Lecture 12 — Refutation of the Opinion That No One Is Voluntarily Evil

Perhaps such a person is naturally not diligent. [507]

But men make themselves negligent by living carelessly, and unjust and incontinent by doing evil to others and spending their time in drinking and such things. [508]

A man’s outlook depends on the way he exercises his powers. This is clearly manifest in the case of those who devote their attention to some exercise or activity. They perfect themselves by constant practice. It seems, then, that only a man lacking understanding would be ignorant that habits are produced by individual actions. [511]

Moreover, it is unreasonable to assert that a man who does unjust actions does not wish to be unjust, or that one who perpetrates seductions does not wish to be incontinent. If one knowingly does those things from which it follows that he is unjust, he will be voluntarily unjust. [512]

Because a person becomes unjust voluntarily, it does not follow that he will cease to be unjust and become just whenever he wishes. One who is sick does not become well in this way. So too it is with a man who voluntarily becomes sick by living immoderately and disregarding the doctor’s advice. Before, it was within his power not to become sick, but having placed the cause, the effect is no longer within his power, just as one who throws a stone has not the power to take back the throwing. Nevertheless, it is within a man’s power to cast or throw a stone, because the original act was under his control. So it is also with the unjust and the incontinent who, in the beginning, had the power not to become like this. For this reason, they are voluntarily unjust and incontinent, although after they have become such, it is no longer within their power not to be such. [513]

Not only are vices of the soul voluntary, but also defects of the body in certain men whom we justly reproach. No one reproaches those who are born ugly, but only those who are so because of slothfulness and carelessness. The same is true with weakness, disgrace, and blindness. No one justly taunts a man who is blind from birth or disease or a wound, but he is rather shown sympathy. But everyone does reproach a man blind because of excessive drinking of wine or other incontinence. Men are reproached for those vices and bodily defects that are within our power, but not for those beyond our control. This being so, in other things, the vices we are blamed for must be within our power. [514]

507. Perhaps such a person. After the Philosopher has rejected the error of those who hold that no one is voluntarily evil, he now removes the roots of this error:

first, in regard to the internal disposition by reason of which (contrary to his own will) someone can tend to evil;

second, at someone may say (1114a32; [515]), in the matter of the faculty of knowledge by which a thing is judged good or bad.

He handles the first point in two steps.

First, he proposes that which one can depend on in support of the preceding error.

Second, at but men make themselves (1114a4; [5-8]), he disproves this.

The Philosopher has stated [506] that it is in the power of man to be diligent or negligent about something. But someone could deny this, saying that some person is naturally not diligent. Thus, we see that men with phlegmatic temperaments are naturally lazy, that men with choleric temperaments are naturally irascible, that men with melancholic temperaments are naturally sad, and that men with sanguine temperaments are naturally joyful. According to this, it is not within man’s power to be diligent.

508. Then, at but men make (1114a4), he rules out what was just said. To understand this, we must consider that a man can be said to be “of a particular bent” in two ways.

In one way, according to bodily disposition, following either the temperament of the body or the influence of the heavenly bodies. By reason of this disposition, there can be no direct change of the intellect or will, which are faculties altogether incorporeal, not using a bodily organ, as is made clear by the Philosopher in De anima. (De anima 3.4.429a29–429b4; see Aquinas, In III de an., lect. 7, nn. 687–99.) But, by this type of disposition, some change can follow in the sensitive appetitive faculty, which does use a bodily organ, the movements of which are the passions of the soul. Accordingly, from such a disposition there is no more movement of the reason and will (which are principles of human acts) than from the passions of the soul; concerning these, it was likewise pointed out in book 1 [241] that they are susceptible of persuasion by the reason.

The other disposition is on the part of the soul. This is a habit by means of which the will or reason is inclined in operation.

509. On this account, the Philosopher, having passed over the dispositions or qualities of the body, treats only the disposition of habits. On this point, he does two things.

First, he shows that habits of the soul according to which a man is negligent or unjust are voluntary from the fact that he is censured on account of them.

Second, at not only vices of the soul (1114a21; [514]), he indicates that even bodily defects that are blameworthy are voluntary.

Regarding the first, he does two things.

First, he indicates that habits of the soul are voluntary with respect to their formation.

Second, he shows that they are not voluntary after their formation has already been completed.

Touching on the first, he does two things.

First, he brings forward his proposition.

Second, at a man’s outlook (1114a7; [511]), he proves it.

510. We must consider that evil habits differ as evil acts do. Some habits are evil from the fact that they withdraw a man from doing good. With respect to habits of this kind, he says that men are the cause of their own evil lives, for they are not diligent in doing good; they live carelessly without attempting good works. Other habits are evil because, through them, a man is inclined to do evil, whether this brings about the injury of others or one’s own disordered condition. With respect to these, he says men by their own volition are the reason why they are unjust inasmuch as they do evil to others and incontinent inasmuch as they live their lives in unnecessary drinking and in other things of this kind that pertain to the pleasures of touch.

511. Next, at a man’s outlook (1114a7), he proves the proposition first by means of a likeness in other things. We see that things done in individual actions make men of that particular stamp, that is, disposed to do similar things. This is clearly manifest in the case of those who are diligent in and take pains with an exercise (like wrestling or soldiering) or any activity whatsoever. Everyone, from the fact that he does the action many times, becomes so adept that he can do similar things perfectly. Since we see this happen in all cases, it seems that only a man lacking understanding would be ignorant that habits are produced by operations.

512. Then, at moreover, it is (1114a11), he shows the same thing by a reason taken from the relation of an act to a habit. If a man wills some cause from which he knows a particular effect results, it follows that he wills that effect. Although perhaps he does not intend that effect in itself, nevertheless he wishes that the effect exist rather than that the cause not exist. Thus, if someone wishes to walk when it is hot, knowing beforehand he will work up a sweat, it follows that he wishes to perspire. Although he does not wish this in itself, nevertheless he wishes rather to perspire than to forego the walk.

Nothing hinders a thing from being non-voluntary in itself, although it may be voluntary on account of something else, as a bitter potion taken for health. It would be otherwise if a man were ignorant that such an effect would follow from such a cause: for example, a voluntary action is not effected when a man who walks along the road falls among robbers, because he did not know this beforehand. Obviously, then, men who do unjust actions become unjust, and those committing seduction become incontinent. Therefore, it is unreasonable for a man to will to do unjust actions and nevertheless not intend to be unjust, or to will to perpetrate seductions and not will to be incontinent. Thus, obviously, if a man who is aware of his action does voluntarily those things that make him unjust, he will be voluntarily unjust.

513. At because a person becomes unjust (1114a14), he shows that evil habits are not subject to the will after they have been formed. He says that, because a person becomes unjust voluntarily, it does not follow that he ceases to be unjust and becomes just whenever he may will. He proves this by means of a likeness in the dispositions of the body. A man who, when in good health, willingly falls into sickness by living incontinently—that is, by eating and drinking to excess and not following the doctor’s advice—had it in his power in the beginning not to become sick. But, after he has performed the act, having eaten unnecessary or harmful food, it is no longer in his power not to be sick. Thus, he who throws a stone is able not to throw it; however, once he has thrown the stone, he has not the power to take back the throwing. Nevertheless we do say that it is within a man’s power to cast or throw a stone, because it was from a principle under his control. So it is also with the habits of vice; that a man not become unjust or incontinent arises from a principle under his control. Hence, we say that men are voluntarily unjust and incontinent, although, after they have become such, it is no longer within their power to cease being unjust or incontinent immediately, but great effort and practice are required.

514. Then, at not only (1114a21), he shows by means of a likeness to bodily defects that vicious habits are voluntary. He says that not only vices of the soul are voluntary, but also defects of the body in certain men. Such men we justly reproach. No one reproaches those who are born ugly, but only those who are ugly by reason of some negligence in proper care. The same is true with weaknesses and blindness. No one justly taunts a man who is blind from birth or disease or a wound that is not voluntary. On account of those things, sympathy, rather, is shown to the victim. Thus, it is evident that we are reproached for those vices and bodily defects that are within our power. Hence, obviously also in other things, that is, those things that pertain to the soul, the vices or vicious habits are in our power.