Lecture 14 — Fortitude

We stated previously that fortitude is a mean dealing with fear and rashness. [528]

Terrifying things are what we fear. They are the things things we universally call evil. For this reason, philosophers define fear as the expectation of evil. We all fear certain evils such as a bad reputation, poverty, sickness, enmity, and death. [530]

But fortitude does not seem to deal with all evils. [532]

For, to fear some things is both proper and good, and not to fear others is base. For instance, in the matter of a bad reputation, he who fears this is said to be decent and modest; one who does not have this fear is called shameless. Such a person is said by some to be brave in a metaphorical sense, because he is like a brave man inasmuch as he is without fear. [533]

Poverty is not to be feared; neither is sickness, nor any of those things that are not caused by wickedness or man himself. But one who has no fear of these things is not called brave, except perhaps by way of similarity. Some are cowardly in the dangers of war but generous and courageous in the face of the loss of their fortune. [534]

No one is called cowardly because he fears injury to his children or his wife, or because he fears envy or any other thing of this kind. No one is called brave because he does not fear a flogging. [535]

About what kind of terrifying things is a brave man concerned? Is he concerned with the most terrifying? No one can sustain such perils more than he. Now, the most frightening of all is death, for it is the end, and nothing either good or bad seems to exist any longer for the dead. [536]

It does not seem that fortitude is concerned with death as it occurs in every case, such at sea or in sickness, but ony in the most suitable cases, such as when men die fighting for their country. [537]

Such men lose their lives in the greatest and noblest dangers. [538]

Honors are given to them both in the city-states and in the monarchies. [539]

A man is called brave principally because he is not afraid of death for a good cause, nor of all emergencies that involve death. Such emergencies are to be met with most often in battle. [540]

Moreover, brave men are unafraid both in shipwreck and in sickness. They differ from sailors, for these brave men despise this sort of death when there is no hope of rescue, while sailors may well hope to be saved by reason of their experience. [541]

Likewise, brave men act manfully in danger where it is praiseworthy to be courageous and to give one’s life. But neither of these conditions exist in these other forms of death. [542]

528. We stated previously that fortitude. After Aristotle has finished the treatise on virtues in general, he begins here a particularized study of the individual virtues.

First, he treats the virtues concerned with the interior passions.

Second, he treats justice and injustice (concerned with external actions) in book 5, at we must give our attention to justice and injustice (1129a3; [885]).

The first section falls into two parts.

In the first part, he treats the moral virtues dealing with the principal passions touching the very life of man.

Second, he treats the moral virtues that are concerned with the secondary passions, which touch the external goods of man, in book 4 at let us next discuss (1119b22; [649]).

Concerning the first part, he does two things.

First, he studies fortitude, which deals with the passions touching things destructive of human life.

Second, he studies temperance, which deals with the passions touching things preservative of human life, such as food and sex, at following this, we must discuss temperance (1117b23; [595]).

On the first point, he does three things.

First, he investigates the matter of fortitude.

Second, the same thing is not terrifying (1115b7; [543]), he treats the method of its operation.

Third, at although fortitude is concerned (1117a29; [583]), he determines certain properties of the virtue.

In regard to the first, he does two things.

First, he reviews what was clearly evident from the premises about the matter of fortitude, that is, with what passions it deals.

Second, at terrifying things are what (1115a7; [530]), he investigates the objects of these passions as fortitude is concerned with them.

529. He says, as has already been explained in book 2 [267, 341], that fortitude is a kind of mean dealing with fear and rashness. Fortitude denotes a firmness of soul by which it remains unmoved by the fear of dangers.

530. Then, at terrifying things (1115a7), he investigates the objects of the previously mentioned passions according as fortitude treats them, especially on the part of the fear about which fortitude is principally concerned, as will be pointed out later [536]. The objects of fear and rashness are identical, for what one man flees because of fear, another attacks in his rashness.

On this point, three considerations demand his attention.

First, he shows what the objects of fear are.

Second, at but fortitude does not (1115a11; [532]), he explains with what class of these objects fortitude deals, since it is concerned with fear of death.

Third, at it does not seem (1115a28; [537]), he shows in particular what kind of death fortitude envisages.

531. He says first that terrifying things are those we are afraid of—objects of fear, so to speak. All evil things are universally of this kind. Hence, philosophers, in giving a definition of fear, say that it is the expectation of evil. Expectation is here taken generally for any movement of the appetitive faculty toward some future things, although expectation properly speaking is directed only to good, as is hope. It is evident, then, that we all fear some evils, like a bad reputation and disgrace (which are contrary to respectability), destitution and poverty (which are contrary to the goods of external fortune), and sickness, enmity, and death (which are contrary to personal goods).

532. Next, at but fortitude does not (1115a11), he shows that fortitude deals with the fear of some particular evils.

First, he shows about what evils it is not concerned.

Second, at about what kind of terrifying things (1115a24; [536]), he concludes about what evils it is concerned.

On the first point, he does two things.

First, he sets forth his proposition that fortitude does not seem to deal with the fear of all evils.

533. Second, at for, to fear some things (1115a12), he proves his proposition.

And first, that fortitude does not deal with the fear of a bad reputation. The brave man is praised because he does not fear. But there are certain things that we ought to fear in order to live a good life. It is good to fear these things inasmuch as fear is not only necessary for the preservation of respectability but even something honorable itself. There is a kind of disgrace attached to the person who does not fear evils of this sort. This is obvious from the fact that one who fears a bad reputation is praised as decent, that is, morally good and modest. But one who does not fear evil of this kind is blamed as shameless. It is evident, therefore, that fortitude is not concerned with fear of these evils. Sometimes, it is true, a man who does not fear a bad reputation is called by some brave in a metaphorical sense, because he has a likeness to a brave man inasmuch as he is without fear.

534. In the second part, at poverty is not to be feared (1115a17), he shows that fortitude does not deal with the fear of poverty. He says that poverty is not to be feared in the way that a bad reputation is to be feared [533]. Neither is sickness to be feared, nor indeed any of those things that do not pertain to the wickedness of which man himself is the cause. It is useless for man to fear what he is unable to avoid. In regard to such things, therefore, a man ought to fear lest he fall into any of them by his own wickedness. The reason is that fear is useful to avoid these very things, but not otherwise. Although it is not necessary to fear things of this sort, nevertheless one who has no fear of them is not called brave except perhaps in a metaphorical sense. The reason is that not to fear poverty seems to belong to another virtue, liberality. Some are praised for the act of this virtue inasmuch as they spend money freely. Yet they are called complete cowards in the greater dangers of war. Therefore, fortitude is not concerned with the fear of poverty.

535. In the third part, at no one is (1115a22), he shows that fortitude does not deal with any fear whatsoever of personal evils. He says that a man is not called cowardly because he fears injury or envy of himself, his children, or his wife, or any other thing of this kind. A person is not said to be brave because he does not fear the lash but boldly endures it, since these things are not especially terrifying. But a person is brave without qualification from the fact that he is brave in the face of the most terrifying dangers. One who is undaunted in some other circumstances is not called absolutely brave, but brave in that particular category.

536. At about what kind of (1115a24), he shows that fortitude is concerned with the fear of certain evils, saying that a man is called absolutely brave from the fact that he is fearless in the face of dangers that are most terrifying. Virtue is determined according to the maximum of the faculty, as is pointed out in De caelo I. (De coelo 1.2.281a8; see Aquinas, In I de coel., lect. 25, n.249.) Therefore, the virtue of fortitude must deal with the things that are most terrifying, so that no one endures greater dangers than the brave man. Among all dangers the most frightening is death. The reason is that death is the end of all present life, and after death, there does not seem to be any good or evil equal to those things of this life that inflict death on us. Things belonging to the state of the soul after death are not visible to us, but that by which a man loses all his goods is appallingly frightening. Hence, it seems that fortitude is properly concerned with fear of the dangers of death.

537. Then, at it does not seem (1115a28), he shows that fortitude is concerned with the fear of a particular kind of death.

On this point, he does two things.

First, he shows with what kind of death fortitude deals.

Second, at a man is called brave (1115a32; [540]), he explains the relation of fortitude to all the kinds of death.

In regard to the first, he does two things.

First, he sets forth his proposition.

Second, at such men lose their lives (1115a30; [538]), he proves his proposition.

He says first that fortitude is not even concerned with the death that a man suffers in some kind of accident or employment, as at sea or in sickness, but with death that he suffers from the best of causes, as happens when a man dies fighting in defense of his country. The same reason holds in the case of any other death that a person undergoes for the good of virtue. But he makes a special mention of death in battle because, in that undertaking, men more frequently suffer death for the sake of good.

538. Then, at such men lose (1115a30), he proves his proposition by two reasons.

The first is that death in battle happens in the greatest danger, since a man easily loses his life there. It happens also in the most noble of dangers, since a man undergoes the danger in that case on account of the common good that is the greatest good, as has been noted in the beginning [30]. But virtue is concerned with what is greatest and best. Therefore, the virtue of fortitude especially deals with death that takes place in battle.

539. Second, at honors are given (1115a31), he proves the same thing from the fact that honors are given to those who die such a death or bravely expose themselves to the danger of a death of this kind. This is the practice both in city-states that exist by association and in monarchies, where kings alone rule. The reason is that those who fight bravely in battle are honored both while they live and after death. But honor is the reward of virtue. Therefore, the virtue of fortitude is considered as dealing with death of this kind.

540. At a man is called brave (1115a32), he shows how fortitude has a relation to all the kinds of death.

First, he shows the way fortitude is related to the fear of death.

Second, at likewise, brave men (1115b4), he shows its relation to boldness, which is a reaction to dangers of this kind.

On the first point, he does two things.

First, he explains the death about which fortitude is principally concerned. A man is called brave, he says, mainly because he is not afraid of death for a good cause, nor is he afraid of the threats—especially sudden threats—of death. The reason is that every virtue is ordered to good. Actions that must be done on the spur of the moment show in a special way that a person acts from habit. In other situations, a man, after careful deliberations, can perform actions like those that proceed from the habit. Actions pertaining to good and the unexpected dangers in battle are especially of this kind. Hence, the brave man who is not afraid is concerned principally with these actions.

541. Next, at moreover, brave men,(1115a35), he shows how the brave man himself is without fear of other kinds of death. He says that, as a consequence, brave men are unafraid both in storms at sea and in sickness because they do not lose their heads and become upset because of fear of such dangers. In storms, however, they differ from sailors. Even if the brave have no hope of rescue, they nevertheless despise death and are without fear. But sailors are unafraid of dangers from the sea by reason of their experience, for they have hope of being easily able to escape them.

542. Then, at likewise, brave men (1115b4), he shows that fortitude is principally concerned not only with fear of death but also with boldness in dangers of this kind. He says that brave men likewise act manfully by meeting dangers in those circumstances where fortitude is praiseworthy and where it is noble to die, as in battle. It is good that a man endanger his life for the common welfare. But in the aforesaid modes of death, by shipwreck or by sickness, fortitude is not honorable, nor does any good follow from death. Hence, it does not belong to the virtue of fortitude to meet such dangers boldly.