Lecture 16 — Acts of Civic and Military Fortitude

Other kinds of fortitude are enumerated according to five types. Among these, fortitude of the citizen holds first place, for it is most like real fortitude. Citizens apparently undergo dangers because of legal penalties and the disgrace of cowardice, and also for the sake of honor. For this reason, men are found to be very brave in those states where the cowardly are censured and the brave accorded honors. [561]

Homer mentions men of this kind, such as Diomedes and Hector. The latter says, Polydamas would be the first to reproach me. (Iliad 22.100.) And Diomedes says, Hector at some time or other when boasting to the Trojans will say, Tydides has fled from me. (Iliad 8.148.) [563]

This fortitude is most like that we just discussed as being exercised on account of virtue. It is indeed practiced on account of shame and the desire of the honorable, for fortitude of this sort is for the sake of honor and the avoidance of the disgrace of opprobrium. [564]

Those who are under compulsion from their rulers will be included in the same type of fortitude. They are less worthy of the title, however, insofar as they do not act bravely because of shame, but rather out of fear, for they flee not what is disgraceful, but what is painful. Masters coerce their subjects by threats, as Hector did: Anyone I find giving way to fear and not doing battle will not have a chance to escape the dogs. (Iliad 2.191.) [565]

Rulers do the same thing when they command their subjects not to give ground and beat those who do. A similar judgment is to be passed on those who, before battle, construct walls, trenches, and other such obstacles to retreat. All such have coerced their subjects. But the virtuous man must be brave not because of constraint, but because of the good of virtue. [566]

In particular cases, experience seems to be a kind of fortitude. For this reason, Socrates thought that fortitude was knowledge. As others are brave in other things from experience, so soldiers are brave in warfare. In war, there are many operations without danger, which soldiers know very well. Those engaged in these exercises seem brave to others who are ignorant of the nature of such things. Hence, professional soldiers are especially able by reason of experience to attack their adversaries without harm to themselves: skilled in the use of arms, they are able to guard themselves from blows and to strike back. They possess other skills like those that enable them to inflict injury while they themselves are not injured. They fight against others like the armed against the unarmed, like well-trained athletes against inexperienced rustics. In athletic contests of this kind, it is not the brave who can fight the most, but rather those who are physically powerful and well-conditioned. [567]

Soldiers turn cowards when they see that the danger exceeds their skill and that they are inferior in numbers and military preparations. They are the first to run away, while those possessing the fortitude of the citizen, refusing to leave, give up their lives. This actually happened in the battle at the temple of Hermes. Citizens think it disgraceful to flee and choose to die rather than to be saved under such circumstances. But soldiers expose themselves to danger because, from the beginning, they think themselves more powerful. When the truth dawns on them, they take flight, fearing death more than disgrace, but not so the brave man. [570]

559. Other kinds of fortitude. After the Philosopher has ascertained how the acts of real fortitude and of the opposite vices are constituted, he treats here certain dispositions having an act similar to but lacking real fortitude.

This happens in five ways.

Since real fortitude is a moral virtue (for which knowledge is required, and because of this, choice), a person exercising an act of fortitude can fall short of real virtue in three ways.

In one way, because he does not operate with knowledge. This is the fifth type of counterfeit fortitude, according to which a person is said to be brave through ignorance.

In another way, because a person does not operate by choice, but by passion (whether it is a passion urging one to undergo dangers as anger does, or a passion quieting fear of the mind as hope does).

According to this consideration, there are two kinds of counterfeit fortitude.

560. The third way a person falls short of real fortitude is that he operates by choice but does not choose what the brave man chooses. In undergoing dangers, he does not think it hazardous, because of his skill, to fight in battle, as is evident among soldiers; or he chooses to undergo the dangers not on account of the end that a brave man chooses, but on account of honors or punishments decreed by rulers of states.

561. Accordingly, this portion falls into five parts.

In the first part, he treats civic fortitude or fortitude of the citizen;

in the second, the fortitude of the soldier at in particular cases (1116b3; [567]);

in the third part, fortitude that operates through anger, at people confuse rage (1116b23; [572]);

in the fourth part, fortitude that operates through hope, at likewise the confident (1117a9; [577]);

in the fifth part, fortitude that operates through ignorance, at those who operate in ignorance (1117a22; [580]).

In regard to the first, he indicates three kinds of civic fortitude.

The first kind belongs to those who undergo dangers for the sake of honor.

The second belongs to those who undergo dangers because of the fear of punishments, at those who are under compulsion (1116a29; [565]).

The third, at rulers do the same (1116a36; [566]), belongs to those who attack and expose themselves to dangerous situations because of pressing compulsion.

He discusses the first point under three headings.

562. First, he brings out this kind of fortitude. He says that, over and above real fortitude, certain other kinds of fortitude are enumerated according to five types. Among these, civic fortitude or fortitude of the citizen holds first place because this type is very similar to real fortitude. Citizens undergo dangers to avoid penalties and disgrace that, according to the civil laws, are inflicted on the cowardly, and to acquire honors that are bestowed on the brave by the same laws. So, in those states where blame is heaped on the cowardly and honors on the brave, men are found most brave according to this type of fortitude, and perhaps even according to the real virtue by reason of habit.

563. Second, at Homer mentions (1116a21), he gives examples taken from Homer, who, describing the Trojan War, introduces men brave for honor or fear of blame: Diomedes among the Greeks, and Hector among the Trojans. He represents Hector as saying these words: Polydamas, the Trojan leader, will be the first to reproach me (that is, he will find fault first of all with me) if I do not fight manfully. And Diomedes, exhorting himself to act bravely, said that Hector, haranguing the Trojans, will say in praise of himself and in vituperation of me that Tydides (Diomedes’ name given him from his father) has fled from me and has been beaten.

564. Third, at this fortitude (1116a27), he clarifies what he has said about how this kind of fortitude is very similar to the genuine virtue. He says that the citizen’s fortitude is much like the one of which we have spoken [562], since it is for the sake of virtue. This fortitude of the citizen is practiced through shame or fear of the disgraceful, inasmuch as someone flees disgrace, and through a desire of the good or honorable insofar as this fortitude seeks honor, which is the testimony of goodness. For this reason, he adds in explanation that fortitude of this sort is motivated by honor and avoidance of opprobrium, which is the disgraceful. Since, then, honor is a thing near to an honorable good, and blame to the disgraceful, it follows that this fortitude is close to real fortitude, which seeks what is honorable and flees from what is shameful.

565. Then, at those who (1116a29), he indicates the second kind of civic fortitude that is practiced on account of punishment. He says that those who are brave can be assigned the same type of civic fortitude because compelled by the fear of punishments inflicted by rulers of the state. They are, however, inferior to the previously mentioned insofar as they do not act bravely on account of the shame of disgrace, but on account of fear of punishment. This is why he adds that they do not flee what is disgraceful or dishonorable but what is sorrowful—that is, painful or injurious—from the fact that someone is made sad. In this way, the masters compel their subjects to fight bravely. According to Homer, Hector threatened the Trojans in these words: anyone running away and not doing battle—that is, without fighting bravely—[I will handle so roughly that] he will not have a chance to escape the dogs.

566. Next, at rulers do the same (1116a36), he presents the third kind of civic fortitude according as some are compelled by their rulers then and there, and not only by fear of future punishment. This is why he says that rulers do the same thing by their actions when they command their subjects not to run away from battle, and beat those who do. A similar judgment is to be passed on those who, before battle, construct walls and trenches and other such obstacles to retreat so that their subjects cannot take to flight. All rulers who do things of this kind coerce their subjects to fight. And those who act under compulsion in this way are not really brave, because the virtuous man must be brave not on account of the constraint he suffers, but because of the good of virtue.

567. At in particular cases (1116b3), he treats the fortitude of the soldier.

He explains this question in a twofold manner.

First, he shows what leads soldiers to fight bravely.

Second, he compares the fortitude of the soldier and the citizen, at soldiers turn cowards (1116b15; [570]).

He says first that, in individual cases, experience seems to be a kind of fortitude. In any undertaking, one who has knowledge from experience works boldly and without fear, as Vegetius says in his book on military affairs: no one fears to do what he believes he has learned to do well. For this reason, Socrates thought fortitude was knowledge that is acquired by experience. He even thought that all the virtues are kinds of knowledge. But this question will be studied later in the book 6 [1286]. Therefore, since certain others are brave by experience in particular affairs, so soldiers are brave in warfare by reason of experience.

568. Two things follow from this.

The first is that, in war, there are many great things like the clash of arms, the charge of the cavalry, and so on that strike the inexperienced with terror, although there is little or no danger in them. These things, as the professional soldiers know, are not really to be dreaded. Hence, men seem brave when engaging without fear in exercises that appear dangerous to others who are inexperienced and ignorant of the nature of what is taking place.

Second, it follows that, by reason of experience, professional soldiers in fighting can do hurt to their adversaries while not suffering or being harmed in turn. They can guard themselves from blows and can strike back, for they are clever in the use of weapons, and they possess other skills effective in enabling them to inflict injury while they themselves are not injured. Hence, it is obvious they fight against others as the armed against the unarmed. A man is in effect unarmed if he does not know how or is unable to use arms.

569. The same can be said of athletes, that is, strong and well-trained boxers compared to simple and inexperienced farm boys. In such athletic contests, it is not the brave who can fight the most, but those who are physically powerful and well-conditioned.

570. Then, at soldiers turn (1116b15), he compares the fortitude of the soldier and the citizen. He says that soldiers fight bravely so long as they do not see danger threatening. But when the danger exceeds the skill they have in arms and when they lack numbers and adequate military preparations, they become cowardly. Then they are the first to run away; they were daring for no other reason than that they thought the danger was not imminent. Therefore, when they first see the danger, they take to their heels. But those who possess the fortitude of the citizen—refusing to leave the danger—lose their lives, as happened in a certain place where the citizens remained after the soldiers had fled. The reason is that citizens think it disgraceful to run away, and choose to die rather than save themselves by flight. But soldiers expose themselves to dangers because, from the beginning, they think themselves more powerful. But after they have recognized that the enemy is more powerful, they take to flight, fearing death more than ignominious escape. It is not so with the brave man who fears disgrace more than death.