Lecture 17 — Counterfeit Fortitude

People confuse rage or wrath with fortitude. Indeed, the enraged appear brave in the way that wild animals turn on those who have wounded them. The brave man does give the appearance of rage, which acts most impetuously against danger. Hence Homer warns, put strength into thy wrath, (Iliad 14.151.) and arouse thy might and wrath, (Iliad 5.470.) and (in reference to a certain man) he panted harsh courage through both nostrils, (Odyssey 24.318.) and his blood boiled. (Theocritus 20.15.) All such expressions seem to signify the stirring up and the impulse of rage. [572]

The brave are incited to valorous deeds by reason of honor with rage cooperating. [573]

Wild animals attack danger because of pain from a wound or from fear; undisturbed in the woods and swamps, they do not come out to attack. They are not truly brave because, aroused against danger by pain and rage, they do not foresee the risks involved. Otherwise, hungry jackasses would be brave, since they do not stop eating when beaten. (Adulterers too undertake many risks for their sensual desire.) Therefore, animals who are incited against danger by pain and rage are not truly brave. That reaction prompted by passion seems to be a most natural one, and if to it be added choice and a proper end, it is fortitude. [574]

Angry men are grieved [because of injury suffered], but delighted when taking vengeance. Those who act this way perhaps are fighters, but hardly brave men, for they do not do what is honorable, nor are they led by reason, but rather by passion. They do though possess something similar to real fortitude. [576]

Likewise, the confident are not truly brave; they are hopeful because they have often conquered many enemies in the midst of dangers. [577]

However, such confident people are like the truly brave because both are daring. But the truly brave are daring in the fashion already indicated, while the confident dare because they think themselves better fighters and expect to suffer nothing. The intoxicated also act in this way, becoming abundantly hopeful, but when they fail to get what was expected, they give up. The brave man, though, will suffer evils that seem, and really are, terrifying to men—and this for the sake of what is honorable and to avoid disgrace. [578]

Therefore, that man seems to be braver who does not fear more and who is not more disturbed by unexpected terrors than by those that were foreseen. He seems to act more by habit, since he acts less from preparation. Someone can choose by reason and deliberation things that are foreseen, but in unexpected events, habit asserts itself. [579]

Those who operate in ignorance of dangers seem to be brave. They do not differ greatly from people who are brave by reason of great hope. They are inferior, however, since they have no self-reliance, unlike the confident who remain in the fight for some time. Those who are bold through ignorance take flight as soon as they know the situation is different from what they suspect. This happened to the Argives when they fell on the Spartans whom they thought Sicyonians. (Xenophon, Hellenica 4.4.10.) We have now discussed both the brave and those thought to be brave. [580]

571. People confuse rage or wrath. After having disposed of two types of counterfeit fortitude, he proposes here to treat a third kind operating by means of rage that urges to the act of fortitude.

He treats this point in a twofold manner.

First, he shows how rage inclines to the act of fortitude.

Second, at the brave are (1116b30; [573]), he shows how this fortitude differs from real fortitude.

He observes first that men in common usage of speech confuse rage with fortitude when they attribute to fortitude things that enraged or angry people do. Indeed, the enraged and angry do seem to be brave. So, too, do beasts, who, when aroused to rage, attack men beating them. Fortitude has some likeness to rage inasmuch as rage incites against danger with a very strong impulse. But the brave strives against danger with strength of soul.

572. As an example, he quotes the verses of Homer, who warned someone in these words: put strength into your wrath so that wrath may be directed by the virtue of the soul; arouse your might and wrath that the virtue of your soul may be rendered more prompt by anger. Elsewhere, Homer remarks that certain people pant harsh courage through both nostrils; in other words, wrath, because of the beating of the heart, makes breathing so heavy that sometimes the blood boils up through the nostrils from the force of rage. And the Philosopher observes that Homer’s statements here seem to indicate that anger is aroused and gives impetus to fortitude’s act.

573. Then, at the brave (1116b30), he explains the difference between this and genuine fortitude.

He discusses this point from three aspects.

First, he shows what pertains to true fortitude;

second, at wild animals attack (1116b31; [574]), what pertains to the rage of beasts;

third, at angry men (1117a5; [576]), what pertains to human rage.

He says that the brave are not incited to perform works of fortitude by the impulse of rage, but by the intention of good. Rage, however, does operate secondarily in these acts in the manner of a cooperator.

574. Next, at wild animals (1116b31), he shows how the anger of beasts compares with the act of fortitude. He remarks that wild animals attack dangers out of pain from harmful things—which they are actually suffering when wounded, for instance—or because of the dread of the things they fear they are about to suffer, such as when they attack men, incited to anger by fear of being wounded. The reason is that, if they were in the woods or swamps, they would not be wounded or fear to be wounded, and so would not come out to attack men. Hence, it is clear that real fortitude is not found in these animals, for they are aroused against the dangers only by pain and rage, since they do not foresee dangers, as those who act bravely by choice. If beasts who act by passion were brave, then, by the same argument, hungry donkeys (who, because of the desire for food, do not stop eating even when beaten) would be brave. Adulterers too undertake many risks for the sake of lust, but real fortitude is not found in them, since they do not act by choice of good, but by reason of passion. So it is clear that animals who are incited against danger on account of pain do not have true fortitude.

575. However much is the likeness between desire and rage, nevertheless, among all the passions, fortitude out of rage seems to be more connatural to genuine fortitude, such that, if rage be antecedently directed by choice and the motivation of a fitting end, real fortitude will be present. He expressly says, antecedently directed, because, in true fortitude, rage ought to follow rather than precede choice.

576. At angry men (1117a5), he shows what belongs to fortitude that operates by the anger of men who seem to act by choice and to intend some purpose—the punishment of the person with whom they are angry. For this reason, he says that angry men are grieved over an injury received and as yet unavenged. But, when they are taking vengeance, they are delighted in the satisfaction of their desire. Those who work vigorously at this may perhaps be called pugnacious, but hardly brave, because they are not doing the right thing, nor are they led by reason, but rather by their passion for the sake of which they desire vengeance. However, they do possess something similar to genuine fortitude, as is evident from the premises [571–72].

577. Then, at likewise, the confident (1117a9), he mentions a fourth kind of fortitude according to which some are called brave by reason of hope.

He develops this idea in a threefold fashion.

First, he explains this type of fortitude.

Second, he compares this type with true fortitude at however, such confident people (1117a11; [578]).

Third, he deduces a corollary from what has been said, at therefore, that man (1117a17; [579]).

He says first that, as those who act bravely on account of anger are not truly brave, so neither are they who act bravely for the sole reason of their hope for victory. But they have a certain preeminence by which they differ from others. From the fact that they have very often conquered in the midst of danger, they are now confident of obtaining victory not by reason of any skill acquired through experience—this belongs to the second type of fortitude—but solely by reason of a confidence derived from their frequent victories in the past.

578. Next, at however, such confident people (1117a11), he compares this fortitude to real fortitude. He notes that those who have abundant confidence in this manner are like the truly brave because both are daring—resolute in meeting dangers—but not in the way that a reckless person is at fault. They differ, however, since the brave boldly attack in the fashion already indicated, that is, by choice and on account of good. But those who have high hopes attack boldly because they think themselves more able fighters and that they are not going to suffer any reverse from others. They resemble drunkards who also become confident when their spirits are reinforced by wine. But when such persons fail to get what they expect, they do not persist; they run away. It is a mark of the brave man, however, to suffer—for the sake of what is honorable and to avoid disgrace—evils that are terrifying to men, real evils and not merely apparent ones.

579. At therefore, that man (1117a17), he deduces a corollary from what has been said. Because the brave man characteristically endures terrifying things according to the inclination of a proper habit, that person seems to be braver who is not more afraid or disturbed by unexpected terrors than by those apparent beforehand. Such a one seems to act more from habit, inasmuch as he apparently has had less opportunity to prepare himself to endure these evils. A man can choose by reason and deliberation (even contrary to the inclination of habit and passion) the things that are foreseen. In no case is the inclination of habit or passion so vehement that reason is unable to resist, provided that the use of reason—which of itself has a relation to contraries—remains with man. But in unexpected events, a man cannot deliberate. Hence, he seems to operate by an interior inclination according to habit.

580. Then, at those who operate (1117a22), he introduces the fifth kind of counterfeit fortitude. He says that those who are ignorant of dangers seem to be brave when they resolutely attack things that are equally dangerous but do not seem so dangerous to them. They do not differ much from people who are brave by reason of great confidence. Each thinks that dangers do not threaten him.

581. They differ, however, in that the ignorant do not consider the evils they attack to be dangers in themselves and without qualification. On the other hand, those who have high hopes know the nature of the evils they assail but do not think that these constitute dangers for them. Those who are ignorant are the more inferior to those who have high hopes, inasmuch as the ignorant have no self-reliance at all, but go out to meet dangers only because of the lack of knowledge. But those who have great hopes remain for some time—even after they recognize the dangers—until the greatness of the danger overwhelms their hope. Those who are brave through ignorance, however, take flight as soon as they know the situation is different from what they suspected. The Argives, Greek citizens, reacted in this way when, thinking they were fighting against Sicyonians—citizens weaker than themselves—they in fact fell upon other stronger soldiers.

582. He concludes that those we have discussed [571–81] are called brave inasmuch as they are considered brave by a similitude, and not because they are truly brave.