Lecture 6 — Choice and Opinion

Choice is not opinion, for opinion can concern everything—no less eternal and impossible things than things lying within our power. [448]

Then, too, opinion is divided into false and true, but not into good and bad, as is the case with choice. Perhaps there is no one who maintains that choice is generally identical with opinion. [449]

Nor is choice identical with a particular opinion. In choosing good or bad things, we are said to be good or bad, but this is not the case in forming opinions about them. [450]

We choose to accept or reject this or anything pertaining to our actions. But we have an opinion as to what a thing is or what effect it has or how it is to be used. However, accepting or rejecting something is hardly a matter of opinion. [452]

Choice is rather praised because it chooses what it ought—as it were—in the right way, while opinion is praised because it has the truth about something. [453]

We choose those things that we especially know are good. But we have an opinion about things we are not sure of. [454]

And it is not necessarily the same people who make the best choices and form true opinions. Some men form a true opinion of what is better, but on account of bad will, they do not make the right choice. [455]

Whether opinion should be said to precede choice or follow it does not matter, for we do not intend to determine this, but whether choice is identical with a particular opinion. [456]

What, then, is its genus, what its specific difference, since it is none of the things previously mentioned? Seemingly, it is a voluntary thing. However, not every voluntary thing—but certainly the deliberately intentional voluntary—is a thing chosen, for choice must be accompanied by reason and intellect. Even the name seems to imply that one thing be preferred to others. [457]

448. Choice is not opinion. After the Philosopher has shown that choice is not the same as sensual desire, nor as anger, which belongs to the sensitive appetitive faculty, nor as wishing, which belongs to the rational appetitive faculty, he here shows that choice is not the same as opinion, which pertains to reason itself.

He illustrates this point by a threefold consideration.

First, he shows that choice is not the same as opinion in general.

Second, at nor is choice (1112a1; [450]), he shows that choice is not the same as that particular opinion that concerns itself with the things we do.

Third, at whether opinion should be (1112a11; [456]), he raises a doubt (which he leaves unsolved).

He says first—this is apparent from the premises—that choice is not the same as opinion in general.

He proves the statement by two reasons, the first of which is this. Opinion can concern everything—no less eternal and impossible things than things lying within our power. But choice concerns only things within our capacity, as was just noted [447]. Therefore, choice is not the same as opinion.

449. He gives the second reason at then, too, opinion is divided (1111b33). It is this. The things that are distinguished by various reasons are said to differ and not to be the same. Opinion, however, is divided into true and false, since it pertains to the faculty of knowledge, the object of which is the truth. Opinion is not divided into good and bad, as is the case with choice, which belongs to the appetitive faculty, the object of which is the good. He concludes from this that choice is not the same as opinion in general. This is so obvious that no one affirms the contrary.

450. Then, at nor is choice (1112a1), he shows that choice is not identical with that opinion that deals with the things we do. He proves this by five reasons. The first is this. From the fact that we choose good or bad things, we are said to be such (that is, good or bad). But, from the fact that we have an opinion about good or bad things, or about true or false things, we are not said to be good or bad. Therefore, choice is not identical with opinion, which refers to eligible things.

451. The reason for this difference is that a man is not called good or bad on account of his capabilities, but on account of his actions, (Metaphysics 9.9.1051a4–15; see Aquinas, In IX metaph., lec. 10, nn. 1883–85.) that is, not because he is able to act well, but because he does in fact act well. When a man understands perfectly, he becomes able to act well, but he does not yet act well. Thus, one who has the habit of grammar is able by that very fact to speak correctly, but that he actually speak correctly, he must will it. The reason is that a habit is that quality by which a person acts when he wishes, as the Commentator says on De anima 3. It is obvious, then, that good will makes a man act well according to every capability or habit obedient to reason. Therefore, a man is called good simply because he has a good will. However, from the fact that he has a good intellect, he is not called good simply, but relatively good—for example, a good grammarian or a good musician. Therefore, since choice pertains to the will but opinion to the intellect, we are called good or bad by reason of choice but not by reason of opinion.

452. He gives the second reason at we choose to accept (1112a3). Choice has to do especially with our actions. We choose to accept or reject this thing, or whatever else there is that pertains to our actions. But opinion principally refers to things. We have an opinion as to what this thing is (for instance, what bread is) or what effect it has or how one must use it. Opinion, however, does not principally concern our actions, for example, that we are of an opinion about accepting or rejecting something. The reason is that our actions are particular contingent things and quickly passing. Hence, a knowledge or opinion of them is not often sought for the sake of the truth in them, but only because of something done. Therefore, choice is not identical with opinion.

453. He assigns a third reason at choice is (1112a5), which runs thus. The good of choice consists in a kind of rectitude; that is, the appetitive faculty rightly orders something to an end. This is what he means saying that choice is rather praised because it chooses what it ought, as it were in the right way, while opinion is praised because it has the truth about something. Thus, the good and perfection of choice is rectitude, but the perfection of opinion consists in truth. Things that have different perfections are themselves different. Therefore, choice is not opinion.

454. The fourth reason, given at we choose those things (1112a7), is this. Choice is accompanied by certitude, for we choose those things that we especially know are good. But opinion lacks certitude, for we have an opinion about the things we are not sure are true. Therefore, choice and opinion are not identical.

455. He assigns the fifth reason at and it is not necessarily (1112a8). If opinion and choice were identical, those who make the best choices and those who have true opinions about them would necessarily be identified. This is obviously false, however, for some men form a true opinion in general of what is better, but on account of bad will they do not choose what is better, but what is worse. Therefore, choice and opinion are not identical.

456. At whether opinion (1112a11), he raises a doubt whether opinion should be said to precede choice or follow it. He states that it does not matter for the present because we do not intend to determine the order of these things, but only whether choice is identical with a particular opinion. Nevertheless, we must know that opinion, since it pertains to the faculty of knowledge, strictly speaking, precedes choice pertaining to the appetitive faculty, which is moved by the cognoscitive power. However, it sometimes happens accidentally that opinion follows choice, such as when a person changes the opinion he formerly held on account of the affection for things he loves.

457. Then, at what, then (1112a13), he shows what choice is. He says that, since it is none of the four things previously mentioned, we must consider what it is according to its genus and what according to its specific difference. As to its genus, seemingly it is voluntary. However, not every voluntary thing is a thing chosen, as has been pointed out before [434–6], but only the deliberately intentional voluntary thing. That this difference should be given attention is clear from the fact that counsel is an act of the reason, and choice itself must be accompanied by an act of reason and intellect. The very name—meaning that one be accepted rather than another—seems to imply or signify this in a hidden way. It pertains to deliberative reason to prefer one to others.