything that the agent originates through a knowledge of circumstances is voluntary. It can happen that the principle that is from within is not the rational appetitive faculty called the will or volition (from which the voluntary receives its name), but a passion of the sensitive appetitive faculty, such as anger, sensual desire, or something else of this kind. The Philosopher says this is not an accurate statement. It should be noted that, because the passions of the sensitive appetitive faculty are aroused by external things grasped by means of an external sense, this error seems to be of the same nature as the one he discarded previously [400–405], according to which it was indicated that external things bring about violence. It was imperative to state that, in that context, it was a question of violence, whose origin is external. But this must be treated here where it is a question of the voluntary, the principle of which is intrinsic, for the passions are within us.

427. Second, at the main reason is (1111a25), he rejects this opinion for five reasons. The first is this. Whatever irrational animals and children do they do in conformity with the affections of the sensitive faculty, and not in conformity with the rational faculty, because they lack the use of reason. If, then, the things that are done through anger, sensual desire, and the other affections of the sensitive faculty were involuntary, it would follow that neither animals nor children would act voluntarily. But agents are said to act voluntarily not because they operate under the impulse of the will, but because they operate of their own accord by their proper movement in such a way that they are not moved by any external thing. It follows, then, that things done by reason of anger or sensual desire are voluntary.

428. He gives the second reason at are none (1111a28). If the things that are done because of anger or sensual desire are not voluntary, either this is universally true or it is true of evil actions, not of good actions, such that the good actions that a person does by reason of passion he does voluntarily, but the evil actions involuntarily. The proponents of this view were probably influenced by the fact that good actions conform to and evil actions are opposed to reason. But this second supposition seems unacceptable, since the one cause of all human actions (both good and bad) is the will. A man does not rush to do whatsoever is rendered desirable by anger or sensual desire without the consent of the rational appetitive faculty. Likewise, the first supposition seems unreasonable—namely, that someone should call involuntary the good things that he ought to seek even according to passion—for the reason, by means of the will, incites to the things we ought to seek. We ought to be angry under certain conditions, such as to curb sin. Likewise, we ought to desire certain things, for example, health and learning. It remains false, then, to hold that the things done on account of passion are not voluntary.

429. He assigns the third reason at involuntary things (1111a32). It is this. Actions resulting from violence are accompanied by sadness, but those that are done in agreement with sensual desire are done with pleasure. Consequently, they are not involuntary.

430. The fourth reason given at further, what (1111a33), is this. As has been pointed out before [383, 393], voluntary faults are to be censured and avoided. This cannot be said of involuntary faults, because a man is neither able to avoid these nor censured on account of them. But, as sins that are committed after reflection—that is, with deliberation—are to be avoided and are blameworthy, so also are sins that are committed on account of anger or another passion. A man can, by means of his will, resist passion. Hence, if he does a disgraceful act because of passion, he is blamed. Therefore, they do not differ from things done by deliberation so far as they are voluntary.

431. He assigns the fifth reason at the irrational passions (1111b1). Irrational passions—namely, of the sensitive appetitive faculty—seem to be human, insofar as the sensitive appetitive faculty can obey reason, as was stated before [272]. Therefore, the actions proceeding from anger, sensual desire, and the other passions are human. But no involuntary operation is human, for neither praise nor blame are imputed to a man who acts involuntarily. Therefore, it is unreasonable to say that things done out of passion are involuntary.