Lecture 11 — Virtue and Vice Are Within Our Power

Since willing regards the end, but counsel and choice the means to the end, the actions concerning these means will be in accordance with choice and voluntary. But virtuous actions deal with the means. Virtue, then, is within our power. [496]

For a similar reason, vice is voluntary. If it is in our power to act, it is also in our power not to act, and contrariwise. Therefore, if to do good is in our power, then not to do evil will also be in our power. If not to do good is in our power, then to do evil will also be in our power. [497]

If it is in our power to do and likewise not to do good or evil actions (by reason of this, men become good or evil), it will be within our power to be virtuous or vicious. [499]

It is said that no one is voluntarily evil and that no one is unwillingly happy. The first statement is really false, and the second true. In fact, no person will be happy unwillingly. Vice, on the other hand, is a voluntary thing. [500]

Must we dispute even about what has now been said and hold that man is not the principle and begetter of his actions just as he is father of his children? [501]

If these things (counsel, choice, and willing) seem to be principles of our actions and we cannot reduce them into principles other than those within our power, then also our actions, the principles of which are under our control, will themselves be in our power and voluntary. [502]

This view seems to be supported by the testimony of private individuals and of legislators themselves, for legislators punish and chastise evildoers, unless these do evil by compulsion or on account of an ignorance of which they themselves were not the cause. Likewise, legislators decree honors for those who do good, thus encouraging them, as it were, but restraining the others. No one persuades a man to do whatever things are not in his power and not voluntary, for before it takes place, it is of no use to persuade a man not to become hot, or afflicted, or hungry, or anything whatsoever of this kind. We will suffer these things nonetheless. [503]

A man who is ignorant will be punished if he is the cause of his ignorance. A drunken man, for instance, is worthy of double punishment. The beginning is within him because he has it in his power not to get drunk. And his intoxication is the cause of his ignorance. Legislators punish those who are ignorant of things stated in the law that they should have known, but not those who are ignorant of the difficult things. Likewise, in other cases, we punish people whenever it seems that their ignorance was due to negligence, because it is in their power not to be ignorant. They have it in their power to inform themselves. [505]

496. Since willing regards the end. After the Philosopher has treated the voluntary, choice, counsel, and willing, which are principles of human acts, he here applies what has been said to vices and virtues.

Concerning this question, he does three things.

First, he determines the truth;

second, at it is said that no one (1113b14; [500]), he rejects an error;

third, at we have discussed virtues (1114b26; [526]), he concludes with a summary of what has been said about virtue.

On the first point, he does three things.

First, on the basis of his previous discussion, he shows that virtue is within us, that is, in our power.

Second, at for a similar reason (1113b6; [497]), he shows the same about vice.

Third, at if it is in our power (1113b11; [499]), he shows the reason for this necessary consequence.

He says first that, since willing regards the end, but counsel and choice the means to the end, it follows that actions concerning this (namely, the means to the end) are in accordance with choice and are consequently voluntary. The reason is that choice is a voluntary thing, as was indicated before [434–6, 457]. But virtuous actions deal with the aforementioned means and are voluntary. Consequently, virtue itself must be voluntary and within us, that is, in our power.

497. Then, at **for a similar reason **(1113b6), he shows the same thing about badness, that is, about vice as opposed to virtue. He says that badness is likewise voluntary and within us because its operations are of this kind. He proves this in the following way: if the capacity to act is within us, then the capacity not to act must also be in our power. If the capacity not to act were not in our power, it would be impossible that we would not act. Therefore, it would be necessary that we act, and so the capacity to act would not come from, us but from necessity.

498. Similiarly, it should be said that, whenever we have the power not to act, then we also have the power to act. For, if action were not in our power, then it would be impossible for us to act. Therefore, we would necessarily not act, and thus the inaction would not be from us, but from necessity. As a consequence, we must conclude that, wherever affirmation is within our power, negation is also (and conversely). Virtuous and vicious actions differ according to affirmation and negation. For instance, if honoring one’s parents is good and an act of virtue, then not to honor one’s parents is evil and pertains to vice. If not to steal pertains to virtue, then to steal pertains to vice. Hence, it follows that, if the operation of virtue is within us, as has been proved [496], then the operation of vice also is within us. So consequently, vice itself is within us, that is, in our power.

499. Next, at if it is (1113b11), he assigns the reason for this necessary inference: if the operations are within us, the habits are also within us. He says that, if it is in our power to do or not to do good or evil actions, as has now been shown [497–8], while man becomes good or evil by reason of the fact that he works or does not work good or evil, as was pointed out in the second book [250–3], then it follows that it is within our power to be virtuous—that is, good in conformity with the habit of virtue, and vicious in conformity with the habit of vice.

500. At it is said (1113b14), he rejects an error about the aforementioned teaching.

First, he removes the error itself.

Second, at perhaps such a person (1114a3; [507]), he removes its roots.

On the first point, his division is threefold.

First, he explains his rejection of the error.

Second, at must we dispute even about what (1113b17; [501]), he raises a doubt over this.

Third, at if these things (1113b19; [502]), he determines the truth.

In regard to the first, we must consider that some have held that no one is voluntarily evil, nor is anyone unwillingly happy or good. They say this because the will of itself tends to good. Good is what all desire, and consequently the will of itself seeks to avoid evil. He says, therefore, that one of these statements is in all likelihood false—that no one is willingly evil—since vice is something voluntary. The other seems to be true, that no one is unwillingly good and happy.

501. Then, at must we dispute (1113b17), he raises a doubt about things said before. If it is true that virtuous and vicious actions (and consequently virtue and vice) are voluntary, obviously what has presently been said is true. But is there anyone who believes there should be a doubt about what has been said, such that he might say that a man is not the principle and begetter of his actions, just as a father is the principle of his children? He as much as says, “that anyone would say this is to be wondered at.”

502. Next, at if these things (1113b19; [502]), he confirms the truth.

First by reason.

Second, at this view seems (1113b21; [503]), by signs.

He says first that, if counsel, choice, and willing—which are in our power—are seen as principles of our actions and we cannot reduce our actions to principles other than those that are in our power (namely, counsel and choice), then it follows that our good and bad actions are within our power. Because their principles are in our power, they themselves are in our power, and hence are voluntary.

503. At this view seems (1113b21), he explains his proposition by means of signs.

First, in the things that are clearly voluntary.

Second, at a man who is ignorant (1113b30; [505]), in the things that seem to have something of the involuntary.

He says first that the particular things that are done by individual private persons seem to bear witness to what has been said, that virtuous and vicious actions are within our power. Any father of a family punishes a child or a servant who does wrong. Likewise, the things that are done by legislators, who care for the welfare of the state, bear witness. They give sometimes give a light sentence to criminals, but other times a heavy one, provided, however, the wrongdoers do not act under coercion or through ignorance (of which they are not the cause). If they acted by compulsion or ignorance, their acts would not be voluntary, as is evident from what was said before [400–405]. Hence, it is clear that they were punished as acting voluntarily.

504. Likewise, legislators decree honors for those who voluntarily do good: encouraging, as it were, the virtuous to good deeds by means of honors, and restraining the vicious from evil by means of punishments. No one encourages a man to do the things that are not in his power and not voluntary, for in such matters, encouragement before the act is entirely useless. It is useless, for instance, to urge a man in summer not to be hot, or in sickness not to be afflicted, or not to be hungry when there is no food, or to do anything beyond his power. The reason is that he would suffer these things notwithstanding encouragement. If, therefore, we are not urged to do the things that are not within our power, but are urged to do good and avoid evil, then such things are in our power.

505. Then, at a man who is (1113b30), he manifests the same truth in those things that seem to have something of the involuntary. Ignorance causes an involuntary action, as was explained before [406–24]. If, however, we are the cause of the ignorance, the ignorance will be voluntary and we will be punished for it. A man can be the cause of his own ignorance in two ways. In one way directly, by doing something, as is evident in those who get drunk and for this reason are rendered ignorant. These should be doubly blamed: first, because they drank too much; second, because they committed a sinful deed in their drunkenness. The principle of drunkenness is in the man himself because he has the power to remain sober, and his drunkenness is the cause of his ignorance. Accordingly, in this way, a man is the cause of ignorance.

506. In the other way, a man is the cause of ignorance indirectly by reason of the fact that he does not do what he ought to do. On account of this, ignorance of the things a man can and is bound to know is considered voluntary, and therefore he is punished for it. This is why he says that legislators punish those who are ignorant of laws everyone ought to know (as that which forbids stealing), but not those who are ignorant of laws that are difficult to know and that not all are bound to know (because it is not possible). The same is true of those things that men do not know apparently by reason of negligence, because they could have learned. They are masters of themselves, and they can be diligent and not negligent.