D. 36 - Sin and punishment

Division of the text

Having thoroughly treated of the opinion positing that the acts of sins, precisely as acts, are good and are from God, on the occasion of the last objection cited against this opinion, which was taken from the difference between fault and punishment, here he inquires whether fault and punishment can be identical.

This is divided into three parts.

In the first, he addresses the question.

In the second, he removes a doubt arising from what was said when addressing the question, at but it is to be diligently noted. (Sent. II, 36.6(242).3.)

In the third, he gives a recapitulation of what was said, at we have very diligently set out the views of those who say that all actions are good natures. (Sent. II, 36.6(242).5.)

The first part is divided into two parts.

In the first, he shows that some sins are also the punishments for sins.

In the second, he inquires how this can be, at and so it is deservedly asked whether insofar as it is a sin, it is punishment of sin. (Sent. II, 36.2(238).1.)

And this part is divided into two parts.

In the first part, he shows the way in which sins are said to be punishments, not essentially, but by reason of a connection.

In the second, he shows that even the sins themselves can be punishments, at and yet it is not held to cause any prejudice to truth. (Sent. II, 36.4(240).2.)

The first part is divided into three parts.

In the first, he sets out a way in which every sin can be called a “punishment” by reason of its effect, namely, inasmuch as it is a cause of the corruption of nature, which is a kind of punishment.

In the second, he shows the way in which some sins, though not all, can be called “punishments” for sins by reason of the cause, which is the subtraction of grace, at and although in this sense any mortal sin can be called a punishment, nevertheless not every one of them can be called a punishment of sin. (Sent. II, 36.3(239).1.)

In the third, he rules out an objection, at but when he says, ‘crimes are avenged with crimes,’ he appears to indicate that the very things which are sins are essentially punishments for sin. (Sent. II, 36.4(240).1, quoting Gregory, Moralia in Job, bk. 21, ch. 12 (CCSL 143A).)

And yet it is not held to cause any prejudice to truth. (Sent. II, 36.4(240).2.) Here he shows that even sins themselves are punishments for sins. Concerning this, he does three things.

First, he puts forward his understanding.

Second, he proves it generally for every kind of sin, at and that some sins are a punishment . . . Augustine openly teaches. (Sent. II, 36.5(241).1, quoting Augustine, Retractations, bk. 1, ch. 9 (CCSL 57; PL 32:598).)

Third, he proves it specifically for certain kinds of sins where it is more manifest, at moreover, it is not at all to be doubted that some sins are most certainly punishments. (Sent. II, 36.6(242).1.)

But it is to be diligently noted. (Sent. II, 36.6(242).3.) Here he removes a doubt that arose from the words of Augustine quoted above. Concerning this, he does two things.

First, he shows the disagreement between the statements of Augustine and Jerome.

Second, he lays out a solution, at to this it can be said that Augustine made that pronouncement according to the state of our present misery. (Sent. II, 36.6(242).4.)

Question 1

Sin and punishment

Here five questions are asked:

first, whether one sin can be the cause of another sin;

second, if a passion can be called “sin”;

third, if sin can be the punishment for sin;

fourth, if every punishment is for some fault in a man;

fifth, on the distinction among goods suggested at the end of the distinction.

Article 1

Whether one sin can be the cause of another sin

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: below, d. 42, q. 2, aa. 1, 3; ST III.75.4; On Evil, q. 8, a. 1; Commentary on Romans, ch. 1, lect. 7.) It seems that sin cannot be the cause of sin.

Obj. 1: For what is nothing does not seem to have the account of a cause. But sin is nothing, and men become nothing when they sin, as established above in the preceding distinction from the words of Augustine. (Augustine, In Iohannis evangelium tractatus, tract. 1, para. 13 (CCSL 36; PL 35:1385).) Therefore, sin cannot be the cause of sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a cause is that upon which something else follows of necessity. But what is necessary is not voluntary, as Augustine says, and what is not voluntary is not a sin. (Augustine, De vera regione, ch. 14 (CSEL 77; PL 34:133).) Therefore, what follows on something else as a cause is not a sin. Thus, sin cannot be the cause of sin.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, one contrary is not the cause of another. But one sin can be contrary to another, as greed is to prodigality. Therefore, sin cannot be the cause of sin, at least not any sin.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, sin can only be the cause of sin insofar as a preceding sin inclines one to a subsequent one. But this only happens insofar as a disposition or habit remains from the preceding sin. Therefore, since a disposition or habit only inclines to acts specifically like those acts that generated it, it seems that no sin can be the cause of a sin, except perhaps of one that is specifically like it.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the Philosopher proves in the Physics 5 (Aristotle, Physics 5.2, 225b15–226a22.) that there cannot be a motion to a motion, since then we would go to infinity. Therefore, and for the same reason, if sin were the cause of sin, it would go to infinity, which is impossible.

On the contrary, Romans 1:26 says: for this reason God gave them up to dishonorable passions, that is, because of pride. But pride is a sin, as is the dishonorable passion of which it speaks. Therefore, a sin is the cause of a sin.

Furthermore, comparing mother to daughter is comparing cause to caused. But one sin is said to be another’s daughter, as Gregory states. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Job, bk. 31, ch. 45 (CCSL 143B; PL 76:620).) Therefore, one sin is the cause of another.

I answer that one sin can be the cause of another sin according to three genera of cause: that is, according to efficient cause, final cause, and material cause.

This happens as efficient cause in two ways: either essentially or incidentally. Incidentally, it is on the side of the turning away, (See note above, at d. 33, q. 2, a. 1, obj. 2.) whereby it has the account of evil. For evil only has an incidental cause. And I mean “incidental” in the sense that what removes a restraint is called an “incidental mover.” Now, what restrains sin is grace itself, which preserves the soul in its rectitude. But sin takes away grace. Hence incidentally it is a cause of sins that occur when grace is subtracted. In this way, every mortal sin can be the cause of any sin. This mode of causality can in a way also be brought back to the genus of formal cause. For just as grace is the formal principle of the act informed by grace, so too is the privation of grace, from which the sin proceeds, like the form of the sin.

But as for one sin’s being the essential cause, as it were the efficient cause, of another, this is on the side of the turning toward, inasmuch as from the act of sin there remains a disposition or habit in the soul that inclines once more to sin. But in this way, a sin is not the cause of any sin, but only of one that is specifically like it, as lust is the cause of lust, and so forth.

However, as for final cause, one sin is the cause of another inasmuch as one sin calls for another for its end, as when someone kills a man to take revenge on him. In this case, for the end of wrath, which is vengeance, murder is called for. In this way, any sin can be caused by another, since someone can even carry out an act of prodigality for a period of time in order that greed may attain its end. Still, in most cases of this kind of causality, certain sins are more naturally apt to be generated by certain others, such as murder from wrath and lying from greed. Hence these kinds of sins that quite often originate from others are called their “daughters.”

Finally, as for material cause, one sin is the cause of another when one sin supplies the matter for another. In this way, gluttony is the cause of lust, since when the belly is warm with wine, it easily spills over into lust, as Jerome says. (Jerome, Epistulae 69, sect. 9 (PL 30:663).) So, too, greed is the cause of dissension, inasmuch as it multiplies temporal things, which are the matter of strife.

Reply Obj. 1: On the part of the turning away, sin is nothing. Thus, from this side it can only be the cause of something incidentally, as was said. But from the side of the turning toward, it is something. In this way, it can be the cause of another sin with respect to the three genera of causes, as was said.

Reply Obj. 2: An effect follows from a cause in accord with the condition of the cause and effect: in some necessarily, in others not necessarily, but it happens in most cases in the way it happens in natural things, since a natural cause can be impeded. Likewise, too, in moral matters, there is much less need for the effect to follow necessarily from the cause, since in these there is only a complete cause if the act of the will is joined and every impediment removed. When it says that the effect follows necessarily upon the cause, this is understood of a complete and unimpeded cause.

Reply Obj. 3: One contrary is not the cause of the other essentially, but nothing prevents it from being so incidentally, as when cold heats, as it says in the Physics 8. (Aristotle, Physics 8.1, 251a32.)

Reply Obj. 4: In the way touched on by the objection, sin is only a cause of sin that is specifically like it. But there are also other ways in which one sin is the cause of another. Thus, it proceeds insufficiently.

Reply Obj. 5: If it were an essential component of sin that it had another sin as its cause, it would go to infinity. For then it would have to fit with every sin. But it is incidental to sin that it be caused by another sin. Thus, it need not go off to infinity. So, too, it is incidental to motion that one motion be the cause of another, yet we can posit a first motion that is not caused by another motion.

Article 2

Whether a passion can be a sin

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I-II.24.1, 2; On Evil, q. 10, a. 1, ad 1; q. 12, a. 2, ad 1; a. 3.) It seems that a passion (The Latin word passio can be translated most generically as “undergoing” or “being acted upon”: in this sense, it is the opposite of “action” and one of the ten categories; but the word can also be translated more specifically as “emotion,” “suffering,” “passion,” etc. In this article, we have opted for the more neutral “passion,” but the variations of meaning should be kept in mind.) can be a sin.

Obj. 1: For passion is a kind of movement of the sensuality. But disordered movement of the sensuality is a sin, as was said above. (Above: d. 24, q. 3, a. 2.) Therefore, passion can be a sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, anger is a passion. But anger is one of the seven capital sins and can be a mortal sin; and likewise envy. Therefore, passion can be a sin.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, everything contrary and inimical to reason is a sin. For, as Augustine says, something is a sin when flesh lusts against spirit. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 10, ch. 12 (CSEL 28.1:309–310; PL 34:416); see also The City of God, bk. 19, ch. 4 (CCSL 48; PL 41:629).) But the passions are inimical to reason, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4 (PG 3:694).) Therefore, the passions are sins.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, that on whose account something is the way that it is, is itself that way all the more, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.2, 72a28.) But one departs from virtue’s mean and incurs sin on account of the superabundance of the passions that are not brought back to the mean. Therefore, the passions are sin.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, merit and demerit, since they are opposites, are traced back to the same genus. But it is the case that one merits by passions, as is clear in the martyrs. Therefore, it is also the case that one demerits by them. Thus, passions can be a sin.

On the contrary, sin can only occur if its principle is in us. But the principle of the passions is not in us. Therefore, passions are not sins.

Furthermore, one is rebuked according to his sins. But we are neither praised nor rebuked on the basis of our passions, as it says in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.5, 1105b30.) For one who becomes angry simply is not rebuked, but one who becomes angry otherwise than he should is rebuked. Therefore, passion cannot be a sin.

I answer that, since a man is only defiled by sin if that sin is from the man, as Matthew 15:18 says: what comes out of a man, this defiles a man, (RSV reads what comes out of the mouth proceeds from the heart, and this defiles a man.) a passion, precisely as it a passion, cannot be a sin. For a passion is not from the one undergoing it as undergoing it. Instead, it is induced by another in the one who undergoes it. But only incidentally can a passion be a sin, insofar as the activity of the will—whereby we are the principle of our own acts—is in some way related to the passion.

But the will relates or can relate to different passions in different ways. Some passions are passions only, (That is, some passions are strictly cases of “being acted upon.”) as is especially clear in bodily passions inflicted from the outside, such as cutting and burning, or also from some principle acting from within, even a natural one, such as fever or this sort of thing. And the will relates to these passions as what causes them, as it is in passions freely undertaken or freely borne for some end. In this way, there can be merit in these passions, if they are becoming, and demerit, if they are unbecoming.

There are also some passions that are not mere passions, but are simultaneously both passions and particular activities, as is clear in the passions that are called the “activities of the soul.” For sensing, as is the Philosopher’s opinion in On the Soul 2, (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.5, 416b33.) is a kind of undergoing. But this is true inasmuch as sensing is perfected by the fact that sight is moved by what is sensible, by receiving the species of that by which it is informed, and it carries out its proper activity. This is how it is in all passive powers, as are all the powers of the sensitive part as well as the intellective part, apart from the agent intellect and apart from the motive powers connected with the organs. Hence even understanding is a certain undergoing, as is willing and desiring. For this reason, anger and such things are called “passions of the soul,” although the term “passion” is taken in them more or less properly insofar as each more or less approaches bodily transmutation, which is also a consequence in anger, envy, and so forth, or also with reference to material qualities such as hot, cold, and so forth.

However, in the senses this is with respect to species received in a material organ spiritually and not materially, while in the intellect it is with respect to a purely spiritual reception. Thus, those passions that have more of the account of passion are less within our power. For this reason, they are more specifically called “passions.” Still, in all of them there is only sin to the extent that the will in some way engages with them either by commanding them, inasmuch as they are activities, or even by accepting them as passions.

Reply Obj. 1: The movement of the sensuality is only a sin to the extent that it is in the will’s power, as was said above, not precisely as a passion.

Reply Obj. 2: The term “anger,” in its proper imposition, signifies a passion. But it was subsequently borrowed to signify a vice. For since virtues, although they are means, are more opposed to certain extremes than others (as meekness is more opposed to anger than to its defect), it happens that the vices opposed to these kinds of virtues are named by the name of the passions which the virtues are especially ordered to restrain. In this way, anger, as naming a vice, is the name not of a passion, but of an act or habit.

Reply Obj. 3: Passion is not inimical to reason as if it were something essentially opposed to virtue, whereby reason is perfected, but because it is essentially opposed to the mean that virtue and reason establish in the passions, just as blackness is opposed to paleness and redness.

Reply Obj. 4: Vice is said to be vice due to an abundance of the passions as its material cause. But a vice is essentially in some deformed act related to those passions. Thus, the passions in themselves need not be vices.

Reply Obj. 5: The saints did not merit by their passions (Alternatively: “by their sufferings.”) except to the extent that they bore them voluntarily and for the sake of God. And so, too, they can be demeritorious inasmuch as the will relates to them in a different way.

Article 3

Whether one sin can be the punishment for another sin

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 46, q. 1, a. 2, ad 4; ST I-II.87.2; On Evil, q. 1, a. 4, ad 1–13; Commentary on Romans, ch. 1, lect. 7.) It seems that a sin cannot be the punishment for a sin.

Obj. 1: For every punishment is ordained and is from God. But no fault possesses order or is from God. Therefore, fault cannot be a punishment.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, cause and effect are not identical. But fault is the cause of punishment. Therefore, fault and punishment cannot be identical.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, punishment is ordered against fault as medicine for it. For, as it says in the Ethics 2, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.3, 1104b18.) punishments are a kind of medicine. But sin is not medicine for sin, since a preceding sin is not cured through a subsequent one. Rather, a subsequent sin inclines to sin. Therefore, sin cannot be the punishment for sin.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, if sin is punished with sin, either this goes with every sin or only with certain sins. If it goes with every sin, then it will go to infinity in the series of sins, so that there will always be another sin after each sin. On the other hand, if it is not common to all sins and, instead, the last of the sins is not punished with a sin, but only with eternal punishment, then the last sin will be punished less than the first one, which is punished with two punishments. But it can be the case that the last sin is graver than the first. Therefore, the graver sin is punished less, which seems unjust.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, no one is punished by acting willfully. But whoever sins commits sin voluntarily and willfully. Therefore, no one is punished in the fact of sinning. Thus, sin is not a punishment for sin.

On the contrary, in the Confessions, Augustine says: you have commanded, O Lord, and so it is, that every disordered aspiration be its own punishment. (Augustine, Confessions, bk. 1, ch. 12 (CCSL 27; PL 32:669).) But a disordered aspiration is an evil. Therefore, it is a punishment.

Furthermore, someone who is deprived of the greatest good cannot be without punishment. But sin is a turning away from an irreplaceable good. Therefore, sin is a punishment.

There are also many authorities cited in the text to the same effect.

I answer that it can be the case that the same thing is a fault and a punishment, though not for the same reason. For every punishment, precisely as a punishment, is found to be contrary to the will, whereas every fault has the account of the voluntary.

Now, it happens that what is a fault can be called a “punishment” in three ways. One way is by reason of the effect, that is, because it corrupts nature and subtracts grace, which are kinds of punishments. But this can happen in two ways.

In one way, fault causes punishment on the side of the turning away, namely, inasmuch as by fault one is deprived of grace, loses God, and the good of nature is corrupted in him.

In the other way, it is on the side of the turning towards. This latter happens in two ways.

One way is insofar as certain sins have a given passion connected with them, such as anger, envy, and so forth, since from the disordered desire for revenge, the body obeying the imagination and affect, is beset by a given passion, which is called “anger” materially speaking, and this body has affliction.

The other way is from the fact that an act of sin is not carried out without effort. For this reason, Wisdom 5:7 says: we journeyed through trackless deserts.

In another way, sin is called a “punishment” inasmuch as it is the effect of a given punishment. For from the fact that one sins mortally, as has been said, he is deprived of grace. Because it was by grace that he was restrained from the ruin of sin, the very subtraction of grace becomes for him a kind of cause of the subsequent sin into which he falls when bereft of the help of grace. In like manner this can be said of every help that God affords to men lest they fall into sin, as are external impediments to sin, as it says in Hosea 2:6: I will hedge up your way with thorns, and I will stop it up with a wall, and she shall not find her paths. And the helps that consist in impediments to sinning are sometimes removed as deserved by a preceding sin, so that in this way, a man more readily falls into the ruin of sin.

The third way in which what is a fault can be said to be a punishment is not by reason of anything preceding or following, but instead by reason of the deformed act itself. For no one doubts that combining things that do not fit together is a kind of punishment for a man. This is also clear in externals, as, for example, if someone of great authority were dressed in unbecoming clothing, this would be a punishment to him. Hence a deformed action, deprived of the rectitude of reason, also cannot be found in rational nature itself without punishment. Thus, to perform this kind of action is something pertaining to punishment. Still, it does not have the account of punishment and fault on the same basis. For inasmuch as it proceeds from the will, it has the account of a fault, but inasmuch as it disturbs the soul apart from the will’s intention, as something unbecoming to it, it takes on the account of a punishment.

Yet this manner can be reduced to the first one, since the disturbance itself is an effect of the sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Every punishment is from God, but not in the same way: there is one kind of punishment that is from God as acting, such as sensible punishments, which are caused by a given action. For we must trace back every action to the first agent as its cause. There are also punishments that are from God, not as acting, but instead as not acting, such as the subtraction of grace. For from the fact that God does not infuse grace, a privation of grace is caused in this respect.

Now, in both ways we find that punishment is connected to fault, since the punishment brought about by sin on the part of the turning toward is a punishment that afflicts man in his senses, such as the distress of anger or the disordered effort in sin. This is from God and is justly ordered such that one who desires pleasure against God’s ordering incurs affliction apart from his own intention also in the very fact of obeying his own desire. As for the punishment that is the subtraction of grace, which is the effect of one sin and the cause of another, God is its cause as not acting, as he likewise is of other similar punishments. It is obvious that this is justly ordered, such that one who desires what is contrary to grace loses grace, and one who acts against God loses God’s help. In this way, too, he is the cause of the punishment that is the deformed act of sin itself, not because he causes it but because he permits it by not preventing it. This, too, possesses an order of justice similar to the aforementioned, and God is the cause of this kind of order.

From this it is clear that, as referred back to the sinner and proceeding from him voluntarily, in which the account of fault consists, what we call “fault” and “punishment” possesses a disorder, but insofar as it has the account of punishment, insofar as it is from God, it is ordered with a due order of justice.

Reply Obj. 2: Cause and effect are not identical in the same respect and with reference to the same kind of causality (since with respect to different kinds of causes, it is also not unfitting that the same thing cause and be caused by the same thing, as the end is the cause of the efficient cause, and the efficient cause is the cause of the end). But in different respects it is not unfitting that even within the same genus of cause something be the cause of one and caused by another. So too, nothing prevents something that is a fault from being the punishment of another sin.

Reply Obj. 3: Punishment is ordered to fault as medicine, but not always as the medicine of the one who sinned (for the hanging of a thief is not for his correction, as neither is the damnation of a man in hell). Rather, it is sometimes ordered to fault as the medicine of another, as a thief is hanged for the good of the whole community, so that thefts may not be committed continually, and as someone is damned in hell for the beauteous order of the universe, so that something disordered may not remain, as it would if fault were not ordered by way of punishment.

Reply Obj. 4: It is incidental that the last sin is not punished by another sin, because either the sinner’s life is ended or because his spirit is changed for the better by penitence, just as it is incidental that the first sin takes away grace and that the second one does not because it does not find it present, but would take it away if it did find it there. The case is likewise in the point at issue.

Reply Obj. 5: In the act of sin there is something the sinner wants, such as pleasure, and also something he does not want, and which, in fact, happens apart from his intention, such as the resulting corruption of nature or even the indecency of the action. Thus, he is punished in what he has done willfully when from the fact that he acts willfully something opposed to his will happens apart from his intention.

Article 4

Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin

To the fourth we proceed as follows. It seems that not every punishment is inflicted for a sin.

Obj. 1: For, as Augustine says, (This is not found verbatim in the works of Augustine, but Mandonnet suggests that it can be gathered dispersedly from Tractates on the Gospel of John, tract. 124 (CCSL 36; PL 35:1969–76) and Enarrationes in Psalmos, Psalm 9, paras. 20–35; (CCSL 38; PL 36:125–31); Psalm 57 (CCSL 39; PL 36:673–92).) chastisements occur in five ways: so that the merits of the just may increase through patience, as in the case of Job; to guard the virtues from the temptation of pride, as in the case of Paul; to correct sins, as in the case of Miriam’s leprosy; to initiate punishment, as in the case of Herod; or to manifest the glory of God, as in the case of the man born blind. But three of these ways do not express a punishment inflicted for any sin. Therefore, not every punishment is inflicted for a sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, it says of Christ: he committed no sin (1 Pet 2:22). Yet Christ bore many punishments. Therefore, not every punishment is inflicted for a fault.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it is said in the text that every sin is a punishment in the first way assigned by the text, while not every sin is a punishment for sin, as it says in the same place. (Sent. II, 36.3(239).1.) Therefore, not every punishment is a punishment for sin.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, fault is opposed to virtue, and just as virtue deserves a reward, fault deserves punishment. But virtue has its reward not in these temporal goods, but in eternal ones. Therefore, neither is fault punished by God through the loss of temporal goods. Therefore, since there are some punishments consisting in the loss of these goods, it seems that some punishments are not inflicted for faults.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the way of the wicked frequently prospers, as it says in Jeremiah 12:1 and Job 21, while, on the contrary, the just are in affliction. But this would not be the case if punishment were rendered only for fault. Therefore, not every punishment is rendered for some fault.

On the contrary, Gregory says in a prayer: no harm from adversity if no reign of iniquity. (Gregory the Great, Liber sacramentorum (PL 78:57). Mandonnet notes that this prayer was recited over the people after Mass on the Saturday after Ash Wednesday, although the prayer was later moved to the weekday Friday Mass.) But every punishment is a kind of harm. Therefore, there can only be punishment where there is a reign of iniquity.

Furthermore, Jerome says: whatever we suffer has been merited by our sins. (Jerome, In Hieremiam prophetam libri VI, bk. 2 (CSEL 59:136–39).) But every passive punishment is a corruption of the good, as was said above. (Above: d. 35, q. 1, a. 1.) Therefore, every punishment is rendered as the deserts of sin.

I answer that one is only punished by being deprived of something good for him.

But it should be known that a thing can be good for a man in two ways: either according to his proper nature, namely, precisely as a man; or else in his common nature, as an animal or as a living thing, and the like. Because man is what he is as rational and as possessing intellect, what is good for him precisely as man is principally what is good with reference to reason, such as virtues, in which intellective nature is perfected. No one has a punishment from the privation of these goods except by his own fault.

But there are also goods of reason in a secondary way that serve the work of virtue organically and instrumentally, such as health of body and external things. These kinds of things are not goods of reason simply speaking, but in a certain measure, namely, as assisting the work of virtue. Hence the Philosopher says in the Ethics 10 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.8, 1179a1–15.) that an overabundance of riches impeding the work of virtue should not be called “good fortune,” but “bad fortune.” Hence if someone is deprived of these goods in regard to what does not help the work of virtue, but rather hinders it, such a privation of goods is not a man’s punishment precisely as man, but it is when he is deprived of what he needs for the work of virtue. Hence it says: give me neither poverty nor riches (Prov 30:8). Hence only for fault is anyone punished by the subtraction of these goods inasmuch as they are necessary for virtue. Hence Psalm 37 [36]:25: I have been young, and now am old; yet I have not seen the righteous forsaken, nor his children begging bread.

On the other hand, if man is considered in his common nature, then all the goods of the body, even external ones, are good for him. Hence any privation of these goods is a kind of punishment for him. Now, not every punishment of this kind is introduced for his own sin, but it always does follow on some sin, at least the sin of the nature. For if human nature had not been infected by original sin, man would not suffer any disturbance or loss in these things.

Reply Obj. 1: The fact that a man is chastised here to increase his merit is not a punishment to him as a man, but is his good. Yet it is a punishment for him as possessing animal nature. Thus, this kind of punishment follows not on the proper fault of the one who sins, but on the fault of the infected nature. If this had not become so infected, men would arrive at perfect merit without such disturbances.

Reply Obj. 2: Christ in no way had any punishment that would be a punishment of man’s precisely as man. For in the goods of reason he was superabundant and suffered no defect in them. But he did have a punishment as regards the common nature. Thus, it did not have to be the case that there was a fault in him, but only that a fault preceded in human nature. Hence it says: I struck him for the transgression of my people (Isa 53:8). (RSV reads he was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities.)

Reply Obj. 3: What it says, that not every sin is a punishment for sin, should be understood of another sin. For the first sin can be called a “punishment” by way of effect and by way of cause, inasmuch as the corruption of nature that takes place through it is a kind of punishment, not that it is the punishment of another preceding sin, but instead of the very same sin that introduces this kind of corruption.

Reply Obj. 4: Just as virtue does not have its reward among these temporal goods essentially, but does incidentally, insofar as it needs these kinds of goods for the act of virtue, neither is fault punished in them as with its essential punishment. Rather, it is instead with a kind of incidental punishment, insofar as the subtraction of these temporal goods redounds to the detriment of spiritual ones as well; whence the punishment begins here, but is completed in the future.

Reply Obj. 5: That the wicked enjoy prosperity is frequently to their evil, as is clear from the Philosopher’s statement that was cited. Hence they are punished in this very fact. Likewise, too, that the just are amid adversities falls to their good, since they are thereby advanced in virtue. Hence this is not a punishment for them, particularly insofar as they are men, but is, rather, rendered like a kind of reward.

Article 5

Whether the distinction of goods is fitting

To the fifth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I-II.18.1–3; On Evil, q. 2, a. 4.) It seems that the distinction of goods, such that some are called “goods” by their genus, others by their end, and others by their cause, is unfittingly posited. (See Sent. II, 36.6(242).5.)

Obj. 1: For what befits something with reference to its genus will not be able to be removed from it by adding a difference. For no matter what difference is added to “animal,” “sensible” will always remain in it. But to refresh the hungry and similar acts that he calls goods by genus can be done in an evil way, such as when they are done for vainglory. Therefore, they are unfittingly called “goods by genus.”

Obj. 2: Furthermore, evil is to the genus of evil as good is to the genus of good. But acts that are evil by genus can in no way be good, such as killing an innocent person or some other such thing. Therefore, neither should acts that can be evil be called “good by genus.”

Obj. 3: Furthermore, every genus has its own corresponding species. Therefore, if there is an act that is good by genus, we should be able to assign an act that is good by species. Since this is overlooked, the distinction seems insufficient.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, good comes from the end, as the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics 3. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 3.2, 996a24–b1.) But matter and end are not identical, as it says in the Physics 2. (Aristotle, Physics 2.8, 199a31.) Therefore, it seems unfitting to call acts that bear upon due matter “good by genus.”

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the matter of an act is its object. Now, an object has the account of an end. Therefore, if an act is called “good by genus” on the basis of the due matter upon which it bears, it seems that “good by genus” and “good by end” are unfittingly distinguished.

On the contrary, genus is taken from the material principle, as Avicenna says. (Avicenna, Logic, bk. 2, ch. 1. Avicenna’s books on logic are sections of the Book of Healing or al-Shifa’.) Therefore, if an act possesses goodness due to the matter upon which it bears, it is fittingly called “good by genus.”

Furthermore, what befits everything that exists in a given genus belongs to them by the nature of their genus. But a goodness befits the acts that bear upon due matter according to entire coordination of their genus. Therefore, they can fittingly be called “good by genus.”

I answer that, just as Dionysius says, (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 11 (PG 3:283).) in all substances we find essence, power, and activity. Now, these possess an order such that power proceeds from essence and activity from power. Because what proceeds from a good can only be good, just as essence and power are goods, so too is activity, to the extent that it proceeds from the agent’s power. But because a power in those who act voluntarily relates to many things, the action does not have determination from the agent’s power. Rather, the proper determination of the act is from the object. Hence if the object is proportionate, the act will receive a kind of further goodness from the same object. Because the first determination whereby something is determined is the determination in the form of the genus, such acts as possess goodness from the determination of the object are called “good by genus.” But because it is the case that a given act can relate to the same object in different ways, an act determined on the basis of the object can still be further determined by other circumstances. If these are fitting, it will receive from them a further goodness and will be called “good by circumstances,” until at last we reach the complete goodness of the act, which is by way of the informing of a habit, and then it will be called a “good of virtue.”

Therefore, in this way, the rationale for the distinction of the goodness of acts posited in the text is clear, as is how these goodnesses relate to one another. For the first goodness, which comes from the act’s essence, is common to all acts. Hence it undergirds all other goodnesses. Among these the first one added over and above it is the goodness from due matter. On top of this is introduced another goodness, which is from the end, from the other circumstances, and from the form of the habit. And with the second goodness taken away, there cannot be the third; yet, with the second included, the third is not necessarily included. Thus, it can happen that an act may possess goodness from the matter and yet be done in an evil way on account of undue circumstances.

Reply Obj. 1: Goodness by genus remains in the act no matter how much it is disordered by other undue circumstances, just as no matter how much grace is taken away from the soul, the goodness of nature remains in it. Hence an act that is good by genus is not said to be done in an evil way because it is deprived of the goodness of its genus, but because it is deprived of the goodness of the circumstances.

Reply Obj. 2: One defect suffices for something to be called “evil,” but not one perfection suffices for something to be good simply. For good occurs from a single, perfect cause, but evil occurs from particular defects, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 30 (PG 3:730).) Thus, what is good by genus need not necessarily be good simply, but can be done in an evil way, whereas what is evil by genus is evil simply and cannot become good.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as genus is determined by species, so also a good in a genus is determined by the goodness that comes from the end and other circumstances. Thus, the good from the end and other circumstances corresponds to the good in the genus, as a species does to a genus. Hence it also receives its predication. For to give food to the hungry for the sake of God is to give food to the hungry, but the converse is not true.

Reply Obj. 4: There are two sorts of matter: matter-from-which or in-which; and matter-about-which. Matter spoken of in the first way is not identical with the end. But in the second way it is the same as the end, since the object is the end of the act.

Reply Obj. 5: A given act has two ends: the proximate end, which is its object, and the remote end, which the agent intends. Thus, when good by end is distinguished from good by genus, this is understood of the remote end that the agent intends.

Exposition of the text

‘Few are able to see these punishments.’ (Sent. II, 36.1(237).1, quoting Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, Psalm 57:9, paras. 18–19 (CCSL 39; PL 36:687).) The Philosopher gives the reason for this in the Ethics 9, (See perhaps: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.5, 1175b24–1176a23.) since an intellectual nature that is bereft of its goods in this way has become hidden, while the external nature is more apparent. Hence it has been believed more by men devoted to the senses that they are what they are on account of their sensitive nature rather than their intellectual nature. Thus, they do not regard what harms them in their intellectual nature as a punishment, but only what harms the external nature known to them, while the truth of the matter is on the contrary side.

‘He enumerates intermediate things that are sins and punishments for sin.’ (Sent. II, 36.1(237).1, quoting Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, Psalm 57:9, paras. 18–19 (CCSL 39; PL 36:687).) This should be understood of what is in the genus of fault. Otherwise it would be false, since some things are only punishments and in no way faults.

‘God places a stumbling-block,’ (Sent. II, 36.1(237).2, quoting Gregory, Homiliae XL in Ezechielem, bk. 1, homily 11, nn. 23–25 (PL 76:914–17).) namely, when he does not remove impediments to sin.

Nevertheless not every one of them can be called a punishment of sin, (Sent. II, 36.3(239).1.) namely, of another sin. For the punishment that follows is the punishment of the same sin that produced it.

Nevertheless, they are not from God insofar as they are sins. (Sent. II, 36.4(240).2.) For sins are one thing as proceeding from the will, but sins become a punishment insofar as there appears in them something repugnant to the will, as has been said. (Above: a. 3, resp.)

Or he says that of man according to the state of free decision before sin. (Sent. II, 36.6(242).4, referring to Jerome, Explanation of the Catholic Faith to Pope Damasus*; however the work is actually Pelagius, Libellus fidei ad Innocentium Papam, nn. 13–14.)* This solution does not seem fitting, since the precepts of the law, of which Jerome was speaking, were given to man after sin.