Lecture 15 — The Act of Fortitude

The same thing is not terrifying to all, but we do call that terrifying that is above the power of man to resist. The superhuman is frightening to every sensible person. However, what is within the power of man differs according to magnitude and degree. It is the same with daring undertakings. [543]

The brave man does not lose his head, but acts like a man. He will, therefore, fear such things, and he will undergo them as he ought, and as reason will judge, for the sake of good, which is the end of virtue. But man sometimes fears dangers more or less; he fears things that are not terrifying as if they were terrifying. Man is at fault because he fears at times the wrong things, at other times in the wrong way or at the wrong time and so forth. The same observation may be made about what inspires confidence. [545]

One who endures and fears the right things, for the right motive, in the right manner, and at the right time, is brave. Likewise, the brave man acts daringly, for he endures and acts in conformity with what is worthy and according to reason. [547]

The end of every action is conformity with its own habit. The good intended by the brave man is fortitude, and this is also an end, since every means is determined by its end. The brave man endures and works, for the sake of good, the things that are in conformity with fortitude. [549]

Of those who go to excess, that man who fears nothing is unnamed. We mentioned before that many vices are unnamed but that a person is a madman or insensible who fears nothing, neither earthquakes nor floods, as it is said of the Celts. [551]

He who is excessive in daring when dealing with frightening things is called reckless. The reckless man is thought to be vain, but he only feigns courage. As the brave man really is in face of danger, so the vain man wishes to appear (even imitating the actions of the brave man). Hence, many who seem brave are in fact cowards. They are daring in these circumstances (of little danger) but do not stand up when fearful things occur. [552]

One who is excessive in fearing is a coward; he fears the things he ought not to fear, as he ought not (and similarly in the other circumstances). He is also deficient in daring, but he is more conspicuous from the fact that he fears painful situations too much. [553]

The coward is a despairing man inasmuch as he fears everything. The brave man, on the contrary, has great hope inasmuch as he is courageous. [554]

The cowardly, the reckless, and the brave are all concerned with these passions, but they are disposed towards them in a different way. The reckless and the cowardly have excess and defect, but the brave man holds a middle course as he ought. [555]

The reckless are precipitate and rush to meet danger, but when actually in it, they fall down. The brave, however, are vigorous while in action and calm beforehand. [556]

As has been pointed out, fortitude is a mean concerned with situations that inspire confidence or terror about which we have spoken; it desires or endures things because it is good to do so, or because it is base not to do so. But to suffer death in order to avoid poverty or a disappointed love or something painful is not characteristic of a brave man, but rather of a coward. It is a kind of effeminacy not to endure these misfortunes, and besides, such a one suffers a death not for an honorable good but to escape evil. Such, then, is the nature of fortitude. [557]

543. The same thing is not terrifying. After the Philosopher has investigated the matter of fortitude, he now treats its act.

First, he distinguishes the act of fortitude from the acts of the opposite vices.

Second, at other kinds of fortitude are enumerated (1116a16; 561]), he treats certain things that have an act similar to fortitude.

He discusses the first point under two aspects.

First, he determines how acts can be differentiated in the matter presently investigated.

Second, at one who endures (1115b17; [547]), he shows what the proper act of fortitude is by comparison with the acts of the opposite vices.

He handles the first point in a twofold manner.

First, he assigns the reason for differentiating acts in this matter.

Second, at the brave man does not lose (1115b10; [545]), he shows how they are differentiated.

He observes first that the same thing is not terrifying to all.

544. Since fear is in the irascible part—the object of which is the difficult—fear is concerned only with an evil that is in some way above the power of the one fearing. Hence, a thing is terrifying to a child that is not terrifying to a mature man. There are evils that exceed human power to overcome, such as earthquakes, tidal waves, and other disasters of this sort. Hence, evils of this kind are terrifying to every sensible man endowed with good judgment. But that terrifying thing that does not seem to exceed man’s power to resist may be viewed in a twofold way.

One is according to the different magnitude of the thing; for example, it is more terrifying to have many enemies come together than to have only a few.

The other is according to degree, such as enemies having greater or less hatred or being closer or farther away. What has been said about terrifying things must be said likewise about things inspiring courage, since fear and boldness have the same object, as has been said previously [530].

545. Then, at the brave man (1115b10), he shows by the reason just given how acts are differentiated in this matter. When it is affirmed that the brave man does not lose his head because of fear, this must be understood as referring to a man of sound judgment. Such a one will fear the things that are above man. Hence, the brave man will also fear them. However, in a case of necessity or utility, he will undergo such things as he ought and as right reason, which is proper to man, will judge. In this way, he will not forsake the judgment of reason on account of the fear of such things, but will endure terrifying things of this kind, no matter how great, on account of the good that is the end of virtue.

546. It happens at times that a man fears terrifying things that are above his power, or within his power more or less than reason judges. What is more, it happens that he fears the things that are not terrifying as if they were terrifying. Man’s sin consists principally in what is contrary to right reason. As sickness takes place in the body by reason of a disorder of some humor, so too sin against reason takes place in the soul by reason of a disorder of some circumstance. Hence, sometimes a person sins in the matter of fear from the fact that he fears what he ought not to fear, but other times from the fact that he fears when he ought not to fear. The same must be said about the other circumstances enumerated above [544]. What has been affirmed about terrifying things is to be understood about things inspiring boldness where a similar reason is found, as has been said [544].

547. Next, at one who (1115b17), he shows what the act of fortitude is by means of a comparison with the opposite vices.

He treats this under two headings.

First, he explains the act of the virtue and of the vices.

Second, at the reckless are (1116a7; [556]), he compares the virtue with certain things that seem similar to it.

He discusses the first point in a threefold manner.

First, he defines the acts of the virtue and the vices relating to fear and rashness;

second, at the coward is (1116a2; [554]), those relating to hope and despair;

third, at the coward, the reckless (1116a4; [555]), he concludes with a summary.

He handles the first point from two aspects.

First, he defines the act of the virtuous man;

second, at of those who go (1115b24; [551]), the acts of the vicious man.

He considers the first point in a twofold way.

First, he expounds his proposition.

Second, at the end (1115b20; [549]), he makes clear something he had said.

548. He says first that one who endures the things he ought to endure and flees through fear the things he ought to avoid with the right motivation, in the right manner, and at the right time is called brave. Likewise, he who dares in the things he ought for the right motive and so forth is also brave. He assigns the reason for this when he says that a brave and virtuous man suffers on account of fear and he acts by means of daring in conformity with what is fitting and as right reason indicates. Every moral virtue is in accord with right reason, as was stated previously [323, 326].

549. At the end (1115b20), he makes clear something he had said, namely, the right motive for operating. He remarks that the end of every virtuous operation is in conformity with the nature of its own habit. A habit caused by custom operates after the manner of a nature because custom is a kind of nature, as is noted in the book De memoria et reminiscentia. (De memoria et reminiscentia 2.452a28; see Aquinas In de mem., lec. 6, n. 383.) The ultimate end of an agent naturally operating is the good of the universe, a perfect good; but the proximate end is to imprint its likeness in another. Thus, the end of a warm object is to make things warm by means of its activity. Likewise, the ultimate end of operative virtue is happiness, a perfect good, as was said in the first book [45, 111–12, 117–18, 201, 222]. But the proximate and proper end is to impress a likeness of the habit on the act.

550. This is what he means in his statement that the good that the brave man intends is fortitude—not the habit of fortitude, for this already exists, but the likeness of it in the act. This also is the end, since every means is determined by its proper end, because the character of means to the end is derived from the end. For this reason, the end of fortitude is something pertaining to the nature of fortitude. In this way, the brave man endures and works for the sake of good, that is, inasmuch as he intends to perform the actions that are in conformity with fortitude.

551. Then, at of those who go to excess (1115b24), he defines the acts of vicious men:

first, of the man deficient in fear;

second, of the man excessive in daring, at he who is excessive in daring (1115b28; [552]);

third, at one who is excessive in fearing (1115b33; [553]), he defines the acts of the man excessive in fearing.

He says first that there is no special term for the man who abounds—speaking of the vices pertaining to excess in fearlessness—namely, who fears nothing. It was said before [341] that many vices have no names. This particularly happens in things that rarely occur. And fearlessness of this sort rarely happens. It occurs only in the case of madmen and insensible persons who fear nothing—not even earthquakes, floods, or anything of this kind. This is said to happen among certain people called Celts, which is the name of a nation. He speaks here of one who is insensible or without a sense of pain because the future things we fear and the things that cause us pain when present are the same.

552. Next, at he who (1115b28), he treats those who are excessive in daring. He says that the man who, in dealing with terrifying things, abounds in daring by boldly attacking them beyond what reason suggests is called reckless. But there is also one who is apparently but not really reckless, the vain man who pretends to be brave. Hence, as the brave or reckless man really is in regard to terrifying things, so the vain man seeks to appear. Because of this, the vain man imitates the works of the brave or reckless man when he can do so without danger. Hence, many of those who seem brave or reckless are cowardly. Many of those who are reckless in circumstances having little danger do not endure when truly frightening things occur.

553. At one who (1115b33), he treats of one who is excessive in fearing. The Philosopher says a man is a coward when he fears what he should not fear, in the way he should not fear, and so on. The man inordinate in fear is lacking in daring. The only reason why a person does not attack to destroy frightening things is fear. But the lack of fear can exist without the recklessness of attack. It does not follow, then, that everyone who does not flee as he ought attacks more than he ought. But whoever is deficient in attacking the right things is motivated only by fear. For this reason, Aristotle separates the defect of fear from the excess of recklessness but joins the excess of fear with the defect of recklessness. Although the coward is extreme in fearing and deficient in daring, nevertheless he is more conspicuous from the fact that he abounds in the fear of painful situations than from the fact that he is lacking in daring, because the defect is not so easily seen as the excess.

554. Then, at the coward is (1116a2), he shows how the previously named things are related to hope and despair. For an understanding of this, we must consider that the object of recklessness and fear is evil. But the object of hope and despair is good. The appetitive faculty tends of itself toward the good, but incidentally flees the good by reason of some evil attached. Likewise, the appetitive faculty of itself flees the evil. But what is essential causes what is incidental. For this reason, hope—whose characteristic is to tend toward good—causes recklessness that tends toward the evil it attacks. For the same reason, fear, which flees evil, is the cause of despair, which withdraws from good. He says, therefore, that the coward is a despairing man, inasmuch as he fears his deficiency in everything. On the contrary, the brave man has great hope because he is courageous.

555. Next, at the cowardly, the reckless (1116a4), he sums up what has been said, concluding from the premises that the cowardly, the reckless, and the brave man all are concerned with these passions but related to them in a different way. The reckless man exceeds in daring and is lacking in fear; the cowardly man exceeds in fear and is lacking in daring. But the brave man follows a middle course in these matters, as he ought according to right reason.

556. At the reckless (1116a7), he compares fortitude with things similar to it.

First, he shows the difference between the brave and the reckless man.

Second, at as has been pointed out (1116a10; [557]), he shows the difference between the brave man and the man who undergoes death to escape misfortunes.

Now, the coward seems to have nothing in common with the brave man, and for this reason, Aristotle does not care to assign the difference between them. He remarks that the reckless are impetuous, rushing into danger—that is, swiftly and spiritedly going out to meet it—because they are moved by a surge of passion beyond reason. When they are actually in the danger, they are checked, for the movement of the preceding passion is overcome by the threatening danger. But when the brave are in the very midst of the dangers, they are vigorous because the judgment according to which they act is not overcome by any danger. But, before they meet the difficulties, they are calm, because they do not act from violence of passion, but from deliberate reason.

557. Then, at as has been pointed out (1116a10), he shows the difference between a brave man and the man who undergoes death to escape misfortune. He says, as has been noted [535–40], that fortitude is a mean in terrifying things, which are evils concerned with the dangers of death spoken of before [535–40]: fortitude tends to operate virtuously and sustains sufferings of this kind in order to bring about something good and honorable, or in order to flee something disgraceful and dishonorable. However, that one should die by laying hands on himself or by voluntarily suffering death inflicted by another (in order to escape poverty or a longing for a thing that he cannot possess or whatever else there is that causes sorrow) does not belong to a brave man, but rather to a coward. This happens for two reasons.

First, it happens because a certain effeminacy of soul, contrary to fortitude, seems to exist when a person is unable to undergo hardships and sorrows.

Second, it happens because such a one does not suffer death for an honorable good, as the brave man does, but to escape a painful evil.

558. Finally, he concludes that we can know the nature of fortitude from what was said.