Lecture 8 — Method and Order of Taking Counsel

We do not take counsel about ends, only about means. A doctor does not deliberate about whether he will cure a patient; an orator does not deliberate about whether he will persuade people; a statesman does not deliberate about whether he will achieve peace. Neither does any other agent take counsel about his end. [473]

But, having taken the end for granted, they will deliberate on how and by what means it may be achieved; when the end is attainable in several ways, by which of these it can be most effectively and most easily attained; when the end is attainable by one means only, how it will be attained through this means; and how this means itself will be attained, until they arrive at the first cause, which will be the last in the order of discovery. [475]

One who takes counsel seems to inquire and to resolve by the method mentioned, as by a diagram. It seems that not every inquiry is a taking of counsel—for instance, a mathematical inquiry—but every taking of counsel is a kind of inquiry. What is last in resolution is first in the order of production. [476]

If those taking counsel find the thing to be done is impossible, they give up the project, for instance, if they need money that cannot be provided. But, if the thing to be done seems practicable, they begin to act. Things are called possible that can be done by us; what our friends do is done in some way by us, for the origin of their action lies in ourselves. [477]

At times, we inquire about what instruments may be used, and at times about the way we ought to use them. It is the same in the other cases, for sometimes we investigate the means of doing a thing, sometimes we inquire how or why it is to be done. [478]

As has been previously stated, it would seem that man originates his own actions and counsel is taken about the things that can be done by him. [479]

Actions are performed for the sake of other things. Counsel, therefore, is not taken about the end, but the means to the end. [480]

We do not deliberate about particular things, for instance, whether this thing is bread, or whether the bread is properly prepared or properly baked. This belongs to sense perception. If a man goes on deliberating forever, he will never come to an end. [481]

473. We do not take counsel about ends. After the Philosopher has shown about what things counsel is taken, he here treats the method and order of taking counsel. Because counsel is a kind of inquiry, he does three things concerning it.

First, he shows the method of deliberative inquiry;

second, at **if those taking counsel **(1112b24; [477]), he shows its effect;

third, at as has been previously stated (1112b31; [479]), he determines the limit of this inquiry.

On the initial point, he does two things.

First, he proposes a method of deliberation.

Second, at one who takes counsel (1112b20; [476]), he explains his statement.

Counsel is a practical deliberation about things to be done. Hence, as in a speculative inquiry, where principles are necessarily taken for granted and certain other things are sought, so also should it be with counsel.

Therefore, he shows first what is taken for granted regarding counsel.

Second, at but having taken (1112b15; [475]), he shows what is the objective in taking counsel.

474. We must consider that, in practicable things, the end holds the place of the principle, because the necessity of practicable things depends on the end, as has been mentioned in the Physics. (Physics 2.9.200a15 sq.; see Aquinas, In II phys., lect. 15, nn. 273–74.) On this account, we must take the end for granted. This is what he means when he says that we do not take counsel about ends but about the means to the end. Thus, in speculative matters, we do not inquire about the principles, but about the conclusions. He clarifies what he has said by examples: a doctor does not deliberate about whether he ought to cure a patient, but this is taken for granted as an end; an orator does not deliberate on whether he ought to persuade people, for he intends this as an end; a statesman or a ruler of the state does not deliberate over whether he ought to achieve peace, which is compared to the state as health to the human body (health consists in the harmony of the humors as peace consists in the harmony of wills). Neither does any other agent take counsel about the end in this way.

475. Then, at but, having taken the end for granted (1112b15), he shows about what and how deliberative inquiry should be made.

He introduces three things concerning this.

The first of these is that, having taken the end for granted, the primary intention of the one taking counsel is how (that is, by what motion or action) he can attain that end, and by what means he must move or work toward the end, as by horse or ship.

His second intention is—when he can attain some end by several things, either instruments or actions—to know by which of these he can better and more easily achieve his goal. This pertains to judgment in finding ways to the end, in which some men are at times deficient.

His third intention is—if it should happen that the end can be attained by one means or motion alone, or most aptly by a particular means—that the end be procured in such a way that it is reached through this means. For this, perseverance and care are necessary. If the means for attaining the end should not be at hand, we must inquire how it can be gained and so on until we arrive at a cause that holds first place in operating (this will be last in the order of discovery).

476. Next, at one who (1112b20), he further clarifies his statement by its likeness to speculative inquiry. He says that the cause that is first in operation is the last in the order of discovery, because one who deliberates seems to inquire, as was just pointed out [473], by some analytic method, just as he who wishes to prove a conclusion by a diagram or a geometrical explanation must resolve the conclusion into principles until he reaches the first indemonstrable principles. All counsel is an investigation—that is, a kind of inquiry—although not every investigation or inquiry is counsel; for example, an inquiry in mathematics is not. Only an inquiry about practicable things is counsel. Because the man who takes counsel inquires in an analytic manner, his inquiry must lead to that which is the principle in operation. The reason is that what is last in analysis is first in production or activity.

477. At if those taking counsel (1112b24), he shows the effect of counsel.

First, he exposes his proposition.

Second, he explains certain things that were said by the words at times we inquire.

He says first that, if those taking counsel, on reaching the point in the deliberative inquiry where the first operation must be done, find this impossible, they give up—that is, dismiss the whole matter as if without hope of success. For example, if, in order to carry out a business venture, a man needs money to pay certain persons and he cannot pay it, he must abandon the project. But, if it is apparent that what was discovered by means of counsel is possible, operation begins immediately, for as was just mentioned [476], the point at which the analytic inquiry of counsel ends must be the beginning of operation. A thing is said to be possible to an agent not only through his own power but also through the power of others. Hence, things done by friends are enumerated by him among possibles because what our friends do is done in some way by us, inasmuch as the principle of the work is found in us, for they themselves do this in consideration of us.

478. Then, when he says, at times we inquire (1112b28), he explains his previous statement: the kinds of things that, upon investigation, we sometimes find possible and sometimes impossible. At times, he says, by counsel we inquire about instruments, such as a horse or a sword, and at times we inquire about the need or suitability of the instruments, that is, how we ought to use them. It is the same in the other arts: sometimes we seek the means of doing a thing, and sometimes we inquire how or why (these belong to the end just mentioned).

479. Next, at as has been previously stated (1112b31), he determines the limit or status of the deliberative inquiry. He does this under three headings.

First, on the part of the agent himself. Hence, he says that, as has been previously stated [292], man is the principle of his activity. Every individual takes counsel about the things that can be done by him. For this reason, when he arrives in the deliberative inquiry at what he himself can achieve, at that point, counsel ceases.

480. Second, at actions are (1112b32), he shows that counsel has a limit or condition on the part of the end. All operations, he says, are performed for the sake of other things, that is, ends. Hence, counsel is not taken about the end, but about the means to the end. Evidently, then, there is a limit in deliberative inquiry (both on the part of the end and on the part of the agent) as in demonstrations (both from above and below) as it were on the part of either extreme.

481. Third, at we do not (1112b33), he shows the status of deliberative inquiry on the part of particular instruments that we use in our operations as available means for arriving at the end. He says that we do not deliberate about particular things, such as whether what is set before us is bread or whether it is properly prepared, that is, baked or made as it should be. This belongs to sense perception.

482. That the status of counsel—as also of demonstration—is according to these three considerations is proved by an argument leading to an impossible conclusion. If a man would always be taking counsel, he would be reaching to infinity, which does not fall under the consideration of the reason, and consequently not under counsel, which is a kind of inquiry belonging to reason, as has been pointed out [476].