Lecture 5 — Choice

After the treatise on the voluntary and the involuntary, we naturally proceed to a consideration of choice. Such a study is especially proper to virtue, for moral practices are judged by choice rather than by actions. [432]

Choice certainly is something voluntary, but choice and voluntary are not identical, for the voluntary is more extensive in range. [434]

Children and all the brutes participate in volition, but not in choice. [435]

Then, too, the things done on the spur of the moment are called voluntary, but they are not said to be done by choice. [436]

Those who say that choice is sensual desire, or anger, or wish, or opinion of some sort do not speak accurately. [437]

Choice does not belong to the brutes, but sensual desire and anger are common both to men and brutes. [438]

The incontinent man acts in conformity with sensual desire, but not in conformity with choice. But the continent man, on the contrary, acts from choice and not from sensual desire. [439]

Sensual desire is opposed to choice, but one desire is not contrary to another. [440]

Sensual desire is accompanied by pleasure or sorrow, but choice is not necessarily associated with sorrow or pleasure. [441]

There is less argument in favor of choice being anger, for the things done on account of anger do not seem to be done by choice. [442]

Choice is not identical with wishing, although it is closely connected with it. [443]

Choice is not concerned with impossibles, and if a person should say that he does choose the impossible, he will appear foolish. Wishing, on the other hand, can be directed to the impossible, for instance, to live forever. [444]

Wishing can be concerned with things not done by oneself, for instance, wishing that a man pretending to be an athlete may win, or even that a man who is really an athlete may win. No one, however, chooses these things, but only those that he thinks he can do himself. [445]

Moreover, wishing is directed rather to the end, and choice to the means. Thus, we wish health but we choose the remedies that restore us to health. Likewise, we wish to be happy, and we do say this. Yet it is not suitable to say that we elect or choose to be happy. [446]

In general, choice seems to be directed to the things that are within our power. [447]

432. After the treatise on the voluntary. After the Philosopher has treated the voluntary and the involuntary, he here makes a study of choice.

First, he gives an explanation of choice itself;

second, of counsel (which is placed in the definition of choice), at do men take counsel about all things (1112a18; [458]).

Regarding the initial point, he does two things.

First, he shows that it belongs to our present study to consider choice.

Second, at choice certainly is something (1111b6; [434]), he investigates the nature of choice.

He says first that, after the treatise [382–431] on the voluntary and the involuntary, he will undertake a passing consideration of choice. Here, then, he proposes briefly the things necessary to study choice. He proves here that it belongs to our science to consider choice, because choice seems especially proper to virtue, which is our principal concern at present.

433. Its appropriateness is clearly shown by the fact that, although both inner choice and outward action flow from the habit of virtue, virtuous or vicious practices are judged rather by choice than by outward works. Every virtuous man chooses good, but sometimes, because of some external hindrances, he does not do it. On the other hand, the vicious man sometimes performs a virtuous deed not out of virtuous choice, but out of fear, or for some unbecoming motive, such as vainglory or something else of this kind. Hence, it obviously pertains to our present purpose to consider choice.

434. Then, at choice certainly (1111b6), he shows what choice is.

First, he investigates its genus;

second, its different aspects, at those who say that choice (1111b10 [437]);

third, at what, then, is its genus (1112a13; [457]), he concludes the definition.

The voluntary is the genus of choice, because it is universally predicated of choice and of other things besides. Hence, he first says that every choice is voluntary, but choice and the voluntary are not identical, for the voluntary is more extensive. He proves this in twofold fashion.

435. The first proof he gives by the words participate in volition (1111b7). It is this. Children and the various brutes participate in volition inasmuch as, of their own accord, they do things by their own movement, as has been noted above [427]. But they do not communicate in choice, because they do not act with deliberation, which is required for choice. Therefore, the voluntary is more extensive than choice.

436. He assigns a second reason by the words then, too, the things done on the spur of the moment (1111b9). It is this. The things we do on the spur of the moment are called voluntary because their origin is within us. However, they are not said to be according to choice, because they are not done with deliberation. Therefore, the voluntary is more extensive than choice.

437. Next, at those who say (1111b10), he investigates the different aspects of choice, proving that choice differs from things with which it appears to agree. On this question, he does two things.

First, he explains his intent.

Second, at choice does not belong (1111b12), he proves it.

He says first that some philosophers have held that choice is sensual desire because both imply a movement of the appetitive faculty toward good. Others maintained that choice is anger, perhaps because, in both, there is a certain use of reason. The angry person uses reason inasmuch as he judges that an injury received deserves punishment. Still others who consider that choice is without passion ascribe choice to the rational part, either so far as concerns the appetitive faculty (saying it is wishing) or so far as it concerns perception (saying it is opinion). In these four states, all the principles of human actions are included in a simple way: reason, to which opinion belongs; the rational appetitive faculty, that is, the will; the sensitive appetitive faculty divided into the irascible, to which belongs anger, and the concupiscible, to which belong sensual desire. The Philosopher says, however, that those who hold that choice is one of these do not speak accurately.

438. At choice does not (1111b12), he proves his proposition.

He shows first that choice is not sensual desire;

second, at there is less argument (1111b18; [442]), that it is not anger;

third, at choice is not identical (1111b19; [443]), that it is not wishing;

fourth, that it is not opinion, at choice is not opinion (1111b30; [448]).

Regarding the first, he gives four reasons.

The first of these, common to sensual desire and anger, is this. Sensual desire and anger are found both among men and brutes. But choice is not met with among the brutes, as has been said [435]. Therefore, choice is neither sensual desire nor anger.

439. He gives the second reason at the incontinent man (1111b13). It is this. If choice were sensual desire, whoever acts with choice would act with sensual desire. This, however, is false, because the incontinent man acts in conformity with sensual desire, but not in conformity with choice, for he does not reasonably direct his choice because of his sensual desire. But the continent man, on the contrary, acts from choice and not from sensual desire, which he resists by choice, as will be made evident in book 7 [1443]. Therefore, choice is not the same as sensual desire.

440. He assigns the third reason at sensual desire is opposed (1111b15). It is this. Sensual desire is opposed to choice in one who is continent or incontinent. One chooses according to reason the opposite of that which the other desires according to the sensitive appetitive faculty. But the sensual desire in the one is not opposed to the sensual desire in the other, because the whole sensual desire of each one tends to the same thing, the pleasure of the senses. But this must not be understood in the sense that one desire may not be opposed to another. We do find desires of contraries, for instance, one man desires to move and another to remain in repose. Therefore, it is evident that choice is not identical with sensual desire.

441. The fourth reason, given at sensual desire is accompanied (1111b16), is this. Sensual desire is always accompanied by pleasure because of the presence of the thing desired, or by sorrow because of the absence of that thing. Every passion is followed by pleasure or sorrow, as has been pointed out in the book 2 [296]. But choice is not necessarily associated with pleasure or sorrow, for it can occur without any passion, by the judgment of reason alone. Therefore, choice is not sensual desire.

442. Then, at there is less argument (1111b18), he shows that choice is not the same as anger. As to this, he says that there is less argument in favor of choice being anger than there is for it being sensual desire. The reason is that, even according to appearances, the things done from anger do not seem to be done by choice, because, by reason of the swiftness of the movement of wrath, the actions done through anger are very sudden. Although there is some use of reason in anger—insofar as the angry person begins to attend to his reason as it judges that an injury ought to be avenged—nevertheless, he does not perfectly heed reason in determining the manner and the order of the vengeance. Hence, anger especially excludes deliberation, which is necessary for choice. But sensual desire does not act so suddenly. Hence, things done in conformity with sensual desire do not seem to be as remote from choice as do the things done out of anger.

443. Next, at choice is not identical (1111b19), he explains the difference between choice and wish.

First, he sets forth his proposition.

Second, at choice is not concerned (1111b20; [444]), he proves it.

Third, at in general, choice (1111b29; [447]), he deduces the origin of the difference between choice and wishing.

He says first that choice is not even wishing, although it seems to be closely connected with wishing. Both belong to the one power, the rational appetitive faculty, or the will. Wishing designates an act of this power related to good absolutely. But choice designates an act of the same power related to good according as it belongs to an act by which we are ordered to some good.

444. At choice is not concerned (1111b20), he proves the statement by three reasons, of which the first is this. Because choice refers to our activity, it is said that choice is not concerned with impossible things. If a person should say that he chooses something impossible, he will appear foolish. But wishing can be directed to any good, even the impossible, because it regards good absolutely. Thus, a man can wish to be immortal, an impossible thing according to the condition of this perishable life. Therefore, choice and wish are not the same.

445. He gives the second reason at wishing can be (1111b23). The wishing of someone can be concerned with things not done by himself. Thus, he who is a spectator at a duel can wish that a hypocrite—that is, a pretender playing an assumed role—may win (such as a man who comes into the ring as a boxer when he is not a boxer), or even that one who is really an athlete may win. No one, however, chooses these things that are done by another, but only those that he thinks he can do himself. Therefore, choice differs from wishing.

446. He assigns the third reason at moreover, wishing (1111b26). He says that wishing is directed rather to the end than to the means, because we wish the means on account of the end. But that for the sake of which something exists is itself greater. But choice concerns only the means, and not the end itself, because the end as already predetermined is presupposed. The means, however, are sought by us as things to be ordered to the end. Thus, we wish health principally, since it is the end of healing. But we choose the remedies by which we are restored to health. Likewise, we wish to be happy—happiness is our ultimate end—and we say we wish this. Yet it is not suitable to say that we elect or choose to be happy. Therefore, choice is not the same as wish.

447. Then, at in general, choice (1111b29), he gives the root of the whole difference to which all the previous differences in general are referred. He says that choice seems to be directed to the things that are within our power. This is the reason why it does not concern impossibles, things done by others, or the end that, for the most part, is prearranged for us by nature.