D. 28 - Errors about grace

Division of the text

After he has determined the truth about grace, here he rules out certain errors concerning grace. This is divided into two parts.

In the first, he rules out the error of Pelagius, who derogated from grace.

In the second, he rules out the error of Jovinian and Manichaeus, who denied free decision, at and so, concerning grace and free decision, let us hold without doubt that which Jerome teaches. (Sent. II, 28.4(184).1.)

The first is divided into two parts.

In the first, he recounts the positions of Pelagius.

In the second, he cites his arguments, at as for their saying that man can fulfill all mandates through free decision and without grace, they support it by inductive reasonings like the following. (Sent. II, 28.2(182).1.)

Then four arguments are laid out.

The first of these is that without grace man can fulfill God’s law perfectly from free decision alone, although grace is given that man may fulfill it more easily, for which purpose God also helps us by instructing through his law.

The second position follows from the first, that it was not necessary to pray either for the faithful or for the unfaithful, since men are capable of good or evil work from themselves, at ‘they also destroy the prayers which the Church offers.’ (Sent. II, 28.1(181).2, quoting Augustine, De haeresibus, ch. 88 (CCSL 46; PL 42:48).)

The third is that they say man merits God’s grace from his own proper acts, at they say that the grace of God, by which we are freed from impiety, is given according to our merits. (Sent. II, 28.1(181).2, quoting Augustine, De haeresibus, ch. 88 (CCSL 46; PL 42:48).)

The fourth is that they say man is born without original sin: ‘little children are born without any bond of original sin.’ (Sent. II, 28.1(181).2, quoting Augustine, De haeresibus, ch. 88 (CCSL 46; PL 42:48).)

As for their saying that man can fulfill all mandates through free decision and without grace, they support it by inductive reasonings like the following. (Sent. II, 28.2(182).1.) Here confirmation of the aforementioned position is given.

This is divided into six parts corresponding to the six texts of Augustine that are cited, whereby Pelagius’s error seems to be confirmed.

The second begins at similarly, Pelagius also found support against grace in the words which Augustine speaks. (Sent. II, 28.2(182).3.)

The third begins at elsewhere, too, Augustine says. (Sent. II, 28.3(183).2.)

The fourth begins at ‘also, it similarly is to be understood’ what he says in the same place. (Sent. II, 28.3(183).3, quoting Augustine, Contra Adimantum, ch. 27.)

The fifth begins at also, in his Exposition of some propositions in the Epistle to the Romans, Augustine interspersed some things which seem to oppose this teaching of grace. (Sent. II, 28.3(183).4.)

The sixth begins at that is also to be examined with diligence. (Sent. II, 28.3(183).5.)

Question 1

Errors about grace

Here five questions are asked:

first, whether there is any good that man can do without grace;

second, whether without grace man can avoid sin;

third, whether without grace man can fulfill the law’s command;

fourth, whether without grace, at least without grace freely given, man can prepare himself for grace;

fifth, whether without grace man can have knowledge of the truth.

Article 1

Whether there is any good that man can do without grace

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: below, d. 39, exposition of the text; In IV Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, resp. and ad 3; ST I-II.109.2; On Truth, q. 24, a. 14; Commentary on 2 Corinthians, ch. 3, lect. 1.) It seems that man without grace can do no good.

Obj. 1: For, as Christ says to his disciples: without me you can do nothing (John 15:5). But God only dwells in us through grace. Therefore, it seems that without grace man can do nothing good.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, thinking of the good precedes carrying it out in practice. But it is said: not that we are competent of ourselves to think of anything as coming from us; our competence is from God (2 Cor 3:5). (RSV reads claim instead of think of.) Therefore, it seems that much less can we carry out the good in practice without grace.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as Augustine says to Pope Boniface, there is no good that man can will unless helped by God, who cannot will evil. (Augustine, Contra duas epistulas Pelagianorum, ad Bonifacium libri IV, bk. 1, ch. 3, para. 7 (CSEL 60:427; PL 44:553).) But the help of him who cannot will evil, namely, God, is his grace. Therefore, man without grace can neither will nor do the good.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, man cannot be just and good without grace. But it is in his doing good and just works that we take note of a man’s justice and goodness. Therefore, man without grace cannot do any good.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, nothing is capable of an effect that is beyond its perfection. But good acts exceed the goodness of natural powers. For they are reckoned among great goods while powers are reckoned among middle goods. Therefore, through natural powers without the addition of grace, man is not capable of good activity.

On the contrary, no one is given an admonition or precept about what he cannot do. But every day men are admonished to do good things. Therefore, to do good things is in their power, even without grace.

Furthermore, according to Damascene, no thing is bereft of its proper activity. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 23 (PG 94:950).) But man’s good activity is what is proper to him, that is, ordered according to reason, just as it is evil for man to be contrary to reason, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4 (PG 3:734).) Therefore, man by himself without added grace is capable of good activity.

I answer that, since a power follows on the essence, the diverse faculties for operation must be according to the diversity of natures.

Some, not attending to this, evaluated the activity of free decision and of natural things in equal manner, believing that just as a stone has its activity necessarily so that it goes downward unless something impedes it, so also man necessarily carries out his activities according to what is appropriate to some nature that is in him. Now, in man we find a twofold nature: one intellectual, from which there is in man an inclination to desire what is desirable and noble through itself, and another that is sensible, in accord with which he is prone to have an appetite for and to desire what are delightful to the senses. Consequently, regarding these two things heretics came up with contrary heresies coming out of the same root. Of these some, namely, the Jovinians, attending to the intellectual nature, asserted that man works well of necessity and can never sin. Others, namely, the Manichees, looking to the sensible nature, which they said is evil in itself and had its origin from an evil god, said that man sins of necessity and cannot do good. In this, both thoroughly destroyed free decision. For man would not have free decision unless he had the determination of his own work, so that he would choose this or that from his own proper judgment, as was said above. (Above: d. 25, q. 1, a. 3.)

Thus, others who wished to save the nature of free decision fell into another error, namely, the Pelagians, enlarging the faculty of free decision. For they say that because free decision is not of itself determined to a given work, but instead the determination of each work depends on it, man is capable of any good work through free decision without any superadded grace, even a meritorious work. They do not attend to the fact that “meritorious work” determines not the act’s genus, but its efficacy. For the genera of acts are distinguished on the basis of the differentiation of their objects, and because free decision is not determined to any object, its act is of itself capable of any genus, such as, to wit, doing deeds of fortitude, justice, and other such things. But a meritorious act has an efficacy exceeding natural virtue inasmuch as it is efficacious to obtain the reward that exceeds the faculty of nature. Thus, free decision is not of itself capable of a work that is meritorious, unless it is lifted up through a habit that also exceeds the faculty of nature, which is called “grace.”

Thus, in keeping with the Catholic faith, we must press onward to the mean between contrary heresies, namely, to say that man can do both good and evil through free decision, yet not that he can proceed to a meritorious act without the habit of grace; just as a man without the habit of acquired virtue cannot do an act of the kind that a virtuous person can, as regards the manner of acting, granted that he can do such an act as regards the genus of the work. This is in such a way that the phrase “of itself” does not exclude the divine causality, insofar as God himself works in all things as the universal cause of the good, as it is said: you have wrought all our works in us, O Lord (Isa 26:12). (RSV reads thou hast wrought for us all our works. Aquinas’s Latin text and interpretation emphasizes God’s causality as transcendent and internal to all secondary causes.) But it does exclude a created habit superadded to natural endowments.

Reply Obj. 1: As the Master said above, we speak of grace in two ways: in one way meaning the gratuitous gift, in the other way as God himself giving gratuitously. Now, the things that are superadded to natural endowments are what are called properly called the “gratuitous gifts.” Without these gifts man can do many good things, although not meritorious ones. Yet he can do nothing good without the grace of God, insofar as the “grace” is understood as God himself giving gratuitously, by the fact that he is the principle of all good, not only in men, but also in other created things. This is the way in which we should understand it when it is said: apart from me you can do nothing (John 15:5). And so, too, we can understand what the Apostle says: not that we are competent of ourselves to think of anything as coming from us (2 Cor 3:5). Or else it may be understood of the thinking of those things that pertain to faith, which exceed the capacity of natural reason. And for these man is not sufficient without the grace of faith.

Reply Obj. 2: Hence the reply to the second objection is clear.

Reply Obj. 3: God not only helps us to act well through the habit of grace, but also from within by working in the will itself, as he works in any thing, and from without by offering opportunities and helps to act well. Without all these no one can act well. For just as non-uniform motions must be regulated by a uniform motion, so also our wills, which can be turned to good and to evil, must be directed by that will which can only be upright.

Or else we may say that he understands this of the meritorious good.

Reply Obj. 4: Someone can be called “just” in two ways: either by civil justice or by infused justice. Now, one can become just by civil justice without any grace superadded to natural endowments, but not by infused justice. Even so, neither justice consists in doing just works. For not everyone who does just works is just, but rather the one who does this work in the manner of one who is just, as it says in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.12, 1144a14–20.) Hence it does not follow, even if civil justice could not be had without grace, that man could not do just works through free decision.

Reply Obj. 5: A work is called “good” in two ways. Either it is a work proceeding from virtue, informed by it, and this kind of good work exceeds the faculty that is reason, whether it is an acquired or an infused virtue. Hence such an act is not elicited from the power unless the power is perfected through a habit of virtue. But there is another good work that is even antecedent to virtue, which causes acquired virtue and disposes to infused virtue, as is clear in one who does just works, but not in the manner of one who is just because he does them without delight. Such activity does not exceed the natural perfection of reason, since the whole rectitude of this work is according to the rule of reason, in which are the principles of law whereby good work is regulated, unless, perhaps, insofar as any activity exceeds power as its completion.

Article 2

Whether without grace man can avoid sin

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In II Sent., d. 20, q. 2, a. 3, ad 5; d. 24, q. 1, a. 4; ST I-II.63.2, ad 2; 74.3, ad 2; 109.8; 111.8; SCG III.160; On Truth, q. 22, a. 5, ad 7; q. 24, a. 1, ad 10, 12; aa. 12–13; On Evil, q. 3, a. 1, ad 9; Commentary on 1 Corinthians, ch. 12, lect. 1; Commentary on Hebrews, ch. 10, lect. 3.) It seems that without grace man cannot avoid sin.

Obj. 1: First, through what the Master said above, (Sent. II, 25.5(157).1.) that man before the reparation of grace through free decision cannot not sin, even mortally. Therefore, without grace man cannot avoid sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, through sin the freedom of decision has been changed in some regard. But man in the first state had the property of being able to do the good, though not the meritorious good in the state of natural endowments. Therefore, free decision has also been changed at least in this regard: that man cannot avoid sin.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Augustine says (Augustine, De vera religione, ch. 13 (CSEL 77; PL 34:133).) that a proud nature has the necessity of envying another. Now, for the same reason, someone who is in one sin has the necessity of falling into another sin. But as regards the present state, any given man is either in sin or in the state of grace. Therefore, it seems that if he is not in grace, he cannot avoid sin.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, one who has a lame foot can only walk by limping. But sin is like a kind of warping of the will. Therefore, a man in the state of sin cannot not sin.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, death resulted from sin, as is said in Romans 5:12. Therefore, where there is a necessity of dying, there is a necessity of sinning. But in this state there is in us a necessity of dying. Therefore, there is also a necessity of sinning.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, whoever resists temptation conquers the tempter. But to the one who conquers, an eternal reward is promised (Rev 2–3). Therefore, since no one can come to the eternal reward without grace, it seems that without it neither can anyone resist temptation by avoiding sin.

On the contrary, Gregory says that an enemy is weak who can only conquer one who is willing. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Job, bk. 5, ch. 22 (CCSL 143; PL 75:702).) But what is through the will is not through necessity. Therefore, man is not necessarily overcome by sin, but instead can conquer it.

Furthermore, wherever there is the necessity of acting, there is an active power determined to a single thing. But this is contrary to the account of free decision. Therefore, man in sin does not have the necessity of sinning, but can avoid sin.

I answer that, as was said above, (Above: d. 24, q. 1, a. 4.) some heretics posited that in us there is a certain nature that is evil, impelling man necessarily to sin. But this error, as has been said, altogether excludes free decision and the nature of reason and of will. Hence it is not consonant either with the faith or with philosophy. But others, wishing to save the nature of free decision, indeed say that man is so established in his natural virtue that he can avoid sin, but they also say that sin has changed that virtue to the point that man in a state of sin cannot avoid sin, but would be cast down into another sin unless freed through grace. But lest they seem to posit that sin is altogether necessary, they indeed say that man in a state of mortal sin can indeed avoid this or that sin, but not all, as is also said of venial sins. They say, too, that man in a state of mortal sin can stand for a time, so that he does not fall into sin, but not for a long time.

But this position is obviously false in several ways. First, since sin does not take away but lessens natural goods, man cannot lose through sin that which pertains to the nature of a natural power, even if he is enfeebled in it. Therefore, since the free decision of, or flight from, good or evil pertains to the nature of free decision, it cannot be the case that through sin man’s faculty of fleeing sin is withdrawn from him, but only that it is lessened, namely, in such a way that the sin that previously man was able to avoid with ease he afterwards avoids with difficulty. Likewise, what they adduce about venial sin is not similar. For when we say that we cannot avoid all venial sins but can avoid individual ones, we say this particularly because of first motions, for which deliberate consent is not required. But there are certain sudden motions. Hence, when a man is striving to stand against one, another motion rises up from another side. But mortal sin requires deliberate consent. Hence if a man can avoid this and that sin, for the same reason he can avoid them all. Again, it cannot be said that he avoids them for a time, but not for long, since free decision resisting evil does not become weaker at resisting evil, but rather stronger. Hence much more can he avoid sin afterwards than before. (Mandonnet notes that Aquinas seems to change his mind in the Summa about the possibility of avoiding mortal sin indefinitely without grace; see ST I-II.109.8.)

Thus, we should say with others that avoiding sin can be understood in two ways: either the sin has already been committed or the sin is yet to be committed. If it is understood of sin already committed, then a man in mortal sin cannot avoid sin without grace. For he cannot absolve himself of past sin and the guilt of fault, unless he is freed through grace. And in this Pelagius erred, esteeming man to be able by his own proper works, without grace, to absolve himself from past sins by making satisfaction. But man can avoid sin yet to be committed even without grace, no matter how much he be in mortal sin—so long as grace is understood as an infused habit and not the divine will itself, through which all good things are caused and all evils repelled.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as we speak of seeing in two ways, namely, having sight and using sight, so also we speak of sinning. Hence when it is said that man cannot not sin before reparation, this is understood of not having sin. But it cannot be understood as meaning that he cannot not make use of sin.

Reply Obj. 2: Our freedom of decision has been changed through sin but not taken away. When it is said that free decision is altogether incapable of what it was previously able to do, this denotes the taking away of the faculty and not only its lessening. But it pertains to lessening that what it was previously able to do easily, and it can afterwards do not without difficulty and struggle, as regards the avoidance of mortal sins. But it cannot avoid all venial sins, due to the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit.

Reply Obj. 3: Augustine’s statement should be understood not of absolute but of conditioned necessity, which is the necessity of an end. For a proud man, if he wishes to cling to his end, namely, such that he seeks his own proper excellence, has the necessity of envying the excellence of others, which takes away from his own proper excellence. But someone who has sinned once mortally through pride does not for this reason have the necessity of always proceeding to an act of pride. For he can pass from one sin to the contrary sin or into generic good. Thus, it is not necessary for him to envy.

Reply Obj. 4: This argument holds in things that act due to a necessity of nature, in which activity necessarily follows in accord with the requirement of the perfection and deficiency of the one working. But it does not hold true in voluntary agents. For a man possessing a virtue is able not to make use of the virtue, but to proceed to a contrary usage. And likewise, one who has a vicious habit is able not to make use of the habit.

Reply Obj. 5: Death does not correspond to fault for just any sin, but to the sin of the first transgression, from which the whole nature has been infected. Hence just as man is not freed from the necessity of dying except through grace, so also only by grace is he freed from the necessity of being subject to the sin transfused through origin from parents to their offspring. But man need not necessarily fall into actual mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 6: It is one thing to resist sin and another to have a victory over sin. For whoever avoids sin resists sin. Hence this can also be done without grace. And in this case a man need not merit an eternal reward by resisting sin. But he properly conquers sin who can reach the point that the struggle of sin contradicts. But this can only be in one who works a meritorious work. Hence this kind of victory merits eternal life and cannot be accomplished without grace.

Article 3

Whether without grace man can fulfill God’s precepts

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I-II.109.4; On Truth, q. 24, a. 14, ad 1, 2, 7; Commentary on Romans, ch. 2, lect. 3.) It seems that without grace man cannot fulfill God’s precepts.

Obj. 1: For one who keeps the commandments of God merits eternal life, as it is said: do this, and you will live (Luke 10:28). But without grace man is not able to do this. Therefore, neither can he fulfill the commandments of the law.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, charity cannot be had without grace. But the love of charity is a matter of precept (Matt 22:37–38). Therefore, the precepts cannot be fulfilled without grace.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as Augustine showed above, (In II Sent., d. 27, q. 1, a. 2, resp.; see Augustine, De libero arbitrio, bk. 2, ch. 18 (CCSL 29; PL 32:1266).) God alone works virtues in us. But the acts of the virtues are a matter of precept. Therefore, we cannot fulfill the precepts by ourselves.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, this seems to be expressly indicated when it says: you make trial of God by putting a yoke upon the neck . . . which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear (Acts 15:10). But the precepts of the law are this burden. Therefore, man by himself cannot fulfill the precepts of the law.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, no one is damned except for a sin of omission or transgression. But no one who fulfills the law’s precepts sins by omission. Therefore, if man can fulfill the precepts of the law without grace—since, as we have said, he can avoid mortal sin without grace—it seems that man can completely avoid damnation without grace. But whoever is not damned is in glory. Therefore, man without grace will be able to reach glory, which is totally heretical.

On the contrary, Jerome says: let one who says that God commands the impossible be anathema. (See Jerome, Dialogi contra Pelagianos, bk. 1, para. 14 (CCSL 80; PL 23:507); Aquinas cites Jerome, Expositione symbol. ad Damasum, but Mandonnet attributes this to Pelagius.) But that which man cannot fulfill is impossible for him. Therefore, man by himself can fulfill God’s commandments.

Furthermore, God is not more cruel than man. But we would regard it as cruelty in the case of a man if he were to oblige someone by a precept to what that person could not fulfill. Therefore, we must in no way form this estimation of God. Thus, without grace man by himself can fulfill the law’s precepts.

I answer that we can speak of the precepts of the law in two ways: either as regards what directly falls within the precept or as regards the intention of the legislator. Now, an act of virtue directly falls within a precept as regards the substance of the work, not as regards the mode of acting, which the virtue concerning it includes. For one is directly commanded to do what is immediately in him to do. But it is not in man to do an act of virtue in the manner whereby a virtuous person does it before he has the virtue, whether acquired or infused. But the intention of the legislator, as it says in the Ethics 2, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.13, 1102a7–9.) is to make citizens good and to lead them to virtue through a habituation to the works that are commanded. And the Apostle’s statement the end of the precept is charity (1 Tim 1:5) (RSV reads the aim of our charge is love.) harmonizes with this. For the precepts of the law have been given so that men may be established in love of God and neighbor. Therefore, the intention of the legislator is not only that these works be done, but that they be done out of charity.

Therefore, it should be said that one can fulfill the precepts of the law, as regards what directly falls under the precept, through free decision without grace freely given or sanctifying grace, if “grace” is taken for an infused habit. (Although there is no direct contradiction, this claim is in some tension with Aquinas’s treatment of similar questions in ST I-II.109.4, where he says that “in the state of corrupted nature, man cannot fulfill all the divine commandments without healing grace.”) But as regards the intention of the legislator, they cannot be fulfilled without grace, since the gift of charity is not in us of ourselves, but is infused by God. But if grace is taken as meaning the divine will causing all good things in us freely, then we should say that man cannot fulfill the precepts without grace in either way. Thus, Pelagius erred, since he posited that the precepts of the law can be fulfilled simply without grace.

Reply Obj. 1: The precepts of the law do not lead to eternal life no matter how they are observed but only insofar as the works commanded are informed by charity, in keeping with which they fall under the intention of the legislator. And it is plain that without grace they cannot be kept in this way.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as we can consider the acts of the other virtues in two ways, either as from the virtue or as antecedent to the virtue, so also can we do this in the case of charity. For one, even someone who does not have charity, can love neighbor and God, even above all things, as some say. And this loving is understood as the act of charity falling directly under the precept and not only as proceeding from charity.

Reply Obj. 3: The acts of the virtues are not a matter of precept as proceeding from the virtue, but instead as regards the substance of the work, as has been said. (Resp.) In this respect it can be the case that someone does just things, even without doing them as a just man does them.

Reply Obj. 4: This is said on account of the multitude of the precepts of the Old Law, particularly as regards the ceremonial precepts, which the multitude of the people had never observed, and which could have been observed only with great difficulty.

Reply Obj. 5: A man, even if he never transgressed or omitted something, would still be subject to original sin, from which he can be freed only through grace. For this he would deservedly undergo damnation and upon reaching the age of majority would even sin by the very fact of not preparing himself for grace. Hence he would also be punished for such negligence. But if he did prepare himself by doing what was in him, he would doubtless obtain the grace through which to merit eternal life.

Article 4

Whether without some grace man can prepare himself for grace

To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In II Sent., d. 5, q. 2, a. 1; In IV Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, resp. and ad 2; ST I.62.2; I-II.109.6; SCG III.149; On Truth, q. 24, a. 15; Quodl. I, q. 4, a. 2; Commentary on John, ch. 1, lect. 6; Commentary on Hebrews, ch. 12, lect. 3.) It seems that without some grace man cannot prepare himself for grace.

Obj. 1: This is, first, because of what is said in Jeremiah 10:23: the way of man is not in himself . . . it is not in man who walks to direct his steps. But no one is prepared for grace unless his steps are directed and he seeks the way of salvation. Therefore, it is not in man’s power to prepare himself for grace.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is not necessary for a man to ask from another for what is in his power. But a man must ask from God to be prepared for grace, as is clear in the passage: conduct me, O Lord, in your way (Ps 86 [85]:11). (RSV reads teach me thy way, O Lord.) Therefore, preparation for grace is not in man’s power.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, what has been done visibly in some who have obtained grace is probably also done in others at least invisibly, since one and all have the same account. But some, since they used even to resist grace, were prepared for grace by a special gift of grace, as is clear in the conversion of Paul. Therefore, others, too, cannot be prepared for grace without grace, at least grace freely given.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, Hebrews 11:6: whoever would draw near to God must believe that he exists. But faith can only be had through grace: it is the gift of God, as is said in Ephesians 2:8. Therefore, since no one prepares himself for grace except by coming to God, it seems that without the gift of grace man cannot prepare himself for grace.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, Augustine says that servile fear introduces charity as the bristle does the thread. (Augustine, In Iohannis epistulam ad Parthos tractatus, tract. 9, sect. 4 (PL 35:2047).) But servile fear is a gift of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, through grace freely given man is prepared for sanctifying grace.

On the contrary, it is said: turn ye to me . . . and I will turn to you (Zech 1:3). (RSV reads return instead of turn.) But the turning that it points out to us seems to be nothing other than preparation for the reception of grace. Therefore, it is first required of us that we be prepared for grace before God turns to us by infusing grace.

Furthermore, Anselm says: that one does not have grace is not from God’s not willing to give it, but because man does not wish to receive it. (Anselm, De casu Diaboli (PL 158:328), ch. 3. Mandonnet notes that Anselm says this about the devil, but that it can be understood to apply to men from the preceding words: do you think that the Apostle said: ‘what do you have that you have not received?’ (1 Cor 4:7) about men alone, or also about angels? No creature has anything from itself.) Therefore, if man wishes to receive grace, God will give it. But what is established in man’s will is in the power of free decision. Therefore, it is in the power of free decision that man prepare himself for grace.

I answer that “grace” can be taken in two ways. Either it is taken as divine providence itself, whereby he gratuitously imparts to all things from his goodness things that are fitting to them. Or else it is taken as the habitual gift received in the soul, which is conferred gratuitously by God.

Therefore, if grace is taken in the first way, there is no doubt that without God’s grace man cannot prepare himself to have grace rendering one favored, or sanctifying grace. (“Sanctifying grace” is the name usually given now for the grace Aquinas is describing here as “grace that renders one favored,” so we include it as an alternate translation.) For as shown in the Physics 8, (Aristotle, Physics 8.4, 256a3.) a change of the will cannot come about without something moving it after the manner of rousing it, for it is necessary for everything that is moved to be moved by another. It makes no difference what it is that affords such occasions of the change as if by rousing the will, whether it be a man’s admonition, sickness of body, or something else of this sort, all of which are obviously subject to divine providence and ordered to the good of the elect. Hence whatever has roused a man to turn himself to receive sanctifying grace can be called a “grace given gratuitously.” And in this way, man does not prepare himself for grace without grace gratuitously given, even if the act of free decision itself is called a “grace”—an act which God accomplishes in us, whereby we are prepared.

However, if “grace” is taken to mean a habitual gift infused in the soul, then there are two opinions. For some say that no one can prepare himself for grace that renders one favored, or sanctifying grace, except by a light infused in the mind, which is a gift of grace given gratuitously. But this does not seem fitting. For the preparation for grace is not through acts that should be held adequate for grace itself by an equality of proportion, as merit is held adequate to the reward. Thus, the acts whereby man prepares himself for grace need not exceed human nature. For as human nature is in material potency to grace, the acts of natural virtues are like material dispositions to it. Hence for man to prepare himself for grace no other light preceding grace is required.

Furthermore, according to this position one would have to go on to infinity, since that light of grace given gratuitously, too, is only given to one who prepares himself to receive it. Otherwise, it would be given to everyone, which we cannot understand to be the case, unless, perhaps, we speak of the natural light of reason as a grace given gratuitously, this pertaining to natural goods not gratuitous ones, unless taken in a broad sense. But if such grace freely given needs preparation, then the question of this preparation will return, whether man is capable of it of himself or not. And so, either it will go off to infinity, or we will be able to arrive at a grace for which man by himself can prepare himself. And there is no effective reason why this is more the case with one grace than another. Thus, we say, agreeing with others, that man can prepare himself to have sanctifying grace by free decision alone. For by doing what is in him, he obtains grace from God. But what is in us is only what is established within the power of free decision.

Reply Obj. 1: Directing a spiritual step can only be from God, without whose providence no good occurs. And it is not necessary that this happen through an infused habit, if directing steps refers to preparation for sanctifying grace.

Reply Obj. 2: Man cannot prepare himself for grace or do any good without God’s help. Thus, we must pray to him to turn us and others to himself. Yet it is not necessary for this help to be always through an infused habit. Rather, it can be through many things that are externally an occasion of salvation and through the internal act that God causes in us.

Reply Obj. 3: That brightness that shone around Paul was a bodily brightness, which was a kind of occasion that led him to prepare himself to have grace by knocking him down and treading upon him. When he had prepared himself for grace, he obtained grace. And it is not necessary that before he received sanctifying grace a light of grace freely given was infused to him. Hence it is not said that brightness shone in him from within, but that it shone around him, as if externally. So, too, God prepares occasions of salvation for others who are turned to God.

Reply Obj. 4: One can even prepare himself to have faith through what is in natural reason. Hence it is said that, if someone born among barbarian nations does what is in himself, God will reveal to him what is necessary to salvation either by inspiring him or by sending a teacher. Hence it is not necessary for the habit of faith to precede preparation for sanctifying grace. Rather, at the same time man can prepare himself to have faith, the other virtues, and grace.

Reply Obj. 5: Even though charity is introduced through servile fear, it is not necessary for servile fear to precede charity. For servile fear is always possessed with mortal sin. But many have obtained charity who have never sinned mortally. Hence the objection proves nothing with regard to the issue at hand.

Article 5

Whether there is any truth that man can know without grace

To the fifth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.109.1; Commentary on 1 Corinthians, ch. 12, lect. 1.) It seems that without grace man can know nothing true.

Obj. 1: This is, first, because of what is said in 1 Corinthians 12:3: no man can say, ‘Jesus is Lord,’ except by the Holy Spirit. Commenting on this, Ambrose says that every truth, no matter who says it, is from the Holy Spirit. (In fact, Ambrosiaster, in a Gloss on 1 Corinthians 12:3 (PL 17:258).) But the Holy Spirit only dwells in us through grace. Therefore, no truth can be spoken or known without grace.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, divine revelation only occurs through the infusion of a light freely given. But Romans 1:19–20 says that God revealed to philosophers even what they knew by natural reason. Therefore, there can be no knowledge of the truth without an infused light of grace.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the easier way to know something is through teaching rather than discovery. But, as Augustine says in On the Teacher, (Augustine, On the Teacher, cc. 11–12 (CCSL 29; PL 32:1215).) no one can learn externally unless God teaches internally. Hence it is clear that man can only have knowledge of the truth through teaching by the help of grace working inwardly. Therefore, much less could he have this knowledge through discovery without the help of grace. Thus, man cannot in any way have knowledge without the help of grace, since everything that anyone knows is known either by learning or by discovering it, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.1, 71a1–71b10; 2.19, 100b4–15.)

Obj. 4: Furthermore, as bodily light is to sight, spiritual light is to the intellect. But nothing can be seen in a bodily way except through an influx of bodily light, especially of what sheds light most of all, which is the sun. Therefore, nothing can be understood except through the influx of spiritual light from God, and this is grace. Therefore, no truth can be known without grace.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, all the things in a given genus are traced back to a single first thing, the greatest in that genus, as to a cause. But the first in the genus of intellective things is God himself. Therefore, he is the most intelligent and the cause of understanding for all intelligent things. But he causes nothing in us except by having some influence. Therefore, we cannot understand any truth without the infusion of some grace.

On the contrary, Damascene says that no thing is bereft of its own proper activity. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 23 (PG 94:950).) But to understand the truth is the intellect’s proper activity. Therefore, it can have knowledge of truth absent all superadded grace.

Furthermore, the intellect is not less powerful in understanding than the senses are in sensing. But the senses can sense sensible objects without grace. Therefore, the intellect, too, can understand intelligible objects without grace.

I answer that, of truths, some are proportionate to natural reason and some exceed natural reason. Those which cannot be concluded from first principles that are known through themselves exceed natural reason. For since first principles are like instruments of the agent intellect, as the Commentator says on On the Soul 3, (Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, comm. 5, 12, 20, 36.) they must be proportionate to its power as bodily organs are proportionate to motive power. Hence what cannot be concluded from first principles exceeds the natural light of the intellect. But matters of faith are such as this, as are future contingents, and other such things. Thus, knowledge of these things cannot be had without the light of a grace freely given, such as the light of faith or of prophecy and so forth.

But if we are speaking of truths that are proportionate to natural reason, then we should know that there are two opinions concerning this. For some say, as was said above, (In II Sent., d. 17, q. 2, a. 1.) that the agent intellect is one for all, saying that the agent intellect is God. Since the agent intellect is related to intelligible objects as what is bright to visible objects, they are of the opinion that just as nothing visible can be seen except by the sending forth of a bodily ray, so also nothing intelligible can be understood without the new sending forth of a spiritual ray, which is a grace freely given. But this position is not fitting, as was said above. (In II Sent., d. 17, q. 2, a. 1.) For the agent intellect is not a separated substance, whether God, as some theologians say, or an intellective one, as several of the philosophers say, as was said above. Rather, it is instead a natural power of the rational soul itself. Nor is it necessary, if we suppose this position, for there always to be a new infusion of grace in the knowing of each and every truth, since the infusion and emanation of spiritual gifts is not successive after the manner of motion, but is fixed and abiding. Hence on the basis of a single spiritual irradiation the potential intellect would be perfected for the knowledge of everything proportionate to it.

But others are of the opinion that the agent intellect is a power of the rational soul. And while we maintain this opinion, we cannot reasonably posit that another light must be super-infused for the knowledge of a truth such as that about which we are now speaking. For receiving the intelligible species and rendering the species actually intelligible suffices to know a given truth. Both happen through the natural power of the rational soul itself, unless, perhaps, we say that the agent intellect is insufficient for this, and in this case human nature would be more imperfect than others, since it would not be sufficient for its own natural activities. Thus, we must say that these truths can be known through the natural light of the agent intellect without any superadded light of grace

Reply Obj. 1: Just as God works in nature and upholds the power of nature, so also he works in the intellect and upholds the power of the intellect. Hence just as there is no natural work except in God as in what upholds it, whether it be walking or any other such thing, so also there is only knowledge of the truth in the Holy Spirit, who works in the intellect and preserves it.

Reply Obj. 2: As a Gloss on that passage explains, (Glossa ordinaria, at Romans 1:19–20, 6.24–25 (PL 114:472).) God is said to have revealed to them because he gave them natural reason and made created things, in which the Creator’s majesty was able to be known, and not through a light of grace superadded to natural light.

Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says in On Christian Doctrine 1, (Augustine, De doctrina christiana, bk. 1, prologue, sect. 3 (CCSL 32; PL 34:16).) one who teaches is like someone who moves a finger to point something out. Hence just as a man can move his finger externally to point out something, but cannot confer the power of sight through which the one who is taught adverts to the visible teaching, so also a man can externally pronounce words that are signs of the truth, but cannot furnish the power of understanding the truth, which is from God alone. Therefore, God alone is said to teach in that he upholds and causes the power of understanding in us, not that he super-infuses a new light of grace every time we know the truth. Now, we addressed the different ways in which God, angels, and man are said to teach above. (In II Sent., d. 9, q. 1, a. 2.)

Reply Obj. 4: The very light of the agent intellect is a kind of irradiation of the first light, according to what Dionysius says, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4 (PG 3:694).) that all the participated goodnesses in created things are rays of the divine goodness. Thus, no other light need be superadded to this irradiation in matters that are subject to natural reason.

Reply Obj. 5: God himself is the cause of whatever knowledge we have. But this need not occur through the influx of a grace. Rather, it can occur through the influx of natural light, this light being from him.

Exposition of the text

‘That they believe man to be able to fulfill all divine mandates without grace.’ (Sent. II, 28.1(181).2, quoting Augustine, De haeresibus, ch. 88 (CCSL 46; PL 42:47).) They took this in the sense that they can be fulfilled simply, as being efficacious for meriting eternal life.

‘And God only helps us through his law and doctrine so that we may know the things which we must do and for which we must hope.’ (Sent. II, 28.1(181).2, quoting Augustine, De haeresibus, ch. 88 (CCSL 46; PL 42:47).) From this it is clear that Pelagius posited that we cannot have knowledge of what is in the law or what pertains to faith through the natural power of reason. And in this he was of the right opinion.

‘It is not possible for mortals to live righteously.’ (Sent. II, 28.2(182).2, quoting Augustine, Retractions, bk. 1, ch. 9 (CCSL 57; PL 32:595).) We should understand the righteousness that is necessary for meritorious work. Yet it does not follow, if man is not capable of this without grace, that he cannot avoid a future transgression, as Pelagius seemed to argue, wishing to draw the one as a conclusion from the other.

For he said it against the Manichees. (Sent. II, 28.3(183).1.) It seems that this response counts for nothing. For Augustine’s statement, even if opposed to their position, can nevertheless confirm the position that Pelagius seemed to promote, and it even seems that it is opposed to it for the same reason.

But it should be said that this does not follow. For the opinion of Manichaeus was that the will was determined to do one single thing. If this were the case, the accounts of fault, praise, and rebuke would be taken away from it, as it is from other things that act by a necessity of nature. But what the Catholic faith asserts, that man cannot free himself from the sin that he incurs either through his own proper act or through his vitiated origin, this is not from the determination of the will to a single thing, but from its insufficiency for acquiring by itself that without which it cannot be freed from sin and cannot fulfill God’s commandments perfectly, that is to say, grace. Hence this text of Augustine is not opposed to both in the same way.

‘It is indeed in man’s power to change his will for the better.’ (Sent. II, 28.3(183).2, quoting Augustine, Retractions, bk. 1, ch. 22 (CCSL 57; PL 32:619).) It should be known that we can understand changing one’s will for the better in two ways: either with reference to political goodness, and in this way, through the natural power that he received from God, man can change his will for the better, as when it says in the Categories (Aristotle, Categories 10, 13a24‒31.) that a perverse person led to better exercises and teachings will make progress in becoming better; or else with reference to gratuitous good, namely, that man acquire a grace that he did not have before, and this he cannot do by natural power, but instead by the power of grace, through which he merits the increase and consummation of grace.