Lecture 19 — Temperance

Following this, we must discuss temperance, for these virtues seem to pertain to the irrational parts of the soul. [595]

Temperance is a mean dealing with pleasures, as we have said before. It is less concerned with sorrows, and not in the same way. Intemperance also seems to deal with these things. [598]

We must now determine with what kind of pleasures temperance has to do. [599]

There are pleasures of the body and pleasures of the soul, such as the love of honor and learning. The lovers of each of these latter (that is, of honor and learning) rejoice not as a result of any bodily passion, but more as a result of mental activity. [600]

Men are not called temperate or intemperate on account of pleasures of the soul. [601]

Likewise, temperance is not concerned with any other pleasures that are not of the body. Those who love to listen to and tell stories and who waste the day making small talk are not called intemperate, but garrulous. [602]

Those who are inordinately saddened by the loss of friends and money are not called intemperate. [603]

Therefore, temperance will be concerned with the pleasures of the body, but not with all of them. Those who take delight in things seen, such as colors, figures, and writing, are not called temperate or intemperate, although it happens that men take pleasure in such things either as they ought or according to excess or defect. [604]

Temperance is related in a similar way to pleasures concerned with hearing. No one who delights excessively or as he ought in songs or instrumental music will be called intemperate or temperate on this account. [607]

The same is to be said in respect to those who take pleasures in odors, except incidentally. We do not call intemperate people who delight in the fragrance of apples or roses or incense, but rather those who take pleasure in the perfume of cosmetics or the aroma of tasty dishes. The intemperate enjoy these pleasures because, in this way, things they desire are recalled. One may see others too taking delight in the aroma of food when hungry. But it pertains to the intemperate man to rejoice in this aroma as representing what is desirable. [608]

Other animals do not take pleasure according to these senses except incidentally. Hounds do not delight in the scent of rabbits for itself, but in the prospect of food, the sense of which they get through smell. The lion does not rejoice in the lowing of the ox, but in the meal that he senses is at hand because of the sound he apparently enjoys. Likewise, he does not take pleasure in the sight of the stag or the wild she-goat that he discovers, but in the hope of possessing food. [610]

Temperance and intemperance then have to do with such pleasures as the other animals have in common with man. Hence, gratifications of touch and taste seem to be servile and brutish. [612]

595. Following this, we must discuss temperance. After the Philosopher has treated fortitude, which is concerned with terrifying things that are destructive of man’s life, he now takes up the question of temperance, which is concerned with pleasurable things that preserve human life, particularly food and sex.

On this point, he does two things.

First, he indicates what he intends to do;

second, he carries out his intention, at temperance is a mean (1117b24; [598]).

He says first that, after the treatise on fortitude, we must speak about temperance. He finds the reason for this succession in the fact that these two virtues agree in subject. Both pertain to the irrational part, according as that part of the soul is called irrational that is designed by nature both to conform to reason and to obey it, as was stated in the beginning [239]. Such is the sensitive appetite to which the passions of the soul belong.

596. Hence, all the virtues dealing with the passions must be placed in the sensitive appetite. Fortitude is concerned with the passions of fear and daring, which reside in the irascible part, but temperance is concerned with pleasures and pains, which reside in the concupiscible part. Consequently, fortitude is placed in the irascible part, but temperance in the concupiscible part.

597. We must consider that the pleasures of food and sex, with which temperance deals, are common to us and the brutes. Likewise, the fear of death, with which fortitude is concerned, is common to us and them. For this reason, he notes particularly that these two virtues are of the irrational parts, because they belong to the irrational parts of the soul not only on account of the passions themselves but also because of the objects of the passions. There are some passions whose objects do not concern the brutes, like riches, honors, and so on.

598. Then, at temperance is a mean (1117b24), he begins to define temperance.

First, he inquires what the matter of temperance is.

Second, at some desires are (1118b8; [618]), he defines the acts of temperance and of the opposite vices.

He considers the first point under two aspects.

First, he proposes the matter of temperance in general.

Second, at we must now determine (1117b27; [599]), he inquires about its special matter.

In regard to the first point, he reviews three considerations that were discussed in the book 2 [342].

The first is that temperance keeps a mean concerning pleasures.

The second is that temperance deals also with sorrows that arise from the absence of pleasures. Temperance is less concerned, however, with sorrows than with pleasures, for a thing acts more efficaciously by its presence than by its absence.

The third is that intemperance likewise deals with pleasures and sorrows, because contraries are concerned about the same thing.

599. Next, at we must now determine (1117b27), he inquires about the special matter of temperance.

Three aspects claim his attention.

First, he says what he intends to do.

Second, at there are (1117b28; [600]), he distinguishes the kinds of pleasures.

Third, at men are not called (1117b31; [601]), he shows with what kind of pleasures temperance deals.

He says first that, since temperance deals with pleasures, we must now determine with what kind of pleasures it deals so that the nature of temperance in particular may be known.

600. At there are (1117b28), he distinguishes the kinds of pleasure. He says that some of them are of the soul and others are of the body. Pleasures of the body are those that are completed in some bodily affection of an external sense. Pleasures of the soul are those that are completed by interior apprehension alone. He gives an example of pleasures of the soul, beginning with the cause of pleasure—which is love. Everyone takes pleasure from the fact that he possesses what he loves. In some men, we find the love of honor; in others, the love of learning. This love is not perceived by an external sense, but by an apprehension of the soul, which is interior. Therefore, each of these—that is, the man who loves honor or the one who loves learning—rejoices on account of what he loves while he has it. This joy does not arise as the result of any bodily passion, but as a result of the mind’s awareness alone.

601. Then, at men are not called (1117b31), he shows that temperance is not concerned with pleasures of the soul.

He indicates three classes of these pleasures.

Some that have an appearance of propriety, like honor and learning, as we have just noted [600], are pleasurable to the soul. For this reason, he says that men are not called temperate or intemperate on account of such pleasures, since temperance seems to refer to pleasures, which have something of shame about them. Concerned with the pleasures of honor and learning there are, however, certain other means and extremes pertaining to other virtues, as will be clearly shown in book 4 [792–9].

602. Second, at likewise, temperance (1117b32), he now recalls other pleasures of the soul that consist in the sayings and deeds of men. He says that, as temperance is not concerned with pleasures of honor or learning, so also it is not concerned with other pleasures that are not of the body. Those who love to listen to and tell stories and who waste the whole day talking about all kinds of contingent remarks and deeds—unnecessary and useless affairs—are said to be garrulous, but we do not call them intemperate. The reason is that intemperance has not only a futility about it but also a certain baseness.

603. Third, at those who are (1118a1), he introduces a third class of pleasures of the soul that refer to money and friends. Hence, he says that those who are inordinately saddened by the loss of money and friends are not called intemperate. But they can be called vicious from one aspect, because such sorrows do not show turpitude, but only a disordered condition of the appetite. From this—that temperance is not concerned with any class of pleasures of the soul—he concludes that it does concern pleasures of the body.

604. Then, at therefore, temperance will be (1118a2), he shows that temperance is not concerned with all bodily pleasures, but with some.

First, he discloses that temperance does not regard the pleasures of the three senses that perceive through a medium separate from the sense organ.

Second, at any use of taste (1118a26; [613]), he explains in what manner temperance regards the pleasures of the other two senses that perceive through a medium contiguous with the sense organ.

He develops the first point in three steps.

First, he shows that temperance does not deal with the pleasures of the three previously mentioned senses.

Second, at other animals do not (1118a16; [610]), he shows that such pleasures do not belong to brutes.

Third, at temperance and intemperance (1118a23; [612]), he draws a conclusion from what has been said.

Regarding the first, he excludes the three senses.

First, he proves that temperance does not concern pleasures of sight.

605. He says that temperance is not concerned with all bodily pleasures that arise by means of the external external senses. Those who take delight in things seen are not on that account called temperate or intemperate.

He gives examples of three classes of visible objects. Some are the proper sensibles of sight, as colors. Others are common sensibles that, however, are known most particularly through sight, as figures. Still others are sensible incidentally by reason of what is signified through the writing, as writing.

606. This does not mean that virtue and vice are not to be encountered here. It happens in such matters that men may take pleasure as they ought, which is the mean, or according to excess and defect, which pertains to curiosity rather than to intemperance, which regards the more vehement pleasures.

607. Next, at temperance is related (1118a6), he proves that temperance does not have to do with the pleasures proper to hearing. He says that temperance is related in a similar way to the pleasures concerned with hearing; neither it nor intemperance is involved. If someone delights too much or as he ought in melodies (namely, harmonies of human voices) and symphony (that is, the imitation of the human voice achieved through instruments), he will not be called temperate or intemperate on this account, because these are not very vehement pleasures either. But this matter can belong to another virtue or vice.

608. Third, at the same is to be said (1118a9), he proves that temperance does not have to do with the pleasures of smell. Regarding this, we must consider that, as stated in the work De sensu et sensato, (De sensu et sensato, c. 12, 443b17–444b7; see Thomas Aquinas, Sentencia De sensu, tract. 1, lect. 13, nn. 177–86.) the kinds of scents are distinguished in two ways:

In one way, in themselves;

in the other way, by a comparison with the species of savors.

He says, then, that they are not called temperate and intemperate who take reasonable or excessive pleasure in odors considered in themselves, but only when they take pleasure in odors incidentally, that is, according as these odors coincide with the pleasures of taste and touch.

609. We do not call intemperate those who take pleasure in the fragrance of apples or roses or incense, which are species of odor in itself, but those who take pleasure in the aroma of foods or the perfume of cosmetics used by women. The intemperate delight in these pleasures on account of memory of certain things they long for. He clearly shows this by the example of the hungry who take pleasure in odors that do not interest them when they have eaten. So, it is evident that these men do not take pleasure in odors as such, but incidentally. In this way, it pertains to the intemperate man—to whom the things represented by the odors are desirable—to take pleasure in those odors.

610. At other animals do not take (1118a16), he proves that pleasures arising from these senses belong only indirectly to other animals. He says that the brutes find pleasure via these three senses indirectly—that is, by reference to taste and touch.

He clearly shows this first in regard to the sense of smell. Hounds do not take pleasure in the scent of rabbits on account of the scent itself, but on account of the expected food, the sensation of which they receive through smell.

Second, he makes the same point in regard to the sense of hearing. He says that the lion takes pleasure in the lowing of an ox because the lion knows from the sound that a meal is near. Hence, he seems to delight in the bellow of the bull, but this is incidental.

Third, Aristotle manifests the same thing in regard to seeing. He says that the lion does not take pleasure even at the sight of the stag or roe (which he calls a wild she-goat) when he finds something of this kind, but he is delighted by the hope of getting a meal.

611. The reason for these things is that the appetite of the other animals is moved by the instinct of nature alone. On this account, animals take pleasure only in the things referring to the preservation of nature; that is why senses of this kind were given them. But senses have been given to men for the perception of sensible things leading in turn to a knowledge of reason, which moves the appetite of man. So it is that man takes pleasure in the very appropriateness of sensible things considered in themselves, even if they are not ordered to the conservation of nature.

612. Then, at temperance and intemperance (1118a23), he concludes from the premises that temperance has to do with such operations or pleasures as the other animals have in common with man. The same is true of intemperance. Hence, pleasures of this kind seem to be servile and brutish, because what we have in common with irrational animals is slavish and naturally subject to reason in us. Such are the pleasures of touch and taste, which are the two senses besides the three mentioned before.