Lecture 21 — How Sorrows, Pleasures, and Desires Affect the Temperate Man

With regard to sorrows, one is not—as in fortitude—called temperate because he faces them, nor intemperate because he does not undergo them. But the intemperate man grieves more than he ought because he does not attain the pleasures he desires. But his pleasure is what causes him grief. On the contrary, the temperate man does not grieve for absent things or in abstention from pleasure. [626]

The intemperate man then desires all pleasures, and he especially desires exquisite pleasures. He is led by sensual desire to choose pleasurable things in preference to all others. For this reason, the intemperate man is saddened when he does not get the pleasure he wants; his desire in fact brings sorrow. He is like the incontinent person who is also saddened by pleasure. [628]

It does not happen too often that men become deficient in pleasure, taking less enjoyment than they ought. Insensibility of this kind is not in keeping with human nature, for the other animals differentiate foods in this, that they take pleasure in some things and in others they do not. If someone finds no joy in anything and does not prefer one thing to another, he is a long way from being human. As this rarely happens, there is no special name for it. [630]

The temperate man follows the golden mean in these matters. He does not delight in those shameful things in which the intemperate man takes the keenest pleasure, but rather he is saddened if they occur. In no way does he rejoice in things more ardently than he ought. He is not unnecessarily saddened by the absence of pleasurable things. If he desires them, he does so in the right measure. He does not crave pleasures more than he ought, nor when he ought not, nor according to any other unreasonable circumstance. [632]

The temperate man desires whatever pleasures are useful to the health and well-being of the body, and he wants them according to right measure and as he ought. He desires other pleasures only if they are not a hindrance to health, nor opposed to what is honorable, nor beyond his means. One who is otherwise disposed takes more enjoyment than is reasonable. The temperate man is not of this nature, but rather acts according to right reason. [633]

626. With regard to sorrows. After the Philosopher has defined in what way temperance is concerned with pleasures, he now explains how it is concerned with sorrows.

And concerning this he does two things:

First, he shows that the brave, the temperate, and the intemperate are affected in different ways by sorrow.

Second, at the intemperate man, then (1119a1), he makes clear his assertion.

He says first that the brave, the temperate, and the intemperate are not disposed toward sorrow in the same way. The brave man indeed suffers many sorrows, but he is praised for this very endurance which is done nobly. This has already been remarked [584, 596]. The temperate man, however, is not praised because he undergoes sorrows. Nor is the intemperate man blamed for not undergoing them, although the cowardly man is blamed. But the intemperate man is censured for the act that he grieves more than he should. His sorrow does not arise from any harmful thing threatening him—which is the cause of the coward’s sorrow—but he is sorry because he does not get the pleasures he wants. Thus, it is by its very absence that pleasure causes him grief. On the contrary, the temperate man is praised for not grieving and for undertaking to abstain from pleasures that he does not desire very much. An effect that follows from the presence of a cause is more important than an effect that follows from its absence.

627. For this very reason fortitude is primarily concerned with sorrows that follow from the presence of harmful things. Temperance, however, is secondarily concerned with sorrows that follow from the absence of pleasures, but primarily with pleasures following from the presence of pleasurable things.

628. Then, at the intemperate man, then (1119a1), he makes evident his assertion, that pleasure is the occasion of sorrow for the intemperate man. This happens because the intemperate man desires all pleasurable things. He strives after pleasure itself. On this account, he strives after everything giving pleasure and he strives after the thing pleasurable in the highest degree, in comparison with which he cares less for other delightful things. Therefore, his pleasure is not guided by reason, but led by sensual desire to choose pleasurable things—especially those that are most abundantly so—in preference to all other useful and honorable goods. The intemperate put aside what is useful and decent in order that they may obtain pleasure. For this reason, the intemperate man is saddened when he does not get the pleasure he wants. Sensual desire brings sorrow when it does not gain the thing coveted.

629. Although, according to a superficial likelihood, it seems incongruous that anyone should be saddened by reason of pleasure, it is nevertheless true that the intemperate man is distressed by pleasure. He is saddened only by its absence, like a ship lost by the absence of its pilot.

630. Next, at it does not happen, he considers temperance’s opposite vice that falls short in regard to pleasures. He says it does not happen very often that men become deficient in pleasures (so that they take less enjoyment than they ought, that is, than is required for the health and well-being of the body and for decent living with others), in which this vice consists and which we have called “insensibility” in book 2 [262, 342]. This defect is not in keeping with human nature, because the other animals differentiate foods in this, that they take pleasure in some, and in others not. So it seems to belong to the common nature of the genus to take some pleasure.

631. Therefore, if there is anyone who does not take pleasure in anything, he seems to be a long way from being human. Because this rarely happens, he who falls short in this manner does not have a special name, except that before [262, 342] we called him “insensible.” When men abstain from pleasures for a useful or honorable reason, as merchants for gain and soldiers for victory, we do not have instances of insensibility. This is not beyond what is reasonable, as is the case with the vice.

632. At the temperate man follows (1119a11), he explains in what way the temperate man should conduct himself in regard to the matter previously mentioned.

He clarifies this point in two stages.

First, he shows from what things the temperate should abstain.

Second, at the temperate man desires (1119a16; [633]), he shows what things the temperate man should enjoy and in what manner.

He says first that the temperate man follows the golden mean regarding the preceding: pleasure, sorrow, and desire.

First, in regard to pleasure, he does not delight in those shameful things in which the intemperate take pleasure, but rather is saddened if any such thing should occur. In general, he does not rejoice in things he ought not, nor does he rejoice more ardently than he ought. Likewise, he is not excessive according to any other circumstance.

Second, in respect to sorrow, he is not saddened beyond measure by the absence of pleasurable things.

Third, in respect to desire, he does not long for absent pleasures, because he cares little for them, or he longs for them in the right measure, which is not excessive; he does not crave pleasure more than he ought, nor when he ought not, nor according to any other circumstance exceeding the norm of reason.

633. Then, at the temperate man desires (1119a16), he shows which pleasures the temperate man enjoys and in what way. He says that the temperate man desires whatever pleasures are useful to the health of the body or its well-being so that he may be prompt and unimpeded for the things of this kind that he has to do. He desires these pleasures, however, according to the right measure and as he ought. If there are other pleasures not necessary for the two reasons previously named, the temperate man desires them under the three following conditions.

634. First, they must not be hindrances to health and well-being, like superfluous food or drink.

Second, they must not be contrary to good, that is, opposed to decency, like the pleasure of fornication.

Third, they must not be beyond his means: they should not exceed his power to possess, as would be the case if a poor man desired to enjoy foods that are too costly.

One who is so disposed that he longs for pleasures harmful to health and well-being, or contrary to decency or exceeding his means, takes more enjoyment than is reasonable. This does not pertain to the temperate man, who loves these pleasures in conformity with right reason.