D. 31 - Principle of original sin

Division of the text

Having shown that original sin exists and what it is, here he follows up with some of its characteristics. This is divided into three parts.

In the first, he addresses original sin as regards its principle, showing how it is passed down.

In the second, he addresses it as regards its end, showing how it is remitted through baptism, at because it has been said above that original sin is the vice of concupiscence . . . it remains to investigate how it is remitted in baptism. (Sent. II, 32.1(213).1.)

In the third, he addresses it as regards its number, inquiring whether it is one or more than one, at it seems that we must add to the above whether the sins of forefathers pass down to children. (Sent. II, 33.1(221).1.)

The first is divided into two parts.

In the first, he shows the manner in which original sin is passed down.

In the second, he raises a certain doubt against this, at but an objection is made to this in the following way. (Sent. II, 31.7(212).3.)

The first is divided into two parts.

In the first, he addresses the manner in which original sin reaches us.

In the second, he concludes as to the reason for its name from this manner, at it has already been shown what original sin is. (Sent. II, 31.7(212).1.)

The first is divided into three parts.

In the first, he raises a question, namely, whether original sin comes down to us through the passing-down of flesh.

In the second, he rules out the opinion of those who said that original sin comes down to us through the passing-down of the soul, at some have held that original sin is contracted according to the soul. (Sent. II, 31.2(207).1.)

In the third, he shows how original sin is passed down in line with the passing-down of the flesh, at for original sin, as we said above, is concupiscence, not the act, but the vice. (Sent. II, 31.3(208).2.)

And this is divided into three parts.

In the first, he shows that on account of the corruption that exists in the flesh fault or punishment is passed down together with the passing-down of the flesh.

In the second, he inquires what this corruption is, namely, whether it is a fault or a punishment, at here it is usual to ask whether the cause of original sin . . . is a fault or a punishment, or something else. (Sent. II, 31.6(211).1.)

In the third, he shows how those who have been purged of this corruption can transmit original sin, at but lest we wonder and be troubled in our mind . . . Augustine indicates by the drawing of a number of analogies that this can be so. (Sent. II, 31.6(211).3.)

Here two questions are asked.

First, about the passing-down of original sin. (Q. 1.)

Second, about its subject. (Q. 2.)

Question 1

The passing down of original sin

Concerning the first, two questions are asked:

first, whether original sin is passed down through the passing-down of flesh;

second, whether it is necessary for original sin to pass into all men.

Article 1

Whether original sin can pass into offspring by way of the flesh’s origin

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: below, a. 2; d. 31, q. 1, a. 1; ST I-II.81.1–2; SCG IV.50–52; On Evil, q. 4, a. 1; Compendium theologiae, ch. 196; Commentary on Romans, ch. 5, lect. 3.) It seems that original sin cannot pass from the first parent to offspring by way of the origin of the flesh.

Obj. 1: For the action of a person does not extend to the nature since a person is lower and less powerful than the nature in which he subsists. But the origin of the flesh is due to the nature itself, since generation is ordered for the preservation of the species. Therefore, our first parent’s sin could not have passed into his offspring by way of the origin of the flesh, since this could only happen if the nature were infected through the action of a person.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, contraries must have the same subject. But the infection of fault is opposed to the perfection of virtue. Therefore, since seed cannot be the subject of virtue, neither can it be the subject of the infection of fault. Now, flesh is only passed down by means of seed. Therefore, in this way, through the medium of seed, original sin cannot be passed down through the passing-down of flesh.

Obj. 3: One might say that the seed is infected through the lust of intercourse, and that this infection is the cause of the fault of original sin.

On the contrary, lust, according to Augustine, is what we call a perverse will. (Augustine, De libero arbitrio, bk. 1, ch. 4 (CCSL 29; PL 32:1225): libidine, id est improbanda cupiditate . . . culpabilis cupiditatis quae libido nominatur; see also bk. 4, ch. 18 (CCSL 29; PL 32:1295): cupiditas porro inproba voluntas est.) But a perverse will is a sin. Therefore, if by reason of lust original fault is caused in the child, then the child would contract original sin from his immediate parent, not his first parents, and this is against what the Master determines below. (See Sent. II, 33.1(221)‒2(222).)

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the infection of the seed is a kind of defect. Now, every defect in us seems to be either a fault or a punishment. Therefore, either it is a fault or a punishment. It cannot be a fault because seed cannot be the subject of fault. It also cannot be a punishment because then punishment would precede fault, and fault would be caused by punishment, which is unfitting. Therefore, original sin cannot in any way be caused in the offspring generated by the infection of the seed.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, even though original fault is destroyed after baptism, concupiscence remains in the body as a punishment. Therefore, if the infection of concupiscence in the seed could infect the soul with original fault, the soul could likewise be infected by the concupiscence remaining in the body even after a man had been cleansed of original sin. Thus, original sin would return of necessity, which is unfitting, since its punishment, which is the loss of the vision of God, would also have to return necessarily. Therefore, it is not possible for the infection of the seed to cause the infection of fault in the soul.

On the contrary, the Apostle says: sin came into the world through one man (Rom 5:12). But the human race could only be infected due to one man in the manner whereby the whole human race has proceeded from one man. But this was through the origin of the flesh. Therefore, this is the manner whereby original sin has passed from our first parents into us.

Furthermore, the sin of nature is to the act of nature as personal sin is to a personal act. But personal sin, that is, actual sin, is caused by a person’s act. Therefore, so too is the sin of nature, namely, original sin, brought about in us by nature’s act. But the act of nature is the act of generation through which the same nature of the species is preserved. Therefore, original sin passes into us through the act of generation.

I answer that in the proliferation of original sin the order kept is such that the person has infected the nature through an act of sin, and the infection of the nature has secondarily passed into the person procreated by the person who sinned. We should now see how this can be.

For as was said before, God had conferred on human nature at its beginning, over and above the character of its own principles, that its reason would possess a kind of rectitude of original justice that it could impress upon the lower powers without any resistance. Because this had been conferred gratuitously, it was justly taken away through the ingratitude of disobedience. Hence it happened that when the first man sinned, the human nature that was in him was left to itself to remain according to the character of its own principles. In this way, a deficiency has passed into the nature itself from the act of the person who sinned. Because nature that falls short of what had been bestowed gratuitously cannot cause what had been conferred over and above nature—since nothing acts beyond its species—it follows that one generated by someone who has the nature that falls short in this way receives the nature with like deficiency. For the person’s act proceeds according to the condition of its own nature, and does not extend beyond it. This is how the deficiency flows into the person generated.

But the account of a fault comes from the fact that what was conferred gratuitously on Adam, namely, original justice, was not conferred on him personally, but inasmuch as he possessed a nature of a given kind, that is, in such a way that all in whom this kind of nature was received from Adam would also enjoy this kind of gift. Thus, original justice would also have been propagated along with the propagation of the flesh. Therefore, it was in the nature’s power for such justice to be preserved in it always. But through the will of a person who had the nature, it happened that this was lost. Thus, this deficiency has the account of a fault in comparison to the nature in all those in whom is found the nature received from the person who sinned. Because this deficiency is passed down through the origin of the flesh by natural generation together with the nature, the original fault is also said to be passed down through the origin of the flesh. Because the account of a fault passes to the nature through the will of a person, the person is said to have infected the nature.

Now, because in other persons there is original sin from the first person of the generator, there is not the account of a fault from them, since they do not incur such a sin by their own proper will, but instead inasmuch as they receive such a nature with the account of a fault. This is why we say in the second place that the nature infects the person. This is also why this infection from the disordered will of our first parent was in that first parent in two ways: as an actual sin, inasmuch as he contracted it through his own proper will; and further as a sin of the nature, inasmuch as the nature became infected in him. However, it is only a sin of the nature in subsequent human beings.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the nature considered absolutely is unmovable, considered in regard to its being, it must vary incidentally when the person is varied. For it is obvious that if a particular man is lacking, the human nature that is in him is also lacking. Thus, Adam’s personal sin has also passed into human nature insofar as it possessed being in him. For when he sinned, he was deprived of what had been granted to him gratuitously by reason of his nature. With him deprived, the nature was also deprived as it was in him and, consequently, in others who were to receive the nature from him.

Reply Obj. 2: Seed is not the subject of fault actually, but only virtually. For in this way, seed relates to original sin as it does to human nature. Hence, just as in seed there is only human nature virtually, so also there is only original fault virtually, since through the power that is in the seed, generation terminates in human nature infected with original sin.

Reply Obj. 3: We speak of lust in three ways. One way is as it consists in the act of the will that desires something illicitly and inordinately. In this way, lust is an actual sin. In another way, we speak of lust as consisting more in the pleasure of sensuality, and particularly in the act of the generative part, where pleasure is very high. In this way, it is something left over from sin, not because there would be no pleasure without sin, but because it would not be disordered, which the name “lust” implies. In the third way, lust can be taken, as it were, in terms of habit for the extreme disorder of the powers whereby there is in us a propensity to desire with concupiscence in a disordered way.

Therefore, the mind of any just begetter is freed from the first kind of lust, since it is the case that the marriage act is carried out without any fault, mortal or venial. Hence it is established that we do not understand lust of this sort to transmit original sin to the offspring. Nor again is it that sort of lust that is disordered pleasure of sensuality. For even if the intercourse of some were purified of such disorder of the pleasure by a miracle, their children would still contract original sin. Hence it is clear that we understand lust to be the cause of original sin when it is spoken of in the third way. For every begetter generates what is like itself in nature. Hence since the condition of human nature bereft of original justice is such as to possess this kind of disorder of the soul’s powers, it is obvious that this sort of condition will also remain in the offspring. And if we find that the frenzy of intercourse is spoken of as the cause of original sin, this is not said on its own account, but rather inasmuch as it is a sign of that which is truly its cause, since the disordered pleasure in intercourse proceeds from the disorder of the powers like a sign and effect that indicates its cause.

Reply Obj. 4: Just as the infection in the seed does not have the account of a fault, properly speaking, before the infusion of the soul, neither does it have the account of a punishment. For fault and punishment must have the same subject. Thus, just as in irrational things there is not properly punishment, which from itself is ordered unto fault, neither can there be punishment in seed. Rather, there is a kind of deficiency inasmuch as a likeness to the nature of the one generating remains virtually in the seed, after the manner, too, whereby leprosy in the seed of a leper is not a sickness. Yet if it were a punishment, it could be the cause of fault, not precisely as such, but insofar as it is caused by fault. For the force of the cause remains in the effect. Hence because this infection has resulted in the whole human nature through the first man’s sin, where a subject able to receive fault is found, it actually has the account of a fault, as in a child already born. On the other hand, where this is not found, the force of fault remains in this kind of infection such that it can be the cause of fault in this way.

Reply Obj. 5: Since, speaking of the essential meaning, original sin is a vice of the nature, it cannot be caused through what belongs to the person through himself, but only through what is owed to the nature. Now, the preservation of the joining of the body to the soul pertains specifically to the being of a given person subsisting in a human nature. Thus, such a joining only produces the infection of original sin in the soul if something that essentially pertains to the nature is added. And this is the act of generation, which is due to the nature to be preserved essentially. Thus, the soul of one who has been baptized is not re-infected by the concupiscence that remains after baptism, but the fact of being born in original sin is passed down to his child through generation.

Article 2

Whether it is necessary for all men to be born in original sin

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: above, d. 30, q. 1, a. 2; In III Sent., d. 3, q. 4, a. 3, resp.; In IV Sent., d. 43, q. 1, a. 4, resp. and ad 3; ST I-II.81.3; III.27.2; 31.8; SCG IV.50ff.; IV.83; On Evil, q. 4, a. 6; Quodl. VI, q. 5, a. 1; Commentary on Psalms, Psalm 50; Commentary on Romans, ch. 5, lect. 3.) It seems that it is not necessary for all men to be born in original sin.

Obj. 1: For baptism returns what was lost through Adam to those who are regenerated through it, since the gift of Christ exceeds the transgression of Adam, as it says (Rom 5:20). But if Adam had not sinned, men would not have generated children in original sin. Therefore, neither do baptized men transmit original sin to their children.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, death is the punishment due to original sin. Therefore, where there will not be death, there will not be original sin. But Jerome posits that at the end of the world there are some who will not die. (Jerome, Epistulae 59, q. 3 (PL 30:587).) Therefore, it seems that they are not born in original sin.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as God formed woman from the man’s rib, so too he has the power now to form a human body from a human finger or some other member. But it is obvious that someone thus formed would not descend from Adam in seedlike principle. Therefore, since this was the reason, as Augustine says, (Rather: Fulgentius of Ruspe (5th–6th cent. AD), De fide ad Petrum, ch. 2, paras. 16–17 (CCSL 91A; PL 40:758).) why Christ did not contract original sin—since he was not in the sinning Adam according to seedlike principle—it seems that such a person will not have original sin. Thus, it is not necessary for original sin to pass into all.

Obj. 4: With the woman sinning, who sinned before the man, the man would have remained possessed of free decision, and he was also able not to sin. But if Adam had not sinned, even if the woman sinned, human beings would not have been generated from them in original sin. Therefore, since this was possible, it is not necessary for the sin of our first mother, namely, Eve, to pass to all her offspring.

Obj. 5: As Augustine says in the text, the concupiscence of lust in the act of intercourse causes original sin. (Sent. II, 31.7(212).2, actually referring to Fulgentius, De fide ad Petrum, ch. 2, para. 16 (CCSL 91A; PL 40:758).) But no matter how we take “concupiscence,” God is able to free a man from it by a miracle. Therefore, it is the case that someone is born without original sin.

On the contrary, the Apostle says: sin spreads to all men (Rom 5:12). (RSV reads all men sinned.)

Furthermore, one who is not liable to sin does not need redemption. Therefore, if there were someone who was not born in original sin, besides Christ, there would be found someone who did not need the redemption accomplished through Christ. And then Christ would not be the head of all men, which is unfitting according to the faith. Therefore, we cannot posit that someone can be born without original sin.

I answer that it is necessary for all who are generated from Adam by way of sexual intercourse to contract original sin. The reason for this can be drawn from what has been said. (Above: a. 1.) For two things come together for the being of original sin, namely, a kind of deficiency consequent upon the principles of human nature and, again, the fact that it was in the nature’s power to lack this deficiency or not, a fact that is required for this deficiency to have the account of a fault.

Now, it is necessary to find both of these in those generated from Adam in the aforementioned way.

For if the deficiency were not passed down, this could only occur through the nature of the begetter’s being perfectly renewed. For it cannot be the case that something is generated in a non-deficient nature by the power of a deficient nature. But human nature in our present wayfaring state is not re-integrated as regards what belongs to the nature, even if it is re-integrated through grace as belonging to the person, although in the future it will be perfectly re-integrated in the blessed. Hence, throughout the whole course of the present life, this deficiency must be propagated from parents to children.

Likewise, too, the account of voluntariness that caused the fault in the nature passes into all human beings who receive the nature from Adam. For, as was said above, original justice was granted to him with the characteristic that all who would receive human nature from him would also obtain justice along with the nature. Hence the fact that those born of him lack this kind of justice has resulted from Adam’s own will. Hence the account of voluntariness passes into all who receive human nature from him along with the deficiency. Because the one generated receives the nature from the one generating and the patient from the agent, all who descend from Adam with respect to the seedlike principle, which is an active power, must be born in original fault.

Reply Obj. 1: Christ’s redemption restores to us everything that we lost in Adam, not all at once, but each thing in its own time. For we are not led to the first state of innocence through Christ in such a way as to be immortal in this present life as Adam was. But we hope to obtain this through Christ in heaven. Thus, through baptism and the other sacraments, which share in the power of Christ’s Passion, man is purified as regards what belongs to him as a person, and also as regards the nature in those things that are compared to his person, so that the same man is not a slave of sin in his personal acts, but not as regards the nature in those things that are essentially due the nature. Thus, the infection of original sin must also pass to the offspring through the act of the nature, even though the father is immune from original fault as far as his own person is concerned. For just as anyone contracts original sin in his own particular generation and not through his father’s generation, so also he must obtain his own cleansing through his own specific regeneration and not through the fact that his father has been regenerated.

Reply Obj. 2: Not everyone concedes that some will be found at the end of the world who will not die. In fact, Augustine (Augustine, The City of God, bk. 20, ch. 20 (CCSL 48; PL 41:687).) and Ambrose (Rather: Ambrosiaster, in Commentaria in Epistulas Beati Pauli, a Gloss on 1 Thessalonians 4:17 (PG 17:475).) state the contrary, and the Master explains Jerome’s statement in Distinction 43 of Book IV as meaning that those who will be found alive are said not to die from the fact that they will immediately rise, and so their death will be for a very short period of time. Yet, even if we grant that they will not die, it does not follow that they are born without original fault. For it will be by God’s special dispensation that he remits this punishment in his liberality, since his will and power are not subject to the order of fault to punishment, just as they are not subject to the order of natural cause to effect. For he can and sometimes does make it so that fire does not burn, as is clear in the case of the three young men (Dan 3). Hence it is not unfitting if he makes it so that those born in original sin do not die, particularly since actually dying is not directly the punishment that corresponds to original sin, but the necessity of dying. Now, those men will have the necessity of dying in their nature, but, this being the case, they will be freed of this necessity of nature by a special grace. So, too, it is necessary for fire to burn with respect to lower causes, but the young men in the furnace were freed from this necessity by grace.

Reply Obj. 3: If someone were formed from a finger by divine power, he would not have original sin. But he would possess all the deficiencies that those who are born in original sin have, though without the account of a fault. This is clear as follows. From the beginning, when God created man, he could also have formed another man from the clay of the earth and left him in the condition of his nature, namely, as mortal, passible, and as one who feels the struggle of concupiscence against reason. This in no way detracts from human nature, since this follows from the nature’s principles. Yet, this deficiency would not have had the account of fault and punishment in him because the deficiency would not have been caused by the will. Likewise, I say that in the man generated from a finger such deficiencies would exist if he were left to the principles of his nature—unless the Lord willed to confer on him gratuitously what he conferred on the first man—but the deficiencies would not proceed from the will of the first man, since the deficiencies are only caused by our first parent’s will in those who receive their nature from him. Now, one does not receive the nature from the matter, but from the agent. Hence, since this man is only from Adam materially, but does not descend from him as an active principle, it is obvious that he does not receive human nature from him and does not incur original guilt through him or the aforementioned deficiencies. Thus, they will not have the account of fault or punishment, since they are not compared to the will as a cause.

Reply Obj. 4: If the woman had sinned while the man had not sinned, perhaps she would have died in her sin and God would have provided the man another wife. On the other hand, if he had begotten children of her, it is said that these children would have contracted passibility and bodily deficiencies, but not original fault and the deficiencies that are on the side of the soul. The reason for this is evident. For, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals 2.4, 738b26.) the body is only from the female, while the soul is from the male, not that the rational soul is passed down, but that the seed has the formative power whereby the sensible power is introduced in other animals, and in man the body is furnished with organs and prepared to receive the rational soul. If, conversely, Adam had sinned while the woman had not sinned, the children conceived of both would have both the deficiencies of soul and body, since from a deficiency of soul deficiencies of the body are also caused. For when what is prior falls short, what is posterior necessarily falls short, but the converse is not true.

Reply Obj. 5: It would not be possible for habitual concupiscence, which consists in the disordering of the soul’s powers, to be wholly taken away unless the nature were thoroughly re-integrated. And no one doubts that God could do this. And if this were to happen, without a doubt, the children begotten would be born without original sin.

Question 2

The subject of original sin

Then the question is asked of the subject of original sin. Concerning this two questions are asked:

first, whether original sin is in the soul’s essence as its subject or in some power of the soul;

second, whether the generative power has been infected beyond the other powers.

Article 1

Whether original sin is in a power after the manner of a subject

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: above, d. 30, q. 1, a. 3; ST I-II.83.2, 3; On Truth, q. 25, a. 6; q. 27, a. 6, ad 2; On Evil, q. 4, aa. 4–5.) It seems that original sin is in a power as its subject.

Obj. 1: For what is separated from the body and immaterial is only united to the body by means of something material. But the rational soul is separate from matter and is immaterial, as the Philosopher proves in On the Soul 3. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 429a22–26.) Therefore, it must be united to the body by means of the powers of the sensitive and nutritive parts, which are material and connected to organs. But original sin passes into the soul from its being joined to the body. Therefore, it is found with greater priority in the powers of the sensitive and nutritive part.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, original sin is passed down by origination. Now, the origination of human nature is through the act of the generative power. Therefore, original sin is first and principally in it as a subject, not in the soul’s essence.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, concupiscence, whether taken in the habitual or actual sense, pertains to the sensitive powers. But in the preceding distinction, the Master said that original sin is concupiscence. (Sent. II, 30.8(198).1.) Therefore, it is in these powers as a subject, not in the soul’s essence.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, as Augustine says, all sin is in the will. (Augustine, De duabus animabus, ch. 10 (CSEL 25:63; PL 42:103).) But original sin is sin. Therefore, it is in the will. However, the will is a power of the soul. Therefore, it is in a power as its subject.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, punishment corresponds to fault. But the punishment of original sin, namely, lacking the vision of God, is in the reason. Therefore, so too is original sin. However, reason is a power. Therefore, so too is original sin, and so on.

On the contrary, all the soul’s powers are infected through original sin. But the powers are only united in the essence. Therefore, original sin regards the essence in a prior way.

Furthermore, original sin is a fault and infection of the nature. But the essence compares to the nature with greater priority than does a power, since the essence is an essential part of the nature. Therefore, original sin is principally in it.

I answer that original sin is in the soul’s essence as its subject. This is clear as follows. The Philosopher shows (Aristotle, Metaphysics 8.6, 1045a20–b26.) that the union of form and matter is not through an intermediary bond. Instead, one is united to the other through itself. Otherwise, it would not be an essential union but an incidental one. Now, the soul is the form of the body. Hence the soul itself must be united immediately to the body by its essence in such a way that one single thing comes about from it and the body, as also occurs from wax and a seal, as it says in On the Soul 2. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.1, 412b6–8.) Because original sin is caused in the soul from its being joined to a certain kind of body as a form (for the exact kind of nature results from both joined together in this way), original sin must first and principally be in the soul’s essence as its subject, whereas it is in the powers consequently, as was also said above of grace.

Reply Obj. 1: The rational soul can be compared to the body as its mover, insofar as it is the principle of certain works, and as its form. If the comparison is made in the first way, since the acts of certain powers are found to be carried out without bodily instruments while the acts of others are carried out with bodily instruments, those powers that do not need a bodily organ in their action, namely, the intellective powers, must move the body by means of the sensitive powers. This is just as On the Soul 3 (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.10, 433a9–b30.) shows plainly that motion only follows from the appetite of the intellect by means of the appetite of the senses. In this way, it is true that the rational soul is united to the body by means of the powers of the sensitive part. On the other hand, if we consider it inasmuch as it is a form, then it is united to the body immediately, because the being that is the act of the form is due to the soul and body. But original sin does not pass into the soul as joined to the body as its mover, but rather as joined to it as its form, since this is the way in which it constitutes human nature.

Reply Obj. 2: Original sin is passed down through the act of the generative power just as human nature is. Hence just as the priority of human nature need not consist in the generative power, neither must it be the subject of original sin. Rather, it is the soul’s essence, which integrates and constitutes human nature.

Reply Obj. 3: As was said above, concupiscence is not the whole being of original fault, but is only the material element in original sin. Now, we take note of the formal element in it from the perspective of the will. Thus, original sin is preserved in both the higher and lower powers. This could only be through the fact that the deficiency and infection is first found in the soul’s essence, which is the principle of both powers, so that in this way, the corruption of original sin passes from it to all the powers.

Reply Obj. 4: Every sin is in the will as its cause, though it is not always in it as its subject, since even the concupiscible and irascible parts can be the subject of sin. In this way, original sin is also in the will as its cause, since it has passed into all from the will of our first parent.

Reply Obj. 5: Not only is the reason glorified through the vision of God, but the whole man is as well. Hence lacking the divine vision is not a punishment only for the reason, but for the whole man. And it is not necessary that, just as the vision of God is first in the power of the reason, original sin must exist also first in a power. For original sin follows on the nature, but the soul’s beatitude consists in an activity. Now, an activity is due to a power, whereas the nature regards the essence. Besides, the soul cannot reach the blessed vision without the light of grace, whose subject is the essence, as was said above. (Above, d. 26, q. 1, a. 3.)

Article 2

Whether the generative power is more infected than the other powers

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I-II.83.4; On Truth, q. 25, a. 6; On Evil, q. 4, a. 2, ad 12; a. 5, ad 1.) It seems that the generative power is not infected beyond the other powers.

Obj. 1: For what is not in some way obedient to reason cannot be perfected by virtue or contaminated by fault. But the generative power is of this sort. Therefore, there cannot be the infection of sin in it.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, it cannot be the case that there is an act of an infected power without sin. But it is the case that the act of the generative power can be without sin, as is clear in the marriage act. Therefore, the generative power has not been infected by the infection of sin.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the infection of original sin is through the fomes. (See above, d. 30, in the exposition of the text.) But the fomes is in sensuality. Therefore, the infection is also principally in it and not in the generative power.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the infection of sin is in that which is the subject of sin. But the subject of original sin is the soul’s essence, not a power, as has been said. (Above: a. 1.) Therefore, the infection is in it, not in the generative power.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the nutritive, augmentative, and generative powers pertain to the same part of the soul, that is, the vegetative part. But we do not posit that the nutritive power is infected by original sin; nor, again, do we posit any sin in the augmentative power. Therefore, we should not say that the generative power is specifically infected beyond the other powers.

On the contrary, the infection of original sin consists in the flesh’s resistance to the soul. Now, we feel this resistance particularly in the act of the generative power. Therefore, it has been infected most of all.

Furthermore, that which is the cause of something else participates in it most of all. But the generative power is the cause of the infection of original sin because this is passed down through its act. Therefore, it has been infected most of all.

I answer that we attribute the infection of original sin to three things: among the parts of the soul, it is attributed to the generative part; among the senses, to touch; and among the appetitive powers, it is attributed to the concupiscible power. The reason for this is that original sin belongs to the nature, as has been said. (Above: d. 30, q. 1, a. 2.) Hence its infection principally pertains to those powers that have a certain order to the act whereby the nature is passed down. Now, this act has two elements, namely, the act’s substance and its pleasure. The pleasure pertains to the sense of touch, while the substance of the act is attributed to the generative power as what carries out the act, but to the concupiscible power as what commands the act, since it belongs to the concupiscible power to tend to what is fitting and pleasant to the senses. Thus, for different reasons this kind of infection is particularly attributed to these three powers.

Reply Obj. 1: Actual sin, which consists in the act of the one sinning and his will, cannot be in the part that does not obey reason. Still, nothing prevents the infection of the nature from being preserved in the part that is the principle of natural activity. But it should be known that even actual sin is spoken of as being in the generative part, not as its subject, but materially, namely, inasmuch as the concupiscible part commands the act of the generative part.

Reply Obj. 2: The infection of the generative power is the infection of the nature. Hence the infection of sin need not be left by it through its act in the person generating, but only in the person generated.

Reply Obj. 3: There is also infection in the sensuality, inasmuch as it orders and disposes the acts of the generative power. But it is in the generative power immediately, insofar as this is the immediate principle of passing down the nature. But it is true that the infection of the fomes appears more principally in the sensuality, insofar as the infection of the nature results in the infection of the person through actual desires of concupiscence.

Reply Obj. 4: The infection is in the soul’s essence as its primary subject, but in the generative power as that in whose act it is made particularly manifest. For the essence is only the principle of an act by means of a power. Hence from the infection of the act we do not say that the essence is infected in the way we are now speaking of infection.

Reply Obj. 5: We ascribe to the generative power the infection both of original and of actual sin: of original sin, inasmuch as it is the principle of the act of nature whereby the nature is passed down; but of actual sin as possessing certain external acts ordered to generation and pertaining to the sensitive motive power. Because the nutritive power likewise possesses certain acts of this kind, such as putting food up to the mouth, chewing, feeling pleasure, and so forth, the infection of actual sin is also attributed to it, as it were, materially, but not the infection of original sin, since it is not a principle of the act whereby the nature is passed down, except remotely, inasmuch as it subserves the generative power. But no infection is attributed to the augmentative power because it is neither ordered to the act of propagating the nature, nor, again, does it possess external acts that are finished out by the motion of the sensitive part.

Exposition of the text

To this it can be said that the cause of original sin is a manifold defect of the flesh, and especially some pollution which the flesh contracts in its conception from the burning of the parents’ joining and their lustful concupiscence. (Sent. II, 31.6(211).2.) It should be known that the Master resolves this by denying both parts. Namely, his solution is that the infection is neither a fault nor a punishment, but a kind of deficiency. And it is said to be caused by the burning of the parents’ joining not as by what is essentially the cause, but by what is a sign of the cause.

This uncleanness appears to be greater in the flesh which has been begotten in concupiscence than in that from which it is begotten. (Sent. II, 31.6(211).2.) This seems to be false, since then original sin would be greater in the son than in the father.

But it should be said that this is understood as regards this act alone, which due to concupiscence in the one generating is only an infection of punishment, but in the one begotten is an infection of fault. But it is not the case that the infection is greater than it was in the father insofar as the father was begotten from another.

‘I was conceived amid iniquities.’ (Sent. II, 31.7(212).2, quoting Psalm 51:7.) This should not be taken to refer to the iniquity of the one conceiving (who has the ability to conceive without any actual sin), but to the original iniquity of the one conceived. We will say below (Below, d. 33, q. 1, a. 3.) whether this iniquity is one or more than one and why it is spoken of in the plural.