Lecture 7 — Counsel

Do men take counsel about all things in such a way that everything is worthy of deliberation, or are some things not objects of counsel? [458]

A thing must not be called worthy of deliberation because some foolish or insane person takes counsel about it, but because men of good sense do so. [459]

No one takes counsel about eternal things (such as the whole universe or the incommensurability of the diagonal and the side of a square) [460];

things that are in motion, provided their motion is always uniform, either by necessity, or from nature, or on account of some other cause (such as the solstices and the risings of the sun) [461];

things that sometimes happen otherwise (such as droughts and rains) [462];

things that happen by chance (such as the finding of a treasure) [463];

and all human things (for instance, the Spartans do not take counsel about how the Scythians ought best to live their lives). [464]

None of these things will take place by our efforts. [464]

We do take counsel about practicable things within our power. [465]

There is no other class of things left. Seemingly the causes are nature, necessity, and chance, to which must be added the intellect and anything else causing what is done by man. Each man takes counsel about those practicable matters that can be done by him. [466]

About certain self-sufficient branches of instruction, counsel is not taken, for instance, about writing the letters of the alphabet, for there is no doubt about how the letters must be formed. But counsel is taken about whatever is determined by us. [467]

In these matters, counsel is not always taken in the same way, for instance, in regard to things pertaining to the art of medicine, to business, and to navigation. In all these—inasmuch as they are less certain—we take more counsel than in gymnastics. The same is to be understood of other arts. [468]

It is more necessary to take counsel in the arts than in the sciences, for more doubts arise in the arts. [469]

Counsel has to concern things occurring more frequently. [470]

It must concern uncertain things where it has not been determined in what way they will come to pass. [471]

We invite counsellors in matters of importance, not trusting ourselves as capable of coming to a decision. [472]

458. Do men take counsel about all things. After the Philosopher has finished the treatise on choice, he here takes up the question of counsel.

First, he treats counsel in itself;

second, at the objects of counsel (1113a2; [483]), he treats it in comparison with choice.

On the initial point, he does two things.

First, he shows the things about which counsel ought to be taken;

second, at we do not take counsel about ends (1112b11; [473]), he treats the method and order of taking counsel.

He handles the first consideration in two steps.

First, he puts forward his proposition;

second, he executes it at no one takes counsel** (1112a21; [460]).

In regard to this, first he also does two things.

First, he proposes the question he intends to treat: should men take counsel about all things in such a way that everything is worthy of deliberation, or are some things not objects of counsel?

459. Second, at a thing must not (1112a19), he explains the proposed question with the observation that a thing is not said to be worthy of deliberation from the fact that sometimes counsel is taken in the matter by some foolish person who perversely uses his reason, or by an insane person entirely lacking the use of reason. But something is deemed worthy of deliberation inasmuch as men with good sense do deliberate about it. Men of this type take counsel only about things that of their nature require careful consideration and that are properly said to be worthy of deliberation. Foolish people sometimes deliberate even about things where no counsel is required.

460. Then, at no one takes counsel (1112a21), he shows where counsel should function:

first, by distinguishing things according to their own causes;

second, at about certain (1112a34; [467]), by distinguishing things according to every cause;

third, at counsel has to concern (1112b7; [470]), by distinguishing things according to the qualities of the things themselves.

On the first point, he does three things.

First, he shows where counsel is unnecessary;

second, at we do take counsel (1112a30; [465]), he infers the areas with which counsel does deal;

third, at there is no other class (1112a31; [466]), he shows that the conclusion follows from the premises.

In regard to the first one, five considerations require his attention.

First, he says that no one takes counsel about eternal things, that is, about things existing always and without motion. Examples of this sort are either those the substances of which are not subject to motion (as separated substances and the whole universe itself) or those that, even though they exist in movable matter, nevertheless are separated from such matter according to reason, such as mathematical entities. Hence, he gives the example of the diagonal of a square and its rib or side—no one takes counsel about the commensurability of such things.

461. Next, at things that are in motion (1112a23), he says that no one takes counsel even about things that are in action provided that their motion is always uniform. This uniformity of motion may be either of necessity, and not by reason of any other cause (as are those things which are of themselves necessary), or from the nature of movable bodies, or through the agency of some separated cause such as immaterial substances, movers of the heavenly bodies, about which he speaks here. Hence, he takes an example from the revolutions or circular motions of the sun and its risings, and so forth.

462. Third, at things that sometimes (1112a26), he says that deliberation is unnecessary about things in motion and that usually follow the same pattern, even though sometimes, in a minor number of cases, they happen otherwise. Such are the droughts that generally occur in summer and the rains that commonly fall in winter; although this may at times vary.

463. Fourth, at things that happen (1112a27), he says that counsel is not taken about things that happen by chance, such as the finding of a treasure. Just as the things spoken of above [461–2] do not depend on our action, so things happening by chance cannot depend upon our forethought, because they are unforeseen and beyond our control.

464. Fifth, at all human things (1112a28), he says that, as men do not take counsel about necessary, natural, and fortuitous things, so neither do they take counsel about all human things. Thus, the Spartans do not take counsel about how the Scythians—who dwell a long way from them—ought best to live their lives.

He then subjoins a common reason valid in all the aforementioned cases when he says, none of these things will take place (1112a29), because none of these things that are necessary or natural or fortuitous or done by other men take place by reason of our efforts.

465. Then, at we do take counsel (1112a30), he concludes as it were from the premises about the proper field for counsel. He says that men take counsel about practicable things within us, that is, in our power. Counsel is ordered to action.

466. Next, at there is no other class (1112a31), he shows that this follows from the premises because, besides the things just mentioned about which it has been indicated that counsel does not apply, there remain these situations within us on whose behalf counsel is required. He proves his contention by separating the causes. Seemingly there are four causes of things: nature, which is the principle of motion either in the case of things always moved in the same way or in the case of things for the most part preserving uniform motion; necessity, which is the cause of things existing always in the same way without motion; fortune, an accidental cause outside the intention of the agent; and chance, which is included under fortune. Besides these causes, there is the intellect and whatever else is man’s agent, as the will, the senses, and other principles of this kind. This cause is different in different men, such that each takes counsel about those practicable matters that can be done by him. From this, it follows that counsel is not taken about things done by other causes, as already noted [464].

467. At about certain (1112a34), he shows about what subjects counsel can be taken in the creative arts, according to which we do what is within our power.

On this point, he does two things.

First, he shows where in the arts counsel is taken and where it is unnecessary. He says that those creative arts that have a fixed mode of procedure and are self-sufficient to the extent that what is done rests on nothing extrinsic do not require counsel, as writing the letters of the alphabet. The reason for this is that we deliberate only about doubtful matters. And there is no doubt about how a letter should be formed, because there is a fixed method of writing that is not doubtful and the written work depends only on the art and hand of the scribe. But counsel is taken about those situations in which we must fix for ourselves in advance how to proceed, since they are not certain and determined in themselves.

468. Second, at in these matters (1112a37), he shows that, in these matters, counsel is not taken in the same way, but that some cases require more deliberation and others less.

First, he explains this difference among the creative arts themselves. He states that, in those cases in which we have the final say, we do not always take counsel in the same way, that is, with equal deliberation. We deliberate more about some things that are less certain and in which we must take into consideration more external things: in the art of medicine we must be mindful of the natural strength of the sick person; in business, we must assess the needs of men and the supply of goods; and in navigation, we must take into account the winds. In all these, we take more counsel than in gymnastics, namely, the arts of wrestling and exercising that have more fixed and determined methods. According as the previously mentioned arts are less settled, by so much must we take more counsel in them. The same must be understood of other arts.

469. Second, at it is more necessary (1112b6), he shows the difference relative to the necessity of counsel in the creative arts and in the speculative sciences. He indicates that counsel is more necessary in the arts (the practicable) than in the sciences (the speculative). In the latter, deliberation occurs not in regard to their subject matter—for these exist necessarily or by nature—but as regards the use of these things, such as how and in what order we are to proceed in the sciences. In this, however, counsel is less mandatory than in the practical sciences, about which we have more doubts because of the great variety occurring in these skills.

470. Then, at counsel has to (1112b7), by considering the qualities of the things themselves, he shows about which things counsel ought to be taken. On this point, he puts forward three qualities of things with which counsel deals.

First, he says that counsel has to do with things that occur more frequently. However, because they can happen otherwise, it is uncertain in what way they may take place. If a man should wish to deliberate about things that rarely happen—for instance, about the possible collapse of a stone bridge over which he must pass—he will never get anything done.

471. Second, at it must concern (1112b8), he says that counsel must attend to those situations in which no determination has yet been made of their outcome. A judge does not take counsel about how he ought to pass sentence on the cases stated in the law, but rather about cases in which something is not determined in the law.

472. Third, at we invite counsellors (1112b10), he says that we take others into our confidence for advice in things of importance, as if we did not acknowledge our own capability of deciding what we ought to do. Thus, it is obvious that counsel ought not to be taken about trifling things of every kind, but only about things of importance.