Lecture 3 — The Involuntary Resulting from Ignorance

Every action done because of ignorance is not voluntary; it is involuntary if sorrow and repentance follow. One who does something on account of ignorance and is not sorry about what he did cannot be said to have acted voluntarily, for he was unaware of his action. But neither can he be said to have acted involuntarily if he is not sorry. A man who has acted from ignorance and regrets his action seems to have acted involuntarily. But if he does not regret it, his case is different; let us call him non-voluntary. Because he differs, it is better that he have a distinctive name. [406]

There seems to be a difference between acting on account of ignorance and acting in ignorance. A drunken or angry person does not act because of ignorance, but because of one of the things mentioned (drunkenness or anger). Such a one, however, does not act knowingly, but in ignorance. Therefore, every wicked person acts in ignorance of the things he ought to do and avoid. Men acting on account of an error of this kind become unjust and wicked generally. [409]

When we speak of an action as involuntary, we do not mean that a man is ignorant of what he ought to do. The ignorance that accompanies choice is not the cause of an involuntary action, but of sin. The same may be said of ignorance that is of a general nature, because a person is blamed for such ignorance. But a person who is ignorant of particular conditions about which and on which human activity is exercised deserves mercy and pardon, because he who is ignorant of any of these circumstances acts involuntarily. [411]

Perhaps it is not out of place to determine the nature and number of these circumstances: who, what, concerning what or in what one operates; also sometimes by what, such as a tool; for the sake of which, such as safety; and in what manner, such as quietly or violently. [414]

No one but a madman will be ignorant of all these circumstances. It is obvious that no one can be ignorant of the agent. How can he be ignorant about himself? But someone can be ignorant of what he does. For instance, those speaking out of turn say that it escaped them unawares or that they did not know that certain things were not to be disclosed: like Aeschylus when he revealed the sacred mysteries; or someone wishing to show the working of a weapon who discharges an arrow; or a man who mistakes his son for an assailant, as Merope did, or thinks a piked lance blunted or a rock merely pumice; or one who kills someone by a blow meant to save him; or a trainer who takes the life of a boxer while sparring with him to teach him. [417]

Since ignorance can be concerned with every one of the circumstances occurring with the action, that man seems to act involuntarily who is ignorant of one of them. This applies especially to ignorance of the most important circumstances. [422]

These seem to be the circumstances of the action and its motives. [423]

For an action to be called involuntary in respect of such ignorance, it must be painful to the agent and cause repentance. [424]

406. Every action done because of ignorance. After the Philosopher has determined the involuntary resulting from violence, he now turns his attention to the involuntary resulting from ignorance.

Concerning it, he does two things.

First, he shows how there is an involuntary action resulting from ignorance.

Second, at perhaps it is (1111a3; [414]), he explains some of his statements.

In regard to the initial point, he sets down three differences concerning ignorance. The first of these is considered insofar as what is done on account of ignorance is related to the will in different ways. Sometimes it is opposed to the will, and then it is properly called involuntary. But at other times, it is not opposed to the will, but is over and above the will precisely as it is unknown. In this sense, it is not called involuntary, but non-voluntary.

407. He says, then, that what is done on account of ignorance in such a way that ignorance is the cause is not voluntary in any case, because the act of the will is not moved to it. The act of the will cannot be moved to what is entirely unknown, since the will’s object is the known good. But only then is that which is done out of ignorance called involuntary—as it were, opposed to the will—when, on becoming known, sorrow and repentance (which is sorrow over one’s past actions) follow. A thing is sorrowful because it is opposed to the will, as is stated in the Metaphysics. (Metaphysics 5.5.1015a26–33; see Aquinas, In V metaph., lec. 6, 829–31.)

408. One who does something on account of ignorance and is not sorry about what he did after he knows it—for instance, if he takes silver, thinking he took tin—cannot be said to have voluntarily taken silver, since he did not know that it was silver. But it cannot be said that he involuntarily took silver—that is, against his will—since he is not sorry that he did take silver by reason of ignorance. He seems to have acted involuntarily who has sorrow or repents for the fact that he took silver by reason of ignorance, just as if someone had, on the contrary, taken tin, thinking he has taken silver. But, because he who does not repent is different from the man who does repent (he is said to be unwilling), let the first be called non-willing. Since he really differs from the one who is unwilling, it is better that he have a proper and separate name.

409. He sets down the second difference at there seems to be (1110b24). This is taken according to the difference of what is done in ignorance; for ignorance sometimes is the cause of an action, but sometimes the act proceeds from another cause. He says that a person acting on account of ignorance seems to be different from a person acting in ignorance. Sometimes one acts in ignorance but not on account of ignorance. A drunken or angry person does not act on account of ignorance, but on account of drunkenness or anger. Neither of these, however, acts knowingly, because ignorance is caused at the same time as the action by drunkenness and anger. Thus, ignorance is concomitant with the action and is not its cause.

410. From this, he concludes that, as an angry person acts in ignorance and not on account of ignorance, but on account of anger, so every wicked person acts not indeed on account of ignorance, but partly in ignorance of the good he ought to do and of the evil he ought to avoid, inasmuch as he thinks that, at this moment, he should do this evil and refrain from this good. For this reason, he sins, because he does what he ought not to do. Men who act in ignorance universally become unjust with respect to others and wicked with respect to themselves. From this it is evident that, when someone acts in ignorance, and not on account of ignorance, he does not cause involuntarily. The reason is that no one is unjust or wicked by reason of what he does involuntarily.

411. He assigns the third difference at when we speak (1110b30). This is taken from the object of the person’s ignorance. Here we must consider that ignorance can be of two kinds. According to one, a person is ignorant of what he ought to do or avoid. He says this is ignorance of what is fitting—of what he ought to be doing. This ignorance does not cause an involuntary action, because ignorance of this kind cannot happen to a man with the use of reason except from negligence. The reason is that everyone is bound to be solicitous about knowing what he is obliged to do and to avoid. Hence, if a man does not wish to avoid (as he is bound to do) ignorance that is considered voluntary, it follows that what is done through this ignorance should not be judged involuntary. This is the meaning of the saying that one does not wish an involuntary action (namely, what is by nature involuntary) if he is ignorant of what he does, that is, of what is suitable under the circumstances. Of this, someone can be ignorant in two ways.

412. One is in a particular choice: for instance, because of sensual desire a person thinks he should commit fornication at this time. The other way is in general, as is evident in one who is of the opinion that fornication is always lawful. Both kinds of ignorance concern what is done. Hence, neither causes an involuntary action. This is what is meant by saying that that ignorance accompanying choice (by which a person thinks he should do this evil at this time) is not the cause of an involuntary act, but is rather the cause of vice or sin. Neither is the ignorance that is of a general nature the cause of an involuntary action, since a person is blamed on account of ignorance of this kind. But no one is censured because of an involuntary action, as was said previously [410].

413. The other ignorance is of singular conditions—for instance, that this woman is married, that this man is a parent, that this place is holy. It is about these conditions and on them that human activity is exercised; by reason of a justifiable ignorance of such conditions, a person deserves mercy and pardon, because he who is ignorant of one of these conditions acts involuntarily. Therefore, it is obvious that ignorance of particular circumstances of this kind—not, however, ignorance of what one should do—is the cause of an involuntary action.

414. Then, at perhaps it is not (1111a3), he explains what he had referred to: those circumstances the ignorance of which is a cause of an involuntary action. In regard to this, he does three things.

First, he points out what these circumstances are.

Second, at no one but (1111a6; [417]), he shows in what way ignorance of them may be present.

Third, at since ignorance can be (1111a15; [422]), he explains how ignorance of these circumstances is the cause of an involuntary action.

On the first point, we must consider that circumstances are nothing else but certain particular conditions of a human act. These can be taken either on the part of the causes of the act or on the part of the act itself. The cause of the act is efficient or final. The efficient cause is either the principal or the instrumental agent. On the part of the act, three things can be understood: the genus of the act, the matter or the object itself, and the mode of acting. In agreement with this, the Philosopher here places six circumstances. He says that it is not out of place—indeed it is very appropriate—to determine what and how many are these particular circumstances, the ignorance of which is the cause of an involuntary action. He uses an adverb, forsitan, indicating doubt, as in many other places of this book, because of the uncertainty in moral matters.

415. Enumerating then these particular things he names: who, which refers to the person of the principal agent; what is done, which refers to the genus of the act; and concerning what, which refers to the matter or the object. But he adds also concerning this—which refers to the measure of the act—as belonging to the agent, namely, place or time, since he says or in what he operates. The reason is that all external things seem to have relation to the human act. Cicero includes what we call “concerning what” under “what.” What is here called in what he divides into two circumstances: time and place.

416. As concerns the instrumental agent, Aristotle adds: sometimes also “by what,” such as an instrument, since not every action is performed through an instrument, like understanding and willing. In place of this, some put “by what aids,” for one to whom help is given uses help as an instrument. Referring to the end, he says for the sake of which—for instance, a doctor cuts for the sake of health. Referring to the mode of acting, he says and in what manner, for example, quietly—that is, lightly—or violently, that is, strongly.

417. Next, at no one but (1111a6), he shows in what way there may be ignorance about the preceding circumstances. He says that only a totally insane person is ignorant of all these circumstances. Among the other circumstances, it is obvious that a man cannot be ignorant of what is meant by the one acting, because, in this case, he would be ignorant about himself (which is impossible). But someone can be ignorant of what he does, as those who disclose things that should not be disclosed say in excusing themselves that it slipped their mind or that they never knew that such things were secret, that is, were not to be spoken. Thus were revealed the sacred mysteries or secrets by Aeschylus, a certain poet. He who speaks such things is ignorant of what he does, because he does not know this is a revelation of secrets.

418. He gives another example concerning what is done: an archer wishing to teach a pupil how archery is practiced shoots an arrow into something. Such a one does not know what he does because he does not know he is shooting an arrow. Then, he gives an example of ignorance concerning what, such as if a man should mistake his son for an enemy besieging his home and kill him, just as a certain woman named Merope killed her son. So, it is obvious that, in a case of this kind, a man knows what he does because he knows he kills, but he does not know the concerning what of his act, because he does not know he kills his son.

419. He then gives an example of ignorance of the instrument: when a lancer uses a piked lance that he thought was blunted, or when a thrower of rocks thinks what he throws are pumice stones.

420. Farther on, he gives an example of ignorance of the end. He says that a doctor or a blood-letter lancing a patient to make him better, or a teacher striking a pupil to correct him, may take a life. These have ignorance of the end, not indeed of what they intended, but of what followed from their action. They were ignorant that their action would lead to such an end.

421. Last, he illustrates ignorance of the manner of the action: for instance, a man thinks he is tapping with his fist to show how to hit like boxers do, but he strikes with force. Such a man strikes with force in ignorance or unknowingly.

422. At since ignorance can be, he shows how ignorance of the previously named things is a cause of the voluntary action.

First, he says that, since ignorance can be concerned with any one of the five aforementioned circumstances that concur with the action, the man who is ignorant of one of the preceding seems to act unwillingly or involuntarily. This does not apply in equal measure to all, but it does apply especially if the ignorance concerns the most important circumstances.

423. Second, at these seem to be (1111a18), he shows what he considers the most important circumstances. He says that the principal circumstances seem to be those on which the act takes place—namely, the object or the matter of the act—and that for the sake of which, the end, because acts are specified by their objects. Just as the matter is the object of the external act, so the end is the object of the internal act of the will.

424. Third, at for an action (1111a19), he says that ignorance of these very things is not enough for an involuntary action. He states that, although an action may be called involuntary according to the preceding ignorance, a further requirement is that the action be connected with sadness and repentance, as was pointed out before [408].