Lecture 9 — A Comparison Between Counsel and Choice

The objects of counsel and of choice are the same, but the object of choice has already been determined by counsel. [483]

What was previously judged by means of counsel is an object of choice. Every individual inquiring how he is going to act ceases from counsel when he reduces the principle back to himself and this into what is to be done first. It is this that is chosen. [484]

Our point is also brought out by the ancient political procedure delineated by Homer, who presents the Greek kings as proclaiming their decisions to the people. [485]

Since the object of choice is one of the things considered by counsel as desirable and within our power, choice will be a desire (arising by reason of counsel) for the things that are in our power. When we have formed a judgment by taking counsel, we desire a thing in accordance with our deliberation. [486]

Choice has now been defined according to type and in a general way, and not as is customary according to a full explanation. It has been stated of what nature the things are with which choice deals and that choice is concerned with things which are ordered to end. [487]

483. The objects of counsel and of choice. After the Philosopher has considered counsel in itself, he now treats counsel in comparison with choice.

A twofold procedure clarifies this point.

First, he compares counsel with choice.

Second, at since the object of choice (1113a9; [486]), he concludes from this what choice is.

In regard to the initial point, he does two things.

First, he introduces his proposition;

second, at what was previously judged (1113a4; [484]), he proves it.

First, he compares counsel with choice in two ways. One way is relative to the object or matter of each where they are in agreement. Touching on this, he says that an object of counsel and an object of choice are the same because both counsel and choice deal with things that act for an end. The other way is relative to the order of each. Touching on this, he says that, when something has already been decided by means of counsel, then it is first chosen—counsel preceding choice as it were.

484. Then, at what was (1113a4), he explains what he has said by a reason taken from his previous observations [473–84] about counsel. The decision of counsel, he says, precedes choice, for after the inquiry of counsel, a judgment concerning the things discovered must follow. Then, what was previously judged is first chosen. He shows clearly that the judgment of the reason should follow the investigation of counsel by the fact that every individual who inquires by taking counsel how he ought to act ceases from deliberation when, by analyzing his investigation, he is led to what he himself can do. If he can do several things, then, when he reduces them to the preceding—that is, to what he considers should be done first—this is what is chosen, namely, what presents itself to be done first. Hence, it remains that choice presupposes the decision of counsel.

485. Second, at our point is also brought out (1113a7), he proves his view by an example. That choice ought to follow the decision of counsel is brought out by the regal procedure of old, that is, by the custom of ancient states according to which kings did not possess dictatorial power over the multitude so that they could do whatever they wished, but were guides of the citizens, to whom it belonged to choose the things decided by the kings in counsel. For that reason, he says that the kings of old declared to the people the things they themselves had chosen by the decision of their counsel so that the people might choose what had been determined. Homer followed this by presenting the Greek rulers as proclaiming to the people what they had decided in counsel.

486. Next, at since the object (1113a9), he shows from the premises what choice is. He says that, since an object of choice is simply one of the number of the things that is within our power and that is considered by means of counsel, it follows that choice is only a desire (arising by reason of counsel) for things in our power. Choice is an act of the rational appetitive faculty called the will. On this account, he said that choice is a deliberating desire, inasmuch as, through counsel, a man arrives at a judgment regarding the things that were discovered by means of counsel. This desire is choice.

487. Last, at choice has now (1113a12), he shows of what nature this definition of choice is. He says that choice has now been defined by type—that is, in outline—and not as he customarily determines a thing through a full explanation, that is, giving a definition and then investigating each element of it. But the definition of choice has been given in a general way. It has been stated [486] of what nature the things are with which choice deals, namely, things in our power. Also it has been said that choice is concerned with things that are ordered to ends—about these, too, counsel treats.