D. 44 - The power to sin

Division of the text

Having addressed sin as regards the act of sin, here he addresses the power to sin. This is divided into two parts.

In the first, he addresses the power to sin.

In the second, he segues into Book III, at let us now readily attend, with the whole consideration of our mind, to understanding and treating those things which pertain to the mystery of the Word made flesh. (Sent. III, Prologue.)

The first is divided into two parts.

In the first, he inquires whether the power to sin is from God.

In the second, he addresses the obedience due to those who possess the power of preeminence from God, at here arises a question which is not to be passed over in silence. (Sent. II, 44.2(269).1.)

Concerning the first, he does three things.

First, he raises a question.

Second, he relates the opinion of some, at some hold that the power to act righteously comes to us from God, and that the power to sin does not come from God, but from ourselves or from the devil. (Sent. II, 44.1(268).2.)

Third, he settles on the truth, at but it is indubitably shown by many testimonies of the Saints that the power of evil is from God. (Sent. II, 44.1(268).3.)

Here arises a question which is not to be passed over in silence. (Sent. II, 44.2(269).1.) Here he inquires about the obedience due those who possess power from God.

And first he raises the question.

Second, he gives a solution, at but it is to be known that the Apostle there speaks of secular power. (Sent. II, 44.2(269).2.)

Let us now readily attend, with the whole consideration of our mind, to understanding and treating those things which pertain to the mystery of the Word made flesh. (Sent. III, Prologue.) Here he segues into what follows.

And first he lays out the fact that he is moving on.

Second, he assigns the order, at now, the order of reason. (Sent. III, Prologue.)

Here there are two questions.

First, on the power to sin. (Q. 1.)

Second, on obedience. (Q. 2.)

Question 1

The power to sin

Concerning the first, three questions are asked:

first, whether the power to sin is good and is from God;

second, since, in accord with an office of preeminence, there is the power of perpetrating many sins that one could not commit if he were not in the state of preeminence, whether all preeminence is also from God;

third, whether preeminence or dominion is from God for the ordering of established nature or for the punishment of corrupted nature.

Article 1

Whether the power to sin is from God

To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that the power to sin is not from God.

Obj. 1: For being able to sin, as Anselm says, (Anselm, De libero arbitrio, ch. 1 (PL 158:489).) is neither freedom nor part of freedom. But every natural power in us to perform human acts pertains to free decision. Therefore, the power to sin is not some natural power within us. It is also certain that it is not a power of grace, because no one is ordered toward sin by a grace. Therefore, since every power in us from God belongs to grace or nature, it seems that the power to sin is not in us from God.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the works of God are perfect (Deut 32:4). Therefore, the more perfect something is, the more it ought to be reckoned among the divine works. But the act is more perfect than the power. Therefore, since the act of sin is not from God, neither will the power to commit sin be from God.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, for a human act, power, knowledge, and will come together. But the will to sin is not from God. Therefore, for the same reason, neither is the power to sin from him.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a cause essentially produces an effect after the likeness of its cause. Hence God, who is essentially the cause of everything, produces everything, and they retain a likeness to him as far as possible. For beings are from the first being and living things from the first living thing. But the creature does not become like God in its power to sin. Therefore, the power to sin is not in us from God.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, that whose use is evil, as Boethius says, is evil itself. (Boethius, De differentiis topicis, bk. 2 (PL 64:1181).) But using the power to sin is a sin, which is evil. Therefore, the power to sin is also evil. But no evil is from God. Therefore, the power to sin is not from God.

On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.2, 1046b4–24.) that the powers of reason regard opposites. Therefore, the power to sin and the power to act well are the same. But the power to act well is from God. Therefore, so is the power to sin.

Furthermore, all being is from God. But the power to sin is a being. Therefore, the power to sin is also from God.

I answer that a power is known through its act. Hence it is by considering the act of sin that we should derive our judgment of the power to sin.

Now, in the act of sin there are two elements: the substance of the act and the deformity or defect of due circumstances. Hence we must also take note of two elements in the power to sin. There is the power itself, which is the principle of the act, and this same power is the principle of the act, whether ordered or disordered. And this is from God. We also consider in it a defect, on the basis of which it can produce a deficient act. For the most perfect powers never fall short of that to which they are ordered, as is clear in necessary things. Hence when a power is impeded or withdrawn from that to which it is naturally ordered, this must be from a defect of it, namely, inasmuch as it succumbs to another agent that impedes it. Hence, since the power of the human will is essentially ordered to the good, falling short of the good in its act must be caused by another defect in it whereby it can be overcome by something, whether pleasure, suggestion, or whatever else, in such a way that it is drawn away from what is natural to what is unnatural.

However, this defect is insofar as it is from nothing. But God is not directly the cause of this kind of defect—the created thing’s being from nothing, as Avicenna proves. For what befits the thing in itself is not caused in it by another. And a created thing, if left to itself, is nothing. Hence its being from nothing does not come to the created thing from God, even though the created thing’s being does come to it from God.

Still, it could be said that this defect is indirectly from God, not as a thing from an agent, but as from a non-agent, namely, inasmuch as he does not afford the creature the property of not being from nothing. Even so, he is called the “cause of the privation of grace,” which is a punishment, unless the creature were to be found incapable of the perfection of not being from nothing. Thus, this defect is in no way from God, whether directly or indirectly. And so, the power to sin, as far as the power itself goes, is from God, but as far as the implied defect goes, it is not from God.

Reply Obj. 1: To be able to sin is not said to be part of freedom because it is not required for the will’s freedom. For it is not required for the will’s freedom that it have the power to sin. Rather, it suffices for the account of freedom that it have the ability to pursue each of the contraries, even though among those who can sin, there is sin by the free decision of the will because the will is that whereby one sins and lives rightly, as Augustine says. (Augustine, Retractions, bk. 1, ch. 9 (CCSL 57; PL 32:596).)

Reply Obj. 2: The act is always more perfect than the power by the perfection of its own genus. Hence a good act is more perfect in goodness than a good power. Likewise, too, an evil act is more perfect in malice than an evil power. For in the evil act there is malice simply, whereas in the power for evil there is evil in a qualified sense. Thus, the evil act simply is not said to be from God, but it is in a qualified sense. Now, the power for evil is said to be from God simply, and not to be from God in a qualified sense. For perfection in malice is not a perfection properly and simply stated, but instead, as it were, in a metaphorical sense, as we speak of a “perfect” thief and the “perfection” of blindness, as it says in the Metaphysics 5. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.16, 1021b20.)

Reply Obj. 3: “Will” can be taken in two ways: either for the very power of the will or for its act. In the first way, the will whereby sin is committed is from God. In the second way, it is not from God. Now, “power” never denotes an act. Rather, it is the use of the power that is itself a sin. Thus, the objection proceeds by equivocating on “will.”

Reply Obj. 4: There is a perfect good and an imperfect good. Therefore, if any name denotes a goodness in us, which is from God, according to which we are like him, without it also naming an imperfection, then it will be found to belong to both God and us. Examples are wisdom, goodness, and so forth. But the power to sin denotes a good along with imperfection. Thus, it cannot belong to God, in whom there is no imperfection.

Reply Obj. 5: The use of a thing means that to which the thing is principally ordered. Now, the power whereby we are capable of sin is ordered not to evil but to good. Thus, sinning is not the use of it. Hence it does not follow that if sin is evil the power is evil, but instead that it is good. For evil is falling short of that which is good.

Article 2

Whether all preeminence is from God

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.96.2, ad 3.) It seems that not all preeminence is from God.

Obj. 1: This is, first, by what is said in Hosea 8:4: they made kings, but not through me.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, what is done in a perverse manner is not from God. But some preeminent positions are acquired in a perverse manner, as is clear in the case of those who commit simony and other such cases. Therefore, not all preeminence is from God.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, preeminence granted by the highest king cannot be called “usurped.” But Boethius says (Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 3, prose 4 (CCSL 94; PL 63:735).) that the wicked possess usurped power. Therefore, their preeminence is not from God.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, what God has given man ought not take away, just as what God has joined together, let not man put asunder (Matt 19:6). But the power of preeminence is justly taken away from certain people. Therefore, their offices of preeminence are not from God.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, everything from God is ordered (Rom 13:1). But in certain exercises of preeminence there seems to be great disorder, as when a fool is placed over a wise person, a child over an elder, or a sinner over a just person, as is often the case. Therefore, not all preeminence is from God.

On the contrary, it seems to be more the case that the offices of preeminence of the good are from God than are those of the wicked. But the preeminences of the wicked are from God, who makes a man that is a hypocrite to reign for the sins of his people (Job 34:30). (RSV reads that a godless man should not reign, that he should not ensnare the people.) Therefore, all exercises of preeminence are also from God.

Furthermore, everything ordered is from God because it is good by this very fact. But we discover an order of higher to lower in every office of preeminence. Therefore, all preeminence is from God.

I answer that, since God is said to be the author of all good acts and not the author of evil, if we find something good and something bad in exercises of preeminence, the preeminence must be from God as far as there is good in it, and not be from God as far as the evil connected with it. Now, we can consider three things in preeminence: the principle of preeminence, the mode, and the use. Thus, in every one of these there is some good, that is, in those who attain preeminence duly and carry out the act of preeminence duly. However, in others the principle is evil, but the use is good, as in the case of those who attain preeminence in an unworthy manner, either due to their inadequacy or the way they get it, and yet carry out in due manner the act of the preeminence they unduly obtained. In yet others it is the converse. But in some, both are evil.

But the mode or form of preeminence in all is good. For it consists in an order of one as ruling and of another as being subject. Because a judgment about a thing simply should be given from considering what is formal in it, it should be said simply that all preeminence is from God. But in a qualified sense, some exercises of preeminence are not from God, namely, because their abuse is not from God or because the unjust action whereby someone attained preeminence is also not from God.

Reply Obj. 1: The kings of the Jews are said to reign not from God inasmuch as they willed to choose a king for themselves while Samuel was discouraging them from doing this. But the form itself of the preeminence was instituted by God.

Reply Obj. 2: It is not unfitting for an effect to be from God when its cause is not from God in some respect, just as when a punishment or a passion is from God, although the unjust action whose effect it is, is not from God. It was stated above how this can be the case. (Above: d. 32, q. 2, a. 1.) Likewise, too, it is not unfitting for preeminence to be from God as regards its form, even though the unjust action whereby the preeminence is attained is not from God, except perhaps permissively.

Reply Obj. 3: The wicked are said to possess usurped power inasmuch as they attain it unduly as far as they themselves go, since they are unworthy to be set over such people, though perhaps those who are afflicted through them are worthy of being afflicted by them. In this respect their preeminence is from God as a punishment for the subjects, who deserve this kind of superior.

Reply Obj. 4: Due to abuse, one deprives himself of a benefice he had received. Hence even if some have obtained preeminence from God, they are worthy, by abusing it, of having the power of preeminence taken away. And both are from God, namely, the fact that they had preeminence and that they justly lose it, just as all have life from God and yet someone can be justly deprived of life.

Reply Obj. 5: It is not altogether disordered for the unworthy to assume offices of preeminence. For it is ordered as a punishment for their subjects, who are deserving of this, as signified in Job 34:30: who makes a man that is a hypocrite to reign for the sins of his people; and Hosea 13:11: I have given you kings in my anger. Hence, since every punishment is from God, these kinds of exercises of preeminence are from God.

Article 3

Whether there would have been dominion in the state of innocence

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.96.1–2.) It seems that in the state of integral nature there would not have been preeminence or dominion.

Obj. 1: For Gregory says: nature made all men equal, but for their merits God’s hidden but just arrangement has made some subject to others. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Job, bk. 21, ch. 15 (CCSL 143A; PL 76:203).) But if men had not sinned, they would have retained the state of nature. Therefore, all would have been equal, and there would have been no preeminence among them.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Augustine says (Augustine, The City of God, bk. 19, ch. 15 (CCSL 48; PL 41:643).) that man made according to God’s image is only set over irrational creatures. But man is only made equal to irrational creatures because of sin, as it says in Psalm 49:12 [48:13]: when he was in honor, man did not understand; he is compared to senseless beasts, and has become like them. (RSV reads man cannot abide in his pomp, he is like the beasts that perish (Ps 49:12).) Therefore, if there had been no sin, one man would not have been set under another.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, dominion cannot exist without servitude. But Augustine (Augustine, The City of God, bk. 19, ch. 15 (CCSL 48; PL 41:643).) and other saints commonly say that servitude was introduced due to sin. Therefore, dominion or preeminence, too, would not have existed before sin.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the Apostle says: the law is not laid down for the just (1 Tim 1:9). But the Philosopher says at the end of the Ethics (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.9, 1180a20–24.) that the necessity of setting up kings and other rulers was to establish laws possessing the power to compel to acts of virtue, a power that the more persuasive speeches of the wise do not have. Therefore, if all had preserved the justice in which they were created, there would not have been preeminence.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, what follows on integral nature also remains in heaven. But in the future all preeminence will cease, as it says in a Gloss on 1 Corinthians 15:24. (Glossa ordinaria, at 1 Corinthians 15:24, 6.336 (PL 114:547).) Therefore, in integral nature, too, there was not preeminence.

On the contrary, what belongs to dignity would have been much more noble in integral nature. But dominion and preeminence pertain to dignity. Therefore, much more would they have existed in the state of integral nature.

Furthermore, the state of integral nature was not higher than the state of the angels is now. But among the angels there is an order called that of dominions as well as others pertaining to preeminence, such as principalities, powers, and archangels. Therefore, there would also have been preeminence in the state of human nature before sin.

I answer that there are two manners of preeminence: one ordered to rule, the other to domination. Now, the preeminence of master to slave, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 8, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.10, 1160b30.) is like that of tyrant to subject. A tyrant differs from a king, as the Philosopher says in that same place, because a king orders his preeminence to the good of the nation over which he is set, making law and statutes for its benefit, whereas a tyrant orders his preeminence to his own benefit. Thus, the two manners of preeminence mentioned above differ in that the good of the subjects is intended in the first, but the good of the one presiding in the second. Thus, the second manner of preeminence could not have existed in the state of integral nature, except in regard to what is ordered to man as an end. These are the irrational creatures, over all of which man would have been set for his benefit much more than now. But a rational creature, as far as it itself goes, is not ordered to another as an end, as man to man. If this happens, it will only be inasmuch as man is compared to irrational creatures because of sin. Hence in the same place (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.11, 1161b4; see also Politics 1.4, 12153b27–1254a16; Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics, bk. 8, lect. 11.) the Philosopher also compares a slave to an organ, saying that a slave is an animate organ and an organ is an inanimate slave. Thus, this kind of preeminence of man to man would not have existed before sin. But the first preeminence, which is ordered to the benefit of the subjects, would have existed there in regard to a given function, though not in regard to all. For preeminence is for making up for a defect, as when the people are defended by kings, as well as for correcting morals, when the wicked are punished and incited to acts of virtue by compulsion. But because there would have been nothing that could harm man before sin nor would anyone’s will contradict the good, there would not have been preeminence in the state of innocence as regards the last two functions, but only as regards the first function, that is, that which is giving direction in what is to be done or known, insofar as one would have been endowed with a greater gift of wisdom and greater light of intellect than another.

Reply Obj. 1: Nature made all men equal in freedom, but not in natural perfections. For the free, according to the Philosopher in the Metaphysics 1, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.2, 982b25.) is that which is the cause of itself. For one man by his nature is not ordered to another as an end. Thus, the second manner of preeminence would not have existed, that which takes away the subjects’ freedom. But the first manner could exist, since it does not prejudice freedom seeing as the subjects are not ordered to the good of the one set over them; but, on the contrary, the rule of the one set over them is ordered to the good of the subjects. Hence it is not inappropriate for them to call themselves their servants.

Reply Obj. 2: This authority is speaking of the second manner of preeminence.

Reply Obj. 3: Likewise in reply to the third objection.

Reply Obj. 4: There would not have been preeminence in that function, but in the others, as was said.

Reply Obj. 5: Above it was stated (In II Sent., d. 11, q. 2, a. 6.) how we should understand that every office of preeminence is vacated in the future. Yet if it were understood simply as being taken away in the future, this need not mean that there would not have been preeminence in the state of innocence. For this state was still a wayfaring state. And on the way there is a necessary preeminence whereby one is directed by another, which we concede is not so necessary at the end of the way.

Question 2

Obedience to prelates

Then the question of obedience to prelates is asked. Three questions are asked concerning this:

first, whether obedience is a virtue, and, if it is a virtue, whether it is a specific virtue;

second, whether Christians are bound to obey secular powers, particularly tyrants;

third, whether those who profess obedience are bound to obey their prelates in all things.

Article 1

Whether obedience is a virtue

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: above, d. 35, q. 1, a. 2, ad 5; In III Sent., d. 34, q. 3, a. 4, resp. and ad 1; ST II-II.4.7, ad 3; 104.2, 3.) It seems that obedience is not a virtue.

Obj. 1: For every virtue is a mean between vices, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.6, 1106a25–1107a26.) But obedience is not this sort of thing because excess does not destroy, but instead perfects it, if someone is obedient in matters in which he is not bound. Therefore, obedience is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, obedience regards a command. But command extends to all the acts of the virtues because all are in the command of the law. Therefore, obedience is not a determinate virtue, but follows on every virtue. This can even be seen from Ambrose’s definition quoted above. (Sent. II, 35.1(231).2, quoting Ambrose, De paradiso, ch. 8, n. 39 (CSEL 32.1:296; PL 14:309).) For he says that sin is a transgression of the divine law and disobedience of heavenly commands.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, if it is a determinate virtue, it is either one of the cardinal virtues or one of the ones connected with them. But it is not one of the cardinal virtues, since those are only the four, and obedience is not among their number. Likewise, we do not find it among the connected virtues, as is clear if we consider the connected virtues that the Philosopher enumerates in the Ethics 4. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4, throughout.) Therefore, obedience is not a determinate virtue.

Obj. 4: One might say that it is traced back to justice.

On the contrary, no virtue is perfected by lessening the account of its proper object, as is clear in magnanimity, which regards the great, and the greater that which was supposed to be done, the more it pertains to magnanimity. But justice regards what is due as its object because the act of justice is to render to another what is his. Therefore, since obedience is perfected by lessening what is due, seeing as the less consideration one gives to the due, as Bernard says, (Bernard of Clairveaux, Liber de praecepto, ch. 7, sect. 16 (PL 182:256).) the more perfect the obedience, it seems that obedience is not traced back to justice.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, legal justice is spoken of as that according to which a man is made level with commands. But obedience regards commands. Therefore, obedience is the same thing as legal justice. But legal justice, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 5, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.1, 1129b26.) is every virtue. Therefore, obedience is not a given determinate virtue, but a general one.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, Gregory says (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Job, bk. 35, ch. 14 (CCSL 143B; PL 76:765).) that obedience is not so much a virtue as the mother of all virtues. But it befits charity to be the mother of virtues. Therefore, obedience seems to be the same as charity. Thus, it does not seem to be distinct from other virtues.

On the contrary, Hugh of Saint Victor says: obedience is the virtue that embraces everything enjoined as necessarily to be fulfilled, unless the authority of the one commanding stands in the way. (The general sense of this quotation is found in Hugh of Saint Victor, Expositio in regulam beati Augustini, ch. 11 (PL 176:919–20); Sermones, sermon 56 (PL 177:1063–64, 1069).) Thus, it is a specific virtue, since a specific act is assigned to it.

Furthermore, what is assigned as the greatest in a genus is something determinate in that genus. But Gregory says (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Job, bk. 35, ch. 14 (CCSL 143B; PL 76:765).) that obedience is the greatest of virtues. Therefore, obedience is a certain determinate virtue.

I answer that obedience is a virtue, and is a specific virtue. For since habits, powers, and acts are distinguished by their objects, a virtue that has a specific object must be a specific virtue. Now, we speak of a specific object on the basis of a specific account, even though this specific account can be applied to many or all things. For it is possible for the same thing to pertain to different powers, as color does to sight, to the imagination, and to the intellect, though with different accounts. Hence one specific virtue can extend to the acts of all virtues with reference to a given specific account, as the Philosopher says of magnanimity, that is, that it performs a great action in the acts of all the virtues. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.3, 1123b30.) Hence it is also a kind of adornment of the rest of the virtues. And such virtues are said to be in a certain way general because they have a general matter, even though they possess a specific object, due to the object’s specific account that is found in many matters.

And in this way, I say that obedience is a specific virtue because it takes note of a specific account, namely, a command with the debt to consent. Since rendering to another what is his and what is due him belongs to justice, obedience is a part of justice, specifically divine justice. For the “one’s own” that is rendered to superiors, namely, fulfilling their orders, is a part of this kind of common justice called “debt” or what is “one’s own,” that which could also be required before a judge. For special justice properly concerns this kind of thing.

Even so, it should be known that special justice is taken in two ways. For it is taken properly and commonly. Taken in the most proper sense, special justice, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 5, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.6, 1134a24–b17.) is only between those who possess an equality in their standing before the prince, before whom one can request from the other that which is his own. In this manner, there is not said to be justice of master to slave nor of father to son. For what belongs to the slave belongs to the master, and what belongs to the son belongs to the father. But commonly, special justice is noted also in a master’s rendering to the slave that which is his own or vice versa, and so forth, since in this way, the aforementioned equality is not required. And taking “special justice” in this way, obedience pertains to justice, since by obedience an inferior renders to a superior what he owes.

Reply Obj. 1: Obedience, like the other virtues, can be the mean between two vices. But it should be known that we cannot take “superabundance” in all the virtues with reference to just any circumstance while the other circumstances are rightly ordered. This is clear in the virtue called “truth,” whose mean we note insofar as a man shows himself to be the kind of man he really is. Now, the superabundance of this is not noted with reference to the circumstance of “how much” while the other circumstances are rightly ordered, namely, such that a man can preserve this truth too much. Rather, the superabundance of this is from one’s showing greater things of himself than there really are, which is with reference to the circumstance of “what.” Likewise, too, I say that the superabundance of obedience is understood insofar as one obeys in matters in which he ought not obey, not with reference to his obeying more than he ought, supposing other circumstances in an ordered way.

Reply Obj. 2: Obedience, even though it extends to all acts of the virtues, does not consider in them what is proper to each virtue (for it does not elicit an act of fortitude as the mean between fear and audacity). Rather, it considers one specific account in all the acts of the virtues, namely, doing what is owed on account of a superior’s command.

Reply Obj. 3: Obedience is traced back to special justice. But it should be known that one virtue is traced back to another in two ways: either as a part of it, or as one connected with it. As a part, a virtue is traced back to a virtue when the one that is traced back has as its object part of the object of the virtue to which it is traced back. For example, the object of temperance is what is pleasant to the touch. Part of this is what is pleasant in venereal matters, and another is what is pleasant in food. Thus, chastity is traced back to temperance as part of it, and likewise sobriety, whose object is what is pleasant in food. This is the way in which obedience is traced back to special justice, as is clear from what has been said.

But a virtue is traced back to another as connected with it when the virtue to which it is traced back has as its object that which is of greatest account in a given matter and that which is being traced back, which is called the “connected virtue,” has as its object that which is less principal. This is the way in which meekness is traced back to fortitude. For the object of fortitude is in the greatest troubles concerning death, such as those in time of war. But meekness has as its object the other troubles that can arouse anger, wherein meekness holds to the mean. And this is the way in which modesty, which keeps to the mean in the pleasures of the others senses, and pleasantness, which keeps to the mean in diversions, are traced back to temperance.

Reply Obj. 4: We can take note of a virtue’s being perfected in two ways: either in what is proper to it, or in what is proper to a higher virtue that commands its act. Thus, I say that the perfection of obedience due to the lessening of what is due is not in regard to the proper account of obedience, but instead in regard to the proper account of charity, which commands its act just as it does the acts of the other virtues.

Reply Obj. 5: Obedience is not the same as legal justice. For legal justice regards the command of the law and the acts of virtues ordered by the law, insofar as they are directed toward another, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 5, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.1, 1129b12–25.) that is, insofar as the acts of the virtues commanded by the law are ordered to the good of the city ruled by the laws. But obedience regards command only insofar as it has the account of what is due, from its order to one’s superior. Hence it need not be a general virtue.

Reply Obj. 6: One virtue can arise from another in two ways. Either it arises by way of final cause, and this is the way in which one virtue is said to arise from another when its act is ordered to the end of the other virtue. This is also the way in which charity, whose object is the last end, is called the “mother of all virtues.” In the other way, it arises insofar as by the acts of one virtue another virtue is either caused or preserved. And obedience is called the “mother of virtues” in this way. For the commands of superiors are ordered to instilling virtues by commanding the virtues’ acts, which cause political virtues by introducing custom, but also dispose for the infused virtues. By “act of virtue” I do not only mean that which comes from the virtue, but also that which is directed to the virtue either as disposing for it or as causing it, just as someone in mortal sin can have an act of obedience, though he lacks obedience and the other virtues.

Article 2

Whether Christians are bound to obey secular powers, particularly tyrants

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST II-II.10.10; 104.6; Commentary on Romans, ch. 13, lect. 1.) It seems that Christians are not bound to obey secular powers, particularly tyrants.

Obj. 1: Matthew 17:25 says: then the sons are free. For if in any kingdom the sons of the king who is set over that kingdom are free, then the sons of the King to whom all kingdoms are subject ought to be free in any kingdom. But Christians have become the sons of God. Romans 8:16: it is the Spirit himself bearing witness with our spirit that we are children of God. Therefore, they are free everywhere. Thus, they are not bound to obey secular powers.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, service was introduced for sin, as was said above. (See above, q. 1, a. 1.) But men are cleansed from sin by baptism. Therefore, they are freed from servility. And so the same follows as before.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a greater bond looses from a lesser one, as the New Law does from the observance of the Old Law. But in baptism man is bound to God, and this binding is a greater bond than that whereby man is bound to man in service. Therefore, the bond of service is loosed by baptism.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, when there is the faculty of doing so, anyone can licitly take back what was unjustly taken away from him. But many secular princes have invaded the domains of the earth through tyranny. Therefore, when the faculty to rebel is granted them, they are not bound to obey them.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, no one is bound to obey someone whom he can licitly—in fact laudably—put to death. But in his book On Duties, (Cicero, De officiis, bk. 1, para. 26.) Cicero justifies those who killed Julius Caesar, even though he was a friend and like family, seeing as he usurped the rights of the empire like a tyrant. Therefore, no one is bound to obey people like this.

On the contrary, 1 Peter 2:18: servants, be submissive to your masters.

Furthermore, Romans 13:2: he who resists the authorities resists what God has appointed. But it is not licit to resist what God has appointed. Therefore, neither is it licit to resist secular power.

I answer that, as was said, (Above: d. 44, q. 2, a. 1.) obedience regards the debt to observe what is in the command it keeps. Now, this debt is caused by the prelate’s order, which has the power of compulsion, not only temporally but also spiritually on account of conscience, as the Apostle says (Rom 13:1–7), insofar as the order of the prelate comes down from God, as the Apostle suggests in the same place. Thus, with respect to its being from God, a Christian is bound to obey such prelature, but not insofar as the exercise of the prelature is not from God.

Now, it has been said (Above: q. 1, a. 2, resp., ad 3–4.) that there are two ways in which the exercise of prelature can be not from God: in the way the office of prelate was acquired or in the abuse of the office of prelate. The first is possible in two ways: either due to a deficiency in the person, being unworthy, or else due to a deficiency in the very way in which he acquires the office, that is, because he acquires it by violence, simony, or some other illicit means. The first deficiency does not impede his acquiring the right of prelature. Since prelature in its form is always from God (which causes the debt of obedience), the subjects are bound to obey these kinds of prelates, though unworthy. But the second deficiency does impede the right to prelature. For one who seizes dominion by violence does not truly become the prelate or the master. Thus, when there is the faculty, one can resist this kind of dominion, unless perhaps the person has later on truly become master either by the consent of the subjects or by the authority of a superior.

The abuse of prelature, in turn, can be in two ways. Either it is by the prelate’s commanding what is contrary to that for which the prelature is ordained, as when one commands an act of sin contrary to the virtue for whose inculcation and preservation the prelature is ordained. In this case, one not only is not bound to obey the prelate, but is also bound not to obey, just as the holy martyrs suffered to avoid obeying the impious demands of tyrants. Or else, it is because prelates compel that to which the order of the prelature does not extend, as if a master requires tributes that the servant is not bound to give or some such thing. And then the subject is neither bound to obey nor bound not to obey.

Reply Obj. 1: Prelature that is ordered to the benefit of the subjects does not take away the subjects’ freedom. Thus, it is not unfitting for those who have become the children of God by the Holy Spirit to be subject to this kind of prelature.

Or else, it should be said that Christ is speaking of himself and his disciples, who were neither of servile condition nor possessed temporal goods whereby they would have been obligated to pay tributes to their masters. And thus, it does not follow that every Christian is a participant in this sort of freedom, but only those who follow the apostolic life, possessing nothing in this world and immune from servile condition.

Reply Obj. 2: Baptism does not immediately wipe out all the penalties following on the sin of our first parent, such as the necessity of dying, blindness, and so forth. Rather, it regenerates unto living hope in the life wherein all these will be taken away. And so, a baptized person need not immediately be freed from the condition of servitude, even though it is a punishment for sin.

Reply Obj. 3: A greater bond only looses from a lesser one when it is incompatible with it, just as shadow and truth cannot exist simultaneously, which is why when the Gospel’s truth came the shadow of the Old Law ceased. But the bond whereby one is bound in baptism is compatible with the bond of service. Thus, it does not loose from it.

Reply Obj. 4: Those who receive a prelature by violence are not true prelates. Hence subjects are also not bound to obey them, except as stated.

Reply Obj. 5: Cicero is speaking of the case when someone seizes dominion for himself by violence while the subjects do not will it or even are compelled to consent, and when there is no recourse to a superior who could make a judgment about the invader. For in this case, one who slays the tyrant for the freedom of his country is praised and receives a reward.

Article 3

Whether professed religious are bound to obey their prelates in all things

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST II-II.104.5; Commentary on John, ch. 2, lect. 1; Commentary on Romans, ch. 13, lect. 1; Commentary on Titus, ch. 3, lect. 1.) It seems that those who have professed obedience are bound to obey their prelates simply.

Obj. 1: Colossians 3:20: children, obey your parents in everything. But a person is bound even more to obey his spiritual father than his bodily father. Therefore, spiritual children, particularly those who have professed obedience, are bound to obey their spiritual fathers in everything.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Blessed Benedict says in the Rule (See St. Benedict’s Regula ad monachos, ch. 48 (PL 66:392). See also Bernard of Clairveaux, Liber de praecepto et dispensatione, ch. 6 (PL 182:255).) that even if a prelate commands the impossible, the impossible must be attempted. But all the more is one bound to obey in possible matters than in impossible ones. Therefore, in all possible matters without qualification, one who has professed obedience is bound to obey his prelate.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, any form of religious life principally possesses three substantial vows: chastity, poverty, and obedience. But one is bound to preserve chastity in every way, and likewise poverty so that he possesses nothing of his own. Therefore, one is also bound to keep obedience in this way, so that he is obedient in everything simply.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, judgment of a superior is not left to an inferior. But if the subject had to discern in which matters to be obedient or not, judgment of the superior’s command would be left to him. Therefore, the subject is bound to obey in everything simply.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, every Christian is bound to obey his spiritual prelates. Therefore, if those who profess obedience were not bound simply to obey in everything, those who profess obedience would not be different from those who do not profess it. And in this case this kind of profession would be pointless. Therefore, since it is not pointless, they are bound to obey in everything.

On the contrary, Bernard says in On Dispensation and Precept: nothing of what I have promised forbids me; nothing requires more of me than I have promised. (Bernard of Clairveaux, De praecepto et dispensatione, ch. 5 (PL 182:254).) But only what is in the rule is promised. Therefore, a subject is not bound to obey in other matters, unless they pertain to the rule.

Furthermore, no one is bound to something to which others are not bound, except insofar as he obliges himself to it by a special vow. But those who make profession do not vow to obey in everything, but only to obey according to such-and-such a rule. Therefore, they are not bound to obey in everything. And this reasoning is also drawn from the words of Bernard in the same book when he speaks of this: no small amount is ordered over to the will of the prelate when one who makes profession promises obedience, not just any kind of obedience, but determinately according to the rule, no other than that of Saint Benedict. (Bernard of Clairveaux, On Dispensation and Precept, ch. 4, sect. 10 (PL 182:253).) And later he adds: and in this way, finally, he has decided that his own commands should be governed in relation only to that which has been ruled on, not any kind of ruling, but only that which the aforementioned Father has established.

I answer that there are three kinds of obedience: indiscreet, imperfect (though discreet), and perfect.

Indiscreet obedience, which ought not even to be called “obedience,” is when one obeys in what is contrary to the rule of divine law, which ought to be observed inviolate. Or, also when one obeys in what is contrary to the rule that he has professed, so long as it is not in something that falls under the prelate’s dispensation. And no one is bound to this kind of obedience. In fact, everyone is bound not to have it.

Next, obedience that is imperfect, though sufficient for salvation for those who profess obedience, is that whereby one obeys in matters he has promised to observe and not others. Hence Blessed Bernard says: still, the subject will know this kind of imperfect obedience, which is limited to the boundaries of the vow. (Bernard of Clairveaux, De praecepto et dispensatione, ch. 6 (PL 182:255).) And this is the obedience to which those who profess obedience are compelled of necessity.

Finally, perfect obedience is that in accord with which the subject obeys simply in everything that is not contrary to the divine law or the rule he has professed. Hence in the same place, Blessed Bernard says: perfect obedience knows no law, is not confined by limitations, is not bound in by the narrowness of profession, by a more generous will is borne to the wideness of charity, and in relation to everything enjoined with the spontaneous vigor of a generous and eager spirit, with no consideration of measure, extends to infinity. (Bernard of Clairveaux, De praecepto et dispensatione, ch. 6 (PL 182:255).) And no one is bound to this kind of obedience by a debt of necessity, but only by a certain nobleness, just as one is bound always to desire earnestly the higher gifts. (See 1 Corinthians 12:31.)

Still, some say otherwise, namely, that those who have professed obedience are bound by necessity to obey their prelates not only in what pertains to the rule, but in everything that is not contrary to the rule, whether it be indifferent or in the genus of the good, so long as it is not higher than the profession of one’s own order requires. But, they say, the prelate can compel to equal or easier matters, even if they are not based on the precepts of the rule.

But the first opinion is far better. For, since the debt of obedience is caused by the order of the prelate, the subject is only obligated by the vow of obedience to that to which the prelature is ordered. Now, the offices of prelates in religious orders are ordered to the preservation of the state of religion according to the institutes of the rule. Thus, the debt of obedience is caused only in what pertains to the rule.

But it should be known that something can pertain to the rule in two ways: directly or indirectly. Directly, it pertains to what is contained in the rule’s statutes, such as not eating meat, maintaining silence, and so forth. Indirectly, it pertains to mutual deference, without which the state of religion could not be preserved, or even what pertains to the punishment of transgressions, even if no specific mention is made of these in the rule.

Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle’s command is understood not of everything absolutely, but of everything that pertains to the prelatial relationship of father to son. For in certain matters, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 9, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.2, 1165a14–35.) the father is more to be obeyed, while in others the captain of the army is more to be obeyed than the father, and in others the physician is more to obeyed, and so forth.

Reply Obj. 2: Blessed Benedict is speaking of perfect obedience, which all who profess obedience ought to desire earnestly out of nobleness, though they are not bound of necessity.

Reply Obj. 3: Chastity is a virtue possessing determinate matter and a determinate act. So, too, is poverty. However, obedience has a general matter, as was said. (Above: d. 44, q. 2, a. 1, resp.) Thus, if one vowed obedience absolutely in everything, there would be a confusion of religious orders, since one would be bound to keep the same thing as another. Thus, the vow of obedience is determined in accord with a certain rule. But the case is not similar for the other two vows.

Reply Obj. 4: Although the subject does not have the competence to judge the prelate’s command, he does have competence to judge his own act in those matters in which he is not subject to the prelate by order of the prelature. Thus, he need not obey in everything. In fact, it is necessary for him not to obey in some things.

Reply Obj. 5: Those who do not profess obedience are not bound to obey their spiritual prelates in everything, but only in what pertains to the rule they professed in baptism, so that, namely, renouncing Satan and all his pomps and professing to live the Christian life, they may put on the new man created according to God.

Exposition of the text

After the aforesaid, it seems worth considering. (Sent. II, 44.1(268).1.) The reason for this order is that a power is known by its act. Hence the act of sin had to be addressed prior to the power to sin, even though the power is naturally prior to the act.

Whether the power to sin comes to us from God or from ourselves. (Sent. II, 44.1(268).1.) It seems that he should have said “the powers to sin” in the plural, since it is possible to sin in the acts of more than one power.

But it should be said that no power has the ability to elicit an act of sin except inasmuch as it is the will or is moved by the will. Thus, there is one power in accord with which sin is first of all in us, namely, the will or free decision.

An evil will does not come to us from God, but from ourselves or from the devil. (Sent. II, 44.1(268).2.) This is true if we take “will” for the act of the will, but not if we take it for the power that is the act’s principle. Thus, the likeness whereby some wish to draw a conclusion about the power on the basis of similarity is null.

But it is indubitably shown by many testimonies of the Saints that the power of evil is from God. (Sent. II, 44.1(268).3.) It seems that the Master’s proof is not valid. For the authorities that follow are speaking not of the power to sin, but of the power of prelature.

But it should be said that in the power of prelature, which is a habitual power, there is also included the habitual power to sin. For on account of the power of prelature prelates can commit many sins that they could not if they were not prelates.

‘Kings rule through me, and tyrants hold the earth through me.’ (Sent. II, 44.1(268).3, quoting Proverbs 8:15–16.) The difference between a king and a tyrant is apparent from what was said in the third article of the first question.

But it is to be known that the Apostle there speaks of secular power. (Sent. II, 44.2(269).2.) It seems that the Master’s solution is insufficient. For above he shows that even the devil’s power to harm is from God. Thus, it seems that if a power is to be obeyed because it is from God, then the devil must also be obeyed.

But it should be said that beyond any doubt the authoritative statement of the Apostle is understood only of the power of prelature, a kind of power that the devil does not have over human beings, except inasmuch as they enter into something like a covenant with him, consenting to it through sin and thus becoming his slaves. But this pact is illicit. Thus, for this reason it does not acquire a debt of obedience. Instead, the pact is to be broken: your agreement with Sheol will not stand (Isa 28:18). Hence not every power that is from God must be obeyed, but only one that is instituted by God so that due obedience may be paid to it, and the power of prelature is the only such kind.

‘Disregard power, fearing greater powers.’ (Sent. II, 44.2(269).2, quoting Augustine, Sermones ad populum, serm. 62, ch. 8, n. 13 (PL 38:420–21).) From this it seems that a greater power is more to be obeyed than a lesser power. But this seems to be false. (Mandonnet notes here that Nicolaï combined the following part of the exposition of the text into a fourth article that he entitled as follows: utrum potestati majori magis obediendum semper quam minori, “whether one should always obey a higher authority over a lower.”)

Obj. 1: For in certain matters one is more obeyed than another and in other matters less, as in some matters one’s father is more obeyed than the captain of the army, and in others the captain of the army is obeyed more than the father, as it says in the Ethics 9. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.2, 1165a14–35.) Therefore, it follows that an identical power is both greater and lesser than an identical power.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, an archbishop’s power is greater than a bishop’s power. But in some matters subjects are more bound to obey their bishops than their archbishops. Therefore, the greater power is not always more to be obeyed.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the abbots of monasteries are subject to bishops, unless they are exempt. Therefore, a bishop’s power is greater than an abbot’s power. But a monk is more bound to obey the abbot than the bishop. Therefore, the greater power is not always more to be obeyed.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, spiritual power is higher than secular power. Therefore, if the greater power is more to be obeyed, a spiritual prelate will always be able to absolve from the command of a secular power, which is false.

I answer that superior and inferior power can be related in two ways.

Either it is such that the inferior power totally arises from the superior, and in this case the inferior’s entire force is founded on the force of the superior. And then the superior power is more to be obeyed than the inferior simply and in all matters. So, too, in natural things the first cause has more influence on what is caused by a second cause than even the second cause itself does, as it says in the Book of Causes. (Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 1.) This is how God’s power relates to every created power. In this way, too, the emperor’s power relates to the proconsul’s power. So too the pope’s power relates to every spiritual power in the Church, since it is by the pope that the different degrees of dignities in the Church are both arranged and ordered. Hence his power is like the Church’s foundation, as is clear (Matt 16:18). Thus, in everything we are more bound to obey the pope than the bishops or archbishops or than the monk is his abbot, without any distinction.

Again, superior and inferior powers can be related such that both arise from one supreme power that places one beneath the other as it wills. And in this case, one is only superior to the other in those matters in which one is put under the other by the supreme power. This is the way in which the powers of both the bishop and the archbishop come down from the power of the pope.

Reply Obj. 1: It is not unfitting for the father to be superior in family affairs and for the captain to be superior in matters of war. But the one who is superior in everything, namely, God, is more to be obeyed simply, and so is the one who serves in place of God in a plenary manner.

Reply Obj. 2: The archbishop is not superior to the bishop in those matters wherein the bishop is more to be obeyed than the archbishop, but only in the cases determined by law, in which recourse is made by the bishop to the archbishop.

Reply Obj. 3: The monk is more bound to obey the abbot than the bishop in those matters pertaining to the statutes of the rule, whereas in what pertains to church discipline, he is more bound to obey the bishop. For in these matters the abbot is placed under the bishop.

Reply Obj. 4: Spiritual power and secular power are both derived from divine power. Thus, secular power is under spiritual power to the extent that it has been placed under it by God, namely, in matters pertaining to the salvation of souls. Thus, in these matters spiritual power is more to be obeyed than secular power. But in what pertains to the civil good, secular power is more to be obeyed than spiritual power, according to the passage: render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s (Matt 22:21). Unless, perhaps, spiritual power also has secular power joined to it, as in the case of the pope, who holds the peak of both powers, spiritual and secular.

And this is by the arrangement of him who is priest and king, a priest forever in the order of Melchizedek, King of kings and Lord of lords, whose power will not be taken away and whose kingdom will not be destroyed forever and ever. Amen.