D. 37 - Cause of sin and punishment

Division of the text

After he has dealt with the opinion positing that the acts of sins, inasmuch as they exist, are good and from God, in this distinction he follows up with the other, opposing opinion, which posits that they are in no way from God. And it is divided into two parts.

In the first, he pursues the latter opinion in how it differs from the preceding.

In the second, he addresses a point on which both opinions agree, namely, that God, although he is not the author of the evils that are faults, is the author of punishments, at and so, although all Catholic authors agree in this, namely, that God is not the author of evil things, you must nevertheless beware not to include punishments, like sins generally, under the term of evil things. (Sent. II, 37.2(244).4.)

Concerning the first, he does three things.

First, he relates their opinion.

Second, he puts forward their responses to arguments suggesting the other opinion, at and as to those words of Augustine . . . they teach that they are to be taken as concerning natures or substances. (Sent. II, 37.1(243).3.)

Third, he puts forward arguments to challenge the aforementioned opinion, at from this one gathers that there are some things which are not from God. (Sent. II, 37.1(243).5.)

And concerning this he does three things.

First, he puts forward arguments against the first opinion.

Second, from what was said he draws a certain conclusion suggesting this opinion in contrast to the objections that could be raised, at and so, when God is said to be the author of all things that are, these want it to be understood only of good things. (Sent. II, 37.2(244).1.)

Third, he leaves judgment of both opinions to the reader, at let the advocates of the sentences set forth above listen diligently to these words. (Sent. II, 37.2(244).2.)

The first part is divided into two parts for the two arguments.

The second begins at and in this statement an objection is rightfully made to the view of those mentioned above. (Sent. II, 37.2(244).1.)

Here there are three questions.

The first concerns the existence of sin. (Q. 1.)

The second concerns its cause. (Q. 2.)

The third concerns the cause of punishment. (Q. 3.)

Question 1

The existence of sin

Concerning the first, two questions are asked:

first, whether sin is a substance or nature or a given thing;

second, whether everything that is, in whatever way it is, is from God.

Article 1

Whether sin is a substance or some nature

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: above, d. 34, q. 1, a. 2; ST I.48.1; SCG III.7–9; On Evil, q. 1, a. 1; Compendium theologiae, ch. 115; Commentary on Dionysius’s On the Divine Names, ch. 4, lect. 14.) It seems that sin is not a substance or nature.

Obj. 1: For nothing that exists in another as in a subject is a substance, as is clear from the definition of “substance.” But sin, no matter how it is taken, is in the sinner as its subject. Therefore, it is not a substance or nature.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, sin is a kind of evil. But Dionysius proves (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 1 (PG 3:694).) that evil does not exist either in universal nature or in particular nature. Therefore, sin is not a given nature.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, what corrupts nature does not seem to be nature. But sin corrupts nature, as we held above. Therefore, sin is not a nature.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, it is from the formal principle that a thing is drawn into a species. Therefore, since a being is said to be a thing or a nature insofar as it is determined to a given species, as Avicenna says at the beginning of his Metaphysics, (Avicenna, Metaphysics, tract. 1, ch. 1.) it seems that what lacks a formal principle cannot be called a “thing” or a “nature.” But “sin” means a privation of form. For it is a privation of mode, species, and order, as Augustine says. (Augustine, De natura boni, ch. 4 (CSEL 25:857; PL 42:553).) Therefore, sin cannot be called a “thing” or “nature.”

Obj. 5: Furthermore, each thing or nature possesses a certain order within the universe. But something is called a “sin” because it is disordered. Therefore, sin is not a thing or nature.

On the contrary, whatever is in one of the ten categories is a thing or nature. But sins are classified in a given genus, since the habits of sins are in the genus of quality and the acts of sins are in the genus of action. Therefore, sins are kinds of things or natures.

Furthermore, contraries are traced back to the same genus. But sin is contrary to virtue. Therefore, since virtue is in the genus of the real and of nature, it seems that sin is a kind of reality or nature.

I answer that “substance” is said in two ways, as is clear from the Metaphysics 5. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.8, 1017b23–25.) In one way, we say “substance” as signifying the account of the first category, and this is the form, or matter, or composite that is essentially in the genus. In another way, “substance” indicates that which signifies the what in all realities, as when we say that a definition signifies the substance of a reality. In this way, whatever is said positively, no matter what genus it is in, is a substance or has substance.

Therefore, taking “substance” in the first way, there is no doubt that sins are not substances, since not even virtues are substances in this way, because they are not in the genus of substance, either as its principles or as from its principles.

But, taking “substance” in the second way, there can be a doubt whether sin is a substance by virtue of the fact that we can consider two elements in the act of sin: the act itself, which is a kind of essence in the fact of being an act, and in this way, it is doubtless a substance; or even the very privation of order whereby the act is evil. Because privations do not possess an essence, from this perspective sin is not a substance. And because a sin is called a “sin” insofar as it is deprived of due order, sin, absolutely speaking, is not called a “substance,” though inasmuch as it is an act, it is a substance.

Likewise, too, the term “nature” is said in many ways, as Boethius says. (Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures, ch. 1 (PL 64:1342).) In the first way, we say “nature” as it relates to all beings in common, in the way that “nature” is defined as everything that can in some way be grasped by the intellect. In a second way, it befits substances only, and this is how “nature” means what can act or undergo. In a third way, “nature” means what is a principle of motion or rest in what it is in essentially and not incidentally. In a fourth way, each thing that informs by a specific difference is called a “nature.”

Therefore, in the second and third ways, sins cannot be called a “nature.” For they are not in the genus of substance, as was said. Nor again are they a principle of motion, but rather are motions or actions of a given kind. And what is more, even taking “nature” in the third way, they cannot be so called by nature, since sin is only in anything incidentally with reference to its withdrawal from what is naturally in it. Hence, too, a man’s sin is by way of withdrawal from the rectitude of reason that naturally befits man. But in the first and fourth ways, sin in a certain way can be called a “nature,” and in a certain way it cannot. For insofar as it is a kind of act, it is a being that can be grasped by the intellect and is determined by a certain difference to a species. But inasmuch as it has the account of sin from the privation of rectitude, it is neither a being nor possesses a difference, but instead is spoken of by way of privation of due form.

Likewise, the name “thing” (Alternatively: “reality.”) can also be taken in two ways. For what is simply speaking called a “thing” is what has an established and firm existence in a nature, and it is called a “thing” in this way, the name is taken insofar as the thing has a certain “whatness” or essence, but it is called a “being” insofar as it has existence, as Avicenna says (Avicenna, Metaphysics, tract. 1, ch. 6.) when he distinguishes the signification of “being” and “thing.” But because it is by way of its essence that a reality is capable of being known, the name “thing” (Alternatively: “reality.”) was extended to all that can fall within knowledge or understanding, insofar as we say the word “thing” (res) based on “think” (reor). And this is the way in which we call what does not possess established and firm existence in a nature “things of reason,” which is also the way that negations and privations can be called “things,” just as they are also called “beings of reason,” as the Commentator says on the Metaphysics 4. (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 4, comm. 2.)

Therefore, taking the term “thing” in the first way, sin, as an act, is a kind of thing, but inasmuch as sin comes from a privation of due order, it is not a thing, but a privation. Now, a privation is not a thing of nature, but of reason only. Hence, taking “thing” in the second way, in reference to both, sin is a thing, namely, both as an act and as it underlies the privation.

Reply Obj. 1: This objection proceeds with respect to “substance” as signifying a thing belonging to the first category; and taking “substance” in this way, there is no way that sin is a substance.

Reply Obj. 2: Something can be said to be in a nature in two ways: either as a part of the nature or something else pertaining to the nature’s perfection, and in this way, evil is not in nature, whether universal or particular; or else, something can be understood as being in a nature as in a subject. In this latter way the subject of the kind of privation that is an evil must be a given nature, such that in this way, evil is said to be in a nature. Thus, the act wherein the deformity has its foundation as its subject must be a nature.

Reply Obj. 3: That which corrupts one nature can be the nature of something else, just as the nature of fire corrupts the nature of water. Hence it is not unfitting for the nature of another animal to be perfected in the act whereby man’s nature is corrupted. For something is worthy of rebuke in a man that is praiseworthy in a lion or a dog. Thus, it is not unfitting for this act to be posited as a nature or even in line with nature, not of man, but that of something else.

Reply Obj. 4: Although the privation whereby sin is called “evil” deprives it of the form through which the act in the genus of the moral possesses goodness, it does not deprive it of the form through which it remains in the genus of act. Thus, it is with reference to this form that it can be called a “thing” inasmuch as an act is a kind of thing. Again, this privation is also taken as its form insofar as it falls to reason’s consideration. Thus, from the perspective of the privation it can be called a “thing,” insofar as we take the word “thing” (res) from “I think,” “you think” (reor, reris).

Reply Obj. 5: It is impossible for there to be a thing bereft of all order. Hence, too, in the very act of sin, as a kind of thing, there remains an order both to the agent and to the given end intended by the agent, which is the perceived good, although there is a deprivation of order to the due end. And this disorder, too, God does not leave disordered, but instead orders it by way of punishment.

Article 2

Whether every being is from God

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In II Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 2; ST I.44.1; 65.1; SCG II.15; On the Power of God, q. 3, a. 5; Compendium theologiae, ch. 68; Commentary on Dionysius’s On the Divine Names, ch. 5, lect. 1.) It seems that not every being is from God.

Obj. 1: For “true” and “being” are convertible. But that someone sins is something true that is not from God. Therefore, not everything that is, is from God.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, whatever is from God was made through the Word. But the form of man in an idol was not made through the Word, as Augustine says. (Augustine, In Iohannis evangelium tractatus, tract. 1, para. 13 (CCSL 36; PL 35:1385).) And yet, the form of man in an idol is a kind of being. Therefore, not every being is from God.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, in the case of whatever we can truly say that it is, it is a being. But it is true to say that there is a deformity in sin. Therefore, sin’s deformity is a being. But sin’s deformity is not from God. Therefore, not every being is from God.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, everything from God retains a likeness to him in some respect. For, as Dionysius says, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 8 (PG 3:646).) what is caused possesses contingent images of its causes. But there are certain things that render a man unlike God. Therefore, not everything that is, is from God.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, any agent whose activity is traced back to another agent as its cause is not an agent by itself. But there are some things that act by themselves, namely, those that have control over their own acts, such as the agents currently at issue. Therefore, their activities are not traced back to another agent prior to them as their cause. But these activities are kinds of beings. Therefore, not all beings are caused by God.

On the contrary, Boethius says (Boethius, Hebdomads, solution (PL 64:1313).) that other things are called “good” inasmuch as they are from the first and highest good, which is God. Therefore, what is not from God is not good. Therefore, if there is a being that is not from God, it will not at all be good. But what is totally lacking in goodness is the highest evil. Therefore, we will be able to posit that there is a highest evil, and there will be many first principles.

Furthermore, every being that does not have a cause is itself the first being simply and is a cause only. But it is impossible for this to be anything but one. Therefore, every other being has a cause. But whatever is caused is produced in being through the activity of its cause. Therefore, either this cause is the first cause or a second cause. If it is the first cause that does not have another cause, this kind of cause is God alone. Therefore, the being of which we are speaking will be from God. On the other hand, if it is a second cause, then the first cause acts more powerfully on what it causes than that very cause acts on it. Therefore, every being proceeds from the first cause, which is God.

I answer that we find being in many things in prior and posterior respects. Now, that is most truly and primarily called a “being” whose to-be (Alternatively: “existence.”) is what it itself is, since its to-be is not received, but subsisting through itself. Further, in all things that we speak of in prior and posterior respects, the first of them can be the cause, and what is called such essentially is the cause of what is called such by way of participation. Thus, the being that is called a “being” not by participating in any to-be that is other than itself—this is the first among beings—must be the cause of all other beings. Other beings, in turn, are called such in a posterior manner, inasmuch as they participate in a to-be that is not the same thing as they themselves are. These proceed down to the last of beings such that no matter what account of existing a thing possesses, it does not have it but from God, whereas a deficiency of existing belongs to it from itself.

Reply Obj. 1: We can consider “true” in two ways: either as founded in the thing, and in this way, saying that a person sins does not possess truth, for it is rather the case that he falls into sin by withdrawing from the truth, if we understand the “truth” as what is in the thing whereby one fulfills that which is ordained by God; or else, as completed by the activity of the soul forming a composition, in which there is truth insofar as it signifies or understands the thing in the way that it is. In this way, “that a person sins” is a kind of being of reason insofar as it indicates a truth, and in this way, it is from God. For only from God can there be the kind of rectitude allowing the intellect to take the thing in the way it is and to express it verbally in the same way.

Reply Obj. 2: The form of man in an idol can be considered in two ways: either as a given shape, and in this way, beyond a doubt, it is from God, from whom is all form, or else as ordered to what is unbecoming or unfitting to it, namely, being worshiped, and in this respect it is not from God. For in this respect it is nothing, since we are speaking then of a negation of due usage.

Reply Obj. 3: As was said above, we say “being” in two ways. In one way, it signifies the essence of a real thing existing outside the soul. In this way, the deformity of sin cannot be called a “being,” since it is a kind of privation, for privations do not possess an essence in the nature of things. In the other way it signifies the truth of a proposition. And in this way, a deformity is said to “be,” not because it possesses being in a thing, but because the intellect compounds the privation with the subject as a kind of form. Hence just as from the composition of form to its subject or matter, there remains a given substantial or incidental existence, so too the intellect signifies the composition of a privation with a subject by way of a certain existence. But this existence is only the existence of reason, since in the reality it is, rather, non-existence. To the extent it possesses existence in reason, it is certainly from God.

Reply Obj. 4: In created things, it is the case that there is a likeness to God with respect to any participated perfection, and the nobler the perfection, the more express the likeness with respect to it that we note. Now, something can lose its likeness to God as regards further perfection while retaining likeness as regards primary perfection. Hence in these cases, it is said that there is a participation of the divine goodness by obscure resonance, as is clear in sin. For in the act of sin there is something that retains divine likeness, for example, bodily pleasure, or some such thing patterned on the highest good, while there is not present a likeness to the highest good through grace. Thus, to the extent that they retain a likeness to God, such beings are from God, while to the extent they withdraw from likeness to God, they are neither beings nor from God, since every being, precisely as a being, is likened to the first being.

Reply Obj. 5: The activity of an agent that acts by itself must be traced back to the first agent as its cause. For although such beings act by themselves, because they determine their own acts through their proper nature and their own judgment, they possess the fact of acting not from themselves, but from the first agent, which confers on them being, being able, and acting.

Question 2

The cause of sin

Then the question of the cause of sin is asked. Concerning this two questions are asked:

first, whether God is the cause of sin itself, absolutely speaking;

second, whether he is the cause of the action in which the deformity of fault exists insofar as it is an action.

Article 1

Whether God is the cause of sin simply

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: above, d. 34, q. 1, a. 3; ST I.48.6; 49.2; I-II.79.1; II-II.6.2, ad 2; SCG III.162; On Evil, q. 3, a. 1; Commentary on Romans, ch. 1, lect. 7.) It seems that God is the cause of sin simply.

Obj. 1: For, as it says in a Gloss on Romans 9, (Glossa ordinaria, at Romans 9:16–19, 6.124–26 (PL 114:502–3).) God works in the hearts of men and inclines their wills to whatever he wills, whether good or evil. But he is called the “author of good works” because he inclines man’s will to good. Therefore, for the same reason, he can also be called the “author of sins,” which are evil works.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, whatever is the cause of a cause is the cause of what it causes. But sin’s cause is the sinner’s will. Therefore, since God is the will’s cause, it seems that he is sin’s cause as well.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, something’s salvation and its peril are traced back to the same cause. For the same sailor is the cause of the ship’s being saved and its being endangered, as it says in the Physics 2. (Aristotle, Physics 2.3, 195a14.) But God is the cause of human salvation, which occurs by way of good works. Therefore, since the soul’s peril is by way of sin, it seems that God is also the cause of sin.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, any activity that befits a thing as given it by God, is from God. But sinful activities befit man in accord with the inclination of the sensible powers, which were given man from God. Therefore, man’s sin, too, is traced back to God as its cause.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, sin is spiritual darkness. But God is the author of darkness: I form light and create darkness (Isa 45:7). Therefore, God is the cause of sin.

On the contrary, Fulgentius says: God is the avenger of a thing whose author he is not. (Fulgentius, Ad Monimum, bk. 1, ch. 19 (CCSL 91; PL 65:167).) But he is the avenger of sin. Therefore, he is not its author.

Furthermore, whatever happens by God’s will happens by God’s authorship, and vice versa. But evils do not happen by God’s will. Therefore, neither do they happen by his authorship.

I answer that God must in no way be called the “author of sin.” For one who acts for an end only falls short of the end due to someone’s defect, either his own or someone else’s. And the one in whom the defect is found will be the cause of the deviation from the end, whether it is the principal agent himself, the matter, the agent’s instrument, or whatever else. Thus, that in which a defect can in no way lie cannot be the cause of withdrawal from the end in what is ordered to the end. Therefore, since we call it sin on account of the disorder from the end to which rational nature is ordered, God cannot be the cause of sin, since there can lie no defect in him. Rather, sin must be caused by the defect of an agent that has the possibility of defect, such as the will of the rational creature.

Reply Obj. 1: God does not incline the will to good and to evil in the same way. In point of fact, he inclines the will to good by supplying the power to act and by directly moving to the good, but he is said to incline to evil inasmuch as he does not afford the grace whereby one would be withdrawn from evil, not because he directly orders the will to evil.

Reply Obj. 2: Sin is referred to the will as its cause. Although the will is created by God as a kind of being, the fact that a defect can arise from it is not. For it has the possibility of defect from the fact that it is from nothing. Now, even though God is the cause of the will by making it from nothing, it does not have the fact of being from nothing from another, but from itself. Hence in this respect it does not have another cause. Thus, the defect that follows from it, insofar as it is from nothing, need not be traced back to a further cause.

Reply Obj. 3: A sailor is the cause of the ship’s danger by his absence. Now God, as far as he himself goes, is not absent to anyone. But the sinner makes himself absent from God. Thus, he is the cause of the very sin of his wherein he is endangered, not God.

Reply Obj. 4: The concupiscible and irascible parts were given man by God in such a way as to be subordinate to reason. Hence if someone uses them with respect to the order they have as given by God, God will be the author of this kind of activity, but this will be unable to be a sin. On the other hand, if someone uses them apart from the order of reason, God will not be the author of such an abuse, since there is sin in it.

Reply Obj. 5: Sin is called “spiritual darkness” by way of effect, namely, since it darkens the mind by depriving it of the light of grace. However, the term “darkness” denotes, rather, a punishment. Hence God is even the author of darkness, as he is also of other punishments, as will be shown below. (Below, q. 3, a. 1.)

Article 2

Whether the action of sin, precisely as an action, is from God

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I-II.79.2, I.49.2; On Evil, q. 3, a. 2.) It seems that the action of sin, precisely as an action, is not from God.

Obj. 1: For everything that is from God is good, and every good is good to someone. Now, there are some sins whose acts are not good to anyone because they harm the one who does them and the one to whom they are done. Therefore, these kinds of acts are not from God in any way.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, whatever is the cause of an action in which a deformity is founded with respect to which the action is called “evil,” is one who moves and cooperates for evil. For only what produces this kind of action acts for evil. But God should not be said to cooperate for evil in any way. Therefore, he must not be called the “cause” of the action in which an evil inseparably exists.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, God is the author of good actions only insofar as God confers efficacy on the power to act. For the determination of the work is from free decision, as we held above. Therefore, if God were the cause of evil actions precisely as actions coming from a power, he would have to be called the “author of evil actions” in the same way as he is the author of good ones.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, what befits something with respect to its genus and constitutive difference befits it in its essence, since a thing’s essence is signified by these. But there are certain acts that are evil by their genus, as we held above, and some that are so by the difference through which they are drawn into a species. Therefore, they are evil by their essence. Thus, they are not from God even inasmuch as they exist.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, we do not assign an efficient cause to a thing as it is in the intellect, but as it is in the thing’s reality. But there are some acts in which what pertains to the nature of the act can only be separated from the deformity intellectually. These cannot be done in a good way. Therefore, they are only caused as falling under this deformity. But as they fall under the deformity, they are not from God. Therefore, they are not from God in any way.

On the contrary, every good is from God. But there are some sins that possess malice from an added circumstance while the acts are good by genus, as in the case of giving alms out of vainglory. Therefore, these acts, precisely as given acts, have God as their cause.

Furthermore, whatever is not the cause of the activity whereby a substance is produced in being is not the cause of that substance. But there are certain substances produced in being through a given action of sin, just as human beings are generated through acts of adultery and fornication. Therefore, if God is not the cause of these actions as actions, then neither is he the cause of the human beings generated through these actions, which is absurd.

I answer that two opinions are touched on by the Master concerning this question. One of these said that all acts, precisely as acts, are from God, but that inasmuch as they possess a deformity they are not from God, but from man or the devil. And he pursued the arguments for this above in Distinction 35. (Sent. II, 35.2(232).1–11.) The other opinion said that the acts of sins are in no way from God, not even as acts.

The present distinction touches on this opinion, which at present no one or only a few hold, since it is also very close to two errors.

The first is because it seems to follow from this opinion that there is more than one first principle. For it pertains to the account of first principle that it be able to act without the help of a prior agent and without its influence. Hence if the human will could produce an action whose author were not God, the human will would have the account of a first principle. Now, they attempt to resolve this by saying that even though the will can produce an action by itself without the influence of a prior agent, it has being not from itself but from another, and that this would also be required for the account of a first principle.

Nevertheless, it seems unfitting for what does not possess being from itself to be able to act from itself, since what is not of itself cannot even continue by itself. And every power proceeds from an essence, and activity from power. Hence the essence of what is from another must have power and activity from another. Furthermore, although this response would avoid its being first simply, it could not avoid its being the first agent, if its action were not traced back to a prior agent as cause.

Second, since even the action of sin is a kind of being (not only to the extent that privations and negations are called “beings,” but also as things existing in a genus are beings by virtue of the fact that actions themselves are ordered in a genus), it would follow due to this fact that if the actions of sin are not from God, then a being possessing an essence would not be from God. Thus, God would not be the universal cause of all beings, which is contrary to the perfection of the first being. For the first in any genus is the cause of what belongs to it, as it says in the Metaphysics 2. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.2, 994a10–13.)

Thus, it should be said with the first opinion that an act, inasmuch as it is an act, is from God and, as such, does not possess something having deformity.

We can consider how this can be as follows. For in everything in which a defect lies from a second cause that is not from the first cause, whatever there is of essence and goodness in the deficient effect must totally proceed from the first cause. Now, that a defect can be traced back to a deficient second cause is clear in limping, which comes from the power to take steps by means of the shin bone, that is, it is through the shin’s being bent that a distortion remains in the gait of the one limping. Hence whatever is present as far as step-taking goes, this is totally from the power to take steps, but the defect or distortion of the step is not from the power to take steps, but only from the shin.

Likewise, too, there is an order of God to the created will as that from first cause to second cause. Thus, on the side of God, no defect can occur; yet the created will does have the possibility of defect. Thus, whatever there is in a deficient act, namely, a sin, pertaining to the account of act and being and good proceeds totally from the first agent, namely, God. This is means of the will, but the defect itself in the act is from the will in such a way that it does not proceed from God. Thus, no matter what term signifies the deformity together with the act, whether generally or specifically, it cannot be said that this is from God simply. Hence it cannot be said absolutely that sin is from God, as in the case of murder and so forth, unless we add qualifications like “precisely as an act” or “precisely as being.”

Reply Obj. 1: When we say that an act of sin is not good for anything, this is fitting insofar as the act is considered under the aspect of deformity, and in this way, it is not traced back to God as its cause. Still, no act, considered in itself insofar as it is good, is not also good for something: such as an act of fornication, which inasmuch as it is pleasurable, is a concupiscible good.

Reply Obj. 2: That is said to cooperate for evil which inclines to an action insofar as the action falls under deformity. Hence the action is evil. But this does not befit God. Thus, there is no need to say that he cooperates for evil, even though he is the cause of the action in which an evil exists, insofar as he gives to the agent an influx of being, of being able, of acting, and of whatever perfection there is in the agent.

Reply Obj. 3: God is called the “cause of good activities” not only as regards the act’s essence, but also as regards the perfection in accord with which they are called “good.” For he gives an influx to the agent in both cases: both to act and to act well. But in evil actions, although he is their cause as regards the essence, he is not the cause as regards the defect. Thus, it should be said absolutely that he is the cause of good works, but not of sins.

Reply Obj. 4: As was said above, (Above, d. 34, q. 1, a. 2.) the privation itself whereby something is called “evil” can be neither a difference nor a genus. But each act is specified and placed in a genus through something positively stated. But a privation can follow on both placings (that is, the placing of an act in a genus or species). Thus, some acts are called “evil by genus,” or by what draws them into a species.

Reply Obj. 5: Just as the action possessing the deformity of sin is called “good” precisely as an action by the goodness of nature, not because it is at some point found separate from the deformity, but because the goodness of nature underlies the deformity; so, too, God is said to be the cause of the action precisely as an action and not as deformed, not because he produces the action as separate from the deformity, but because in the action joined with the deformity he makes what belongs to the action and does not make what belongs to the deformity. For even though several things are inseparably joined together in an effect, it need not be the case that whatever is the cause of the effect with respect to one of them also be its cause with respect to another. So, too, nature is the cause of the eye as regards its substance, not as regards the defect of blindness that occurs by a defect of nature.

Question 3

The cause of punishment

Then the question is asked of the cause of punishment. And concerning this two questions are asked:

first, whether God is the cause of punishment;

second, what has priority in being called an “evil”: namely, fault or punishment.

Article 1

Whether punishment is from God

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: above, d. 32, q. 2, a. 1; d. 34, q. 1, a. 3; ST I.49.2; SCG II.41; III.71; On Evil, q. 1, a. 5; Compendium theologiae, ch. 141; Commentary on John, ch. 9, lect. 1; Commentary on Romans, ch. 1, lect. 7.) It seems that punishment is not from God.

Obj. 1: For every evil is contrary to some good. But punishment is an evil, since it does harm. Therefore, it is contrary to a good. But what is contrary to a good cannot be from the highest good. For then the highest good could not be the author of peace, but rather of conflict and dissension, if contraries proceeded from him. Therefore, punishment is not from God.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, everything apart from the agent’s intention occurs due to a defect. But every evil is apart from the agent’s intention, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, nn. 17, 31, 32 (PG 3:715).) For nothing acts with respect to evil. Therefore, every evil occurs from some defect. But whatever occurs from a defect is not traced back to God as to a cause, as we showed above. Therefore, God is the cause of no evil. But punishment is evil. Therefore, it is not from God.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, whatever is not the cause of action is not the cause of what is caused by action, as was said. (Above: d. 37, q. 2, a. 2.) But there are many punishments inflicted on some through others’ sins. For many are punished with afflictions through those who are unjust oppressors. Therefore, since God is not the cause of fault, it seems that neither is the cause of every punishment.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, whatever is from God tends to the good. But there are some punishments that incline to evil, such as the fomes, and other such things. Therefore, not every punishment is from God.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the corruption of that whose generation is good is evil. But the generation of grace is good because it is from God. Therefore, the corruption of grace is also evil. But the corruption of grace is a kind of punishment. Therefore, not every punishment is from God, since God is only the cause of goods.

On the contrary, everything that is just is good, and everything that is good is from God. But every punishment is just, as Augustine proved in the preceding distinction. (Augustine, Retractions, bk. 1, ch. 9 (CCSL 57; PL 32:597), quoted in Sent. II, 36.2(238).2.) Therefore, every punishment is from God.

Furthermore, recompense and condemnation pertain to the same person, namely, to the one who possesses judgment of good and evil acts. But to render rewards for good works belongs to God. Therefore, it also belongs to the same to inflict punishments. Therefore, every punishment is from God.

I answer that punishment contains two elements: the account of an evil, insofar as it is the privation of a good, and the account of a good, insofar as it is just and ordered. Thus, some ancients, considering punishment only from the perspective of being a defect and an evil, said that punishments are not from God. Even Cicero seems to have fallen into this error, as is clear in On Duties. (Cicero, De officiis, bk. 2, sect. 17.) Such men denied God’s providence for human acts. Hence they did not say that the order belonging to punishment with respect to fault is through divine providence, but instead through the justice of the man inflicting the punishment, while the defect in punishment is not ordered by God, but occurs from the necessity of second causes. For they posited that God produces things in being as an agent produces from the necessity of nature, that is, such that from one first thing, in which there is no defect, one first thing would proceed distant from its perfection, and the farther the distance from the one first thing, by an order of cause and caused, the more they said a defect occurs.

Now, this position is erroneous, as has been clear from Book I, (In I Sent., d. 39, q. 2, a. 2.) where it was said that divine providence extends to everything.

Thus, it should be said that punishments are from God, while fault is in no way from God, even though both are called an “evil.” The reason for this is that each thing is assigned an acting cause to the extent that the thing proceeds from the agent. Now, fault has the account of an evil and a defect insofar as it proceeds from its own agent that does not order its own action to the due end. Thus, fault can only be assigned a cause of the kind in which a defect can lie. Punishment, in turn, does not have the account of an evil or a defect as proceeding from the agent, since it is by the agent’s ordered action that punishments are inflicted. Rather, it has the account of a defect and an evil only in the recipient of the action, which is deprived of a good through a just action. Thus, God is the author of punishment, but differently in different cases. One kind of punishment is that of loss, as in the case of the subtraction of grace, and so forth. And God is the cause of these punishments, not by doing a certain act, but rather by not acting. For by the fact that God does not give an influx of grace, the privation of grace follows in the person. Another kind of punishment is that of the senses, which is inflicted by an action. And God is the author of this also by acting.

Reply Obj. 1: One particular good can be contrary to another particular good, as hot is to cold, and yet both are from God. Nor does it follow that God is not the author of peace, since even the conflict between contraries is ordered to a union; this is to say that they come together to form a mixture, and they are even ordered to a kind of harmony as found in the universe. So, too, it is not unfitting, although the good of nature is from God, for punishment, which is contrary to it, also to be from God inasmuch as it is good.

Reply Obj. 2: No evil or any defect is intended by God or another agent. Rather, every evil and defect occurs from some defect, either a defect of the acting cause or a defect of the recipient matter. For the evil of fault occurs from a defect of the acting cause. Thus, it cannot be traced back to an acting cause that cannot fail. However, the evil of punishment occurs from a defect of matter. This is clear as follows: a just judge intends to set up an order of justice among his subjects. This order can only be received in a sinner insofar as he is punished through a kind of defect. Thus, even though the defect by reason of which the punishment is called an “evil” is not intended by the judge, but rather the order of justice is, the just judge is still called the “author of the punishment” insofar as the punishment means something ordered. And this is how God is the author of punishments.

Reply Obj. 3: Although God is not the cause of a shameful action insofar as it underlies a deformity, he is its cause as a kind of action. Thus, he can also be called the “cause” of what is effected through the action.

Reply Obj. 4: Punishment inclines to the evil of fault not directly, like a habit or disposition, but indirectly, inasmuch as by a punishment one is deprived of something that restrained him from fault. And it is not unfitting to say that God subtracts that whereby one was preserved immune from fault, namely, grace.

Reply Obj. 5: Although the corruption of grace is an evil in itself, that a given person who is unworthy of grace be deprived of grace is good and just. And in this way, it is from God’s ordering.

Article 2

Whether “evil” is said of punishment with greater priority than fault

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.48.6; II-II.19.1; On Evil, q. 1, a. 5.) It seems that “evil” is said of punishment with greater priority than fault.

Obj. 1: For good, though it is in all genera, is in substance with greater priority than the others, as is clear from the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.6, 1096a21.) But the evil of punishment deprives of the good in a substance, such as death—which is a kind of punishment—deprives of substantial perfection. But the evil of fault is an evil in an action. Therefore, “evil” is said of punishment with greater priority than fault.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the second perfection, which is an activity, derives from the first perfection, which is a form. But above we said that punishment is opposed to the first perfection, while fault is opposed to the second perfection, which is activity. Therefore, evil is found with greater priority in punishment than in fault.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, punishment is to fault as reward is to merit. But reward is good in a greater and prior sense than merit. Therefore, punishment, too, is more evil than fault. But that which is prior among what is spoken of as prior or posterior, is also said in the greatest sense, as fire is called “hot” in the greatest sense. Hence that which is said in a greater sense is what is first, as is clear from the Metaphysics 2. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.1, 993b24–26.) Therefore, “evil” is said with greater priority of punishment than of fault.

Obj. 4: Along the same lines, just as good is desired precisely as good, so also evil is avoided precisely as evil. But that on whose account something is desired is good in a greater sense. Therefore, that on whose account something is avoided is evil in a greater sense. But fault is avoided on account of punishment. Therefore, punishment is evil in a greater sense than fault. And so, the same follows as before.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, as Augustine says above, “evil” means something that does harm. (Augustine, On the Customs of the Church and the Manichees, bk. 2, ch. 3 (CSEL 90:91; PL 32:1346).) Therefore, the account of evil fits more truly with that which the account of harm fits with more truly. But it fits more truly with punishment than fault, since what is said by essence is truer than what is denoted by participation, as “whiteness” more truly indicates the nature of whiteness than something white. Now, punishment is harm itself, whereas fault denotes something that does harm. Therefore, the account of evil is also found with greater priority in punishment than in fault.

On the contrary, cause precedes what is caused. But the evil of fault is the cause of the evil of punishment. Therefore, evil belongs to fault prior to punishment.

Furthermore, Dionysius says (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 22 (PG 3:723).) that to be punished is not evil, but to be worthy of punishment is. Now, one becomes worthy of punishment only through fault. Therefore, fault is more properly called “evil” than is punishment.

I answer that “evil” is said of fault with greater priority than of punishment, and the account of evil fits more with fault than punishment. Some assign the reason for this from the perspective of the good that suffers deprivation by way of evil. They say that by fault one is separated from the last end, which is the highest good, wherein the account of good is found first. Hence, too, the account of evil is found first in the evil that separates from this good, whereas it is found in punishment consequently, since punishment deprives of the good of created nature, which derives from the highest good.

But this reasoning seems insufficient. For fault and punishment do not differ with respect to the good that one lacks through each, since the good that one is actively made to lack by fault is the same one whose passive lack is a punishment. Hence, too, the subtraction of grace, whereby the soul is joined to God, and the lack of the vision of God are punishments. But the reason assigned only touches on bodily punishments. Hence it is not universal. Thus, we must uncover the reason for such in another way on the basis of the proper account of fault and the proper account of punishment.

Therefore, it should be known that the account of good is taken from the end, as is clear from the Metaphysics 2. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.2, 994b9–10.) Now, the end is the perfection of the agent as agent by virtue of the fact that the end moves the agent to action. Hence the end, as well as deviation from the end, is compared to the agent with greater priority than the one undergoing the action. Thus, the evil that has the account of evil insofar as it is from the one acting is more closely related to the end than the evil that is introduced in one undergoing the action through the act of the one acting. Hence the withdrawal from the end is prior in fault, which has the account of evil insofar as it proceeds from the one acting, than it is in punishment, which has the account of evil insofar as in the one undergoing the action some defect is brought about through the action of the same or another. It is the action of the same in the case of the punishments that follow immediately from the act of sin, as through the act of fault there follows the subtraction of grace in the sinner. And the disordering of the act (which possesses the account of evil from the sinner as agent) is prior to the subtraction of grace, which is an evil of punishment. It is the action of another, in turn, when a punishment is inflicted on the sinner by the act of the judge.

Reply Obj. 1: The intensification or lessening of something can occur in two ways: essentially or incidentally. Essentially, it occurs when there is intensification with respect to what pertains to the nature of the thing. Incidentally, it occurs when it is called “greater” or “lesser,” not with respect to the magnitude that is proper to the thing being called “greater” or “lesser,” but instead with respect to the magnitude of something else, as when whiteness is called “greater” either due to the intensification of the principles of the whiteness or due to the magnitude of the surface area. So, too, we can take note of magnitude in evil either with respect to the proper account of evil or with respect to the account of the good that suffers deprivation through the evil. That magnitude is more essential to the evil which is essential than that which is incidental. In this regard, I say that, speaking of the essential meaning, evil is not called “prior” or “posterior” insofar as a prior or posterior good suffers deprivation through it, but rather insofar as it participates with greater priority in the account of evil, which consists in withdrawing from the end. Hence the evil of punishment that deprives of a substantial good need not be more evil simply or with greater priority than the evil of fault, which exists in an action.

Reply Obj. 2: First perfection relates to activity in two orders. For activity terminates in first perfection, and thus, activity is elicited from first perfection. The case is likewise in the privation of first perfection. Now, “punishment” denotes the privation of first perfection insofar as activity terminates in it. For punishment indicates the effect of fault. Thus, fault need not be called “evil” with greater posteriority

Reply Obj. 3: Just as reward is what orders merit, so also punishment is what orders fault. Hence both reward and punishment possess a kind of goodness from the fact of the ordering. Hence even if reward is more good, there is no need for punishment to be more evil. Rather, it is less inasmuch as it does possess some perfection of the good.

Reply Obj. 4: Fault is to be avoided on its own account, even if no punishment followed. Hence the virtuous person flees fault more than punishment, and we must measure the acts of other human beings against him, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics. (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.4, 1113a30–33.)

Reply Obj. 5: Whatever is found in the cause, and what it causes, is found in the cause prior to being in what it causes. Hence since the harm that is punishment is introduced by fault, the account of harmfulness is found in fault prior to being in punishment, even though punishment is the harm itself. For the very fact that punishment is harm proceeds from the harmfulness of fault.

Exposition of the text

Not because it is not an evil action or will, which is something, but because it separates men from true being. (Sent. II, 37.1(243).2.) This is unfittingly said. For it is obvious that an action is not separate from true being precisely as an action, but instead as disordered. Hence the fact that sin is called “nothing” is not by reason of the action, but by reason of the disorder.

They teach that they are to be taken as concerning natures or substances only. (Sent. II, 37.1(243).3.) From this we have nothing more than that substance and nature, taken in one way, are different from good and evil action. And this is true.

‘The works of the devil, which are called vices, are actions, not things.’ (Sent. II, 37.1(243).4, quoting pseudo-Augustine, Hypomnesticon contra Pelagianos et Coelestianos, bk. 1, ch. 5, n. 7 (PL 45:1618).) They are said not to be things from the perspective of that whereby they are vices, namely, from the perspective of the privation.

And so there are some things by which men are evil. (Sent. II, 37.1(243).5.) This is true, but men are evil by them not precisely as things, but inasmuch as they underlie a privation.

Indeed, what is strange about saying that God is not their author? (Sent. II, 37.2(244).1.) This objection is null. For something can be the cause of that which is nothing, not by acting directly but by removing a restraint, as one who closes a window produces darkness (which is nothing) when he removes the light that prevented the darkness. So, too, God can bring about a privation, which is a punishment, even though the privation is nothing, by not affording that which prevents the privation, as by not affording grace he causes the privation of grace. But God cannot cause the defect insofar as the account of fault exists in it, as has been said. (Above: q. 3, a. 1.)

These want it to be understood only of good things. (Sent. II, 37.2(244).1.) This reply is null. For it is no less true that every being is from the first being than that every good is from the first good. Hence in whatever the nature of being is found, the nature of good is found. Thus, being absolutely must be from God.

‘Iniquity itself, to be sure, is not a substance.’ (Sent. II, 37.2(244).2, quoting Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, Psalm 68, sermon 1, para. 5 (CCSL 39; PL 36:844).) Here Augustine takes “substance” not as signifying a thing belonging to the first category, but as signifying the essence of a thing no matter which genus it is in. For, on the side of the defect whence it has the account of iniquity, iniquity lacks an essence. But if he took substance as signifying the first category, it would be equally true that justice is not a substance, just as it is true that iniquity is not a substance.