Lecture 18 — The Properties of Fortitude

Although fortitude is concerned with both daring and fear, it is not concerned with each in the same way. Its task rather is to manage terrifying things, for one who is not disturbed by these things but conducts himself as he ought in regard to them is braver than the man who behaves well in regard to daring. [583]

As has been said, men are called brave because they endure distressing things. Consequently, fortitude is justly praised because it does not withdraw on account of pain. It is more difficult to endure afflictions, as we have indicated, than to abstain from what is pleasant. [584]

Still, the brave man seems to take pleasure in attaining the end for the sake of fortitude, but this pleasure vanishes on account of the accompanying discomforts, as we see happen in athletic contests. Boxers take pleasure in the end they strive for, the laurel wreath and the honors. But, being flesh and blood, they suffer pain from blows, and all the labor they undergo is disagreeable. Because these distressing things are many and the end insignificant, they do not seem to feel any pleasure. Such also is it with the act of fortitude, for death and wounds are painful to the brave man who endures them to attain the good of virtue and to avoid disgrace. [586]

As a man is more perfect in virtue and happier, so much the more is he saddened by death. The virtuous man most of all deserves to live, and he is knowingly deprived of the most excellent goods. This is saddening. [588]

But it does not lessen the virtue of the brave man. Rather, a man is said to be brave because he prefers the good of fortitude in battle to those goods. [591]

The pleasurable operation is not found in all virtues except as it attains to the end. [592]

Nothing hinders men who are not such as we have described from being very good soldiers. But perhaps even those who are less brave and have no other good in view are good soldiers. They are prepared for dangers and barter their life for trifling gains. [593]

So much, then, have we discussed the question of fortitude. From what has been said, we can without difficulty understand the outline of the definition of fortitude. [594]

583. Although fortitude is concerned. After the Philosopher has treated the matter and the act of fortitude, he considers here certain properties according as it is related to pleasure and pain.

On this point, he does two things.

First, he details the properties of fortitude.

Second, he excludes them from the fortitude of the soldier, at nothing hinders (1117b17; [593]).

He develops the first consideration in three ways.

First, he shows how fortitude is related to fear and daring;

second, how fortitude is related to pain, at as has been said (1117a32; [584]);

third, how fortitude is related to pleasure, at still, the brave man seems (1117a35; [586]).

He says first that, although fortitude is concerned with both daring and fear, it is not concerned with each in the same manner. But praise of this virtue consists rather in this: that a person behaves well with respect to terrifying things. One who is not disturbed by frightening evils but conducts himself as he ought in regard to them is more commended for bravery than one who conducts himself well in regard to daring. The reason is that fear is a threat to a man from someone stronger rising up against him. But daring originates from the fact that a man thinks that the one he attacks is not too powerful to overcome. It is more difficult to stand against a stronger man than to rise up against an equal or weaker one.

584. Then, at as has been said (1117a32), he shows in what manner fortitude is concerned with pain. To understand this, we must consider that fear and pain share the same object, evil. But they differ according to past and future. Future evil is something terrifying, while evil threatening in the present is something afflicting. It pertains to the brave man not only to stand against the fear of future dangers but also to continue steadfastly in the midst of these very dangers, as was noted previously [548]. For this reason, he says that men are called brave particularly because they stout-heartedly endure distressing things, namely, immediately threatening things like blows and wounds. So it is that fortitude has pain connected with it.

585. Consequently, fortitude is justly praised because it does not withdraw from the good of virtue to escape pain. On this account, it is reasonable that fortitude is most praiseworthy, since the praise of virtue consists especially in the fact that a person deals courageously with troublesome matters. It is more difficult to endure distressing things (which pertains to fortitude) than to abstain from pleasurable things (which pertains to temperance). Therefore, fortitude is more praiseworthy than temperance.

586. Next, at still, the brave man (1117a35), he shows in what manner fortitude is related to pleasure.

He discusses this point from three aspects.

First, he submits his proposition.

Second, he rejects an error, at as a man is more perfect (1117b9; [588]).

Third, he deduces a corollary from what has been said, at the pleasurable operation (1117b15; [592]).

He says first that, since fortitude consists in enduring distressing things, the brave man seems to take some pleasure in attaining the end for which he bravely struggles. But this pleasure is vapid—that is, feebly felt on account of the accompanying griefs, as happens in athletic contests in which boxers fight with no protection.

587. Boxers take pleasure in the end they strive for, namely, that they may receive the crown and be honored. But to take a beating is painful to them. To deny this is to deny that they have flesh and blood, for if they have sensitive flesh, hurtful things must cause them pain. Likewise, all the drudgery they suffer in fighting is disagreeable to them. Since there are many disagreeable and painful experiences they undergo, and since the good they possess as an end is something insignificant, they do not seem to be sensible of any pleasure, because the pleasure is absorbed by the stronger pain. So it occurs, too, in the act of fortitude, for death and wounds are painful to the brave man, although he endures them to attain the good of virtue and to avoid disgrace—an end more important than that of boxers. Hence, some pleasure abides rather by reason of the end.

588. At as a man is more (1117b9), he rejects the error of the Stoics, who held that virtuous men feel no pain.

He considers this point in a twofold manner.

First, he proves that very intense pain befalls the brave man;

second, that, because of this, his fortitude is not lessened, but increased, at but it does not lessen the virtue (1117b13; [591]).

He argues in the first part from what the Stoics took for granted, that there was no human good except virtue. Therefore, they said that the virtuous man is not subject to grief because, by reason of his own good, he suffers no harm. On the contrary, the Philosopher says that, as a man is more perfect in virtue and happier according to the happiness of the present life, so much more he is saddened (according to the consideration of the goods of this life) by the imminence of death.

589. A man’s sadness at the loss of any good can be increased by two circumstances.

First, if the loss is of a deserved good;

second, if the loss is of something great.

Both things are present in our case, because the virtuous man most of all deserves to live. Likewise, he is knowingly deprived of the most excellent good, that is, the best life and the virtues that he loses so far as the use in the present life is concerned. This causes him distress, even granted that sorrow does not befall him in respect of any other evils whatsoever that are suffered without the loss of life.

590. But we must consider that, to some virtuous men, death is desirable on account of the hope of a future life. But the Stoics did not discuss this, nor did it pertain to the Philosopher in this work to speak of those things that belong to the condition of another life.

591. Then, at but it does not lessen the virtue (1117b13), he says that this sorrow of which we were speaking does not lessen fortitude. Rather, someone is said to be brave from the fact that he chooses the good of fortitude—which is sought in battle—in preference to those goods that he loses by death, desiring more to do one great good than to preserve many lesser goods, as will be explained later in book 9 [1879–80].

592. Next, at the pleasurable operation (1117b15), he concludes from the premises that, although it was stated in the first and second books [154–60, 267, 275–9] that virtuous operations are pleasurable, the pleasurable operation is not found in all virtues, but only as it attains to the end. This is noted on account of fortitude, as is evident from what was just said [586–7].

593. At nothing hinders (1117b17), he excludes the previously mentioned properties from the fortitude of the soldier. He says that nothing hinders some men who are not such as we have described the brave man to be from being very good soldiers. But perhaps those who are less brave and attend to no other good, not even the good of fortitude, are better soldiers. They are prepared for danger not by reason of any good of virtue, but in a measure, they barter their life, which they expose to risk for trifling gains of money and booty for instance.

594. Then, at so much, then (1117b20), he sums up in conclusion what has been said. He states that the definition of fortitude can be understood according to its general outlines, such that we may say that it is a virtue consisting in a mean according to right reason dealing with fear and daring on account of the good.