Lecture 20 — Temperance in Relation to Touch and Taste

Any use of taste made by temperance, or intemperance for that matter, is small or even non-existent. Taste here means the discernment of flavors, the occupation of wine-tasters and cooks sampling their own food. The intemperate do not take delight in these things, or at least not much, but in the enjoyment by touch in the taking of food and drink and in the gratification of sex. [613]

On this account, a certain man by the name of Philoxenus Erichius—a voracious eater—prayed for a gullet longer than a crane’s so he could take more pleasure in the contact with his food. [615]

Touch, with which intemperance deals, is the most widely shared of all the senses. Rightly, then, intemperance seems worthy of reproach, since it does not exist in man as belonging to what is proper to him, but to what he has in common with the animals. To take pleasure in things of this sort and to love them above everything else is brutish. We exclude those pleasures of touch that are especially liberal, for instance, those taken in gymnasia by massages and heat-treatment. But the pleasure of touch, which the intemperate man seeks, is not that of the whole body, but of certain parts of the body. [616]

Some desires are common, and others are proper and acquired. [618]

The desire for food is natural, for everyone—when he is without it—desires food and drink (and sometimes both) just as, according to Homer, (Iliad 24.130.) the young and growing man longs for a bed. [620]

Not all men, however, do want such and such a bed, or the same kinds of food. For this reason, such desires seem to be peculiar to each of us, although they still have something of the natural. Different people enjoy different pleasures, and some persons take more pleasure in certain kinds of things than in chance objects. [621]

In natural desires, few men go astray, and then only in one way, by excess. This happens when men eat or drink even to an immoderate fullness, which is an excess in the quantity of food nature requires. (Nature desires that its need be supplied.) These people are called “belly-mad” because they stuff their stomachs beyond need. Such persons become very brutish. [622]

But in regard to proper desires, many sin in numerous ways. Those who love such pleasures sin in delighting in things they ought not, or more than they ought, or as many of the foolish do, or not according to measure. The intemperate are excessive in all these ways because they enjoy certain odious things they ought not to enjoy. If pleasure may be taken, they delight in such things (as many do) more than they ought. Therefore, since intemperance is excess in regard to pleasures, it is despicable. [624]

613. Any use of taste made by temperance. After the Philosopher has proved that temperance and intemperance do not deal with the pleasures of three senses, but with the pleasures of two—namely, taste and touch—he shows now what concerns the pleasures of taste and touch.

He treats this from three aspects.

First, he shows that temperance does not deal directly with the pleasures of taste, but with the pleasures of touch.

Second, at on this account (1118a32; [615]), he clarifies by an example what he has affirmed.

Third, at touch, with which (1118b1; [616]), he draws a conclusion from what has been said.

He says first that temperance and intemperance seem to make little or no use of what is proper to taste, namely, the discernment of flavors. Those who test wine use taste in this way; likewise, those who season food and sample to see whether their dishes have a delicious taste.

614. The intemperate do not take much delight in this, and they are not deprived of much pleasure when they do not perfectly discern the flavors of food. But all their delight consists in the enjoyment of certain pleasurable things, such as eating, drinking, and sex—all of which occur through touch. It is obvious, therefore, that the pleasure of the intemperate has to do directly with the sense of touch, and with taste only because flavors make the enjoyment of food delectable. For this reason, he previously said [608–11, 613] that intemperance has little use for taste: namely, as it is ordered to touch, or no use—that is, in respect to what belongs to taste in itself.

615. Then, at on this account (1118a32), he clarifies by an example what he had said. A certain man named Philoxenus Erichius desired to have a throat longer than a crane’s so the food would remain a long while in his throat, since he ate his meals greedily. From this it is evident that he did not take pleasure in taste (which is active in the tongue and not in the throat) but in touch alone.

616. Next, at touch, with which (1118b1), he draws a corollary from what has been said. The sense of touch, which temperance deals with, is the most common of all the senses, because all the animals share in it. On this account, intemperance seems to be really despicable, since it does not exist in man as belonging to what is proper to him, but to what he has in common with other animals. But to take pleasure in things of this sort and to love them as the highest goods seems to be especially animal-like. So it is that vices of intemperance possess the most disgusting shamefulness because they make man like the brutes. Therefore, by reason of such vices, a man is rendered notoriously evil and blameworthy.

617. Someone might say that, even in things pertaining to touch, there is some properly human good that is not bestial. In order to answer this objection, he adds that we exclude from temperance those pleasures of touch that are especially liberal—appropriate for humans—and used according to reason. Such pleasures are found in gymnasia by massage and heat-treatment in view of the games (since some are going to wrestle or indulge in other sports). These pleasures of touch are not ordered to the desire of food or sex. The pleasure of touch, which the intemperate man seeks, is not that of the whole body but of certain parts of the body.

618. At some desires (1118b8), he shows how the act of temperance (in the previously mentioned matter) and of the opposite vices is constituted.

Here he proceeds in twofold fashion.

First, he explains his proposition.

Second, at intemperance is more (1119a21; [635]), he compares the vices of intemperance with certain other vices.

Regarding the first, he has three considerations.

First, he treats intemperance, showing in what manner it operates in the previously investigated matter.

Second, at it does not happen (1119a5; [630]), he treats insensibility.

Third, at the temperate man (1119a11; [632]), he treats temperance.

In regard to the first, he does two things.

First, he shows how temperance is related to pleasures;

second, at with regard to sorrows (1118b28; [626]), how it is related to sorrow.

Fear and sorrow are ordered to the same thing—we noted this before [584]—because sorrow has to do with present evils, as fear with future ones. So also desire (which concerns future goods) and pleasure (which concerns present goods) are ordered to the same thing. Temperance is concerned with sensual desires and pleasures and is in the reason.

First, he makes a certain division of desires.

Second, at the desire for food (1118b9; [620]), he explains the division.

Third, at in natural desires (1118b15; [622]), he shows in what manner intemperance deals with both desires.

619. He says first that some desires are common and others are proper, being in addition to the common.

620. Then, at the desire for food (1118b9), he explains this division.

First, he points out what the common desires are, saying that the desire for food in general is natural, as following the whole nature of the species and genus. Hence, every man desires dry nourishment called food or moist nourishment called drink—and sometimes both—in order to succor a natural need, just as, according to Homer, every man (the young as well as the growing, that is, the adolescent) longs for a bed to rest in.

621. Next, at not all men, however (1118b12), he points out what the proper desires are, saying that not all men want this particular bed—say a couch strewn with feathers and costly covering. Likewise, not everyone craves such and such a food, such as an expensive or daintily prepared dish. All do not yearn for the same gratification, but in such matters, some desire one thing and others another. Hence, desires of this kind seem to be our very own, because we are not inclined to them by nature, but by our own devising. Here nothing hinders a thing from being natural as belonging to the nature of the individual, although it may not belong to the nature of the genus or species. We see that different people enjoy different pleasures according to their different temperaments. And because of natural temperament, some persons take more pleasure in certain kinds of things than in other commonplace objects.

622. At in natural desires (1118b15), he explains in what manner intemperance has to do with the desires just mentioned. He says that, in the natural desires that are common, few men go astray. Here transgression occurs only in one way, according as someone takes more than nature requires. This happens when someone eats or drinks what is given him in an immoderate amount, in which there is an excess in regard to the quantity of food nature needs. Nature desires only that the need be supplied. Therefore, that someone should take more than he needs is an excess above nature.

623. People of this type are called “belly-mad” (gastrimargoi), from “gastir,” meaning “belly,” and “marges,” meaning a “raving” or “madness”), as if they had a raving or mad stomach, since they stuff nature beyond requirement. Such persons are very brutish, for their only concern is to fill their bellies without discrimination like animals.

624. Next, at but in regard to proper desires (1118b21), he explains in what manner intemperance has to do with proper desires or pleasures. He says that, in regard to them, many sin in numerous ways, that is, according to all the circumstances. Those who love such pleasures sin because they enjoy things they should not (like eating food that does not agree with them) or they sin by taking more enjoyment than they should (for instance, someone takes too much pleasure in eating agreeable dishes). Others sin by taking pleasure in foods without discernment—like most fools do—or finally, they do not observe due measure in enjoyment as they should. The intemperate are excessive in all these ways because they enjoy objects highly indecorous and blameworthy by nature that they ought not to enjoy. Even when pleasure in certain things may be lawful, they commonly take more enjoyment than they ought without discrimination.

625. So he concludes that, since intemperance is excess in regard to pleasures of this kind, it is blameworthy like other excesses, as was explained in book 2 [333–4].