D. 35 - Evil of fault

Division of the text

Because there are elements to consider in actual sin—namely, the defect, whereby it has the account of evil, and the substance of the act, on the basis of which it is called an “actual” sin—having discussed actual sin as it has the account of evil, here he begins to discuss it as regards the substance of the act, in which the defect, in regard to which it is called “evil,” is founded.

And this is divided into two parts.

In the first, he considers sin as regards act.

In the second, he considers it as regards the potency to the act of sin, at after the aforesaid, it seems worth considering whether the power to sin comes to us from God or from ourselves. (Sent. II, 44.1(268).1.)

The first part is divided into two parts.

In the first, he discusses sin in general.

In the second, he goes through the differences among sins, at but since an evil will and activity are sinful, it is usual to ask whether, in the same man and concerning the same thing, these two are one sin or several. (Sent. II, 42.1(259).1. The Silano translation has been slightly modified.)

The first part is divided into two parts.

In the first, he discusses the act of sin in general.

But because the act of sin is either the internal act of the will or the external act of the work, in the second part he goes through both acts: after the aforesaid, we must discuss the will and its end. (Sent. II, 38.1(245).1.)

The first part is divided into two parts.

In the first, he pursues the opinion of some who say that the acts of sins are from God.

In the second, he puts forward the contrary opinion, at but there are many others who feel entirely otherwise concerning sin and action. (Sent. II, 37.1(243).1.)

The first part is divided into two parts.

In the first, he pursues the opinion of those who say that all acts are from God.

In the second, he does this tangentially; because the disputation that was raised required it, he intersperses a comparison of sin to punishment, whether a sin be a punishment, at and yet it is to be known that some things are sins in such a way that they are also punishments for sins. (Sent. II, 36.1(237).1.)

The first part is divided into three parts.

In the first, he puts forward a definition of sin.

In the second, he introduces different opinions occasioned by the given descriptions, at by reason of the diversity of these statements, many have thought different things concerning sin. (Sent. II, 35.2(232).1.)

In the third, he pursues the opinion that all acts are from God, at and some, diligently noting the words of Augustine . . . not unlearnedly teach. (Sent. II, 35.2(232).4.)

Concerning the second, he does two things.

First, he recounts the different opinions.

Second, he says briefly which of them we should hold, at it can well be said. (Sent. II, 35.2(232).3.)

The third part is divided into three parts.

In the first, an opinion is put forward.

In the second, the confirmation of the opinion by argumentation is put forward, at and they prove that any will and action is a good insofar as it is, from what Augustine says. (Sent. II, 35.2(232).5, quoting Augustine, Book of Eighty-Three Different Questions, q. 21 (CCSL 44A; PL 40:16).)

In the third, a response is posed to what can be objected to the contrary, at this objection is made to them: if all things that are, insofar as they are, are good . . . then adultery, homicide and suchlike . . . are good. (Sent. II, 35.2(232).10.)

Concerning the second, he puts forward two arguments.

The first is taken from the account of being.

The second is taken from the relation of evil to good, in which evil necessarily exists as in a subject, at also, they prove in another way that every act, interior or exterior, insofar as it is, is good. (Sent. II, 35.2(232).8.)

The first argument runs like this: every being, precisely as a being, is a good and is from God. But every action is a being. Therefore, and so on.

First, he proves the major premise.

Second, he puts forth the minor premise and draws the conclusion, at from the aforesaid, it is gathered and inferred. (Sent. II, 35.2(232).6.)

This objection is made to them: if all things, etc. (Sent. II, 35.2(232).10.) Here he rules out the objections that there can be against this opinion. And this is divided into three parts for the three objections.

The first is taken from the immediately named acts that express evil, such as homicide and so forth.

The second is taken from the omissions that do not seem to have an act, at also, another objection is made to them. (Sent. II, 35.2(232).11.)

Third, he takes it from comparing punishment to fault, at it can also be asked by them. (Sent. II, 35.3(233).1.)

And it is divided into two parts.

In the first, he poses the objection and solves it, showing that in the corruption of the good, fault is different from punishment.

In the second, he raises certain questions that come up because of the solution, at but since it is nothing insofar as it is sin, how can it corrupt or destroy the good? (Sent. II, 35.4(234).1.)

And concerning this he does two things.

First, he inquires as to how fault can be a corruption actively.

Second, how punishment can be a corruption passively, at and it is usual to ask whether privation or corruption of the good is a punishment. (Sent. II, 35.6(236).1.)

Concerning the first, he does three things.

First, he shows the good by reason of which the evil of fault is called a corruption in the active sense.

Second, he shows the good of which it is a corruption, at but sin, that is, fault, is properly a corruption of the soul. (Sent. II, 35.4(234).2.)

Third, he explains what he had said, namely, how someone can become distant from God, at and he distances himself from him through sin. (Sent. II, 35.5(235).1.)

Question 1

The evil of fault

Here five questions are asked:

first, about the division of evil;

second, about the definition of fault;

third, if every fault consists in an act;

fourth, if it is in an internal act only or in an external one;

fifth, if fault is the corruption of the soul’s powers.

Article 1

Whether evil is sufficiently divided into evil of fault and evil of punishment

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.48.5; On Evil, q. 1, a. 4.) It seems that evil is not sufficiently divided into fault and punishment.

Obj. 1: For evil is nothing other than a lack of the good. But everything that is found to be less good than another is not without the lack of a good. Therefore, everything that is a lesser good is also evil. But all created things are lesser goods. Therefore, since there are many created things in which there is neither punishment nor fault, it seems that evil is not sufficiently divided into punishment and fault.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, there cannot be evil of fault in those who do not have control over their own acts. But in those in whom there is no fault, there is no punishment, since punishment is due fault. Therefore, although there are many things that do not possess will, and thus do not have control over their own acts, yet there is some evil in them, as is clear in insensible things, it seems that evil is not sufficiently divided into punishment and fault.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Augustine says that it is called “evil” because it does harm. (Augustine, On the Customs of the Church and the Manichees, bk. 2, ch. 3 (CSEL 90; PL 32:1346).) But everything that does harm is a punishment. Therefore, it is unfitting to divide some other kind of evil from punishment.

Obj. 4: One might say that punishment does harm passively, whereas fault harms actively.

On the contrary, passion is the effect and result of action. Therefore, if punishment is a passive harm and fault an active harm, every punishment will be the result of fault. Thus, everyone who inflicts a punishment will commit a fault, which is heretical because then the order of justice would be lost.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, there is a punishment that consists only in a negation, such as lacking the vision of God. But passion is not a negation only. In fact, it is a being positively stated, since it is one of the ten categories. Therefore, not every punishment is a harm passively stated.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, there are some faults in which no act exists, as is clear especially in the case of the original fault. But nothing harms actively except through a given action. Therefore, not every fault is an active harm.

On the contrary, Augustine says: every evil of ours is either what we do or what we suffer. (Augustine, De libero arbitrio, bk. 1, ch. 1 (CCSL 29; PL 32:1221); Contra Adimantum Manichaei discipulum, para. 27 (CSEL 25:184; PL 42:168).) But the evil we do is fault, and the evil we suffer is punishment. Therefore, evil is divided into fault and punishment.

I answer that, as was said above, (Above: d. 30, q. 1, a. 2, s.c.) speaking of the essential meaning, evil is a sort of privation of some good. Now, good consists in perfection and act. Hence the distinction among evils must be based on the distinction among perfections.

But there are two kinds of act or perfection: first act and second act. First act is the primary form itself. Second act is the activity itself. Thus, differences in evil arise from the privation of each different perfection. For if some form or perfection of a given natural thing suffers privation, it will be called an “evil of nature,” but if it is deprived of a perfection of activity, it will be called a “sin.” For, as it says in the Physics 2, (See perhaps Physics 2.8, 199a33–b7, on the nature of mistakes or faults.) sin exists in what is meant to attain an end when it does not attain it. Now, each thing is meant to attain its end through its activity. Hence sin must consist in an activity to the extent that it is not directed in the way the end requires, as when a grammarian does not write correctly or a physician does not rightly prepare the medicine.

But, as it says in the Metaphysics 5, (This claim does not seem to be explicit in Aristotle, Metaphysics 5, but see 5.1, 1013a22–23 and 5.2, 1013b25–27.) good and evil exist in a certain specific way in what acts by choice, knowing the account of the end and able to determine the end for itself. Thus, in this kind of thing, sin takes on a specific account of evil, namely, that sin in these things is called a “fault.” Hence sin exists in more things than fault does. For, as we have it from the Physics 2, (Aristotle, Physics 2.8, 199a33–b7.) sin is both in what regards nature and in what regards art. But fault can only be in what exists through the will. For nothing attains the account of fault if it is not worthy of reproach, and reproach is only due someone for a disordered act if the act lies under his control.

However, having control over one’s own acts—that is, to be able to perform them or not perform them—properly belongs to the will. Hence “fault” adds on top of “sin” the account that it is an act of the will. Likewise, too, the evil of nature takes on a certain account of evil in what possesses choice—namely, the account of punishment—inasmuch as the will finds a defect disagreeable. Hence every punishment is an evil of nature. For a punishment is called an “evil,” as Augustine says, (Augustine, On the Customs of the Church and the Manichees, bk. 2, ch. 3 (CSEL 90; PL 32:1346).) because it harms the good nature, inasmuch as it subtracts from it that whereby the nature is perfected, either in its natural being, as in the case of blindness, or in what is super-added to nature, as in the subtraction of grace or things of this sort.

Yet some say that even in brute animals the lack of reason participates in the account of a punishment. But it seems, rather, that there is only punishment where fault can exist. Thus, it is clear that the evil of a rational creature is sufficiently and fittingly divided into punishment and fault.

Reply Obj. 1: The term “lack” can be taken either as negation or privation. If it is taken as negation, then not everything that lacks a given good is automatically an evil, since evil is a privation. Hence it is only the lack of what one is meant to possess and ought to possess. But if it is taken as privation, then it is clear that not everything that is without a given good has a lack. For it is not a lack in a stone that it does not see. Hence it is clear that the argument proceeds by equivocating on the term “lack.”

Reply Obj. 2: Fault and punishment are not differences in evil taken in an absolute sense, but in evil as it is in what possesses choice, as has been said. (Resp.)

Reply Obj. 3: We speak of doing harm in two ways: efficiently and formally. Formally doing harm means the harm itself, that is, the removal of good or the privation itself, just as whiteness makes a thing white. In this way, everything that does harm is a punishment in what is meant to undergo punishment. On the other hand, if we take it in the efficient sense, then doing harm means what causes the privation of a perfection in a thing. And in this way, fault harms because a perfection, grace, is taken away by the disordered act, and yet the privation of grace is itself a punishment. This is what the Master says, (Sent. II, 35.4(234).1–2.) that fault is the corruption of the good in an active sense, that is, because the evil of fault consists in the defect of an act to the extent that it falls short of due end and due circumstances. This deficient act produces or effects the privation of grace in the soul, and the privation of grace, taken in the passive sense, is a punishment.

Reply Obj. 4: Every punishment is a kind of corruption introduced by some agent. Although fault is an active element of corruption, not every active element of corruption is a fault. Thus, not everyone who inflicts a punishment must incur a fault.

Reply Obj. 5: “Passion” can be taken in two ways. Either it is taken as regards the nature of a thing, as the logician and natural philosopher considers passion. And in this way, there is no need for every punishment to be a passion, but only a certain punishment, namely, a punishment of the senses. Or else, it is taken as regards the mode of signification, as the grammarian considers it. In this way, “in a passive sense” means derived from a passive verb. Hence the privation whereby someone is deprived of something is called a “passive privation,” and the privation whereby something deprives is called an “active privation.” And, taking “passion” in this way, every punishment is a corruption or passive privation.

Reply Obj. 6: Fault is not called an “active corruption” because it consists in an act, but rather because it produces a corruption. Thus, the objection does not proceed. For it can happen that through what is not an act, a privation passively stated is produced or introduced. Now, whether an activity is required in every fault will be addressed later on. (See a. 3, below.)

Article 2

Whether the definitions of sin proposed here are fitting

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I-II.71.6.) It seems that sin is unfittingly defined as proposed. (The text in question is Sent. II, 35.1(231).1–3. The definitions enumerated there are as follows: sin is every word or deed or desire which happens against the law of God (Augustine, Against Faustus the Manichee, bk. 22, ch. 27 [PL 42:418; CSEL 25:621]); sin is the will to obtain or retain what justice forbids (Augustine, On the Two Souls, Against the Manichees, ch. 11, para. 15 (PL 42:105; CSEL 25:70); Retractions, bk. 1, ch. 15, para. 4 [PL 32:609; CSEL 36:75]); what is, except a transgression of the divine law and disobedience of heavenly commands?” (Ambrose, On Paradise, ch. 8, para. 39 [PL 14:292C-D; CSEL 32.1:295]); sin is iniquity (1 John 3:4).)

Obj. 1: For what is defined should be something because the question “whether it is?” precedes the question “what is it?” Again, everything that is defined has an essence, since the definition signifies the thing’s essence. But, according to Augustine, (Augustine, In Iohannis evangelium tractatus, ch. 1, tract. 1, para. 13 (CCSL 36; PL 35:1385).) sin is nothing and men are made into nothing when they sin. Therefore, it cannot be defined.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a definition should be convertible with what is defined. But the definitions given here about sin do not agree with every sin, as it says in the text. (Sent. II, 35.1(231)–2(232).) Therefore, they are unfittingly assigned.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the lower should not be included in the definition of the higher. But desire, word, and deed (Sent. II, 35.1(231).1, quoting Augustine, Contra Faustum Manichaeum, bk. 22, para. 27 (CSEL 25:621; PL 42:418).) are lower than sin, since every deed contrary to God’s law is a sin, but the converse is not true. Therefore, the description based on what is naturally subsequent is unfittingly assigned.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a specific sin is opposed to a specific virtue. But justice is a specific virtue. Therefore, sin taken universally should not be defined by way of opposition to justice.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, obedience is a specific virtue. But disobedience is opposed to obedience. Therefore, disobedience will also be a specific sin. Therefore, since a species should not be included in the definition of the genus, it seems that sin taken in a universal sense is unfittingly defined by reference to disobedience.

I answer that it must be said that “sin” indicates an evil consisting in an activity, as was said. (Above: a. 1, resp.) Hence two things come together for the account of sin: the act and the defect whereby it acquires the account of evil. Now, the defect that causes the account of evil in sin, as has been said, is a defect of the act’s uprightness whereby it was directed to the end. But the last end of rational nature, which the theologian especially considers, is eternal blessedness itself. The divine law directs us to this end by instruction, and the divine justice directs us to it by inclination.

Thus, sin is here described in three ways.

In the first description, it touches on the substance of the act in its order to the instruments whereby acts are carried out, when it says: word, deed, or desire. (Augustine, Contra Faustum Manichaeum, bk. 22, para. 27 (CSEL 25:621; PL 42:418).) It also touches on the privation of what directs by instruction, the law, when it says that it happens against the law of God. (Augustine, Contra Faustum Manichaeum, bk. 22, para. 27 (CSEL 25:621; PL 42:418).)

In the second description, it touches on the substance of the act from the perspective of the object, given that it says: the will to obtain or retain. (Sent. II, 35.1(231).1, quoting Augustine, De duabus animabus, para. 15 (CSEL 25:70; PL 42:105); see also Aristotle, Physics 7.3.) It also touches on the privation of what directs to the end by inclining like a habit in the statement: what justice forbids. (Augustine, De duabus animabus, para. 15 (CSEL 25:70; PL 42:105).)

Finally, in the third description, it touches on the formal element in sin, whereby it has the account of evil, namely, the privation of what directs to the end, in that it says: a transgression of the divine law. (Sent. II, 35.1(231).2, quoting Ambrose, De Paradiso, ch. 8, n. 39 (CSEL 32.1:296; PL 14:309).) It also touches on the disordering from the end itself, by saying: disobedience of heavenly commands. (Ambrose, De Paradiso, ch. 8, n. 39 (CSEL 32.1:296; PL 14:309).)

Reply Obj. 1: To the extent things possess being, they can be defined, as it says in the Metaphysics 7. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.5, 1031a12.) Hence, because “being” is said with greater priority of substance, which has the account of being in the complete sense, only substance can be defined completely. Therefore, accidents, as having an incomplete participation in the account of being, do not have an absolute definition. For their definitions include something outside their genus, namely, their subject. Likewise, too, since “being” is said in a certain way of privations and negations, as it says in the Metaphysics 4, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.2, 1003b5–10.) there can also be a way of defining them, though a quite incomplete one, which is a sort of explanation of the term’s signification, not an indication of the essence that it does not possess. It is not that sin is totally a privation or negation, but instead it is as regards that whereby it formally has the account of evil. Thus, from that perspective it is defined by way of privation, as is clear from all the descriptions put forward in the text.

Reply Obj. 2: “Sin” is not said univocally of all kinds of sin, but with priority of actual mortal sin, of which venial sin falls short due to the fact that it does not totally disorder one from the end. But it does in a way slow one down from reaching the end while preserving the order to the end. Hence it falls short of the aspect whereby sin formally has the account of evil. Original sin, in turn, falls short on the side of the act’s substance. For actual mortal sin is voluntary by the proper will of the person in whom it exists, but original sin is voluntary by the will of another. Hence it falls short of the aspect whereby sin has the account of a fault. Thus, the definition of sin in general need only agree with the kind of sin in which the account of the genus is found perfectly. But the definition of sin in general can also agree with the others in a qualified sense, just as the account of the genus is found in them in a subsequent way.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as we sometimes use differences (That is, specific differences, which define a particular species within its broader genus.) that are not true in place of true ones because the true ones are obscure, as it says in the Posterior Analytics 1, (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.9, 76a26–27.) so too in place of a true genus we can give something whereby the genus becomes better known. Thus, Augustine, intending to speak more plainly than artificially, signified the genus of sin, which is an activity, by way of the circumlocution word, deed, or desire. (Sent. II, 35.1(231).1, quoting Augustine, Contra Faustum Manichaeum, bk. 22, para. 27 (CSEL 25:621; PL 42:418).)

Reply Obj. 4: “Justice” is not being taken here as the specific virtue, but for general justice, which is the same in subject as all virtue, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 4, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.1, 1129b26.) differing only conceptually from virtue. For we say “virtue” as directing to the act, but “justice” as agreeing with the rectitude of the law and as falling under the common good.

Reply Obj. 5: “Obedience,” too, is sometimes taken as the specific virtue, namely, when the specific reason for doing something is the authority of the person commanding it. And the disobedience that is the specific sin is opposed to this, that is, when someone omits what is commanded specifically in contempt of the one commanding it. But sometimes “obedience” is taken as what follows on all virtue. For every act of virtue is in the law’s command. Hence whoever does an act of virtue, obeys. To this kind of obedience is opposed the disobedience that follows on every mortal sin. This is how disobedience is being included here in the definition of sin.

Article 3

Whether there is an act in every sin

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I-II.71.5; On Evil, q. 2, a. 1.) It seems that every sin consists in an act, even a sin of omission.

Obj. 1: For sin is a word, deed, or desire against the law of God, (Sent. II, 35.1(231).1, quoting Augustine, Contra Faustum Manichaeum, bk. 22, para. 27 (CSEL 25:621; PL 42:418).) as was said. But in saying word, deed, or desire, it touches on an act. Therefore, even a sin of omission consists in some act.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, every sin is either original or actual. But omission is not original sin because original sin passes equally to everyone generated through concupiscence; but there is not a sin of omission in everyone. Therefore, it must be actual. But we say “actual” because of “act.” Therefore, a sin of omission signifies some act.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, whoever is situated now like he was before is not sinning more now than he was before. But someone who is doing nothing now is situated similarly now and before. Therefore, if such a person ever sins, he seems to be continuously sinning when he is not performing the given act. But this is unfitting because then any sin of omission would be very grave. Therefore, it is not a sin of omission if someone is doing nothing at all. Rather, there must be some act in him.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, demerit is opposed to merit. But merit can only be through act. Therefore, since opposites are traced back to the same genus, it seems that every sin and demerit consists in an act.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, Augustine says that every sin is voluntary. (Augustine, De vera regione, ch. 14 (CSEL 77; PL 34:133).) Therefore, if omission is a sin, it seems that there must at least be an act of the will in it.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, as was said above, (Above: d. 30, q. 1, a. 2, s.c.) there could not be evil if there were not good, in which evil exists. But where there is no act, we find no good, in which the deformity of sin has its foundation. Therefore, it seems that there cannot be a sin in which there is not some act.

On the contrary, Ambrose says in the text: sin is a transgression of the divine law and a disobedience of heavenly commands. (Sent. II, 35.1(231).2, quoting Ambrose, De Paradiso, ch. 8, n. 39 (CSEL 32.1:296; PL 14:309).) But some commands are affirmative, others negative. Therefore, since one can be disobedient to the affirmative divine commands by doing nothing, it seems that there can be a sin of omission where there is no act.

Furthermore, only sin is justly punished. But a punishment is justly inflicted on one who does not do what is commanded him, even if he does not carry out any act. Therefore, even if someone performs no act, he can still sin by omitting one.

I answer that every sin must in some way consist in an act, though not in the same way. For just as original sin has the account of a fault from the fact that it is voluntary, albeit not by one’s own will, but by the will of another, so too it has the account of a sin from the fact that it is introduced through the act of another. But actual sins consist also in the proper act of the one in whom they exist, and this is indeed clear in the case of those who sin by commission.

But on the question of whether there is some act elicited from a power in a sin of omission, there are two opinions. Some say that in a sin of omission there must always be an act whereby one is held back from fulfilling a mandate or command, whether this be an internal act of the will, as when one wills not to obey a command, or an external one, as when one performs an act that impedes fulfilling the command. And the example is given of one who stays up too late such that he cannot get up at the proper time.

But this opinion does not seem to be endowed with necessity. For since the will is free and not determined to do something or not to do it, it can omit something without willing its contrary, and without thinking about its contrary or about anything else that would be an essential impediment to what the will is bound to do. For if it wills something that, considered in itself, is not an impediment to fulfilling a command by being opposed to the command, it is obvious that it does not sin from the fact that it wills this thing, since the thing can be licit in itself, but it does sin from the fact that it omits what it ought to do. Therefore, it is established that the act, either internal or external, pertains to the sin of omission incidentally, and thus, the omission’s deformity is not founded in the act. Nor is it founded in an act contrary to the command, since we posited that it is not this kind of act because the will can be turned to neither opposite, just as God neither wills evils to occur nor wills evils not to occur. No one can doubt that one who is in this situation sins by omission because he is justly punished due to his not fulfilling a command. Hence it is clear that a sin of omission consists only in the negation of a due act. And this is the other opinion.

But because opposites are traced back to the same genus, the omission of an act attains the account of a sin by being voluntary, just as a voluntary act has the account of a sin and a fault. The Philosopher’s words in the Ethics 3 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, 1110b30–1111a2.) agree with this as well, where he shows that negligence in knowing or doing something is justly punished on the basis that, just as it is within a man’s power to do something, so also it is in his power not to do it. Hence, just as he is justly punished for doing something unduly, so also he is justly punished for unduly failing to do something.

Reply Obj. 1: As was said, opposites are traced back to the same genus, in which either both are essential, as is clear in contraries and relatives, or one is essential and the other is by way of reduction, as is clear in privation and habit and in affirmation and negation. Hence we have it from Augustine (Sent. I, 28.1(118).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 5, ch. 6 (CCSL 50; PL 42:914).) that in the same genus are the begotten and the not-begotten. Thus, in “word” is included the omission of a word, in “deed” the omission of a deed, and so forth. For a word is not a sin precisely because it is an affirmative statement, but because it is in the will’s power and departs from the rectitude of the end. But in this respect, not speaking agrees with affirmative speech, since it is likewise in the will’s power and departs from right order.

Reply Obj. 2: A sin of omission is not original sin, but an actual sin. And it is not called “actual” as consisting in an act, but because it is traced back to the genus of act, of which it is the negation, just as Augustine includes “unbegotten” in the genus of relation, as we have it from Book I. (Sent. I, 28.1(118).1.) And again, just as an act is in the will’s power, so is its negation.

Reply Obj. 3: Omission is only a sin insofar as it is opposed to an affirmative command. Now, an affirmative command obliges always, but not at every moment. Instead, it obliges at a determinate time. Thus, only at the time the affirmative command obliges is one held guilty of omission.

Reply Obj. 4: Evil can occur in more ways than good, as is clear through Dionysius (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 30 (PG 3:730).) and the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.6, 1106b28–35.) For there is only good when everything required for a thing’s perfection comes together. But when any of these things is subtracted, the account of evil is introduced. Thus, merit, which is like a kind of path to the end of beatitude, can only be an activity and the rectitude of an activity. But whether the rectitude is lacking in the activity or whether the activity itself is lacking, there will be demerit, which is a departure from the end. This is also clear in bodily things. For nothing reaches a bodily place except by motion ordered to that place. But it can miss a place outside its own proper place in two ways: if it does not move but stays still, or if it moves with an undue motion.

Reply Obj. 5: Omission is voluntary, not by an act of the will leading to it, but because it is in the will’s power not to do an act, just as it is in its power to do it. Thus, just as an act is called “voluntary” because it is in the will’s power, so also is the omission of an act.

Reply Obj. 6: Evil must always subsist in a good, but it is not necessary for the good in which an evil subsists to be an act. Thus, I say that the evil of omission is founded not in an act, but in the power that can produce the act.

Article 4

Whether there is sin in the external act

To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I-II.20.1; On Evil, q. 2, a. 3.) It seems that sin does not exist in the external act.

Obj. 1: For, as it says in On Sleep and Sleeplessness, (Aristotle, On Sleep and Sleeplessness 1, 454a8.) what has the potency has the act, and for the same reason what has the habit has the act. But the habit of a virtue or vice is not in the body, but in the soul. Therefore, the act of sin will not be the body’s act, but the soul’s.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, sin should not be imputed to one who cannot avoid sin. But just as a sword moved by a human being cannot avoid killing, neither can a hand or some limb avoid following through with the act that the will commands. Therefore, sin does not exist in the limbs’ external act.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the act of the will is a mean between the intellect’s act, thinking, and the limbs’ external act, and the will is more united to the intellect than even to the limbs. But purely speculative thought about something, no matter how evil, is not a sin. Therefore, much less will there be sin in the external act.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, that which is a sin whether it is there or not does not seem to contain within itself the deformity of sin. But whether there is the external act or not, as long as the complete will to perpetrate an evil is present, the sin is complete and is imputed unto death. Therefore, the external act does not contain the deformity.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, what only manifests goodness or malice does not seem to be by itself an act of malice or virtue. But, as the Philosopher seems to suggest in the Ethics 10, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.6, 1176b25–28.) external acts are only a manifestation of virtue and, for the same reason, only a manifestation of vice. Therefore, sin does not exist in external acts.

On the contrary, to serve sin is to sin. But the external members are said to serve sin in Romans 6:19: for just as you once yielded your members to impurity and to greater and greater iniquity, so now yield your members to righteousness for sanctification. Therefore, sin does exist in the external act of the members.

Furthermore, nothing but sin is forbidden by divine law. But the divine law forbids not only internal acts, but also external ones, to the point that distinct commandments are given concerning them, as is clear from Exodus 20:14 and 17: you shall not commit adultery, and: you shall not covet your neighbor’s wife, etc. Therefore, sin exists not only in the internal act, but also in the external one.

I answer that, in all ordered agents, there is this element in common: what is moved by another, like an instrument by its proper agent, realizes as much as it can in its own act the character of the first agent. Therefore, since in all acts of a human being the will holds primacy due to the fact that it, being the most free, inclines all the powers to their acts, the characteristic of will must be preserved in human acts, that is, in those taking place at the will’s command. And so it is that, since it is proper to the will to have control over its own act, this is also found in everything else moved by the will to the extent that these things can realize its character. For the intellect can consider or not consider, as moved by the will. It is likewise for the concupiscible appetite. This extends all the way to the external acts of the motive power, so that a man can walk or not walk, speak or not speak, and so forth.

But because the account of merit and demerit, praise and rebuke, consists in the fact that the good or evil done is in the agent’s power, so it is that the will’s act has the account of sin and fault primarily, and the other acts commanded by the will are characterized in this way consequently. In this way, too, the deformity of fault exists in the external acts.

But because an act is always attributed to the first agent more than the instrument, as cutting is attributed more to a craftsman than to a saw, some people, considering that acts commanded by the will have the account of fault only from the will, said that sin can only be in the internal act of the will. However, other people, considering both that in which there is primarily the account of fault and that in which it exists secondarily, said that both internal and external acts are sins. And they considered sin not only as regards its formal element, whence it has the account of an evil, namely, a turning away, but also as regards a turning toward, which is the material element in sin. (See above, d. 30, q. 1, a. 3, resp.; see also note above, at d. 33, q. 2, a. 1, obj. 2.)

But some, considering only the formal element in sin—namely, the defect from which it has the account of an evil—said that neither the internal nor the external acts are sins.

Among these opinions, the truest is the one that says that sin is in both. For this opinion had the full consideration of sin, considering sin in its formal element and in its material element, not only in what contains the deformity of sin primarily, but also that which contains it secondarily.

Reply Obj. 1: The substance of the act is informed by the habit of virtue or vice. Hence the habit of virtue or vice must be in the reason, from which proceeds the account of fault and merit, not in the body, which serves in carrying out the act’s substance.

Or, it should be said that the external act does not proceed from the habit immediately but by the mediation of the internal act. Thus, it follows that the account of sin is not in the external act primarily, but it does not follow that it is not in it in any way.

Reply Obj. 2: Hitting is not an act of the hand. Rather, it is the act of a man by way of the hand. For acts belong to individuals. Thus, fault is imputed not to the hand, but to the man on account of the act that he did through the hand, which he could have avoided.

Reply Obj. 3: The power of the prior is in the posterior, but the converse is not true. Now, speculative knowledge precedes the act of the will that is the external act, but the external act follows the will’s internal act. Thus, the account of fault that is first in the act of the will passes from the will to the external act that follows, but not in the act of knowledge that precedes it.

Reply Obj. 4: What is primary does not depend on what is subsequent. Rather, the subsequent is caused by the primary. Because the act of the will has the account of fault first, even if the external act ceases, the account of fault remains in the will’s act. Yet it does not follow from this that it cannot produce the account of fault in the external act.

Reply Obj. 5: Internal acts are manifested by external ones, as causes are by effects. Hence just as effects participate in the likeness of their causes as far as they are able, so too do external acts obtain the account of fault, which is found first of all in internal acts.

Article 5

Whether the soul’s powers are in some way corrupted by sin

To the fifth we proceed as follows. It seems that no corruption takes place in the soul’s powers through sin.

Obj. 1: This is, first, by what Dionysius says, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 23 (PG 3:726).) that natural gifts remain integral in the angels who sinned. But what is corrupted is not integral. Therefore, since man’s sin is not greater than an angel’s sin, it seems that in us, too, no corruption of natural powers occurs due to sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, what is corrupted does not remain the same specifically. But after sin, man is the same specifically as he was before sin. Therefore, he is in no respect corrupted by sin.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, nothing is corrupted except by its contrary. But, as it says in the Physics 1, (Aristotle, Physics 1.7, 190b34.) the subject is not contrary to either of the opposites. Therefore, since the soul’s power is the subject of fault and virtue, it seems that it is not corrupted by fault.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, nothing acts for its own corruption. But the cause of sin is the soul itself by way of its natural power. Therefore, sin does not corrupt the soul’s natural power.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, no potency is corrupted by being reduced to act. But in sinning, a natural potency is reduced to an act to which it was in potency. Therefore, it is not corrupted by sin but perfected.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, if the soul is corrupted by sin, then either this will be with regard to first being or with regard to second being. It is not in first being, since then by sinning a man would immediately cease to exist. If it is in second being, this is completely taken away by the first sin, which subtracts grace. Therefore, a subsequent sin corrupts nothing in the soul. In this case corrupting the soul’s natural powers will not be common to every sin.

On the contrary, nothing becomes something else except by the fact of having been corrupted. But the Philosopher says in the Ethics 9 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.3, 1165b13–23.) that by an act of vice man becomes not only different, but something else. Therefore, sin corrupts the soul’s nature.

Furthermore, corruption is opposed to perfection. But the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Physics 7.3, 246a10–15.) that a man who acquires virtue is not said to be altered, but perfected. Therefore, since sin is opposed to virtue, it seems that by sinning a man is not altered, but instead corrupted.

I answer that when something is in potency to different things, this can happen in two ways. One way is such that both of the things to which it is in potency are equally due it and perfective of its nature. This is clear in the case of a heavenly body, in which different positions recur, of which one is not more due to it than another. Thus, when it acquires a given position of several, it is not said to be perfected simply; and when it loses one, it is not said to be corrupted simply. For by losing one it acquires another position of equal value. Thus, there is no evil in this kind of loss because above the lunar sphere there cannot be evil consisting in natural defect. The case is similar in a body that is in potency to white and black. Thus, in gaining or losing such things, there is properly transmutation, but not perfection or corruption simply.

The other way is such that either of the possibilities is owed simply to what is in potency to both and the other is not owed it. Then the acquisition of that which is due it is called its “perfection” and the loss of it, its “corruption.” For example, the soul’s power is in potency to the habit of virtue or vice. But the habit of virtue is due it, since by this habit it is ordered to its proper end, whereas the habit of vice is not due it, since by this habit it departs from the rectitude of the proper end. Thus, when someone acquires a virtue, he is not said simply to be “altered,” but rather “perfected,” as it says in the Physics 7. (Aristotle, Physics 7.3, 246a10–15.) Vice versa, when the habit of vice is acquired in him, he is said to be “corrupted,” when he is changed from what is fitting to him by nature into what is not fitting, as if in a certain way passing into another nature, as when one who becomes wrathful takes on the property of a dog. Thus, Boethius says (Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 4, prose 3 (CCSL 94; PL 63:797).) that when men sin, in a certain way they lose human nature and become different brute animals. For man is what he is by reason, whereas the ultimate perfection in brute animals is in the sensible part. Hence when a man passes from what is fitting with respect to reason, into what is agreeable to the sensitive part, he is changed from what is characteristically human into what is characteristically brutish. In this way, sin or fault in an act is said to corrupt the soul or its powers, that is, insofar as it perverts it from the order of reason whereby it was directed to its due end.

Reply Obj. 1: Natural perfections can be considered in two ways: as regards first being, and in this case they are not corrupted by sin, since intellect, will, and everything of this sort remains; or as regards the order whereby they are ordered to the end, and in this case they are corrupted by sin, as has been said. (Resp.)

Reply Obj. 2: Just as there are two sorts of perfection, first and second, so also there are two sorts of corruption. One takes away the first perfection whereby a thing possessed first being. This kind of corruption results in a change in species. But fault does not corrupt a man’s nature in this way. The other kind of corruption is that which takes away the second perfection whereby a thing is completely perfected in second being. This does not vary the species, but only takes away the fulfillment of the species. And this is the way in which fault corrupts human nature.

Reply Obj. 3: A subject can relate to contraries in two ways, as was said in the main body of the article: such that both are equally due it, and then it is not more corrupted by one than the other, or such that one is due it and the other is undue it, and then by one it is perfected simply and by the other simply corrupted. For although the contrary whereby it is corrupted is not contrary as regards first being, since it serves as subject to both of the contraries, it is contrary to it as regards second being, to which the nature of the subject is ordered.

Reply Obj. 4: Nothing acts for its corruption as intending this corruption, but it is not unfitting that by something’s action its corruption should follow apart from the agent’s intention. In this way, something is the cause of its own corruption incidentally, as is clear in a sick person who has consumed what is harmful and whereby he incurs death. For he intends the pleasure in the food, but death follows apart from the pleasure. The case is likewise in one who sins. For he intends to take pleasure in the work of sin, but the corruption of the soul follows apart from his intention.

Reply Obj. 5: A potency is not corrupted if it is reduced to the act to which it is ordered of itself and which is due it. But this kind of act is not a sin. Thus, the argument does not proceed.

Reply Obj. 6: Sin corrupts the soul, not in first being, but in second being. But second being can be considered in two ways: in act, and in this way, it is taken away by the first sin and not by a second sin. But this is incidental, since the second sin did not encounter it. Or it is considered in aptness, and in this case, as is clear from what was said before, it is lessened by any sin, yet never totally taken away.

Exposition of the text

‘The will to obtain or retain what justice forbids.’ (Sent. II, 35.1(231).1, quoting Augustine, On the Two Souls, ch. 11, para. 15 (CSEL 25:70; PL 42:105).) It seems that this is not a common element in every sin. For there is a kind of sin that tends to corrupt, but does not acquire anything, as is clear in murder, envy, and so forth.

But it should be said that intention, whether of will or nature, is never essentially terminated in non-being or corruption, but instead in some good to the one intending it, even though an evil or corruption without which the intended good cannot exist follows apart from the intention. This is clear in fire, which intends to introduce its form into matter, on which follows the corruption of air. Likewise, too, the will intends some good to the one willing that does not exist without the corruption of something else, as when one wills his own rest that he believes will be impossible without the death of his adversary, or some such thing.

The will, as was said above, is a movement of the spirit. (Sent. II, 35.1(231).1.) Here “will” is taken as meaning the act of the will, not the power itself.

For there would be no sin of transgression, if there had been no prohibition. (Sent. II, 35.1(231).2.) This is true either of the written law or of the law that is implanted by nature.

‘But if there were no sin, not only wickedness, but perhaps not even virtue would exist.’ (Sent. II, 35.1(231).2, quoting Ambrose, De paradiso, ch. 8, n. 39 (CSEL 32.1:296; PL 14:309).) This seems false because virtue does not depend on malice, just as good does not depend on evil.

But it should be said that in Sacred Scripture a thing is said to come to be or to exist when it is made known; likewise, in the opposite way it is said not to exist when it is unknown. Because virtue is made manifest only by the opposing malice, it says that if there were no sin there would be no virtue. Thus, it adds: might either not exist, or not rise in excellence above it. (Ambrose, De paradiso, ch. 8, n. 39 (CSEL 32.1:296; PL 14:309).)

It should be known as well that as far as the statement, what is sin, except a transgression of the divine law and disobedience of heavenly commands? (Ambrose, De paradiso, ch. 8, n. 39 (CSEL 32.1:296; PL 14:309).) is concerned, we should insert the note that is included in some editions in the previous distinction, which begins: John says: the one who commits sin commits iniquity. (Sent. II, 35.1(231).3. This quotation does not appear in d. 34 as we have it now.)

By reason of the diversity of these statements, many have thought different things concerning sin. (Sent. II, 35.2(232).1.) For the first definition gives occasion for the opinion stating that sin exists both in the internal and the external act. The second gives occasion for the opinion stating that sin is only in the act of the will. The third, from Ambrose, occasions the other opinion, which states that sin consists only in a privation and not an act.

And some, diligently noting the words of Augustine . . . not unlearnedly teach that an evil will and evil actions, insofar as they are . . . are goods. (Sent. II, 35.2(232).4.) This opinion differs from that which he first gave since this one is speaking of the evil whose account consists only in privation, whereas the other given above was speaking of sin as embracing privation and act simultaneously.

‘The same, proving that nothing happens by chance in the world, says in the same, etc.’ (Sent. II, 35.2(232).5, quoting Augustine, Book of Eighty-Three Different Questions, q. 24 (CCSL 44A; PL 40:17).) This seems to be false. For everything that occurs in the lower number of cases happens by chance. Therefore, if nothing happens by chance, nothing will result in the lower number of cases. But if nothing falls into this category, then everything happens of necessity because what is frequent only falls short of the necessary insofar as it can do so in the lower number of cases, as we have it from the Metaphysics 7. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 6.2,1027a8–14.)

But it should be said that an effect resulting in the lower number of cases can be considered in two ways: in the order to its proximate cause, apart from whose intention it occurs, and in this case it is by chance or fortuitous; or in the order to the first cause, whose presence nothing escapes, and in this way, it is not by chance.

To this they say that some things are in fact posited by these and similar expressions. (Sent. II, 35.2(232).11.) This solution proceeds in accord with the opinion positing that there is an act in a sin of omission. But according to another opinion the objection will be resolved by the fact that a good thing, namely, a potency not passing into act, underlies the privation whereby an evil of omission is called “evil.”

It can also be asked by them: since sin, as has been said above, is a privation or corruption of the good, and every evil action is a sin, whether or not it is also a privation or corruption of the good insofar as it is a sin. (Sent. II, 35.3(233).1.) This objection proceeds as follows. In sin there are two elements: the substance of the act and malice. Therefore, the fact that sin means a corruption of the good is founded either on the fact of its being evil or on the fact of its being an act. If it is in the first way, then since every corruption of the good is a punishment, sin precisely as sin or as evil will be a punishment and will be from God, which is unfitting. On the other hand, if it is on the side of act that it is a corruption of the good, since every act, precisely as act, is a good, then, as a good, it will have the property of corrupting the good, which seems unfitting. Therefore, what is in sin apart from deformity and corruption, from which the account of evil is caused, must not be a good thing. But the objection is resolved due to an equivocation on “corruption,” as is clear in the text. (Sent. II, 35.3(233).2.)