D. 22 - First sin of man

Division of the text

After having addressed the principle of the fall of man on the part of the tempter, here he addresses the intrinsic principle on the part of man himself who sinned.

It is divided into two parts.

In the first, he inquires as to what was the first sin in man, the origin and root of the sins that followed.

In the second, he inquires as to what was the principle of that first sin, at it is also usual to ask, since human nature was without defect, from where did the consent to that evil come. (Sent. II, 22.5(134).3.)

The first part is divided into three parts.

In the first, he says that the first sin in man was self-exaltation.

In the second, he shows that it existed in man and woman in different ways, at and indeed there was such pride in the woman’s mind. (Sent. II, 22.2(131).1.)

In the third, he concludes from this that the woman’s sin was more grave than the man’s, at from this it may be clearly deduced who sinned more. (Sent. II, 22.4(133).1.)

Concerning the first, he does three things.

First, he lays out the opinion and arguments of those who posit that pride in man’s heart even preceded the demon’s temptation.

Second, he raises an objection to the contrary, at but if it was so, then humankind did not first sin at another’s suggestion. (Sent. II, 22.1(130).6.)

Third, he settles on the truth, at and so the aforesaid words of Augustine pressingly require a pious and diligent reader. (Sent. II, 22.1(130).7.)

And indeed there was such pride in the woman’s mind. (Sent. II, 22.2(131).1.) Here he shows the quality of the self-exaltation in man and woman.

First, the sort of self-exaltation that belonged to the woman.

Second, the sort of self-exaltation that belonged to the man, at it is usual to ask whether there was the same pride and love of one’s power in the man as in the woman. (Sent. II, 22.3(132).1.)

From this it may be clearly deduced who sinned more. (Sent. II, 22.4(133).1.) Here he concludes from the aforementioned that the woman’s sin was more grave than the man’s sin.

First, he shows the proposition.

Second, he raises an objection to the contrary, at but what Augustine . . . says appears to be contrary to this. (Sent. II, 22.4(133).6, referring to Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 11, ch. 35, n. 47 (CSEL 28.1:369; PL 34:448–49).)

Now he shows that the woman’s sin was more grave in three ways.

First, from the motive to sin, since it was from greater pride.

Second, from the offense, since she sinned against more than one person, at she sinned against herself, her neighbor, and God. (Sent. II, 22.4(133).5.)

Third, from the punishment, since she was more seriously punished, at that the woman sinned more may also be gathered from her being punished more severely. (Sent. II, 22.4(133).5.)

But what Augustine . . . says of the man and woman excusing their sin, appears contrary to this. (Sent. II, 22.4(133).6, referring to Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 11, ch. 35, n. 47 (CSEL 28.1:369; PL 34:448–49).) Here he raises an objection against what was said.

First, he shows that the sin was equal.

Second, he shows that the man’s sin was more grave, at it is customary to object to this in the following way. (Sent. II, 22.4(133).11.)

Concerning the first, he does two things insofar as he cites two authorities against what was determined.

The second begins, at but even so we read of the man also that he wanted to be like God. (Sent. II, 22.4(133).8.)

Now, each of these parts is divided into objection and reply.

It is also usual to ask, since human nature was without defect, from where did the consent to that evil come. (Sent. II, 22.5(134).3.) Here he inquires as to what the principle of that sin was.

It is divided into two parts on the basis of the two questions he raises.

The second begins, at but if it is asked whether the will preceded that sin, we say that that sin consisted in both the will and the act. (Sent. II, 22.6(135).1.)

Here two questions are asked.

First, concerning the sin of the first man. (Q. 1.)

Second, concerning ignorance. (Q. 2.)

Question 1

The first sin of man

Concerning the first, three questions are asked:

first, what was the first sin with respect to its genus;

second, what did man desire in sinning;

third, who sinned more, the man or the woman.

Article 1

Whether man’s first sin was pride

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.63.2; I-II.89.3, ad 2; II-II.105.2, ad 2; 163.1; Compendium theologiae, ch. 191; On Evil, q. 7, a. 7, ad 12; q. 14, a. 2, ad 5; q. 15, a. 2, ad 7; Commentary on Romans, ch. 5, lect. 5; Commentary on 1 Timothy, ch. 2, lect. 3.) It seems that pride was not man’s first sin.

Obj. 1: For to disbelieve the words of God is the sin of infidelity. But man’s sin seems to have proceeded from the fact that he disbelieved God’s words or was doubtful of them, as has been said above. (Above: d. 21, q. 1, a. 1, resp.) Therefore, man’s first sin was infidelity.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in the spiritual edifice, the first foundation is faith (Heb 11:10). But what is opposed to faith is infidelity. Therefore, too, in the process of man’s perdition the first sin was infidelity, not pride.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it is said: by one man’s disobedience many were made sinners (Rom 5:19), speaking there of the first sin of man. For through sin death entered into the world. Therefore, the first sin is disobedience.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the species of sin is determined by the motive for sinning. But the woman was moved to sin by delight with respect to taste. Hence it is said: the woman saw that the tree was good for food, etc. (Gen 3:6). Therefore, since gluttony concerns what is delightful with regard to eating, it seems that man’s first sin was gluttony.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, it was the demon’s promise that incited the woman to sin. But the demon promised the perfection of knowledge. Therefore, she sinned out of a desire for knowledge. But the immoderate desire to know is curiosity. Therefore, the first sin is curiosity.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, whoever does not do what he is bound to do sins by a sin of omission. But in temptation man was bound to give consideration to the precept enjoined on him, since if he had given due consideration to it, he would not have sinned. Therefore, it seems that he first sinned by a sin of omission.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, man’s first sin was the root and origin of the sins that followed. But, as it is said: cupidity is the root of all evils (1 Tim 6:10). (RSV reads love of money instead of cupidity.) Therefore, it seems that the first sin was cupidity, not pride or self-exaltation, as it says in the text. (Sent. II, 22.2(131)‒3(132).)

On the contrary, it is said: the beginning of all sin is pride (Sir 10:13). (RSV reads the beginning of pride is sin.) But all sin took its beginning in man’s first sin. Therefore, the first sin was pride.

Furthermore, by tempting man, the devil tried to make him into an imitator of himself. But the demon sinned through pride, as has been said above. (Above: d. 21, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1.) Therefore, so did man.

I answer that it sometimes happens that the deformations of more than one sin are found in a single act. Still, the deformation that remains from the principal motive, to which the others are ordered, is more principal and more formal, completing the species of the sin. For the end is that which lies first in the will, from which sin has its origin. And moral acts are specified on the basis of the end. Hence the Philosopher says in the Ethics 5 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.2, 1130a24–34.) that if someone commits adultery to make a profit, he is more greedy or unjust than an adulterer.

On this basis I say that many deformations appear in man’s first sin. Hence the Master took note above of gluttony, vainglory, and avarice in it, for which reason the one sin can be called “manifold.” Nevertheless, all the other deformations are material with respect to pride. For he ordered them all to the end of obtaining excellence, as the demon’s promise inciting him to sin shows, since it said: you will be like gods (Gen 3:5). Appropriately then, the sin of both the demon and man began with pride, since the occasion for all other sins is usually some defect, whereas pride alone is what takes its foundation from perfection. Hence Augustine says that it even lies in wait for good works to turn them toward destruction. (Augustine, Regula ad servos Dei, sect. 2 (PL 32:1379).)

Reply Obj. 1: They did not believe that God had said something false (for this would have belonged to infidelity simply). Rather, they believed, perhaps, that what he said should be understood in some other way, and metaphorically, and for signifying something else.

Or it may be said that from the very self-exaltation by which they desired what was promised, the eye of the mind was impeded from actually attending to the truth of what God said, insofar as every wicked person is in some way ignorant. But such ignorance or doubtfulness, even of things that must be believed, does not produce infidelity.

Reply Obj. 2: The order of assembly is contrary to the order of disassembly. For what is first in assembly is last in disassembly. Thus, it does not follow that if faith is first in the assembly of the spiritual building then infidelity is first in its disassembly.

Reply Obj. 3: Disobedience is taken in two ways. Sometimes it is a specific sin, namely, when someone sins specifically out of contempt of a precept. But sometimes disobedience is taken as being a general condition consequent upon every mortal sin. For since a precept of law orders the acts of all the virtues, the consequence is that any vice has a connected transgression of a precept, and thus disobedience. This is the way in which it is said: by one man’s disobedience many were made sinners (Rom 5:19).

Reply Obj. 4: The motive of gluttony was not the principal motive but was, rather, secondary and ordered to another, as has been said. (Resp.)

Reply Obj. 5: The woman did not sin in this, that she desired knowledge of things that did not pertain to her, since this would have been curiosity. Rather, she sinned in this, that in that knowledge she desired an eminence that would in a certain way make her equal to God.

Reply Obj. 6: Man was not at that time bound to give such consideration, since he could have resisted the temptation even without such consideration.

Or we may better say that there was in this case an omission, not as a specific sin, but as the omission that is consequent upon every sin. For every sin has in common the fact that someone does not do what is in him to resist the sin, which, if he were to do, he would not sin.

Reply Obj. 7: Cupidity is taken in three ways. In one way, it is taken as being a specific sin, having specific matter, namely, goods pertaining to usefulness for life insofar as they are possessed. In this way, it is not the root of all sin, except as the Master says below, (Sent. II, 42.8(266).) that there is no genus of sin that does not at times arise from avarice. In the second way, cupidity is spoken of as a general sin, being the immoderate desire for possessing anything, whether knowledge, or a possession, or anything else. This is the way in which the Master said above that in man’s first sin there was avarice. And these are the two ways that Augustine posits. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 11, ch. 15 (CSEL 28.1:347; PL 34:436).) In the third way, cupidity is taken not as a sin but as the root of sin, indicating a kind of propensity of the appetite inclining to something actually and inordinately desired. And it is obvious that man did not sin out of avarice in the first way, there understanding cupidity as a specific sin.

Article 2

Whether man’s sin was that he desired to be just like God

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In II Sent., d. 5, q. 1, a. 2; ST I.63.3; II-II.163.2; SCG III.109; Compendium theologiae, ch. 191; On Evil, q. 16, a. 3.) It seems that man’s sin was not that he desired to be just like (Throughout this article, the word sicut (“just like,” “as,” “like”) should be carefully distinguished from similis (“like,” “similar to”). For it was shown above (In I Sent., d. 16, q. 1, aa. 1, 4) that in one way, being like God is not only possible, but even natural to man, and in another way, being like God is possible to man as a grace.) God.

Obj. 1: For a prudent person cannot have a complete will for what is impossible, especially what does not fall within apprehension. But it is impossible for a created thing to be just like God, and this cannot even be grasped by the intellect. Therefore, since he had prudence and the rest of the virtues, he did not desire in this way, as the Master says below.

Obj. 2: One might say that he did not desire to be just like God by way of equality, but instead by way of likeness.

On the contrary, as Augustine says, love pertains to things that are possessed, but desire pertains to things that are not possessed. (Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, Psalm 118, sermon 8, para. 3 (CCSL 39; PL 37:1520).) Therefore, since man was made after the likeness of God at his creation, it seems that man did not desire this.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it is obvious that God does not know evil through experience. But the knowledge of good and evil is understood to mean evil by experience, which was previously through knowledge alone. Therefore, it seems that from the fact that he desired knowledge of good and evil, he did not aspire to likeness to God.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the Philosopher says in the Ethics 10 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.7, 1177b30–35; Metaphysics 1.2, 982b29–983a10.) that we should draw ourselves up into the things of God as much as we are able. For he does not begrudge us what is divine, as a certain poet lied. Now, Dionysius (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 5 (Patrologia Graeca [PG] 3:818).) and Augustine (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 6 (CCSL 50; PL 42:946).) say that one approaches God not in place but in likeness. Therefore, since we should approach him—as it is said, come to him and be enlightened (Ps 34:5 [33:6])— *(RSV reads look to him, and be radiant.)*it seems that he did not sin in desiring likeness to God.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, no one sins in desiring what he naturally desires. But all men, as the Philosopher says, by nature desire to know. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.1, 980a26.) Therefore, since he desired the divine likeness only in knowledge, as the serpent’s words show, it seems that in desiring likeness to God he did not sin.

On the contrary, in the text Augustine is cited as saying: one who perversely wishes to be as God, perversely wishes to be like God, as in the case of the devil and man. (See Sent. II, 22.4(133).8, quoting Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, Psalm 70, sermon 2 (CCSL 39; PL 36:896).) This is even seen from God’s reproach: behold, the man has become like one of us (Gen 3:22).

I answer that in one respect man desired to be like God, though in another respect he did not. For if “like” indicates equality in any perfection, then in this way, man did not wish to have as much knowledge, power, or goodness as God has, since this is impossible and unthinkable. But as regards a manner of possession, both man and the devil willed to be put on par with God—that is, that both would have the perfection given to them as God has it in a certain manner, though man and the devil desired this differently. For the proud angel desired this kind of equality in power, while man desired it in knowledge.

The reason for this is that the first angel was most excellent among other created things. Hence in a certain way it had an influence on other created things by the order of its nature. And so, relying on the dignity of its nature, it wished to exist as a kind of principle of subsequent creatures by a mode of governance and a certain causality. Still, it willed to be under the first principle, which it recognized to be the source of its power, but it presumed to get this on the basis of the dignity of its nature, not from an additional gift of God. But man, who was placed over lower creatures to rule them and to make use of them, not so much through power but through prudence, desired to obtain such great fullness of knowledge through the condition of his own nature, and through the eating of the forbidden tree, that by the light of his own reason (which he nevertheless believed was conferred on him by God) he would rule himself in all matters as well as the lower things subject to him. Hence Augustine says (Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, Psalm 70, sermon 2 (CCSL 39; PL 36:896).) that he did not wish to be a servant bound by precept, as though ruled by another through a light added to his natural light. And the words of the serpent show this as well, since it promised knowledge of good and evil, which pertain to actions and to the governance of things.

Reply Obj. 1: Self-exaltation blinds the eyes of the mind so much that it esteems possible what is not possible. Hence it could have been that at the serpent’s words man inordinately desired excellence in general, while reason was blinded by that desire, he rendered a perverse judgment about the impossible, and so his appetite inclined to this manner of excellence.

Or we may say that he did not desire equality of equivalence (which is impossible and cannot be conceived of in thought), but rather a kind of assimilation, as has been said, (Resp.) which he was able to conceive in thought.

Reply Obj. 2: He did not sin by desiring the likeness of natural dignity that he received at his creation, but rather, by desiring another likeness above this, namely, that as God by the light of his nature rules and governs all things, so also man would govern things subject to himself and himself through the natural light of reason without the help of an external light.

Reply Obj. 3: Man did not desire to know evils by experience, but instead by judgment. But it followed from his sin that he came to know evil by experience, so that in this way, when it was carried out, the demon’s promise even came true, whose custom it is to deceive men with doubtful words, and also so that the name given to the tree would not seem to be in vain.

Reply Obj. 4: Likeness to God should be approached in accord with the manner and order offered to each by God. But one who would approach God by his own motion wills to be like God in a perverse way, as Augustine says in the text. (Sent. II, 22.4(133).8.) For every sinner desires likeness to God, since nothing is desirable except insofar as it has a likeness to him. But in this he sins, since he seeks likeness to him inordinately and in something in which this likeness is not to be sought.

Reply Obj. 5: He did not sin in this, that he desired knowledge, but rather because he desired it inordinately, as has been said.

Article 3

Whether the woman sinned more gravely than the man

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST II-II.163.4.) It seems that the woman did not sin more gravely than the man.

Obj. 1: For both sinned by the vice of self-exaltation. But that self-exaltation was only in this, that they perversely desired likeness to God. Therefore, it seems that both desired the same thing and sinned equally.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, weakness excuses from sin. But the woman was weaker than the man, for which reason the devil, as was said above, first approached her. Therefore, it seems that she sinned less.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the reason why the demon’s sin is judged graver than man’s sin is that it had more eminent knowledge about God. But the man was more endowed with a spiritual mind than the woman, as it says in the text. Therefore, it seems that he sinned more gravely.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the governance of the woman pertained to the man. Hence it is also said above that the precept was given to the woman through the man. Therefore, it seems that even the woman’s sin should be imputed to the man and reckoned graver.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, to sin with regard to the divine mercy seems to be the sin of presumption, which is a species of sin against the Holy Spirit, which is most grave. Therefore, since the man sinned by thinking of God’s mercy, as it says in the text, (Sent. II, 22.4(133).1.) it seems that he sinned more gravely than the woman.

On the contrary, sin came from the devil to the woman and from the woman to the man. But the devil sinned more gravely than the woman. Therefore, the woman also sinned more gravely than the man.

Furthermore, the citations in the text make the same point. (See Sent. II, 22.4(133).1–5.)

I answer that, as was said above, (Above: d. 21, q. 2, a. 2.) when different circumstances are considered, it is not unfitting for one of two sins to be graver than the other. Still, that sin should be called “graver” simply speaking which is weightier in more respects or in more important respects. Now, what is most significant in any sin is that to which the sin moves, as was said before, and it is in this regard that we should most of all consider the gravity of a sin. In this regard it is clear that the woman’s sin is graver. For the woman was moved to sin only out of self-exaltation of the mind, whereas the man was moved not out of self-exaltation alone, but also out of a kind of loving kindness toward his wife, which in a way mitigates his sin.

Again, the self-exaltation that moved the woman was greater than the self-exaltation that moved the man. For in the woman the process of self-exaltation was such that at the serpent’s words she conceived such a great desire for excellence that it perverted the judgment of reason, and she believed that what the devil said was both possible and true. For this reason she is said to have been seduced. However, in the man, love for his own excellence did not grow so great in the beginning that it perverted his judgment, as if he believed that the given thing would happen, but instead that he would will it if it were possible. Thus, he is not said to have been seduced. Rather, such self-exaltation incited him to make a test of it. Hence in him self-exaltation produced a certain doubtfulness, while in the woman it had conceived a firm opinion. And so, in consequence the woman had a perfect will for the desire for the divine likeness, but the man’s will was imperfect, namely, on the condition that it were possible.

Reply Obj. 1: As is clear from the aforementioned, granted that both desired this in a certain way, they did not desire it equally. For what is believed to be possible has a complete desire, whereas what is believed to be impossible or doubtfully possible has a conditional desire alone, that is, one would will it if it were possible. Therefore, because the woman’s mind was so blinded through self-exaltation at the words of the serpent that she believed that what the devil promised was possible, she had a complete desire. But the man had an incomplete desire, because he did not believe it was possible.

Reply Obj. 2: There was not such great weakness in the woman that she could not resist sin. Hence, even though woman’s weakness is a circumstance diminishing her sin in comparison with a man, she did not perform a lesser sin simply.

Reply Obj. 3–4: And we should reply likewise to the third and fourth objection.

Reply Obj. 5: To think about the mercy of God with the resolution of repenting and coming back from sin does not amount to the sin of presumption, but rather alleviates sin. But to think about the mercy of God without resolving to repent is a matter of presumption and contempt for the divine justice. But Adam did not think about mercy in this way.

Question 2

Ignorance

Then the question of ignorance, mentioned in the text, is asked. And two questions are asked:

first, whether ignorance is a sin;

second, whether it excuses from sin.

Article 1

Whether ignorance is a sin

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: below, d. 42, q. 2, a. 2, resp. and ad 3; In IV Sent., d. 9, q. 1, a. 3, resp. and ad 1; ST I-II.74.1, ad 2; 74.5; 76.2; II-II.53.2, ad 2; On Evil, q. 3, a. 7; Quodl. I, q. 9, a. 3; Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, bk. 3, lect. 11.) It seems that ignorance is not a sin.

Obj. 1: For every sin, as Augustine says, is within the will. (Augustine, De duabus animabus, ch. 10 (CSEL 25:63; PL 42:103).) But ignorance is in the intellect. Therefore, it is not a sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, every sin is either original or actual. But ignorance is not original sin, but rather concupiscence is, as will be said below. Neither is it actual sin, since it is not a word, deed, or desire contrary to the law of God. Therefore, ignorance is no sin.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, every sin consists in the defect of an act, not in the defect of a habit. Otherwise someone would sin while sleeping. But ignorance is more opposed to habit than to act. Therefore, the same follows as before.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, one who is ignorant remains continuously in his ignorance. Therefore, if it were a sin for him to be ignorant, it seems that he would be continuously sinning. For there is no apparent reason why it is more a sin now than before. But this seems to be a serious charge. Therefore, it seems that ignorance is not a sin.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, Augustine says that every sin is voluntary. (Augustine, De duabus animabus, ch. 10 (CSEL 25:63; PL 42:103).) But ignorance is not something voluntary, since knowledge is naturally desired by all, according to the Philosopher. Therefore, it is not a sin.

On the contrary, it is said: if any man know not, he shall not be known (1 Cor 14:38), (RSV reads if any one does not recognize this, he is not recognized.) speaking about the not-knowing of reprobation. But reprobation is only due to anyone for mortal sin. Therefore, ignorance is a mortal sin.

Furthermore, it is said: therefore, my people go into exile for want of knowledge (Isa 5:13). But punishment is only due to fault. Therefore, to lack knowledge is a fault.

I answer that some have said that ignorance is never a fault in and of itself, but can be a fault by reason of something connected to it, either preceding or following. Ignorance connected with a preceding cause is a fault, namely, negligence of learning. Ignorance connected with a following effect is a fault, namely, that of an inordinate act following on ignorance.

But because there is only more of the account of fault when there is the privation of something that ought to be had and is in the power of the one who is deprived, we can call ignorance in itself a fault, if ignorance is taken in a privative and not a negative sense. And I say that ignorance, taken in a privative sense, is ignorance of what someone is naturally apt to know and ought to know, whatever it may be. For not all are bound to know precisely the same things, since some are bound to know more than others. Hence a given ignorance is a sin for one that is not a sin for another. For ignorance of what pertains to good morals and the truth of the faith is a sin for everyone, but to someone holding a certain office, ignorance of what pertains to his office is also a sin. And it is no wonder that if this very thing—to lack knowledge—is a sin for one who can and is bound to having it, since even lacking something bodily pertaining to one’s office, such as tonsure or attire appropriate to the office, is a sin. And the fact that these things are sins in themselves is shown by the punishment that is justly inflicted for them.

Reply Obj. 1: There are two ways something can be in the will. Either something is in the will as in a subject, and in this way, not every sin is in the will. For a sin can be in the concupiscible or the irascible part, and so on for the other powers. Or something is in the will as in a cause, namely, in the way that the will is the master of what is said to be in it, as being in its power. And in this way, every sin is in the will, even ignorance. For it is the will that commands the other powers and the intellect. Hence the acts of the other powers are in the power of the will, as well as their defects, that is, only those powers that obey reason.

Reply Obj. 2: Ignorance is not original sin (for ignorance is not imputed to a child as a sin before he reaches the proper age). Rather, it is an actual sin in the way in which omission is called an “actual sin.” And the description of actual sin befits ignorance in the same way as omission, though how this is the case will be explained below.

Reply Obj. 3: Even though knowledge, to which ignorance is opposed, is not an act that is an activity, but rather a habit, it is acquired through an activity that is in the power of the will. Thus, the fact of having knowledge is subject to the will and, consequently, the fact of lacking knowledge. And so it is that it has the account of fault.

Reply Obj. 4: A sin of omission only has the account of a fault from the fact that it is opposed to an affirmative precept of the natural or written law. Now, an affirmative precept obliges always, but not at every moment. Thus, every omission is actually a sin for the time in which someone is obliged by the precept. And the sin is multiplied as often as that time returns.

Reply Obj. 5: Even though all naturally desire and will knowledge, they do not all will that through which knowledge is gained. This is how ignorance becomes in a certain way something voluntary, not through itself, but incidentally, as any evil does.

Article 2

Whether ignorance excuses sin

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I-II.76.) It seems that ignorance does not excuse sin.

Obj. 1: This is, first, through the fact that Ambrose’s Gloss on Romans 2 says: if he is ignorant he sins most gravely. (Rather: Ambrosiaster, Commentaria in Epistolas B. Pauli, on Romans 2:4–5 (PL 17:264–65); see also Anselm of Canterbury (ca. 1033–1109 AD), Orationes, n. 33 (PL 158:926). In ST III, q. 82, a. 10, Aquinas cites the same text: Ambrose says in a certain prayer, etc.) But what aggravates a sin does not excuse it. Therefore, ignorance does not excuse sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, one who kills a man through drunkenness obviously sins through ignorance. But, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 3, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.5, 1113b31.) such a person deserves double the curses. Therefore, ignorance does not excuse sin, but rather aggravates it.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a sin added to a sin does not excuse it, but aggravates it. But ignorance is a sin, as was said above. Therefore, it does not excuse sin.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, what follows on every sin cannot excuse or alleviate sin. For in this case it would excuse every single sin. But ignorance follows on every sin, since every wicked person is ignorant, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 3. (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, 1110b9–1111a20; 3.5, 1113b25–1114b15.) Therefore, the same follows as before.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, as Bede says, (This teaching does not seem to be in Bede’s extant works.) there are four penalties we suffer from the sin of the first man: ignorance, weakness, concupiscence, and malice. But malice does not excuse sin, but rather aggravates it, as does concupiscence. Therefore, it seems that neither ignorance nor weakness excuse sin.

On the contrary, the Apostle says: I received mercy because I had acted ignorantly (1 Tim 1:13). But nothing evokes mercy unless it excuses from or alleviates sin. Therefore, ignorance excuses or alleviates sin.

Furthermore, every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine. (Augustine, De duabus animabus, ch. 10 (CSEL 25:63; PL 42:103).) Therefore, what takes away or diminishes the account of the voluntary excuses or alleviates sin. But ignorance is such a thing, since ignorance causes involuntariness, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, 1110b17–1111a21.) Therefore, ignorance either excuses or alleviates sin.

I answer that there is a kind of ignorance that excuses sin completely, a kind that alleviates it partly, and a kind that neither completely excuses nor partly alleviates sin.

To elucidate this it should be known that we can divide ignorance in three ways. The first is on the part of the knower. For there is a kind of ignorance that is in the power of the knower, and this is called “vincible ignorance” or “affected ignorance.” However, there is a kind of ignorance that is not in his power, and this is called “invincible ignorance.” But ignorance can be in someone’s power in two ways. For it is either in his power in itself, as when someone is ignorant of a precept that he could know at once; or it is in his power with regard to its cause, though not in itself, as is clear in the ignorance of someone who is drunk, since the drunkenness that is the cause of the ignorance was in his power, but not the consequent ignorance, since the use of reason is impeded.

The second is on the part of the knowable object. For one kind of ignorance is of that which one is bound to know, and, according to the Philosopher, this is called “ignorance of the universal,” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, 1110b32.) and, according to legal experts, “ignorance of law.” This is varied in different people, as has been said. (Above: d. 21, q. 2, a. 1, ad 5.) For one person is bound to know certain things that another is not bound to know. On the other hand, there is ignorance of that which one is not bound to know, and this is knowledge of actual particular circumstances, which the Philosopher calls “ignorance of the particular,” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, 1110b33.) while the jurists call it “ignorance of fact.”

The third is from the ordering to act. For there is a kind of ignorance that is the cause of an act because if one were not ignorant, he would not do it, and then he is said to sin through ignorance. A sign of this is actual repentance. There is also a kind of ignorance that is not the cause of an act, but is instead related incidentally to the act. And on the basis of this kind of ignorance, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 3, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, 1110b25–27.) someone is not said to act through ignorance, but rather to act while being ignorant. Hence such a person does not repent of the act, such as when someone, believing that he is approaching one woman, approaches another, whom he would still have approached if he had not been ignorant that it was she. Finally, there is a kind of ignorance that in a certain way follows on the affect of sin, such as when from concupiscence for a sin that the will does not repress, the judgment of reason concerning that particular practical matter is submerged, in accord with what is said in the Ethics 6, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.5, 1140b11–19.) that delight corrupts the estimation of prudence. And this is ignorance of choice, in accord with which every wicked person is called “ignorant.”

And so, having made these observations, it should be known that ignorance only excuses or lessens sin to the extent that it causes involuntariness. For that of which one is ignorant cannot be voluntary. Now, ignorance that is not the cause of an act does not cause involuntariness, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, 1110b17–24.) Hence it in no way excuses or diminishes sin. Rather, only that kind that is the cause of an act does. Now, this can excuse sin either completely or partly. For if there is such ignorance to which no account of fault is in any way connected, then the very fact of ignorance excuses completely, as in the case of invincible ignorance and ignorance of the particular, provided due diligence was employed.

On the other hand, an ignorance that has the account of fault does still excuse in a certain respect, namely, inasmuch as it is ignorance. For in this way, it has the property of causing involuntariness. However, it does not excuse inasmuch as it is fault, since in this way, it retains the account of the voluntary. Thus, ignorance of the universal excuses a subsequent sin, not completely, but from having its full gravity. So too with vincible ignorance, whether it is vincible in itself or in its cause, as long as one was not engaged in an illicit matter when he incurred the ignorance. For if he had been engaged in a moderate way in a licit matter, the subsequent ignorance would have no fault. Thus, it follows that it would completely excuse a subsequent sin, as is clear in the case of those who by carrying out spiritual works go mad.

Reply Obj. 1: One who is ignorant is said to sin most gravely, not on account of the magnitude of the sin, but rather on account of the danger. For when one does not know about the disease, he does not seek the medicine.

Or we may say that Ambrose is not speaking of the gravity of the sin that follows through ignorance, but of the gravity of the sin that is itself the ignorance of the benefits of God, which is the gravest among the species of ingratitude, that is, insofar as a person does not recognize the benefit.

Reply Obj. 2: A drunken murderer sins by two sins, namely drunkenness and murder, for which reason he is said to deserve double the curses. Even so, nothing prevents the magnitude of the subsequent sin from being lessened through ignorance following from what preceded. Hence in the course of the argument there is a fallacy of speech, because the discrete is changed into the continuous.

Reply Obj. 3: All ignorance that is a sin is in the intellect as in a subject, and in the will as in a cause, as was said above. Hence to the extent that it is in the intellect, namely, insofar as it deprives one of direct knowledge actually, it lessens the magnitude of a subsequent sin, nor does it have the property of being a sin in this respect. Rather, insofar as it is in the will, as in a cause, it has the property of being a sin. In this way, ignorance does not excuse, but instead adds to sin. And it can be the case sometimes that the very sin of ignorance adds more weight than what is lessened through ignorance of the subsequent sin.

Reply Obj. 4: The ignorance that follows on every sin is not the cause of sin, as has been said. (Resp.) Thus, it neither excuses nor diminishes sin.

Reply Obj. 5: Ignorance and weakness have the property of excusing sin either completely or partly due to the fact that they cause involuntariness. But malice and concupiscence increase voluntariness and thus do not excuse, but instead aggravate sin. This is what I say if “concupiscence” is taken for an act of the will. However, if it is taken for a passion of the concupiscible part, drawing the will in a certain way resistant to it, then in this case concupiscence does excuse. For to the degree that someone succumbs to a greater temptation, he sins less. But this is reduced to the case of weakness.

Exposition of the text

‘Which was to be convicted or destroyed by temptation.’ (Sent. II, 22.1(130).3, quoting Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 11, ch. 30 (CSEL 28.1:363; PL 34:445).) That is to say, by spiritual or even bodily death, either by her, by the man, or by God, if this is understood of the woman, as the Master explains.

‘And so he could be deceived into thinking that the offense was venial.’ (Sent. II, 22.4(133).4, quoting Augustine, City of God, bk. 14, ch. 11 (CCSL 48; PL 41:419–20).) This is understood, as was said above, of venial by cause, not by genus. For he thought that, because he acted in order to go along with his wife, his sin would have cause for excuse and easily receive pardon. The cause of this sort of seduction seems to have been self-exaltation of the mind, which crept in at the woman’s suggestion.

Due to which he wished to experience the forbidden tree. For because experience pertains only to doubtful things, it is clear that from self-exaltation he was led into a kind of doubtfulness of the matter, regarding which the woman was also seduced.

As Isidore says, ‘sin is committed in three ways, namely, by ignorance, infirmity, or intention.’ (Sent. II, 22.4(133).11, quoting Isidore of Seville (ca. 560–636 AD), Sentences (On the Highest Good), bk. 2, ch. 17, nn. 3–4 (CCSL 111:130; PL 83:620).) It seems that he does not sufficiently enumerate them. For there is also a kind of sin that is from concupiscence, which he does not mention.

And it should be said that sin proceeding from concupiscence is reduced to sin out of weakness or infirmity. For a sin out of weakness is not only when someone sins by an external impulse, but also when someone falls into sin through a temptation of the flesh.

‘Because . . . ignorance itself is a sin.’ (Sent. II, 22.5(134).2, quoting Augustine, Epistola 194 (ad Sixtum), ch. 6, n. 27 (CSEL 57:197; PL 33:883).) This is true if it belongs to things that one is bound to know. Otherwise not. For even to will not to know geometry is not a sin for someone who does not have the office of teaching it as a profession.