Lecture 10 — The Object of Willing

As was stated before, willing is concerned with the end. [488]

To some, it seems that willing has for its object what is of itself good, but to others, what is apparently good. [489]

For those who say the object of willing is what is good of itself, it follows that that thing is not an object of willing that a person does not rightly will. If something were an object of willing, it would be good. But what is to prevent a man from wishing some thing evil? [490]

On the other hand, for those who say the object of willing is apparent good, there is no such thing as a natural object of willing but only what appears so to each man. But different and sometimes contrary things seem to be objects of willing for different men. [491]

If these conclusions are not acceptable, then it must be said that, in an absolute or true sense, it is the good that is the object of willing, but for each man, it is the apparent good. [492]

For the good man, that thing is an object of willing that is truly good; for the vicious man, that thing is an object of willing that seems pleasing to him. Thus, when men are in good bodily health, those things are healthful that are such in reality, but for men who are ill, it is otherwise. The same applies to bitter, sweet, warm, and heavy things and to others of this kind. [493]

The virtuous person correctly passes judgment on each individual thing, and in each case, what appears to him is truly good. Those things which are proper to each habit seem pleasurable to it. The good man perhaps is much different in his capacity to see what is truly good in individual matters, being as it were a norm and measure of these things. [494]

Many men are apparently deceived because of pleasure. What is not good seems good, so they desire as good the pleasurable and seek to avoid the painful as evil. [495]

488. As was stated before, willing is concerned. After the Philosopher has finished the treatise on the voluntary and on choice, he here begins the study of willing.

He initiates his discussion by three stages.

First, he takes notes of what is obvious about willing.

Second, at to some, it seems (1113a16; [489]), he raises a doubt.

Third, at if these conclusions (1113a22; [492]), he solves the doubt.

First, he restates what he has previously insisted on [466], that willing is concerned with the end itself. He speaks here of willing as it denotes the act of the faculty of the will. The act of any faculty is named from the faculty itself and regards that to which the faculty primarily and of itself tends. Thus, the act of the visive faculty is called vision in relation to visible things. In this manner, understanding is named in relation to first principles that, of themselves, are referred primarily to the intellective faculty. Hence, also willing is properly said to concern ends themselves that, as certain principles, the faculty of the will primarily and of itself regards.

489. Then, at to some, it seems (1113a16), he raises a doubt. Regarding it, he does three things.

First, he sets forth contrary opinions about willing. He says that, to some, it seems that willing has for its object what is of itself good, but to others, what is apparently good.

490. Second, at for those who say (1113a17), he disproves the first opinion, stating that, for those who say that only the good in itself is the object of willing (that is, to which the will tends), it follows that that thing that a person does not rightly will is not an object of willing. The reason is that, according to their opinion, it would follow that, if something were an object of willing, it would be good, but it happens sometimes that it is evil. Therefore, willing does not always have real good as its object.

491. Third, at on the other hand (1113a20), he disproves the second opinion, stating that, for those who say the object of willing is apparent good, it follows that there is no natural object of willing, but for each one, the object of willing is what seems so to him. But, for different men, different and sometimes contrary things seem to be the object of willing. Thus, if color were not visible, but only what seemed to be color were visible, it would follow that nothing would be by nature visible. This, however, would not be fitting, for every natural faculty has some object determined by its nature. Therefore, it is not true that the object of willing is apparent good.

492. At if these conclusions (1113a22), he solves the aforementioned doubt.

First, he gives a solution according to a certain distinction. He says that, if these disagreeable conclusions following from both these opinions are unacceptable, we must answer with a distinction that what seems good to a man is desirable either without qualification or under some aspect, that is, in relation to this or that.

493. Second, at for the good man (1113a25), he shows with whom both parts of this distinction agree. He says that, for the good man, that thing is an object of willing that is truly worthy of being willed, that is, good in itself. But, for the wicked or vicious man, that thing is the object of willing that attracts him, that is, whatever seems pleasing to himself. He exemplifies this in things of the body. We see that, for men whose bodies are in good health, those things are healthful that are really so. But for the sick, certain other things are healthful, namely, those that moderate their diseased condition. Likewise, things really bitter and sweet seem bitter and sweet to those who have a healthy taste, and things really warm seem warm to those who have a normal sense of touch. Those who have normal bodily strength properly estimate the weight of objects; those who are weak think light objects heavy.

494. Third, at the virtuous person (1113a29), he explains what he said, first as it affects virtuous men. He says that the virtuous person correctly passes judgment on individual things that pertain to human activity. In each case, what is really good seems to him to be good. This happens because the things that seem naturally pleasurable to each habit are those that are proper to it, those that agree with it. Those things are agreeable to the habit of virtue that are in fact good, because the habit of moral virtue is defined by what is in accord with right reason. Thus, the things in accord with right reason—things of themselves good—seem good to it. Here the good man differs very much indeed from others, for he sees what is truly good in individual practicable matters, being as it were the norm and measure of all that is to be done, for in these cases, a thing must be judged good or bad according as it seems to him.

495. Next, at many men (1113a33), he explains what he said as it affects vicious men. He says that, for many, the vicious, deception in the distinction between good and evil occurs especially because of pleasure. As a consequence of this, it happens that they desire as good the pleasurable, which is not good, and seek to avoid as evil what is for them painful but in itself good. The explanation is that they do not follow reason but the senses.