D. 30 - Original sin

Division of the text

After he has addressed the fall of human nature as regards the sin of our first parents, in this part he begins to address how human nature has been damaged in their offspring. This is divided into two parts.

In the first, he addresses the sin that has passed from our first parents into their offspring through fleshly origin, namely, original sin.

In the second he addresses the sin that has passed into their offspring by imitation of the work, namely, actual sin, at after what has been said above, some things are to be considered by diligent investigation regarding actual sin. (Sent. II, 34.1(226).1.)

The first part is divided into two parts.

In the first, he addresses original sin, showing whether it exists and what it is.

In the second, he addresses some of its conditions, at now it remains to investigate how that sin is passed from fathers to children. (Sent. II, 31.1(206).1.)

The first part is divided into two parts.

In the first, he gives what he considers to be a truthful treatment of original sin.

In the second, he rules out certain objections whereby the passing-down of original sin is impugned, at and so the statement, ‘through the disobedience of one, many were made sinners,’ is to be understood to have been said in this sense: that from Adam’s disobedience . . . proceeded the original sin. (Sent. II, 30.12(202).1, referring to Romans 5:19.)

The first part is divided into two parts.

In the first, he shows that a sin passes from our first parents into their offspring.

In the second, he inquires what it is, at here it is first to be seen what that sin was. (Sent. II, 30.2(192).2.)

This is divided into two parts.

In the first, he inquires whether or not it is an actual sin that the Apostle says has entered into the world through one man, showing that it is original sin, not an actual sin.

In the second, he again inquires what this original sin is, at and it is to be diligently investigated what it is. (Sent. II, 30.6(196).1.)

Concerning the first, he does three things.

First, he raises a question.

Second, he rules out the false opinion of some who explain it as actual sin only, at it has pleased some to understand that text to refer to the actual sin of Adam. (Sent. II, 30.3(193).1.)

Third, he shows that it should be understood to refer to original sin, at the original sin is that which through Adam passed into all. (Sent. II, 30.5(195).1.)

And it is to be diligently investigated what it is. (Sent. II, 30.6(196).1.) Here he inquires about what original sin is. This is divided into two parts.

In the first, he inquires about what it is in the genus of moral character.

In the second, he inquires about what it is in the genus of nature, at now it remains to see what is original sin itself. (Sent. II, 30.8(198).1.)

Concerning the first, he does two things.

First, he lays out the opinion of some who said that original sin is only guilt, not fault.

Second, he shows that original sin is a fault, at but that original sin is a fault is taught by several testimonies of the Saints. (Sent. II, 30.7(197).1.)

And so the statement, ‘through the disobedience of one, many were made sinners,’ is to be understood to have been said in this sense: that from Adam’s disobedience . . . proceeded the original sin. (Sent. II, 30.12(202).1.) Here he rules out the objections impugning original sin. This is divided into two parts.

In the first, he rules out objections that directly impugn original sin.

In the second, he rules out an objection impugning original sin as to its cause, which is the passing-down of flesh, at as to what we said earlier about all men having been in Adam, some literalists make an objection, saying as follows. (Sent. II, 30.14(204).1.)

Concerning the first, he does two things.

First, he rules out the objection of Pelagius proceeding from authority.

Second, he rules out two objections of Julian, who impugned original sin by reasoning.

The first of these begins at Julian the heretic contended . . . In reply, Augustine plainly states that original sin proceeded from Adam’s will. (Sent. II, 30.13(203).1.)

As to what we said earlier about all men having been in Adam, some literalists make an objection, saying as follows. (Sent. II, 30.14(204).1.) Here he rules out the objections of those who impugn original sin on the part of its cause, which is the passing-down of flesh from one man in whom all existed materially.

And concerning this he does three things.

First, he raises the objection.

Second, he lays out a response, at to this it can be answered. (Sent. II, 30.14(204).2.)

Third, he gives a confirmation of the response, at and that nothing extrinsic passes into the nature of the human body is indicated by truth, who says in the Gospel. (Sent. II, 30.15(205).1.)

Here there are two questions.

The first is about original sin. (Q. 1.)

The second is about the passing-down of flesh. (Q. 2.)

Question 1

Original sin

Concerning the first, three questions are asked:

first, whether the deficiencies that we experience, such as the necessity of dying and so forth, have come down to us for the sin of our first parents after the manner whereby punishment follows on fault;

second, whether a deficiency could have come from our first parents down to us that would have the account of fault;

third, supposing that it could, the question is asked what the original fault that is contracted from parents is.

Article 1

Whether the deficiencies we experience are like a punishment for us for the sin of the first man

To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that the deficiencies we experience are not inflicted on us as a punishment for the sin of the first man.

Obj. 1: For as Seneca says: death is man’s nature, not his punishment. (In certain excerpts among his works, which nevertheless are not his, in those which begin “licet cuntorum”: Pseudo-Seneca, De remediis fortuniorum 2.1; Mandonnet continues, quoting from Nicolaï: “but thus truly he himself writes, in a different sense: death is not bad; it is the only equal law for mankind (Epistulae morales ad Lucilium, letter 123, para. 16); and death is the law of nature (Naturales quaestiones, bk. 6, ch. 32, para. 12).”) But among all deficiencies, death is the greatest. Hence the Philosopher calls it even the end of things feared, in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.6, 1115a26.) Therefore, neither should other deficiencies that follow on human nature be called “punishments.”

Obj. 2: Furthermore, whatever is found in things created from the same principles is found in them in accord with a single account, since the unity of a thing depends on the unity of principles. But death, hunger, thirst, and other such things are found in man from the same principles as in other animals, namely, from the struggle of the contrary elements of which the body is composed. Therefore, since in other animals they do not exist under the account of punishment, neither will they exist in man as punishments.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, man did not sin more than the angels. In fact, he sinned less, as was said above. (Above, d. 21, q. 2, a. 2.) But through sin the angels lost nothing of the natural goods conferred on them, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 1 (PG 3:726).) Therefore, neither did man. Therefore, if it pertained to man’s nature that his body would be incorruptible and impassible, this would not have been lost through sin. Therefore, since man did lose this, it seems that it belonged not to nature, but to grace. Therefore, too, the privation of these properties follows on nature not as a punishment, but as a natural deficiency.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, every natural power tends to its object. But the object of the concupiscible power is what is delightful to the senses. Therefore, for the concupiscible power to be moved to this is not a punishment, but man’s nature. The case is likewise for the irascible power and the other powers. But the fact that each power is moved to its own object causes a struggle of the lower powers against the higher. Therefore, it seems that this sort of struggle is natural to man and not his punishment, as is said.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, it is not said to be anyone’s punishment if he does not attain that which exceeds the powers of his own nature; for example, that man cannot fly is not a punishment. But to attain to seeing God in his essence exceeds all the powers of human nature, for otherwise man could come to it by his natural endowments. Therefore, neither should the lack of the vision of God be called “man’s punishment.” Thus, none of the things that are said to be the punishment for the first sin seems to have the account of a punishment.

On the contrary (6), all involuntary suffering is a punishment. But death is the suffering that is most involuntary, to the point that not even old age took from Peter the will not to die, as a Gloss says on the end of John. (Augustine, In Iohannis evangelium tractatus, tract. 122, sect. 5 (CCSL 36; PL 35:1969).) Therefore, death and other such things are punishments.

Furthermore (7), as the Philosopher says in Physics 2 and On the Soul 1, (Aristotle, Physics 2.2, 194b9; On the Soul 2.2, 414a25; 1.2, 404b16–21.) a proper act comes about in its proper matter. Hence a perfection must be proportionate to what is perfectible. But the rational soul, which is the perfection of the human body, is by its nature incorruptible. Therefore, the human body, too, is naturally incorruptible. Therefore, if it is corrupted, this will be through a deficiency of nature, and thus, it will be a punishment.

Furthermore (8), the more powerful is not overcome by the less powerful. For the agent is more noble than the patient, as the Philosopher says in On the Soul 3. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.5, 430a18.) But the human body is more noble than other inanimate bodies. Therefore, since it suffers from them, this will be through the infirmity of its nature. But the infirmity and deficiency of the body that is in man by nature is a punishment. Therefore, the ability to suffer from such bodies is in man as a punishment.

I answer that things that are directed toward the end are arranged according to the need of the end, as is clear from the Physics 2. (Aristotle, Physics 2.3, 194b32‒195a2.) Now, the end to which man is ordered, namely, beatitude, which consists in the vision of God, is beyond the faculty of a created nature. For this is connatural to God alone, as is clear from what things were said in Distinction 23. (Above, q. 1, a. 1.) Hence human nature had to be established in such a way that it would not only have what was due to it from natural principles, but also something beyond this, whereby it might easily arrive at the end. Because he was only able to cling to the last end in love and to arrive at possession of it through his highest part—which is the mind and intellect or reason, in which the image of God is inscribed—in order for this part to tend freely to God, the lower powers were subjected to it so that nothing could happen in them that would hold back the mind and impede it from its journey to God. For equal reason his body was so disposed that no suffering could occur in it to impede the mind’s contemplation.

Because all these things were in man from his order to the end, as has been said, when the disordering from the end through sin took place, all these ceased to be in human nature, and man was left in only those goods that accrue to him from natural principles. Dionysius says this expressly, stating: now man having his proper principle in corruptible generations was deservedly led to the principle’s consequent end, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 3, n. 11 (PG 3:439).) that is, from sin he merited that, since corruption was due to him from the principles from which he was composed, he would be reduced through sin to such an end as would be appropriate to his principles. This is based on what is said: you are dust, and to dust you shall return (Gen 3:19).

Therefore, in accord with this I say that these deficiencies can be compared to human nature in two ways. Either they can be compared to it insofar as it is considered only in its natural principles, and in this case these are undoubtedly not punishments for it, but instead natural deficiencies, just as being from nothing or needing preservation are a kind of natural deficiency consequent upon everything created, and a punishment for none of them. Or else they can be compared to human nature as it was established, and in this case they are undoubtedly punishments for it. For after that which is granted to someone gratuitously is granted to him, he is also said to be punished by its privation.

Reply Obj. 1: Seneca and other philosophers considered human nature in accord with what follows on it from its natural principles. For they were not able to know the state of its first condition, which only faith holds. Thus, they spoke of death only as a natural deficiency, although even a natural deficiency can in a way be called a “punishment.”

Reply Obj. 2: Other animals are not ordered to an end that exceeds their natural faculty. Thus, in them only goods that are due them from natural principles have been created. Hence there is not a similar argument concerning man and the other animals.

Reply Obj. 3: Goods are said to be natural in two ways: first, as considered in themselves, as due to nature from its own proper principles. And in this way, neither man nor the angels lost anything or were lessened in anything of what is natural through their sin, for Dionysius also says (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, sect. 23 (PG 3:726).) that natural gifts remain integral in the angels who sinned. Or else they are considered as ordered to the last end. And in this way, natural goods were lessened in both, though not totally lost, inasmuch as both were made less fit for and more distant from attainment of the end. For this reason, too, in a Gloss on Luke 10, man is said to have been despoiled of gratuitous gifts and wounded in natural ones. (Glossa ordinaria, at Luke 10:30, 5.843 (PL 114:286).)

Reply Obj. 4: Whenever many things come together for the constitution of something, something can befit one of them in itself naturally according to its proper nature, while something else befits it according to the nature of the whole. This is clear in the case of the elements coming into the mixture of a body. Accordingly, I say that the concupiscible power has the natural property of tending to what is delightful sensibly, but insofar as it is the human concupiscible power, it further has the property of tending to its object according to the rule of reason. Thus, for the concupiscible to tend in an unbridled manner to its object is not natural to it as human, but instead against its nature precisely as human. In this regard it can have the account of a punishment, giving greatest consideration to the human nature, insofar as the whole is under the rule of reason, as it was in the first condition.

Reply Obj. 5: Even though human nature by itself cannot attain to the vision of God, it can arrive at it with the help of grace, and it does of itself possess an aptitude for reaching it. Likewise, human nature had a greater aptitude from what was conferred on it gratuitously in its first condition, and the lessening of this aptitude is man’s punishment, if it is considered in relation to his establishment. (“His establishment,” that is, the concrete state in which man was actually created, including gratuitous gifts.) This is the way in which lacking the vision of God is called a “punishment,” not as naming a mere negation, but as naming a kind of privation with a certain liability, as was said above.

And because the other arguments seem to conclude that these deficiencies are a punishment for human nature even considered in its principles, we must reply to them as well.

Reply Sed Contra 6: Of things that are involuntary, only those things have the account of a punishment that can be subject to the will. For the will is not only for what is possible, but also what is impossible. Thus, if what is not subject to the will’s power is involuntary to someone, it does not for that reason have the account of a punishment, as if someone is too short in stature or something of this sort. And this is the way in which death and other such things are involuntary.

Reply Sed Contra 7: There must be a proportion between the soul and the body, as that of potency to act, not as of things that agree in the same nature or property. For if the soul is naturally incorruptible, it is not necessary for the body to be so too.

Reply Sed Contra 8: Even though man’s body is more noble simply than the body of burning fire or cutting iron, inasmuch as it is perfected by a more noble form, nothing prevents these bodies from being more noble in a qualified sense, namely, inasmuch as they have actually what the human body has potentially, such as hotness or something of this sort.

Article 2

Whether a deficiency that comes to us through our origin has the account of a fault

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: below, d. 31, q. 1, a. 1; ST I-II.81.1; SCG IV.50–52; On Evil, q. 4, a. 1; Compendium theologiae, ch. 196; Commentary on Romans, ch. 5, lect. 3.) It seems that no deficiency that comes to us through our origin can have the account of a fault.

Obj. 1: For something blameworthy is worthy of rebuke, if it is evil, from the fact that it is in the power of the one who is blamed for it. For we are only rebuked on the basis of what is in us, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 3. (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, 1109b30–1111b4.) But what is contracted by origin cannot be in the power of the one who contracts it by his origin. Therefore, it is impossible for something contracted by origin to have the account of a fault.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to Augustine, (Augustine, De vera religione, ch. 14 (CSEL 77; PL 34:134).) every sin is voluntary, to the point that if it is not voluntary, it is not a sin. But what is contracted by origin cannot be voluntary because the act of the will does not precede the origin of the one willing. Therefore, it is impossible for something contracted by origin to be a sin or fault.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, no accident can be passed down unless its subject is passed down. But the subject of fault is the rational soul, and since it does not exist from being passed down, as was proved above, (In II Sent., d. 18, q. 2, a. 1.) it seems that neither can something contracted by origin have the account of a fault.

Obj. 4: One might say that sin is passed down through the transmission of seed.

On the contrary, nothing gives to another, or effects in another, what it itself does not have. But seed cannot be the subject of the infection of fault. Therefore, neither can fault come to the soul from it.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the more noble does not suffer from the less noble. But the soul is more noble than the body. Therefore, the body cannot act on the soul by infecting it.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, it is unjust that the fault of a father should redound to the son, and that the son should be punished for the father. But if from the fact that Adam sinned, fault redounded to all by origin, then it would follow that the son is punished for the father’s transgression. Therefore, this does not belong to divine justice.

On the contrary, the Apostle says: we were by nature children of wrath (Eph 2:3). But no one is a child of wrath except through his having fault. Therefore, man contracts fault from his very birth.

Furthermore, as Anselm says, (Anselm, De conceptu virginali et de originali peccato, ch. 2 (PL 158:434).) if man had remained steadfast, the original justice in which he was created would have come down to his children. But as a just man is to just children, a sinful man is to sinful children. Therefore, because he sinned, he also transfused his fault to others by generation.

I answer that concerning this matter two errors are touched on in the text. One is the error of those who denied original sin simply, like the error of Julian and Pelagius. This error does not harmonize with the truth of the faith. For it takes away the necessity of the sacraments and redemption, which are ordained against the servitude of sin in which we are born. The other is the error of those who concede to the extent of granting the name “original sin” while denying the reality, saying that in a child at birth there is no fault but only obligation to punishment. This is manifestly repugnant to the divine justice, namely, that someone not having any fault would be obligated to punishment, since a punishment is only justly due to a fault. Thus, avoiding these errors, we must concede simply that a fault is contracted in children at birth from vitiated parents by way of origin. As to how this is the case, we must now investigate.

Therefore, it should be known that these three things are related by way of being added one over and above another: deficiency, evil, and fault. For “deficiency” implies the simple negation of some good. But “evil” is the name of a privation. Hence the lack of something, even of something that one is not made to have, can be called a “deficiency,” but it can only be called “evil” if it is the deficiency of a good that one is made to have. Hence lack of life in a stone can be called a “deficiency,” but not an “evil,” whereas to man death is both a deficiency and an evil. Now, “fault” adds on top of this the account of voluntariness. For one is blamed from the fact that he falls short in what he could have willed. Hence to the extent that something has the account of a fault, we must find the account of voluntariness in it. But just as there is a good that regards nature and a good that regards the person, so also there is a fault of nature and a fault of the person. Hence for the fault of the person the person’s will is required, as is clear in actual fault, which is committed through the person’s act, whereas for fault of nature, only will in that nature is required.

And so, it should be said that the deficiency of the original justice that was conferred on man at his creation occurs from man’s will. Just as that gift of nature was and would have been propagated to the whole nature if man had remained steadfast in justice, so also the privation of this good is brought into the whole nature like a privation and vice of nature. For the privation and the habit are referred to the same genus. And in every man it has the account of a fault from the fact that through the will of the nature’s principle, that is, of the first man, such a deficiency was introduced.

Reply Obj. 1: Since original sin is not the vice of a person insofar as he is a person, but rather, as it were, incidentally, inasmuch as the person has a nature of such a kind, it need not be in such a person’s power to have or not to have this deficiency. Rather, it suffices that it be in the power of someone who exists in that nature. For from the fact that one having the nature has sinned, the nature has been infected. Consequently, it is infected in all who contract that nature from him. Thus, it can be called a “fault of nature,” since one subsisting in that nature has caused that deficiency for the whole nature through his will.

Reply Obj. 2: And in this way, the reply to the second objection is also clear.

Reply Obj. 3: Original sin is not passed down through the passing-down of its subject, which is the rational soul, but instead through the transmission of seed. For from the fact that the father’s soul was infected through sin, a disordering in the body also follows, once that order that his established nature had previously received has been taken away. And so, too, from that seed is generated a body devoid of such an order. Hence even the soul that is infused into such a body contracts a disordering of fault from the very fact that it becomes the form of a body of this sort, since the perfection must be proportionate to the perfectible, as on account of some corruption of the seed there occur not only deficiencies in the body of the offspring generated from that seed, such as leprosy, gout, or some such infirmity, but also deficiencies in the soul, as is clear in those who from birth are naturally slow of mind.

Reply Obj. 4: Granted that the seed does not actually have the infection of fault in itself, it does have it virtually, as it is also clear that from a leper’s seed a son with leprosy is generated, although leprosy is not actually in the seed itself. For in the seed there is some deficient power, through whose deficiency the deficiency of leprosy occurs in the offspring. Likewise, too, from the very fact that in the seed there is a disposition such as is deprived of impassibility and being ordered to the soul, which the human body had in the first state, it follows that in the offspring, which is susceptible to original sin, original sin comes to be in act.

Reply Obj. 5: The soul is not infected by the body’s infection as if the body were acting on the soul. Rather, the soul is infected by way of a kind of co-limitation of one as regards the other. For the form is received in the matter according to the condition of the matter itself, since everything that is in another is in it after the mode of the receiver. Thus, from the very fact that the body is deprived of that power whereby it was perfectly subjectible to the soul, it also follows that the soul will lack that power whereby it perfectly rules the body subjected to it. This kind of deficiency of original justice is a fault of nature insofar as it is considered as consequent on the will of someone who has that nature, from whom the nature was derived.

Reply Obj. 6: It would be unjust for the son to feel a punishment for the father’s sin if the father’s sin did not also pass into the son such that the son is no longer being punished for the father’s sin, but for his own proper sin, which he contracts by origin.

Article 3

Whether original sin is concupiscence

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: below, in the exposition of the text; d. 31, q. 2, a. 1, ad 3; d. 32, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1, 3, 4; ST I-II.82.3; On Evil, q. 3, a. 7; q. 4, a. 2.) It seems that original sin is not concupiscence, as it says in the text. (Sent. II, 30.8(198).2: original sin is called the incentive to sin, namely concupiscence or the attraction of pleasure, which is called the law of the members, or the weakness of nature, or the tyrant who is in our members, or the law of the flesh.)

Obj. 1: For nothing is the cause of itself. But original sin is the cause of concupiscence, as is clear from the words of the Apostle: but sin, finding opportunity in the commandment, wrought in me all kinds of concupiscence (Rom 7:8). Therefore, original sin is not concupiscence.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, nothing of what is natural can be called a “sin” or an “evil.” But the concupiscible power in man is a natural power. Therefore, it cannot be called “original sin.” But original sin is that through which man is apt for concupiscible desiring. Therefore, the concupiscence whereby we are apt for concupiscible desiring is not original sin, as it says in the text.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as the judgment of reason is disturbed by the motion of the concupiscible part, so it is also by the motion of the irascible part. But original sin consists in the disordering of the soul itself, insofar as what is lower does not obey what is higher. Therefore, not only concupiscence, but for like reason irascibility should be called “original sin.”

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a deficiency contracted by origin does not have the account of a fault, as has been said, (Above: a. 2, resp.) except insofar is it follows on the will of one who has the nature. But many bodily deficiencies follow from that will, such as the necessity of dying and so forth. Therefore, not only concupiscence, but any of these should be called “original sin.”

Obj. 5: Furthermore, among the other things that man lost through sin, he was also deprived of that knowledge in which he was so strong in the first state. But deficiency of knowledge is called “ignorance.” Therefore, ignorance and not only concupiscence should be called “original sin.”

On the contrary, on the passage: let not sin, therefore, reign in your mortal body (Rom 6:12), a Gloss adds: that is, the fomes of sin. Now, the fomes (Fomes is an expression that originally signified the straw used for kindling or anything that is good to start a fire because it catches flame easily; the word became idiomatic for something that inclines one toward sin. See also the exposition of the text below for Aquinas’s explanation of the term.) of sin is concupiscence. Therefore, concupiscence itself seems to be sin.

Furthermore, as actual concupiscence is to actual sin, original concupiscence is to original sin. But actual concupiscence is actual sin itself. Therefore, too, the concupiscence that is contracted by origin is original sin.

I answer that in every sin we find something as the formal element and something as the material element. For if we consider actual sin, the substance of the disordered act is in the sin materially, but the disordering from the end is the formal element in the sin, since it is from this that it especially has the account of evil. Hence it is said that turning toward a changeable good is there as the material element and turning away from the unchangeable good is there as the formal element. This is due to the fact that the perfection of virtue even in an act stemming from the order to the end is the form of the act. Now, just as actual sin consists in the disordering of the act, so also original sin consists in the disordering of the nature. Hence the disordered powers themselves or the disordering of the powers must be like the material element in original sin, and the disordering from the end must be like the formal element in it.

Now, the part that through itself was made to be joined to the end is the will itself, which has the property of imposing the order to the end on all other parts. Thus, the bereavement of the will itself from that rectitude toward the end that it had in the establishment of nature is the formal element in original sin. And this is the privation of original justice. But the powers of the sensible appetite were made such as to receive an ordering to the end from the will inasmuch as they are subject to it. Thus, the removal of the bond whereby they were in a certain way held under the power of upright will is the material element in sin. But from this removal it follows that every power tends inordinately to its own object by desiring it with concupiscence. Thus, the concupiscence whereby we are apt to desire evilly is called “original sin,” as being the material element in original sin. For we think of the material and formal elements in moral acts as we do in artificial things, in which the matter is predicated of the whole, such that it can be said that a dagger is iron. Likewise, that which is material in sin can be predicated of it. And this is the way in which original sin is said to be concupiscence.

Reply Obj. 1: We speak of concupiscence in two ways, namely, the act of desiring with concupiscence and the aptitude to desire with concupiscence, as well as the act caused by the aptitude. Hence it is not unfitting if original sin, which causes actual concupiscence, is said to be habitual concupiscence.

Reply Obj. 2: There is a difference between saying “able” and “apt.” For the fact that someone is able to desire with concupiscence is from the concupiscible power, but that he is apt to desire with concupiscence is from a habit or from something existing after the manner of a habit. For it can happen that even a privation leaves a kind of aptitude, inasmuch as one is deprived of something that could put forth an impediment. Thus, habitual concupiscence is said to be original sin, not the concupiscible power, nor again a habit positively indicating something, but the very aptitude that is left in the lower powers to desire inordinately from the fact that reason’s retention, whereby it was held back so as not to be able to tend in an unbridled manner to its object, is removed.

Reply Obj. 3: “Concupiscence” is said to be the material element in sin not insofar as it takes its name from the concupiscible power as distinguished from the irascible, but insofar as it is taken from the appetite of sensuality, which is divided into both powers, namely, the irascible and the concupiscible.

Reply Obj. 4: As it says in the Physics 2, (Aristotle, Physics 2.6, 197b25.) sin occurs in what is ordered to an end insofar as it falls short of its end. Thus, among the parts of the soul, man’s sin is especially in those in accord with which man is ordered to the end. Because the appetite is what tends to the end, sin especially consists in the appetite. Now, the appetite of reason, which is the will, is ordered to man’s end immediately, whereas the sensible appetites are ordered mediately, namely, inasmuch as they receive the order to the end from the reason’s will. For this reason they are said to be, in a way, able to obey reason, as the Philosopher says at the end of the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.13, 1102b30–1103a4.) Thus, the deficiency of order in the appetite of the will is the formal element that gives completion to original sin, which is the privation of the will’s rectitude that was in it in original justice. However, the deficiency of order in the lower appetite is in sin materially. And this is concupiscence, as has been said. Thus, no other deficiency of nature on the part of reason or on the part of the sensible part is called “original sin,” but only concupiscence as the material element and the privation of original justice as the formal element.

Reply Obj. 5: From this the reply to the fifth objection is clear. For ignorance does not through itself regard the will. Hence, too, that deficiency, like others, retains the account of a punishment, but not of fault. If we find that ignorance is said to be original sin, this should be understood of the ignorance that deprives one of knowledge included in original justice. For no one is just or temperate who is not prudent, as it says in the Ethics 6. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.13, 1144b30.) Taking note of this, Socrates said that all virtue is knowledge and all vice ignorance, as recounted in the same place.

Question 2

The passing down of the flesh

Then the question of the passing down of the flesh from the parents, through which original sin is contracted, is asked. Two questions are asked concerning this:

first, whether food is converted into true human nature;

second, whether the seed is extracted from food.

Article 1

Whether food passes into true human nature

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In IV Sent. d. 44, q. 1, a. 2, resp.; ST I.119.1; Quodl. VIII, q. 3, a. 1.) It seems that food does not pass over into true human nature.

Obj. 1: For anything eaten that is cast out does not pertain to true human nature, which always remains the same. But everything taken by mouth goes to the belly and is cast out into the latrine, as it is said (Matt 15:17). Therefore, the nourishment taken by mouth does not pass over into true human nature.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the truth of each thing is in that which is according to its species. Now, that which comes in the manner of nourishment exists in the manner of matter, as it says in On Generation and Corruption 2. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 2.8, 335a15.) But flesh according to matter does not become flesh according to species, as is clear from On Generation and Corruption. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.5, 321b20, 322a11–12.) Therefore, nourishment does not pass over into true human nature.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, that in which the converting heat is rooted pertains to true human nature; this is the root moisture. But as doctors say, once this kind of moisture is consumed, it is not restored, as is seen among those who suffer from the third species of hectic fever, which is incurable because this moisture is not restored. Therefore, since everything into which food is converted can be restored after its consumption, it seems that nourishment is not changed into what properly pertains to true human nature.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, everything that food is converted into is also broken down through the continuous agency of heat, such that the forward and backward flows would be judged the same. But it cannot be the case that the entirety of what is in the body flows in both directions, as will be proved. Therefore, there must be something remaining in the body that food is not converted into. Now, this especially pertains to true human nature. Therefore, food is not changed into what pertains through itself to true human nature. Proof of the middle premise: if there were nothing permanent and fixed in the human body, then it would be the case that every part of it could vanish with some other substituted in its place. By the same reasoning, what could happen for any part could happen to the whole. Therefore, it could happen that none of the matter that was first in the body of a given man would remain in the end. But the unity of the individual is from the unity of his matter. Therefore, a man would not be numerically the same at the end of life and at the beginning, which is absurd.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, no natural power is weakened by the multiplication of matter suited to it, but only through the admixture of something extraneous. But the restorative power in man is weakened at the end of life, for otherwise a man could grow and live to infinity. Therefore, it occurs through the admixture of something extraneous. But nothing is mixed into the matter in which the restorative power was previously founded except what is produced from food. Therefore, what is produced from food is extraneous to that in which the truth of the nature is founded. And so, the same follows as before.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, nature does each thing in the easiest way possible. But God works in an even more ordered way than does nature. Therefore, since the easier way of increasing something is through the multiplication of matter, rather than through the conversion of something else into what is being increased, it seems that the former mode belongs to divine providence, namely, that the human body grow without the passage of anything external into it, but only by the multiplication of its matter. And so, the same follows as before.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, things of the same species are brought to completion in the same way. But some infants that died will in the resurrection be brought to their full stature, not through a multiplication of food, but through a multiplication of their matter. Therefore, other men, too, will be brought to their full stature in this way. And so, the same follows as before.

On the contrary is that, according to the Philosopher in On Generation and Corruption, (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.5, 322a27.) only what is potentially flesh nourishes flesh. But everything that is in potency to something is changed into it through the action of what is in act. Therefore, food is changed into that flesh which pertains to the truth of nature.

Furthermore, at the beginning what nourishes is unlike the one nourished, but is like at the end, since nothing is nourished and fostered except by its like. But those things are similar that share in the same form. Therefore, since the truth of nature is from the form, it seems that what nourishes is, in the end, brought to the truth of the nature of what was nourished.

I answer that concerning this there are many opinions.

Some held, as seems to be the Master’s opinion in the text, (Sent. II, 30.14(204).3.) that the truth of the newborn consists in that which is separated from the parents. Now, this is completely preserved and grows into a greater quantity in such a way that nothing is added to it such that it might receive a greater quantity. Rather, the whole quantity of the complete man comes about through the multiplication of that matter. This matter alone, they say, is what will rise again at the resurrection, whereas the rest will be left aside as excess. They think, too, that the consumption of food is necessary not for growth, such that the nutritive power might assist the augmentative power, nor again for the restoration of what is depleted, but only to foster natural heat; this is like when one melts gold and lead is mixed with it, such that the gold would not be consumed but only the lead.

But this position seems unreasonable in two ways, namely, on the part of what is increased and on the part of the food that is taken in. For growth can happen only when the matter that first was bound under small dimensions is later brought to larger dimensions. But this can happen in two ways only.

Either it is such that there is only as much matter under the large dimensions as there was under small dimensions, and such a change from small to great necessarily takes place through rarefaction, for dense and rare differ in that in the rare a small amount of matter is under large dimensions, and in the dense much is under small, as is clear from the Physics 4. (Aristotle, Physics 4.9, 217b8.)

Or else this happens in such a way that there is more matter under large dimensions than small ones. Now, this can only occur either because the matter is newly created, or through the matter of another body becoming the matter of this body, with the former body having been changed into the latter. This is also why Augustine says that nothing is more absurd than thinking that there is any body that grows in all directions while the quantity of its nature remains, unless it becomes rarefied. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 10, ch. 26 (CSEL 28.1:331; PL 34:428). This statement is given in the context of critiquing Tertullian’s view of the growth of the human body. A fuller quotation may be helpful to understand the dispute in the next paragraph: quid autem absurdius quam putare massam cuiuspiam metalli ex aliqua parte crescere posse, dum tunditur, nisi decrescat ex altera, vel augeri latitudine, nisi crassitudine minuatur? Aut ullum esse corpus manente naturae suae quantitate, quod undique crescat, nisi rarescat? Quomodo igitur inplebit anima ex illa stilla seminis magnitudinem corporis, quod animat, si et ipsa corpus est, cuius substantia nullo accessu crescat? Quomodo, inquam, inplebit carnem, quam vivificat, nisi tanto rarior fuerit, quanto grandius, quod animauerit?; “What is more absurd than to think that any hunk of metal can grow on one side when hammered without it shrinking on the other, or that it could grow in length without it getting smaller in width? Or than to think that there is any body, while the quantity of its nature remains, that would grow in all directions, unless it becomes rarefied? How, then, will the soul fill out, from that drop of seed, the magnitude of the body that it animates, if it is also the body itself, the substance of which grows without anything coming to it? How, I say, will it fill out the flesh, which it vivifies, except to the degree that it becomes more rarefied to the extent that what it animates is greater?”)

But it is obvious that the growth of the human body does not happen through rarefaction. Again, it is obvious that it does not happen through the addition of matter newly created, since God created the matter of everything at the same time, as the saints say. Therefore, it remains that the growth of the human body takes place through the addition of matter that was under the form of another body, that body having been truly converted into the human body. And this is nourishment.

Nor can Augustine’s statement be explained, as some say, as if Augustine is speaking of the common way in which things grow. For if it referred to this, his proof against Tertullian (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 10, cc. 25–26 (CSEL 28.1:331; PL 34:427–28). As Augustine reports here, Tertullian thought that the growth of the soul had to be different from that of bodies (both in general and from the human body in particular), since unlike bodies, the soul can grow but cannot shrink.)—who held that the soul grows, but in no way shrinks—would avail nothing. But the way in which the human body grows is more the common way than is the way the soul grows; for even according to Tertullian the soul grows along with the body growing.

Nor again can it be said, as they say, that: while the quantity of its nature remains, should be taken with the force of “the body remains in its quantity such that its quantity is not increased, neither through addition nor through multiplication, and grows only through rarefaction.” Therefore, since growth properly belongs to quantity, we cannot understand that a body would grow and its quantity would remain with the same dimensions. Rather, Augustine’s statement: while the quantity of its nature remains, must be understood such that no quantity is being joined to it—either one that is of the same nature, as when gold is joined to gold, or one that receives the same nature in the joining itself, as when food comes to flesh.

Thus, by saying: while the quantity of its nature remains, only the addition of something like in nature is being denied. For if he intended to deny multiplication of its matter, then his proof would avail nothing, since it could be said (That is, by Tertullian’s followers.) with greater probability that if the soul is the body, (As Augustine reports here, Tertullian believed that the body is the soul . . . and that the [human] body is incorporeal; see On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 10, ch. 25 (CSEL 28.1:331; PL 34:427).) it would grow through the sort of multiplication that they posit, which they do say of man’s body, because it is more spiritual than other bodies.

Now, on the part of what is added, the fallacy also appears. Because consuming food will not be so intended by nature through itself, but only incidentally, namely, to counteract something harmful, that is, the natural digestive heat, and if the transmutation of food were not necessary through itself for the human body, then the heat that converts it would be superfluous. And then many superfluous things would be found in the works of nature instituted by God.

Yet, maintaining this position, they discover three ways of asserting it, any of which is easy to refute.

For some say that this sort of multiplication happens miraculously by divine activity, as the loaves of bread in the Gospel were multiplied (John 6:1–14). But this contains an express fallacy, turning a work of nature into a miracle. Besides, in the multiplication of those loaves of bread it is not denied, and in fact may be necessary, that an addition of matter through the conversion of other bodies into the loaves of bread took place by divine power. But the conversion of food into true flesh is something nature can do, since it changes what is in potency into act, although it completes successively what God does all at once. Now, what is possible for nature is entrusted by God to nature’s activity, for he gives perfection to each one insofar as it is capable. Hence there is no need to have recourse to a miracle.

Others say that since in the human body there is a lot of the fifth essence, the human body’s multiplication follows on the fifth essence being multiplied. (The “fifth essence” refers to the matter of the heavenly bodies, usually simply called “aether.” The other four “essences” are the traditional four elements (earth, air, fire, and water). The stars, planets, and the entirety of the space surrounding them was hypothesized to be composed of an incorruptible matter (incorruptible due to the apparent eternity of their motions). See Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.2–3. Some ancient and medieval thinkers had speculated, based on some ambiguous remarks of Aristotle, that this celestial matter enters into the composition of the human body, especially into the reproductive powers.) Hence just as sunlight is multiplied in its very diffusion through the air, so also the human body is multiplied without the addition of anything extrinsic.

But this contrivance contains two fallacies. The first is that a body of the fifth essence does not enter into the composition of the human body except by its power alone, since it is neither capable of mixture nor divisible nor able to be outside its own proper place. The second is that the diffusion of light is not through the multiplication of any matter, since light is not a body. Rather, it is a formal multiplication alone, just as in any alteration and generation the agent multiplies its form in matter.

Others contrive another way. For they say that in and of itself prime matter lacks all quantity and form. Therefore, it stands equal to the reception of all quantities, as it is to the reception of all forms. Thus, no matter how small is the prime matter in any small body, it can receive any quantity no matter how great, to the point that from a grain of millet the whole world could be made. Nor should one wonder at this, since from point-like matter the whole world has been made. For since matter lacks quantity, it is indivisible and bears itself after the manner of a point.

But this latter way falls short in many ways.

First, it falls short because it imagines the indivisibility of matter after the manner of a point such that the world would be made from matter through a kind of quasi-extension, as though a small thing were extended into a large one. But this is not true. For matter is called “indivisible” by the negation of the whole genus of quantity, whereas a point is indivisible as a principle of quantity, having a determinate position. Hence a thing becomes quantified due to matter not through an extension, speaking of prime matter, since extension is only of what has some quantity, but rather through its reception of quantity.

Second, because even if prime matter considered in itself has no quantity, it does not follow that it is in potency with regard to any quantity imaginable. For matter receives determinate quantities and all other accidents according to the requirements of form, by the fact that the underlying matter with the form is the cause of the things that are present in it, as it says in the Physics 1; (Aristotle, Physics 1.9, 192a5–15.) and therefore, prime matter must be in potency to a quantity only if it belongs to a natural form that can be in matter. But prime matter is not in potency to other forms except those that really exist or can be educed through natural principles. For if there were a given passive potency in matter to which no given active potency in reality corresponded, that passive potency would be superfluous, as the Commentator says. (Averroes, Commentary on the Physics, bk. 1, comm. 81.) Thus, prime matter is not more capable of receiving a quantity greater than the quantity of the world, for which reason it says in the Physics 3 that, speaking of nature, it is not possible for magnitude to be increased to infinity. (Aristotle, Physics 3.5, 206a7.)

Third, it falls short because, if the same matter that was first under small dimensions comes to be under larger dimensions, this can only occur through rarefaction, as was said. And this mode does not belong in the growth of the human body, as is clear in itself.

Fourth, it falls short because, when we speak of the matter existing in this thing, we have already left aside consideration of matter absolutely. For whatever of matter there is in this thing cannot be understood except as divided from that part of matter that is in another thing. But division only occurs in matter as considered under at least indeterminate dimensions. For, if quantity is removed, as it says in the Physics 1, (Aristotle, Physics 1.2, 185b17.) substance will be indivisible. Hence the consideration of the matter of this thing is the consideration not of matter absolutely but of matter existing under a dimension. Hence it is not necessary that what applies to matter as absolute and prime should apply to matter existing in this thing taken precisely as it exists in this thing, since by this very fact we withdraw from the consideration of prime matter. Hence the matter existing in this thing is not in potency to the whole quantity of the world, but up to some determinate point, as much as it can attain through rarefaction. And this does not exceed the rarity of fire because there can be no greater rarity, as the Commentator says on the Physics 4. (Averroes, Commentary on the Physics, bk. 4, comm. 84.)

In this way, it is clear that this position contains falsity both in itself as well as in the arguments devised to explain it.

Thus, there is the position of others who concede with the first that there is something in the human body, and likewise in other bodies, that does always remain fixed during the whole lifespan with respect to a determinate part of matter (in which they say the truth of human nature principally consists), but that there is something else that waxes and wanes, that is, comes about and is consumed, and that this is what is generated from food.

Yet they differ from the first in that they say that the consumption of food is necessary not only to kindle natural heat but also for growth in quantity. For it could not be the case that what was first separated from the begetters (which they say is in fact permanent) is extended to a size as great as the size of the human body, unless some matter were added that could receive the whole size together with the preexisting matter without any rarefaction. And this latter, which is permanent, is said to be diffused through the whole, just like what is added and withdrawn after the manner that occurs in the mixture of wine and water. For wine only grows to greater quantity through the addition of water, which is converted into the wine. Yet, this is in such a way that the wine’s power always remains more in that part of the matter that was previously under the form of wine. Accordingly, these thinkers believe that what is generated from food is not altogether foreign to the truth of human nature, as the first said, but that it pertains to it secondarily, insofar as it is necessary for the completion of due quantity. Hence not everything that has been converted from food is laid aside in the resurrection, but only as much as is required for the perfection of quantity to be reserved.

And the commentator Alexander is the first author found who espouses this position, as Averroes says on On Generation. (Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s On Generation and Corruption, bk. 1, comm. 39. The reference is to Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. 200 AD).)

But this does not seem to hold the truth. For since it is of the nature of heat to consume fluid (I speak of fiery heat), the heat of fire, which is the instrument of the vegetative soul, as it says in On the Soul 2, (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.2, 416a10–15.) must consume everything moist in a way that is in and of itself indifferent. Hence we can find no effective reason why a certain designated moisture would remain for the whole life.

Besides, according to this, the consumption of food would not be first and through itself necessary for the restoration of what has been depleted, but only for growth. Yet it is obvious that the work of growth presupposes the work of nourishment, and only that is nourished in which a depletion of what is restored through nourishment has occurred. Hence if there were only consumption of what is principally taken on account of growth, nourishment would only be because of growth.

Besides, it can be conceded that what is converted into flesh through the formative power at the beginning of generation is brought to greater specific perfection than what is later converted through the act of the nutritive power, since the generation of something that is generated through itself is always found to be more perfect than that whereby something receives the species of something else through being mixed with it. For what is mixed in some way alters the nature of what it is mixed with, as is clear in the case of wine, which is generated on the vine, and which grows through the admixture of water to the wine. And so, too, we see that from the addition of nourishing moisture, the body nourished is changed so that it takes on in some respect the conditions of the foods by which it is nourished.

Yet for nourishment or growth to occur, the flesh that was generated from food must be mixed with the preexisting flesh. But whenever there is a mixture of things that differ either with respect to contrary qualities or with respect to purity and impurity of the same quality, when the mixture is complete each does not retain its proper quality. Otherwise it would be an admixture of preserved things and there would only be a composition. Rather, the whole must receive one form at the same time, which is a mean, as is clear in the mixture of wine and water. For after the mixture no designated part remains there which has the complete strength of wine while another portion has it more weakly. Instead, the whole is something that has it to a middling extent.

Hence neither is it possible that, once the act of the nutritive and augmentative power is complete, something that completely participates in the nature of the species remains while something else does so incompletely. Rather, the whole must participate in the nature of the species uniformly.

They assume, too, for the assertion of their opinion, the Philosopher’s distinction (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.5, 321b20.) concerning flesh specifically and materially, and physicians’ distinction about nourishing moisture and radical moisture. But in the response to the arguments it will be clear that neither of these does anything for them.

The third position is that of Averroes on On Generation 1, (Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s On Generation and Corruption, bk. 1, comm. 35.) saying that no matter can be received in a given body that is fixed and permanent. But the whole of whatever is in a body can be considered in two ways: either on the part of the matter, and in this way, it is not permanent, or on the part of the form and species, and in this way, it is permanent. For in On Generation and Corruption 1, (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.5, 322a10–16.) Aristotle is comparing the change of food into flesh to the burning of wood. For we see that if a fire is kindled and wood is continuously added as pieces of wood are consumed, the form of the fire will always remain in the wood, yet any given matter is consumed as other matter takes its place, in which the species of fire will be preserved. Accordingly, what pertains to the species and form of flesh will also always remain, even though whatever receives this form is continuously being consumed and restored.

Now, this position differs from the first two in that it does not posit that any matter can be designated as always remaining, but that any designated part, from the fact that there is matter in it, has a flow both in and out, though in such a way that what belongs to the form always remains. On the other hand, the first opinions held that some given portion of the matter is always permanent, in which primarily and principally the truth of man consists. And they also differ in this respect. For the first opinion held that nourishment is in no way converted into the truth of the nature, whereas the second held that it is converted into what pertains secondarily but not primarily to the truth of human nature. But this third opinion holds that it is converted into what simply and primarily pertains to the truth of human nature. For although what is first converted into flesh has more perfectly assimilated the species of flesh than what is additionally generated from food, when food is added, the admixture occurs at the end of digestion so that the whole uniformly receives the truth of the species without any distinction. Accordingly, it is also clear that in the resurrection as much of what has been additionally generated from nourishment must rise as pertains to the completion of due quantity.

And this is the position that I agree with more among them all, without prejudice to the others.

Reply Obj. 1: From this authority, we cannot surmise that, of what is taken in through the mouth, nothing remains that passes into true flesh. For the statement “everything” designates not the integral whole, but the quantitative whole. Hence it is not necessary for the whole to be cast into the latrine, but for something of any given portion to pass into it. And this is necessary because there must be a separation of the pure from the impure. But no food is consumed in which there must not be some impurity from the fact that at the beginning it is dissimilar. Hence if it has to be reduced to similarity, those parts in which there was dissimilitude must be taken away. For example, if parts of earth predominate more in the food than in that which is nourished, what is of earth must be removed and what is more subtle be taken in. And it is likewise, too, in the case of whatever parts predominate more.

Reply Obj. 2: According to the third opinion, it is not different flesh, materially distinct, that is called “flesh” materially and “flesh” specifically. Rather, the same flesh numerically is called “flesh” specifically inasmuch as it participates in the form and properties that follow on the species, but is called “flesh” materially inasmuch as it consists of matter. And that this is Aristotle’s understanding is clear from the Commentator’s words, who explains it this way and, again, from the Philosopher’s words given in the text. For he says that we can make this distinction, that is specifically and materially, in flesh and bone, as also in anything else that has a form in matter. But it is obvious that such a distinction cannot be made in stone and water, so that a part drawn from those first begetting would be called a part specifically and a part that is added from nourishment be called a part materially. Thus, it is clear that in flesh and bone it should be understood not in this way, but in the aforementioned way. Hence the objection proceeds from a bad understanding of the Philosopher’s words.

Reply Obj. 3: According to physicians, the moisture that is drawn from those first begetting need not be called “radical” because it always remains distinct according to matter and property from the moisture generated from food. But because natural heat existed previously in this moisture, and what is mixed in only participates in species by virtue of the moisture with which it is mixed, it is the root of the whole of what is later converted from food. This is not in such a way that both moistures remain after the end of the last stage of digestion. Rather, the whole mixture retains a single property, and both matters, namely, the matter that was previously under the first moisture, and the matter added to it that was previously under the second, are equally related to what passes into and what participates in the power of the species. Nor do we say that the radical moisture is consumed because of the departure of this matter, but instead because the property that the whole mixture had from the power of the first moisture does not remain. For then there can be no restoration because the power of the species does not remain, just as if the whole hand is amputated it is not restored through nourishment, since the power of the species determined for this organ does not remain. For this reason, too, certain members are said to be composed of radical moisture, not that no nourishment passes into the substance of these members, since every member of the body grows proportionately, but because it is in these members that the power of the species, which is from the radical moisture, principally consists, and there cannot be any separation of these without the power of the species in a certain part being taking away. This is also why, when such members are cut off, they are not healed.

Reply Obj. 4: Since what is added as additionally generated from nourishment is mixed with what was previously there, and there is likewise a single thing made out of both, depletion always occurs in both proportionately. Hence it is also necessary that something of both remain proportionately. Thus, it is never the case that the whole of what was previously there goes away such that nothing of the previous matter remains. Instead, something always remains, and what is added is made one with what was previously there. Thus, there is one matter and one individual throughout the whole life, as is clear also in a fire that is nourished with pieces of wood. For it always remains numerically one fire, even though as certain pieces of wood are put into it others are being consumed. For what is added always becomes one with what was previously there. And the case would be even more similar if there were a mixture throughout the whole as there is in nourishment. But it would be otherwise if from the matter that is added fire or flesh were generated as separate. For in this case there would also be numeric differentiation because of the thorough differentiation of the matter.

Reply Obj. 5: What is additionally generated from nourishment does not obtain the nature of the species as perfectly as what was first converted into flesh or bone through the formative power. This is because the first generation was of flesh as such, while the second is of flesh in another through a sort of commingling. This is also because the more the soul’s power is diffused and spread, the weaker it is rendered, as is clear in the heart, which is less hot the larger it is. Hence animals having a large heart are naturally timid, as the Philosopher says in On the Parts of Animals 13. (Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals 3.4, 667a15.) Thus, it is in a way extrinsic and, for this reason, when mixed with what was previously there, is the cause of the weakening of the strength, as when water is mixed into wine, which is the example the Philosopher gives in On Generation and Corruption 1. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.5, 322a31–34.) Thus, diminution and corruption must follow in the end.

Reply Obj. 6: This manner, namely, through the multiplication of matter, is not possible, at least for nature, which, since it does not act with respect to its entirety, but with respect to form alone, only multiplies form and not matter. And for this reason, to preserve the work of nature, there had to be that manner in growth that belonged to the power of nature.

Reply Obj. 7: Everything of the same species obtains its perfection by natural activity in one way. But if one person obtains it naturally and another through a miracle, it will not be the same way, as seen in the case of a person born blind who is given sight through a miracle, who has sight in a different way from one who is born seeing. So, too, those who die as children arrive at their due size through a miracle. Yet there is no need for this miracle to occur through the multiplication of matter, but through the addition of external matter. But those who live to a perfect age arrive at perfect quantity by natural activity. Hence it is not necessary for there to be the same way in both cases, and even if it were the same, it would not follow that this would be through the multiplication of matter.

Article 2

Whether seed is extracted from what is generated from food

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.119.2.) It seems that seed is not extracted from what has been additionally generated from food.

Obj. 1: For Augustine says (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 10, ch. 20 (CSEL 28.1:323; PL 34:424).) that we were all in Adam according to bodily substance and even according to seedlike principle, except for Christ, who was in him only according to bodily substance. But our bodily substance only comes from our parents by means of seed. Therefore, the seed that is transmitted from one’s first parent is not extracted from what was converted from food, but from what he himself had received from his own parent, such that in this way, the bodily substance of our body is found to be extracted from our first parent.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to Damascene, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 8 (PG 94:811, 814).) generation is a work of nature, producing what is generated from the substance of the begetter. But the excess of one’s nourishment does not belong to the begetter’s substance. Therefore, if generation took place in men from this alone, it would not be true generation.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, one’s weakening does not follow from the subtraction of any excess, but rather his relief. But the begetter is weakened by the emission of seed. Therefore, seed is extracted not from an excess of nourishment, but from the root moisture itself.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a son becomes like to his father more than to another man because he is generated from the seed transmitted by him. But sometimes a son is likened not only to his father, but also to his grandfather or great-grandfather, even going back many generations, as the Philosopher says in On the Generation of Animals 15. (Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals 1.18, 722a9, and 4.3, 767a4.) Therefore, the seed must come not only from the father, but also from the grandfather and great-grandfather. But the moisture of nourishment was only ever in the father. Therefore, seed is not extracted from this moisture, but rather from the root moisture that the father drew from the grandfather, and the grandfather from the great-grandfather.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, what pertains to the substance of a given thing is closer to it than what is from a foreign substance. But what is converted from food did not at root pertain to the substance of the one who generated, but pertained, rather, to the root substance of some animal, whose flesh was eaten, such as a cow or a pig. Therefore, there will be a greater affinity and likeness to the cow or pig than to one’s father. But this is unfitting. Therefore, seed is not extracted from the moisture of nourishment.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, suppose someone were to feed only on human flesh, and let us also suppose (to make the question more serious), that of the embryos he generated, there was one also nourished in the same way. On this basis, I argue as follows. The root moisture of any man is that which he has drawn from his parents. Therefore, if the seed from which this offspring is conceived is from the moisture of nourishment, his root moisture must be from the substance of the others whose flesh was eaten. Therefore, if, according to Augustine, (Augustine, The City of God, bk. 22, ch. 20 (CCSL 48; PL 41:782).) flesh eaten by someone will rise again in the one in whom it first existed, then the whole root moisture will rise again in those whose flesh was eaten by his father. Likewise, the moisture of nourishment is from the flesh of those whom he himself eats. Therefore, nothing of this person will rise again. In this case there would not be a resurrection of all, which is contrary to our faith. Therefore, it is impossible for the seed to be extracted from the moisture of nourishment. Thus, it does not seem to be excess of one’s nourishment.

On the contrary, the Philosopher shows the contrary of this in On the Generation of Animals 15, (Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals 1.18, 724a15–726a25, 726a26; 4.3, 769a1–b3.) with two arguments and three indications.

The first argument is by the following process of elimination. Whatever is in an animal’s body is in it either naturally or else occasionally, that is, incidentally. But seed is not in it occasionally, like the pus and secretions of wounds. For what is incidental does not follow on the whole species, just as seed is found in all. Therefore, seed is there naturally. But everything that is in a body naturally is either part of it, like flesh and sinew, or else is excess, like milk, urine, and so forth. But seed is not a part, since it is neither an organic part, since seed is uniform in the whole and in the part, which does not befit organic parts, nor again is it a homologous part, since it does not enter into the constitution of a member, as the homologous parts enter into the constitution of organic members. Therefore, it remains that it is from excess nourishment.

The second argument is that if seed is not an excess, it must be extracted from the members. But everything separated out or extracted from an animal is corrupted and loses its nature. Therefore, seed would lose the nature of the members from which it was extracted, as well as the power. Thus, something like the members could not be generated from the power of the seed. For the form of the generated must be in what generates, at least virtually.

Again, he puts forth three indications to this effect in the same place.

One of these is that nothing extracted from the body has a determinate place in the body, but instead travels throughout the body. But seed does have a determinate place in the body, as do other excesses, namely, the seminal passages, which are nearly in the same part of the body in which the other excesses are located.

The second indication is that nature is relieved through the emission of the excess, but never through the extraction of what belongs to the substance of a member. But nature is sometimes relieved through the emission of seed. Therefore, seed is not something extracted from the members but is an excess.

The third indication is that where we find less excess nourishment, we find less seed. For this reason there is not seed in boys because the excess nourishment is converted into growth. For this reason, too, fat people have little seed and low generation because the excess of the food is converted into fat. For this reason, too, larger animals have less seed in proportion to their body and low generation because they need much nourishment. Thus, very little in them can be excess, as is clear in the elephant. But if seed were extracted, the contrary would have to be the case because from a larger body larger extraction is possible. Therefore, seed is not something extracted, but is the excess of nourishment.

I answer that concerning this there are three opinions.

One opinion is that seed is a certain part extracted from what is of the substance of a member, such that the whole substance of the seed is from the radical moisture, of which they say that the substance of the members is first of all and principally composed, which is drawn from the substance of the begetter. Because nothing is added in the generated over and above the substance of the seed that it may be something pertaining to the truth of the same nature, according to them, only that which pertains to the truth of the nature in the child was something pertaining to the truth of the father’s nature in him. And so, tracing the matter back, it follows that whatever pertains to the truth of nature in all men was all actually in Adam.

Now, this position was posited by certain philosophers in ancient times, and even by some theologians, as is clear from the Master in the text, (Sent. II, 30.14(204).1.) though they are inclined to it for different reasons.

Some of the ancient philosophers, Anaxagoras (See Aristotle, Physics 1.4, 187a27–b6.) in particular, posited that the generation of someone only takes place through the gathering together of like parts that were previously in the one from whom the generation comes about, such that nothing passes into the nature of flesh that was not previously flesh. Hence for flesh and bone to be generated in the offspring, something from the father’s flesh and bones would have to be extracted, and so forth for the other parts and members.

Some, too, who attributed the whole power of acting to the matter, which they said is the only nature of things, (Aristotle, Physics 2.1, 193a10–12.) were unable to discover a cause of the likening of son to father in individual members unless something should be extracted materially from the individual members constituting the child’s body.

But the roots of these reasons have been sufficiently disproved by subsequent philosophers, namely, that generation is not only from extraction and consolidation, but also through matter’s being transmuted from form to form, such that what did not previously possess the nature of flesh afterwards becomes flesh. Likewise, too, the active power is not on the part of the matter, but rather on the part of the formal principle. Hence the cause of the likening of son to father is not agreement in matter so that a member has to be made of the matter that is extracted from the father’s members, since there is also a likeness of son to father in those things from which seed is in no way extracted, such as nails and hair. Rather, the cause of likeness is the formative power, which is left in the seed from the activity of the same father’s formal power acting on the seed.

But the Master and other theologians who posit this are led to this position because of the passing-down of original sin. They fall, as it were, into a similar error with the former, so that there cannot be a passing-down of original sin to the children by the parents except insofar as the matter of the children’s body itself was in our first parents themselves when they sinned, so that in this way, the assimilation in the corruption of sin is with reference to agreement in matter and not according to the account of an active power.

Augustine expressly asserts the contrary of this, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 10, ch. 20 (CSEL 28.1:323; PL 34:423).) saying that original sin is not in us because we have been propagated from Adam with respect to bodily substance, since in this way, original sin would also have been in Christ, but instead because we are descended from them in a concupiscible way in seedlike principle.

Hence it is clear that the reasons why this opinion is asserted have a false foundation.

This same position is false in itself. For there are only three ways in which the substance of the human body that was in our first parents can be spread to so many: through the multiplication of the matter, as some say; through division, since a continuum is divisible to infinity, as others posit; or also through mixing, according to others, as wine is increased through the admixture of water.

But the multiplication of matter in such a way that no super-addition takes place, as is their opinion, can only be through rarefaction, as was proved in the preceding article. Hence it would follow that the son would have a more rarefied body than the father, and that eventually generation would come to a natural end because there cannot be rarefaction to infinity, except metaphorically speaking, as the Commentator says on the Physics 4. (Averroes, Commentary on the Physics, bk. 4, comm. 77, 79.)

The same, too, would follow if the matter that was in Adam’s body were distributed to so many by being divided. For a natural body is not divisible to infinity, but only a mathematical body, as we have it from both the Commentator’s and the Philosopher’s words in the Physics 3. (Averroes, Commentary on the Physics, bk. 3, comm. 60; Aristotle, Physics 3.6, 206b13–26.) Hence generation would necessarily have to fail. And a “mathematical body” is what we call a bodily object considered only with reference to its quantitative dimensions, and this is a bodily object in the genus of quantity. This is what can be divided to infinity because there is nothing in the account of continuous quantity opposed to being divided. A “natural body,” on the other hand, is what we call a bodily object considered with reference to a determinate species and power, and this cannot be divided to infinity because every species requires a determinate maximum and minimum quantity. For as it says in On the Soul 2, (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.4, 416a16–17.) everything constant has a naturally established limit and proportion for size and growth. Thus, we can find a least amount of water and a least amount of flesh, as it says in the Physics 1, (Aristotle, Physics 1.4, 187b36–188a1.) such that, if they were divided, there would no longer be water and flesh. It is obvious, too, that the human body is a natural body. Hence it cannot be divided to infinity to allow for generation to last to infinity.

Furthermore, even granting that a natural body could be divided to infinity like a mathematical one, this could not occur with the same quantity but instead with the same proportion. For in the case of any finite body, if a part were removed from it, no matter how small that part is, then when taken repeatedly it reaches the measure of the whole and even exceeds it. Hence when this kind of part is taken through division, the whole bodily object eventually has to be used up. However, if something is taken from a size always keeping the same proportion (for example, first cutting off a third of the whole size, and then a third not from the whole size, but from what is left, and so forth) the dividing to infinity will never cease. But then what is taken in the second cutting must be less in quantity than what was taken away in the first. For the first piece subtracted was a third of the whole, whereas the second is a third of part of it, and so forth. Hence if this is the way the extraction of the radical moisture—from which the seed is extracted in their opinion—takes place, there must be less radical moisture that pertained to true nature in the seed from which the son is generated than in the seed from which the father was generated. Thus, the son’s seed will not be able to generate offspring in as great a quantity as the father’s seed was able, since every natural power is divided when the subject is divided, so that in less size there is less power. Thus, it would follow that the son would always have less quantity than the father. Hence human beings would already have reached the minimum quantity, even if the first human beings had been enormous. It would also follow that children would always be weaker than their parents, since the less one has of what pertains to the truth of his own nature, the weaker he is.

Likewise, too, it is not possible for human nature to experience such growth through this kind of mixing. For when something small is mixed with something very large, it does not create a mixture, as it says in On Generation and Corruption 1. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.5, 321a35–b2; 322a9–10.) Rather, the form of the small dissolves by being added to the large, as when a drop of wine is added to a thousand amphorae of water. Hence nothing pertaining to the truth of human nature would have remained in us any longer, but rather the whole of what pertained to true human nature would have vanished through mixing in a very large amount of something extraneous.

There is another opinion that asserts that the seed is not only from the radical moisture extracted from the parents, but from this together with the nourishing moisture that was in the excess of the food in the father, and that the entirety of this will be the radical moisture in the son, and will be something pertaining to the truth of human nature in him in the first way. In this way, something pertaining to true human nature in us also pertained to the truth of human nature in our father and in our father’s father, and so forth all the way back to Adam. In this manner, they assert that we were all in Adam with reference to bodily matter.

But although this opinion avoids some of the unfitting conclusions that follow on the first one, it cannot avoid them all. First, this is because the Philosopher’s reasonings and noted indications evidently show that seed is in no way something separated out from the members. Hence the same arguments disprove the opinion positing that the entirety of the seed is something separated out or that part of it is. Second, this is because in this way, as they posit it, there would be growth of the truth of human nature through admixture. And so, the unfitting conclusions that follow on the two ways of speaking given above would follow. For there would then be less truth of human nature in the son than in the father. This is clear if water is mixed with a certain amount of wine and then water is again mixed with part separated from the mixed wine to arrive at the same quantity, and so forth. For it is obvious that there will always be less wine remaining in the second case than in the first, and so in the end the wine will be reduced to nothing. Hence it is clear that it would also follow on this position that generation would naturally come to an end and that in us the truth of human nature and the infection of sin, as it were, would already have vanished.

The third opinion is the Philosopher’s, (Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals 1.18, 726a26.) that is, that seed is only from the excess of the nourishment. For he is of the view that seed is not something separated out from the whole, but instead that which has the nature in such a way as to agree with the whole. This can occur as follows. Since every agent assimilates the patient to it as much as it can, food must be assimilated to the nature of the body, which is perfected by the soul, through the power of the soul acting on the food. And the more it is processed, the more it will share in the soul’s power. Therefore, when it comes to the final stage of processing, before it is converted into the members, it has, as it were, obtained perfect likeness to the whole virtually, even if not actually. And thus, there is in it the power whereby the whole body can be formed. Therefore, when, to nourish the members, the nutritive part takes what is needed for nourishment or growth from the nourishment so assimilated, the nutritive part supplies the rest, which is called the “excess of the final stage of processing,” to the generative power, and from this is the substance of the seed, so that in this way, the seed is both an excess, inasmuch as it is left over from the work of the nutritive part, and yet something necessary inasmuch as the generative power needs it. Hence the Philosopher says in On the Generation of Animals 15 (Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals 1.18, 726a26.) that seed is an excess that is needed. Thus, the seed supplied and prepared by the generative power has the nature such that from it the whole is generated with the admixture of what is supplied from the mother, whatever that may be. And this is the opinion I agree with, which seems more reasonable than the others.

Reply Obj. 1: We can understand Christ as being in Adam with respect to bodily substance in two ways: either such that his body was in Adam as a certain bodily substance, and in this way, it is impossible, nor is this how Augustine understands it; or else such that his bodily substance was in Adam in some way, and this is true. For the proper matter from which his human body was formed was in Adam virtually as in its efficient principle by way of origin. Hence in this regard it is clear how there is a difference between being in Adam according to bodily substance alone and being in Adam according to a seedlike principle. For two things have to come together to constitute a human body: the matter from which the body is formed, which is called the “bodily substance,” and the formative power, which is called the “seedlike principle.” Both originated from Adam. Thus, those who are generated by the intercourse of a man and a woman are said to have been in Adam by way of origin in seedlike principle and in bodily substance. But Christ, whose body was formed by the power of the Holy Spirit from the matter supplied by the Virgin, is said to have been in Adam in bodily substance only.

Reply Obj. 2: If Damascene’s statement is understood generally of all generation, then what is generated need not be of the substance of the begetter materially, but only formally, not with respect to one form numerically, but with respect to one form specifically. But if it is understood specifically of the generation of living things, in this case what is generated is of the begetter’s substance, since it was from the extraction of something agreeable enough to pass into the begetter’s substance. For blood is in a way said to be of the substance of the begetter, and so much the more is seed, which is processed to the greatest extent.

Reply Obj. 3: If only the seed that remains from the work of the nutritive and augmentative powers were emitted through intercourse, weakening would never follow. But from immoderate intercourse sometimes even what was necessary for the nourishment of the members is emitted, to the point that due to lack of moderation in intercourse, someone emits blood in place of seed, as it says in On the Generation of Animals 15. (Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals 1.19, 726b5–10.) Thus, weakness of nature must follow. No wonder, since even from excess defecation or urine the body is weakened just as it is relieved when these are moderate.

Reply Obj. 4: The assimilation is not because of an agreement in the matter, but because of the motion of the active power whereby it moves unto its own likeness. Because the father’s motion in the seed is sometimes corrupted, the son is born like the grandfather and great-grandfather, whose motion remains, as the Philosopher shows in On the Generation of Animals 18, (Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals 4.3, 768a12–18.) not because the matter of the offspring’s body is passed down from the grandfather and great-grandfather.

Reply Obj. 5: In this way, the reply to the fifth objection is clear, which likewise proceeded based on the notion that the cause of family resemblance is more on the side of the matter than from the active power. The Philosopher shows the contrary in the Metaphysics 5, saying: a human being is more like his father than his mother, since he receives form from his father and matter from his mother. (Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals 2.1, 731b13; 2.4, 738b26; 4.3, 767b1–768b15; Metaphysics 5.2, 1013a30.)

Reply Obj. 6: There are different moistures in a human being’s body and in an embryo’s body that more or less approach perfect participation in the species, such as blood, and also the moisture into which the blood is converted when further processed, and also flesh and bone. Therefore, it should be known that each will rise in the one in whom it perfectly shared in the nature of the species, and if it perfectly shared in the nature of the species in both, then it will rise in the one in whom it first existed. Therefore, following this, it should be said that any portions of flesh the father of the boy ate that had already been assimilated to the members by the full conversion process will rise in the one whose flesh was eaten. But what pertained to the moistures and humors among those pieces of flesh and was not yet at the point of complete assimilation will rise in the boy who is generated from that seed. And in both cases, what is lacking will be supplied by the divine power. But this really belongs more in our treatment of the resurrection.

Exposition of the text

Some heretics wrongly reached this conclusion. (Sent. II, 30.4(194).2.) Pelagius was cited to this effect due to the fact that he made too much of the power of free decision so that there could be no sin in a man without its coming from his free decision, and that man needed no grace in order to be immune from sin.

Original sin is called the incentive to sin. (Sent. II, 30.8(198).2.) Here eight names for original sin are put forward, whose difference we take as follows. This sin can be named either by comparison to the way in which it is caused in us, or by comparison to the subject in which it exists, or by comparison to the actual sin to which it inclines, and because it comes to us through an origin infected with vice. Thus, when we name it after the manner whereby it is caused in us, we call it “original sin.”

Now, two things are considered in actual sin: the defect or deformity of sin, and on this basis it is called the “fomes of sin,” as if fomenting or inciting one to sin, just as fire is fomented by the dryness of wood; and, again, the pleasure that consists in turning to a changeable good, and in this way, it is called “concupiscence,” as regards the disorder that actually exists among the parts of the soul with the restraint of original justice taken away, or in an order to the act of concupiscence, to which original sin inclines, and in this way, it is called “concupiscibility.”

Next, the subject in which original sin consists is man, who is constituted by two natures: rational and sensitive. Therefore, original sin can be named either by comparison to the rational or by comparison to the sensitive. If comparison is made in the first way, then from the perspective of the formal element in original sin, namely, the lack of due justice, it is called the “languor of nature.” From the perspective of the material element, namely, the disordering of the lower powers, it is called a “tyrant,” inasmuch as through the disordering of the lower powers, reason is unjustly and in a certain way tyrannically taken into slavery to sin. Therefore, from the side of the sensitive nature, which is a power attached to organs, it is called the “law of the flesh,” from the fact that it is passed down through the passing-down of flesh, and it is called the “law of the members,” inasmuch as it reigns in adult members and in a certain way inclines to act with respect to their condition, that is, in such a way that man is inclined to what is pleasurable by the members because it agrees with them.

They were in him materially. (Sent. II, 30.10(200).2.) This is not in such a way that what was the matter of Adam’s body is later the matter of all men. Rather, it is because the matter of all man was passed down from Adam by way of origin as from the first efficient principle in human nature. For the matter of the human body is menses, or, as some would have it, seed together with menses. Now, what seed and menses causes in us is only through natural power that comes down to us from our parents. Thus, all the matter of the human body has an origin from Adam, not as if it were extracted from him, but as from a power set up in advance that has come down from him.

This may also be shown by reason. (Sent. II, 30.15(205).1.) This reasoning is not valid, since its procedure is to make affirmations from the greater to the lesser. For it seems, rather, that in the resurrection, which will be wholly miraculous, something occurs by divine power either through multiplication or some way other than the natural growth that is completed by the action of nature.

And yet we do not deny that foods and liquids cross over into flesh and blood. (Sent. II, 30.15(205).2.) What the Master states here seems unfitting because either the flesh or blood generated from food was distinct from that which came down from one’s parents, and in this case the full quantity of a human body would not be preserved in the flesh that comes down from one’s parents, or else that flesh was combined with the flesh from one’s parents, and in this case a single thing would have to be generated from both and it would not be either of them but instead a mean between them. In this case, that whole would equally pertain to the truth of the nature, unless perhaps it were asserted that it is a combination according to least parts that have been preserved, (Or, in other words, unless there is a small part that does not combine with the other, as Nicolaï notes. This would, however, not be a combination, strictly speaking, but rather a mixtio ad sensum, as Aquinas explains in De mixtione elementorum (On the Blend of the Elements)**.) as some have posited, which would also lead back to the first possibility.