D. 32 - Remission of original sin

Division of the text

After he has shown how original sin is passed down from the parents, here he shows how it is remitted through baptism. This is divided into two parts.

In the first, he shows in what respect original sin is taken away in baptism and in what respect it remains.

In the second, he inquires what the cause is of the concupiscence that is not taken away by baptism but remains after baptism, at moreover, it is usual to ask whether the concupiscence which remains after baptism . . . has God as its author or another. (Sent. II, 32.3(215).1.)

The first part is divided into two parts.

In the first, he shows how original sin is remitted through baptism as regards the soul.

In the second, he inquires whether in baptism man is also purified of the uncleanness of the flesh, at but it is usual to ask here whether even the flesh itself is purged in baptism of that uncleanness which it contracted at its conception from lustful concupiscence. (Sent. II, 32.2(214).1.)

The first is divided into three parts.

In the first, he raises a doubt.

In the second, he poses a solution, showing that we speak of “original sin” in two ways, at but although concupiscence remains after baptism, yet it does not dominate and reign as before. (Sent. II, 32.1(213).2.)

In the third, he further explains the ways and confirms them by authorities, at and so original sin is said to be remitted in baptism by a double reason. (Sent. II, 32.1(213).3.)

And he first shows that original sin is said to be absolved through baptism inasmuch as its guilt is taken away.

Second, it is said to be absolved inasmuch as concupiscence itself is lessened, at then, he shows that it is also remitted in the sense that, by the grace of baptism, concupiscence itself is mitigated. (Sent. II, 32.1(213).5.)

Moreover, it is usual to ask whether the concupiscence which remains after baptism . . . has God as its author or another. (Sent. II, 32.3(215).1.) Here he inquires whether God is the cause of the concupiscence that remains after baptism. And because concupiscence is contracted together with guilt and the infection of the stain, he thus does three things concerning this.

First, he inquires whether God is the author of this concupiscence.

Second, he inquires whether it befits the divine justice that a child should incur the guilt of punishment for the parent’s sin, at it is also usual to ask by what justice a soul created innocent by God is bound by that sin. (Sent. II, 32.4(216).1.)

Third, he inquires how it is becoming to the divine wisdom that its work, namely, the soul, should be infected immediately upon its creation, at but if it is asked. (Sent. II, 32.6(218).1.)

Concerning the second, he does two things.

First, he addresses the principal question.

And because guilt follows on the voluntary element of sin, without which no one is obliged to punishment, he shows, second, how original sin can be called both “necessary” and “voluntary,” at it may also not undeservedly be asked. (Sent. II, 32.5(217).1.)

Concerning the third, he does three things.

First, he shows how it is becoming to the divine wisdom for the soul to be infected immediately with the stain of original sin from its being joined to its body.

Second, he inquires whether the soul remains at any time in its own purity wherein God created it, or whether it is stained immediately at the very beginning of its creation, at here it is usual for some to ask. (Sent. II, 32.7(219).1.)

Third, supposing that it is not, he inquires whether one soul is preferred over another in natural goodness from its very creation, at it is also usual to ask, not unsuitably. (Sent. II, 32.8(220).1.)

Here there are two questions.

First, how original sin is taken away by God through baptism. (Q. 1.)

Second, regarding its cause, whether the fact that man incurs original sin is also likewise from God. (Q. 2.)

Question 1

How original sin is taken away

Concerning the first, three questions are asked:

first, whether original fault is absolved through baptism;

second, whether the punishment following on original fault remains after baptism;

third, whether original concupiscence is found to be greater in some and less in others.

Article 1

Whether original sin is taken away through baptism

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In IV Sent., d. 4, q. 2, a. 1, resp.; d. 12, q. 2, a. 2, resp. and ad 3; d. 14, q. 2, a. 1, resp. and ad 3; d. 17, q. 2, a. 2, resp. and ad 3; ST III.69.1, ad 1; SCG IV.59, 72.) It seems that original fault is not taken away through baptism.

Obj. 1: For a privation is only taken away if the opposing habit is restored. But original justice, of which original sin is the privation, is not restored through baptism, since the due order of the lower powers to reason does not remain. Therefore, neither is original sin taken away through baptism.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, there are two things in baptism: one that is a reality-and-sign, namely, the character, and another that is only a reality, namely, the grace. Therefore, if baptism destroys original sin, this will either be by the power of the character it imprints or by the power of the grace it confers. If it is by the power of the character, then since even those who approach in bad faith obtain the character, it would follow that they would also be forgiven original fault, and in this case someone in mortal sin would be purged of a fault, which is unfitting. If, alternatively, it is by the power of grace, then grace is frequently lost after baptism by mortal sin, and so original sin would have to come back through any subsequent mortal sin. But original sin can only be purged through baptism. Therefore, whenever anyone does penance for a mortal sin, he would also at the same time have to be baptized against original sin.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as the act in an actual sin has the role of underlying the deformity in a material sense, so also does concupiscence in original sin, as was said above. (Above: d. 30, exposition of text.) But the deformity of sin cannot be taken away while the act of sin remains, since they are acts of the kind that cannot be done in a good way. Therefore, it is also the case that when this kind of concupiscence remains, original fault cannot be destroyed.

Obj. 4: One might say that it does not remain intense, but is lessened.

On the contrary, “more” and “less” do not differentiate a species. But punishment and fault denote different species of evil. Therefore, it cannot be the case that intense concupiscence is a fault while lessened concupiscence is only a punishment.

Obj. 5: One might say that it is only absolved as regards guilt.

On the contrary, guilt follows on the deformity of fault. For a punishment is inflicted for the purpose of ordering a fault’s deformity through punishment, which in itself is disordered. Therefore, if original sin is not taken away as regards the deformity of the stain, then it seems that neither can it be absolved as regards the guilt.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, habits give rise to acts like themselves, as it says in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.4, 1105b5–11.) But to desire with concupiscence, which proceeds from disordered concupiscent desire, is a sin after baptism as well as before. Therefore, the same concupiscence does not lose the account of a fault through baptism.

On the contrary, he who has died to sin is justified from transgression (Rom 6:7). (RSV reads he who has died is freed from sin.) But one who is baptized dies with Christ and is buried with him through baptism, as the Apostle says in the same place. Therefore, every sin of one’s past life must be destroyed through baptism, unless the effect of baptism is impeded on the part of the one being baptized.

Furthermore, one cannot simultaneously be a child of grace and a child of wrath. But we are born as children of wrath through original sin, as Ephesians 2:3 says: we were by nature children of wrath. But through baptism we are regenerated as children of grace. Therefore, original fault cannot remain after baptism.

I answer that we must speak of the remission of original fault in proportion to the remission of actual fault. For the act of sin leaves two effects in the sinner: the privation of grace by reason of turning away from the end, and a kind of disposition to a similar act, which the act of sin introduces by reason of turning toward the object. And from the very fact that one is deprived of grace by his own will, he incurs the guilt of punishment. Hence when grace is restored to him, the stain that consisted in lacking grace and the obligation to punishment that we call “guilt” is simultaneously taken away. However, the disposition introduced by the act of sin is not totally taken away all at once. Rather, it is lessened inasmuch as grace inclines to the contrary of this disposition. But later through a custom of good works, the disposition is also taken away.

Likewise, too, from the act of nature that is the propagation of the flesh, there is left a kind of disposition inclining to evil in the very nature of the one generated, which we call concupiscence or the fomes. (For an explanation of the use of the word fomes, see note above, at d. 30, q. 1, a. 3, as well as Aquinas’s explanation of the term in the exposition of the text of the same distinction.) From the very fact that the corruption of the nature containing in itself the power of the sin whereby it was caused touches the person, it renders the person himself unworthy of God’s grace. Hence a stain and lack of grace are left in the soul, and thereby the person is also obliged to the guilt of punishment, namely, to lack the reward that was due to grace.

Now, grace is conferred through baptism, and by its power the infection that passed from the nature to the person is taken away from a human being. With respect to this, the soul is purged of the stain of fault and consequently absolved of the guilt of punishment. But the disposition to evil that we call the “fomes” and “concupiscence” is not totally taken away, because this disposition follows on the condition of the nature. However, baptism does not purge the nature except as pertaining to the infection of the person. Thus, this disposition is not totally taken away until the state of beatitude, wherein the nature will be perfectly cured. Even so, the disposition is lessened through baptism, inasmuch as the grace that one obtains in baptism inclines to the contrary of that to which the fomes disposed the person. In this way, the power of the fomes is lessened in us through the help of grace.

Reply Obj. 1: In original justice there was something like a formal element, namely, the very uprightness of the will, and in this respect the deformity of fault is opposed to it. There was also in it a kind of material element, namely, the order of uprightness impressed on the lower powers, and in this regard concupiscence and the fomes are opposed to it. Therefore, although original justice is not restored as regards the material element that was in it, it is restored as regards the uprightness of the will, whose privation is why the account of a fault was present. For this reason what belongs to fault is taken away through baptism, but something else pertaining to punishment remains.

Reply Obj. 2: Baptism destroys original fault by the power of the grace it confers, which causes uprightness of the will. But it does not follow that if the grace is lost original fault returns. For though all the kinds of mortal sins have in common the fact that they take away grace, they do not all have one stain. Rather, they have different stains insofar as the lack of grace is referred to different causes. Hence the lack of grace coming from an act of lust is the stain of that sin, and so forth. Hence the stain of a given sin does not return no matter how much grace is lost unless the cause is repeated. Now, the cause through which the stain of original sin is left on the soul was the propagation of the human nature, which it is impossible to repeat in the case of the same human being. Thus, the stain of original sin cannot come back. Rather, the lack of grace that occurs through mortal sin will be the stain of lust, or murder, and so on.

Reply Obj. 3: Concupiscence and the fomes do not relate to the original stain in the same way as an act of sin relates to an actual stain. For even if concupiscence is in a certain sense related to the original stain as a material element, it is not its cause insofar as they are found in the same subject, but an act of sin does cause the actual stain. Thus, it cannot be the case that the act remains while the stain or guilt pass away, as happens in original sin, where concupiscence remains while the guilt and stain pass away.

Reply Obj. 4: Intensification and lessening never cause a differentiation of species, but sometimes they follow from a differentiation of species. For when intensification and lessening are founded on a single nature, which decreases and increases, then they neither cause a differentiation of species nor are caused by it, as is clear when the same whiteness is intensified and lessened. But sometimes intensification and lessening are founded on different natures, and then intensification and lessening arise from a differentiation of species, as when we say that angels are more intelligent than men. So, too, the intensification and lessening of the fomes are founded on different natures. For it is called “intense” as being joined to its formal element, which is the lack of justice, and it is called “lessened” as separate from this kind of lack.

Reply Obj. 5: Just as guilt passes away, so also does the stain pass away. Hence we must concede the objection’s conclusion.

Reply Obj. 6: It is even the case in actual sins that the disposition to sin remains with the arrival of grace. And then if an act follows from this disposition it will have the account of a sin, even though the disposition that causes the act would not be a fault. So, too, although desiring with concupiscence, which is an act of the fomes, is a fault after baptism, the fomes after baptism need not remain with the account of a fault. Nor need there be a likeness between the act and the habit as there is between fault and fault. Instead, it is on the part of the turning toward the object that the act terminates in the object to which the habit inclined.

Article 2

Whether the punishment of original sin ought to remain after baptism

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: below, d. 44, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2, 3; In III Sent., d. 19, q. 1, a. 3, resp.; In IV Sent., d. 4, q. 2, a. 1, resp.; d. 46, q. 2, a. 2, resp. and ad 3; ST I-II.85.5, ad 2; 87.7, ad 1; 109.9; II-II.104.6, ad 1; III.49.3, ad 3; 52.5, ad 2; 69.3; 69.7, ad 3; SCG IV.55; On Evil, q. 4, a. 6, ad 4; Quodl. VI, q. 9, a. 1.) It seems that the punishment of original sin should not remain after baptism.

Obj. 1: For it is unjust for someone to be punished without fault. But original fault is taken away through baptism, as was said. (Above: d. 32, q. 1, a. 1.) Therefore, it would be unjust for the punishment to remain.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, gratuitous justice is of greater account than original justice. But when original justice remained in the soul, there was nothing pertaining to punishment in it, no rebellion of the flesh against the spirit, corruption, or passibility. Therefore, since gratuitous justice is conferred through baptism, it seems that punishment should not remain after baptism.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, spiritual generation is of greater account than fleshly generation. For the gift is not like the transgression and, in fact, is much greater, as Romans 5:16 says. But fleshly generation leads to the corruption of fault and punishment. Therefore, spiritual generation, which takes place through baptism, ought to take away both.

Obj. 4: One might say that punishment’s not being taken away would not imply any deficiency on the part of baptism, but would instead provide a useful and expedient impetus to salvation.

On the contrary, each thing must be judged with reference to what befits it more than with reference to what it possesses incidentally. But the fomes inclines to evil essentially, whereas it impels to the good only incidentally, inasmuch as one is crowned by resisting or insofar as one is rendered more humble. Therefore, it would be more expedient for a person not to have the fomes than to have it.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the grace conferred in baptism lessens the fomes. But when the cause grows, the effect grows. Therefore, if greater grace is infused, the fomes will be lessened even more. Therefore, grace will only be able to grow to the point that the fomes is totally taken away.

On the contrary, for the desires of the flesh are against the spirit, and the desires of the spirit are against the flesh (Gal 5:17). Yet here he is speaking to those who have been reborn through baptism. Therefore, this kind of rebellion is not taken away through baptism. We have this, too, from the passage, so then it is no longer I that do it, but sin which dwells within me (Rom 7:17), where “sin” means the fomes of sin, as a gloss says. (Peter Lombard, Commentary on Romans, at Romans 7:24 (PL 191:1430); Hervé de Bourg-Dieu (ca. 1080–1150 AD), Commentary on Romans, ch. 7 (PL 181:692).)

Furthermore, original sin proceeds into the offspring from the parent’s concupiscence, as was said above. (Above: d. 31, q. 1, a. 1.) Therefore, if one who is baptized did not have the concupiscence of the fomes after baptism, no one would generate a child in original sin, and the Master disproved this above. Therefore, baptism does not totally take away concupiscence.

I answer that original sin is primarily and essentially the infection of the nature, and it infects the person as a consequence, insofar as the nature’s disposition redounds to the person. With respect to this, original sin is due two punishments. One punishment is inasmuch as it infects the person, namely, the lack of the vision of God. For the vision of God denotes a kind of act, and every act belongs to a person because, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.7, 1107a30.) individuals have acts. Hence lack of the vision should also be referred to the person, since opposites concern the same thing. The other punishment is due it inasmuch as it infects the nature, including such things as the necessity of dying, passibility, the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit, and other such things. All these are caused from the principles of the nature and accrue to the whole species unless it turns out otherwise by a miracle.

Therefore, it should be said that baptism cleanses the infection of original sin insofar as the nature’s infection redounds to the person. Thus, through baptism the punishment due the person is taken away, namely, the lack of the vision of God, whereas baptism does not remove the infection of the nature as essentially referred to the nature, although this will take place in heaven, when our nature will be restored to perfect freedom. Thus, the punishment due original fault as infecting the nature must remain after baptism, and such punishment is the fomes, the necessity of dying, and things of this sort.

Reply Obj. 1: To the extent that fault is destroyed, the punishment corresponding to it is also taken away, as is clear from what has been said. (Resp.; d. 31, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4.) Thus, nothing unjust happens.

Reply Obj. 2: In every effect that belongs to justice essentially, gratuitous justice is of greater account than original justice. But excluding penalties of this sort is not an effect of justice precisely as justice. Rather, it was the effect of original justice by reason of a certain incidental element connected with it, namely, inasmuch as it was continued and not interrupted in human nature. For it was becoming that just as the soul was directed to God without interruption through justice, so also the body would totally obey the soul without interruption. Thus, this effect need not befit gratuitous justice, since there has been an interruption in the uprightness of human nature in relation to God.

Reply Obj. 3: Spiritual generation is more effective in that to which it is ordered than bodily generation. Now, bodily generation essentially terminates in the nature, since the form is the term of generation. But spiritual generation terminates in the perfection of the person that takes place through grace. Thus, spiritual generation cleanses the person more than bodily generation can infect him. For bodily generation can only infect the person with the infection of original sin, but spiritual generation purges the person of both original and actual fault. But penal deficiencies of this sort follow on the principles of the nature, as was said. Hence bodily generation is more closely related to their being introduced than spiritual generation is to their being cured.

Reply Obj. 4: Simply speaking, it would be better for a person to lack the fomes than to have it. For it is obvious that due to an abundance of grace it happens in some that they are freed from the fomes. But in a certain regard, and in consideration of a certain state of the person, it is expedient to have the fomes, lest being puffed up he should fall into pride. This is a conclusion that even the objection drew.

Reply Obj. 5: No matter how much baptismal grace is infused in baptism, it can never make it so that the fomes is totally taken away, since this grace is only ordered to curing the infection of the person that proceeds from the infection of the nature. However, God could infuse another kind of grace whereby it would be taken away, so that in this way, the infection of person and nature would both give way to grace at the same time.

Article 3

Whether the fomes is found to be greater in one person than in another

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I-II.82.4.) It seems that the fomes and concupiscence is found to be more in some and less in others.

Obj. 1: For when the cause is multiplied, the effect is multiplied. But the infection of the fomes is caused by the uncleanness of intercourse. Therefore, since the greater the distance a person is from the first generator, the more of such infecting acts there are, it seems that we always discover greater infection of the fomes in the offspring than in the parent.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, “fomes” indicates nothing other than a kind of propensity to desiring with concupiscence in a disordered way. But by natural makeup one is born more prone to lust or to wrath or to any other genus of sin than another. Therefore, one is born with greater infection of the fomes than another.

Obj. 3: Being accustomed or unaccustomed to acts leaves a greater facility or difficulty in doing something in one who acts voluntarily. But it is the case that some devote themselves to works of concupiscence while others withdraw from them by busying themselves with upright exercises. Therefore, the fomes is found to be more intense in some than in others.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, just as the corruption of the fomes proceeds from the sin of our first parent, so also do the other penalties, such as passibility, mortality, and other such things. But the other penalties always increase in a human being the further human nature recedes from the first parent through generational succession. For it is commonly said that people now have a shorter lifespan and less strength than they did in ancient times. Therefore, for like reason, the corruption of the fomes is also found to be greater in children than in their parents.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, it is obvious that the other penalties are intensified and lessened in accord with different bodily makeups, which causes some to be more passible and have shorter lifespans than others. Therefore, if the fomes is found in us through the same cause whereby the other penalties are found, it seems that it is intensified and lessened in accord with people’s constitutions.

On the contrary, what follows on a nature is found equally in all who have the nature. But the fomes follows on human nature as a corruption of it, as was said. (Above: d. 32, q. 1, a. 1.) Therefore, since all human beings participate in human nature equally, it seems that they also equally incur the corruption of the fomes.

Furthermore, equality of punishment should correspond to equality of fault. Therefore, since there is not a greater original fault in one than in another (because all are due a single punishment for this fault, namely, lacking the vision of God), it seems that the infection of original sin is also not greater in one than in another.

I answer that, since the corruption of the fomes is essentially the infection of human nature, we must judge its intensity in the same way we judge the intensity of human nature. Now, the nature itself can be considered in two ways: either as regards the account of the species, and in this way, it is found equally in all; or else inasmuch as the nature’s perfection redounds to the individual’s perfection in the way that individuals’ activities follow from the principles of the species. In this latter respect one human being is greater than another in carrying out the activities that follow from the species. For one is quicker than another to understand or to reason, and so forth.

The case is similar with the corruption of the fomes. For if we consider it as regarding the nature essentially, then without a doubt it is found equally in all. And this is its absolute consideration. For the fact of losing that uprightness that held all the soul’s powers in check together fits with everyone equally, since a privation, in and of itself, does not admit of greater or lesser degree. But if we consider the infection of original sin as redounding to the infection of the person, inasmuch as the powers lacking uprightness incline to shameful activities, then the corruption of the fomes is greater in one than in another, that is, inasmuch as the concupiscible or irascible part is more effective and fervent as regards its act in one than another, either by natural makeup or custom. This is also the way in which we say that the fomes is lessened after baptism, inasmuch as grace reduces the impetus of the concupiscible and irascible parts by inclining to the contrary acts.

Reply Obj. 1: The cause that introduces original sin is not the actual pleasure in the intercourse, but the habitual concupiscence in the generator. But this cannot introduce greater concupiscence in the offspring than in the parent because a generator generates what is like itself. Thus, it does not follow that after many generations one would be more infected with original sin. Rather, the infection would be the same, just as all the properties that follow on the nature are found in the same way throughout the whole nature.

Reply Obj. 2: Difference in makeup comes from different dispositions of matter, which is the principle of individuation. The more disposed the matter is, the more perfect it attains to the nature of the species as the principle of personal activities. In this way, too, the fomes can be more intense in some in comparison to activities that are owed to the individual, but not absolutely insofar as it is in respect to the nature.

Reply Obj. 3: In this way, the solution to the third objection is also clear. For the facility that remains from custom also exists in accordance with the fact that powers are inclined to acts of the individual.

Reply Obj. 4: Other kinds of passibility are not greater in man now than they were in ancient times from the time of the flood. Hence David also speaks of the people of his own time, saying: the years of our life in them are three score and ten (Ps 90 [89]:10). But it is true that before the flood human beings lived longer, divine power producing this effect in order to multiply the human race.

Reply Obj. 5: The other kinds of passibility, such as mortality and things of this sort, are not intensified and lessened from a difference of makeup insofar as they regard the nature (hence “mortal,” as the difference constituting the nature of the species, does not admit of greater or lesser degree), but only as compared to the consistency and activities of the individual.

Question 2

The cause of the infection of original sin

Then the question of the cause of the infection of original sin is asked. Concerning this three questions are asked:

first, whether it is from God;

second, whether it is becoming for the divine wisdom to permit the soul to be stained in this way;

third, whether souls are unequal from their creation, as the Master says in the text. (Sent. II, 32.8(220).1: not unreasonably, it seems to many that, from creation itself, some souls excel others in natural gifts, as in their essence; one is more acute than another and better able to understand and remember, in as much as it is endowed with a sharper mind and a more far-seeing intellect.)

Article 1

Whether the infection of original sin is from God

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I-II.89.1.) It seems that the infection of original sin is from God.

Obj. 1: For when the soul is created, it is infused, as Augustine says. (The manuscripts do not indicate where this citation might be found, though Nicolaï refers to chapter 14 of De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus, which is now attributed to Gennadius of Massilia (d. ca. 496 AD).) But the soul is stained at its infusion. Therefore, it is also stained at its creation, and so it has a stain from God.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Master said above (Sent. II, 3.4(16).7.) that if an angel had been wicked at the beginning of its creation, it would follow that God is the author of evil. But the soul has been stained at the beginning of its creation. Therefore, it follows that God is the cause of this stain.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as Augustine says, every punishment is from God. (Augustine, De libero arbitrio, bk. 2, ch. 1 (CCSL 29; PL 32:1239).) But this infection, particularly as remaining after baptism, is a kind of punishment. Therefore, it is from God.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, whatever follows on the principles of a nature proceeds from the nature’s author. But this sort of disorder follows from the principles of the nature, as was said above, (Above: d. 30, q. 1, a. 1.) inasmuch as every power naturally tends to its own object. Therefore, it proceeds from God, who is the author of the nature.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, nothing is ordered to the good unless it is from God. But the fomes incites to the good, most of all as it remains after baptism. Therefore, it is from God.

On the contrary, Damascene says (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 6 (PG 94:1006).) that Christ assumed what he implanted in our nature. But he did not assume the corruption of the fomes. Therefore, the fomes in our nature is not from him.

Furthermore, Augustine says (Augustine, Book of Eighty-Three Different Questions, q. 3 (CCSL 44A; PL 40:11).) that what makes a person worse cannot be from God. But the whole human nature has been put into a worse state through the infection of the fomes. Therefore, this kind of infection is not from God.

I answer that, in the infection of original sin, we can consider both the account of fault and of punishment. It has the account of a fault inasmuch as this kind of deficiency has resulted from the disordered will of our first parent. Hence just as the same Adam’s own actual sin, whereby his will became disordered, does not have God as its author, neither is the whole resulting deficiency, insofar as it has the account of a fault, from him. On the other hand, if we consider it insofar as it falls short of a given perfection, then it is a punishment. And God is the cause of this sort of punishment.

But it should be known that he is not the cause of every punishment in the same way. One kind of punishment is through the inflection of some contrary element of affliction or corruption. This kind of punishment is from God as an agent, from whom every action as ordered and, consequently, the suffering takes its principle. Now, every punishment, when just, is ordered. Another kind of punishment is that which consists simply in a taking-away or a deficiency, such as the subtraction of grace and things of this sort. These punishments are from God, not as doing something, but instead as not imparting the given perfection, since it is his prerogative to impart or not to impart, and his will is the cause of both.

Therefore, if we consider the fomes as a punishment, it does not indicate a punishment that has been inflicted (because supernatural principles do not presuppose something positively in man), but instead pertains to the genus of punishments that consists in a deficiency alone. For concupiscence or the fomes inclines in a disordered way from the fact that the bond of original justice that connected the lower powers within the obedience of reason has been taken away. God is said to be the cause of this kind of punishment inasmuch as he does not confer on a man at his birth the original justice that he once conferred on the first man at his creation.

Reply Obj. 1: Creation and infusion, although they occur at the same time, differ with respect to the soul. For we say “creation” with respect to the principle from which the soul alone exists, but “infusion” with respect to two things: the principle from which it proceeds and the matter it perfects. Therefore, since the soul is said to be stained “in its creation,” this ablative can denote a habitude to some cause, and in this way, it is false. For the creation of the soul is not the cause of its being stained, since the soul has nothing from its creation that is not from God. Or else, the ablative can denote concomitance, and in this way, it is true. For when the soul is created, it is stained, but it does not follow from this that God is the stain’s author. However, when we say that the soul is stained “in its infusion,” if the ablative designates concomitance in an absolute sense, it is true. On the other hand, if it denotes a habitude to a cause, there are two possibilities. Either the infusion is understood to be the cause of the stain on the side of the principle from-which, and in this case the statement is false, or on the side of the term to-which, and in this case it is true.

Reply Obj. 2: The case of the soul and angels is not similar. For angels are not created as the form of another body. Hence a deficiency could not accrue to them on the part of matter. Rather, if at the beginning of their creation they had had the stain of sin, this would have to have been on the part of the Creator. But the soul is created as the act of a given body and can contract a stain from being joined with it. Nor does it follow that God is the principle of this stain.

Reply Obj. 3: The response to the third is clear through what has been said.

Reply Obj. 4: Although being attracted to what is pleasurable belongs to the flesh from the nature of the concupiscible part considered absolutely, it is not from its nature as human, that is, as made to be ordered through the judgment of reason, and particularly in regard to the fact that in human nature there could exist the kind of perfection in reason whereby it would thoroughly order the concupiscible part. Thus, when it is attracted to its object apart from the order of reason, this occurs from a kind of deficiency. And the cause of this deficiency, inasmuch as it has the account of a fault, is not from God, as was said.

Reply Obj. 5: The fomes essentially inclines to evil, but the fact that it incites to the good is incidental. Hence it does not follow that it is from God regardless of any consideration, since from any evil there are some goods that result incidentally.

Article 2

Whether it befits the divine wisdom to infuse a soul into a body from which it will contract a stain

To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that it is not becoming for the divine wisdom that a soul should be infused into a body from which it contracts a stain.

Obj. 1: For no wise person puts his treasure in a place where it can be ruined. But the soul is God’s most precious treasure, being sealed with God’s image. Therefore, it is not becoming for the divine wisdom for the soul to be infused into the kind of body from which it contracts a stain.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, if God sent anyone to hell without that person’s own fault, this would be unbecoming to his justice and wisdom. But the soul incurs guilt liable to punishment in hell from being stained at its infusion. Therefore, it is unbecoming for God to infuse it into a body of this kind.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, spiritual infection is worse than bodily infection. But counsel is given to those infected with bodily leprosy to abstain from intercourse in order not to generate infected children. Therefore, all the more should God have established that human beings cease from the carnal work due to which it is necessary for their offspring to contract the stain of original fault by way of intercourse.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, no wise craftsman makes the kind of work from which his intention cannot be brought to completion. But the end for which God made man is to enjoy his beatitude. Therefore, since the soul incurs the guilt of lacking the vision of God by being infused into this kind of body, it seems that this is not becoming to God’s wisdom.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, as Fulgentius says, God is the avenger of what he does not author. (Fulgentius, Ad Monimum, bk. 1, ch. 19 (CCSL 91; PL 40:167).) Therefore, for the same reason, it necessarily results that he is not the author of that which he avenges. But the infection of original fault, which God avenges, necessarily follows from the union of the soul with this kind of body. Therefore, it is unbecoming for God to unite the soul to a body of this kind.

On the contrary, it is unbecoming for God to change his works. But God established that human beings would be generated through the mingling of the sexes and that a soul would be infused into the body resulting from insemination. Therefore, it did not become God to change this.

Furthermore, it is not characteristic of one who is wise to introduce a greater deficiency to avoid a lesser deficiency. But it would be a greater deficiency if the human race were not multiplied—seeing as it is through the multiplication of the human race that the number of the elect is filled up—than for a child to be born in original fault. Therefore, it is not becoming for God to put an end to the natural multiplication of the human race in order to avoid the infection of original sin.

I answer that, just as the good of the nation is more divine than the good of a single person, as it says in the Ethics 1, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.2, 1094b7.) so also the good of the universe has priority over the good of a particular thing and a specific nature. Hence, too, a deficiency that redounds to the universe is worse. But if the human race’s natural multiplication were taken away, it would redound as a deficiency to the whole universe. For either a given nature conferring a perfection on the universe would be removed from the universe, or the universe would also have its natural perfection taken away from part of it, insofar as each thing is made to generate something like itself. Both would redound as a deficiency to the universe. Thus, the natural process of human generation ought not have been interrupted to avoid the infection of original sin.

Furthermore, it is the natural order in things that, when what is posterior is removed, what is prior remains and is not taken away at the former’s removal. And so, when you remove a vice, being remains, as it says in the Book of Causes. (Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 1.) Now, natural goodness pre-exists all super-added goodness, whether acquired or conferred gratuitously. Hence when the goodness that God had conferred gratuitously on human nature, namely, original justice, is subtracted, it is not appropriate to the order that divine wisdom established for things that one of the elements pertaining to natural goodness be changed, particularly since there remains in the nature the faculty to recover what was lost or something more excellent than it.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as someone would not be wise if he put a treasure, one that could be kept safe in a clean place, in a place that was not clean, so also he would be very foolish if he refused to store his treasure in an unclean place if there were no other way to preserve it, especially if there remained the possibility of cleaning up the treasure. I say as well that the soul has the kind of nature that is meant to be united to this kind of body. Hence if it were not united to this kind of body, the soul would either have to be not created at all or would have a different nature. And if it had a different nature, it would not be this nature. Hence it is established that this is the only way to preserve this nature.

Reply Obj. 2: Hell has two punishments. One is due for actual sin, and this is the corruption of a good that follows even from the natural principles of human nature. Hence it would be unjust for someone to undergo this kind of punishment if he had not merited it through his own fault. However, the other is due for original sin, which subtracts nothing due to the nature from its own principles, but rather takes away something that surpasses human faculties, though the nature had been ordered to this by way of something conferred gratuitously on it. Hence a man suffers no injury if he is not given what is not due to his nature as he has received it.

Reply Obj. 3: Leprosy is a corruption of a good that follows on the principles of nature, and that cannot be healed. But the infection of original sin is a corruption of a good that does not follow on the principles of nature, and that can be healed. Thus, the account of both cases is not similar.

Reply Obj. 4: God made each created thing to participate in his own goodness as much as possible, and it is better to participate in that goodness in some way than not at all. Therefore, I say that although those who are born in original sin are liable to being deprived of the participation in the divine goodness that renders people blessed in heaven, they do participate in it and have the faculty of participating in it in the way possible to nature as characterized by its own principles. Hence it is clear that the work of God does not totally fall short of the end to which it is ordered, particularly since the faculty of arriving at a further participation is not taken way.

Reply Obj. 5: Original fault is due a punishment precisely as a fault, and it possesses the property of being a fault not from the soul’s union to the body, but from the will of our first parent. Hence, although God unites the soul to the body, it does not follow that he is the cause of what he avenges.

Article 3

Whether souls are equal at their creation

To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that souls are equal from their creation.

Obj. 1: For a formal difference differentiates species. But the soul is the form of the body. Therefore, since all men belong to a single species, it seems that there is no difference among men on the part of the soul.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Gregory says that all men are by nature equal. (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Job, bk. 21, ch. 15 (CCSL 143A; PL 75:203).) But we take note of a thing’s dignity especially in reference to its form. Therefore, if one man has a soul that is more noble than another’s soul from creation, one man will also enjoy preeminence over another by nature, which contradicts the authority just cited.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as it says in On Generation and Corruption 2, (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 2.10, 336a27.) the same is always naturally apt to make the same. Hence from a uniform agent there must be a uniform effect. But the soul is created immediately by God. Therefore, since there is no differentiation in God, it seems that souls are not unequal from creation.

Obj. 4: One might say that, although they do not possess differentiation from the agent, they do have it from matter.

On the contrary, forms that are differentiated in accord with the differentiation of matter are educed from the matter’s potency, as is clear in bodily forms. But the rational soul is not educed from the potency of matter. For, as it says in On the Generation of Animals 2, (Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals 2.3, 736b25–29.) the intellect is from without. Therefore, neither can there be inequality among souls from the differentiation of matter.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics 3 (Aristotle, Metaphysics 3.3, 999a5–13.) that we cannot make predications referring to “prior” and “posterior” among individuals of a single species. But there can, in fact, be this kind of predication among different species, as when we predicate a genus of them with reference to “prior” and “posterior.” But it seems especially the case that a species receives predication of a genus as prior when a more noble form or difference participates in the nature of the genus. Therefore, it is not the case among individuals that one man possesses a more noble form than another. Therefore, it seems that neither does one man have a more noble soul than another from creation.

On the contrary (6), commenting on On the Soul 1, (Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 1, comm. 53.) the Commentator says that matter’s differentiation proceeds from form’s differentiation. But we see great differences among men on the part of the body, in accord with which one is keener on good or evil than another, as is clear in the different human constitutions. Therefore, their souls must possess this differentiation from their creation.

Furthermore (7), we have observational evidence that some men have a better intellect than others. But goodness of intellect cannot be caused on the side of the body. For the intellect is separate from the body, as proved in On the Soul 3. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 429a22–26.) Therefore, this must occur from the differentiation possessed by souls from their creation.

I answer that there are two opinions about the soul and angels. Some say that the soul and angels are composed of form and matter or of two elements that are parts of their essence. According to this, we might perhaps find a way of assigning a difference between souls and angels so that there would be more than one in a single species of themselves, since the unity of the species will be from the formal principle in them, while the differentiation of individuals is from the differentiation of the material principle, and we could even note among them certain degrees of nobility. This is how it seems the Master’s words sound, who says that there is a difference among souls in the way there is among angels.

But because it was said above, in accord with the other opinion, that souls and angels are by nature simple and there is no composition in them except that of being and what-it-is, whatever difference there is between them of themselves must be a formal difference, one that introduces a difference of species. For this reason we also said that among the angels there are as many species as there are individuals. Thus, it is impossible to posit a differentiation of souls after the manner whereby ranks of angelic nature are distinguished, since all rational souls have the same species and differ only numerically.

Now, every differentiation of this kind is caused by matter, and thus, since the soul does not have matter as part of it, differences and distinction of degrees among souls must be caused by the body’s being different, such that the better the body has been put together, the more noble is the soul allotted to it, since everything that is received in another is received after the manner of the receiver.

Two signs make this clear. The first is from what differs in genus. For we find that each thing participates in the genus of soul more nobly the more noble is the bodily constitution that it attains, as in men, brute animals, and plants. Hence even among things belonging to a single genus, the fact of bodily differences leads to the differences among souls. This is also clear from the sign of a good intellect, which the Philosopher in On the Soul 2 (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.9, 421a22–25.) gives by saying that those who have a good sense of touch and are soft of flesh are astute of mind. Now, goodness of touch occurs due to equality of makeup. For the instrument of touch must be as a mean between contrary tangible objects, and the closer it is to that mean, the better the sense of touch will be. Hence it is clear that differences among souls result from differences among bodies.

Reply Obj. 1: There are two kinds of formal differentiation. One belongs to form essentially, in accord with what pertains to the account of the form. This kind of differentiation of form leads to the species’ being different. But there is another kind of differentiation that belongs to form not essentially, but incidentally, one that results from matter’s differentiation, insofar as a form participates in a more outstanding way in matter that is better disposed. This way of being different does not differentiate the species. This is how souls are different.

Reply Obj. 2: Gregory is speaking of equality and inequality as we see in the case of dominion and subjugation. For one man does not have the property of holding dominion over another from his nature. Hence it is clear that the quotation is irrelevant to the point at issue.

Reply Obj. 3: Although God is an agent in whom there is no differentiation, because he acts through his will, he can produce manifold effects as his will decides. But it cannot be the case that things agreeing in species have differences in their forms, since this implies a contradiction. Thus, the differences among souls of the same species must be reduced to differences in matter.

Reply Obj. 4: Even though the rational soul is not educed from the potency of matter, it is created in matter as its act. Thus, it must be received in matter after matter’s manner of receiving.

Reply Obj. 5: The reply to the fifth objection is like the reply to the first.

Reply Sed Contra 6: We can take “differentiation of matter” in two ways. Either it is a differentiation of parts of a species, that is, of parts differing specifically or formally, such as a hand, a foot, and things of this sort. And this kind of differentiation is caused on the side of the form because, due to the fact that the form is such-and-such, the body must be disposed in a certain way. But there is also a kind of differentiation that is only material, not pertaining to species, but to the individual alone. And this redounds from matter to form, not vice versa.

Reply Sed Contra 7: Although the intellect is separate from the body as regards its proper activity, which is not carried out with a bodily organ, it is joined with the body in two ways: on the part of the essence of the soul, which is the form of the body; and on the part of the lower powers, from which the intellect receives. And by way of the latter, differences among bodies result in intellectual differences.

Exposition of the text

So that it is not able to dominate afterwards. (Sent. II, 32.1(213).2.) It seems from this that by going after concupiscences, one calls back the dominion of original sin, and thus, that from actual sin, original fault returns.

But it should be said that the dominion of concupiscence is called back through an actual sin in two ways: because grace, which mitigated the impulse of concupiscence, is taken away; and because by an actual sin propensity to sin is increased. Now, in neither way does original sin return, as is clear from the aforementioned. For even if grace is subtracted, this does not occur by an act of origination. Hence it is not an original stain but an actual one that follows. Likewise, too, it does not return from the fact that propensity is increased by custom because this pertains not to what belongs to nature, which is what original sin essentially regards, but instead follows on the person as what remains due to personal acts.

Concupiscence passes away in guilt and remains in act. (Sent. II, 32.1(213).6.) “Act” is not taken here in the sense of an activity. (Latin: operatio.) For in this way, original sin does not consist in an act. Rather, it is taken in the way that “act” is distinguished from “potency,” as that which is already present is said to be in act. For example, blindness is said to be in act when someone is actually blind.

It seems to some that, just as the soul is purified from guilt, so also the flesh is purged of that pollution. (Sent. II, 32.2(214).2.) Both opinions are true when understood in a certain sense. For if we take “pollution of the flesh” as regards the person, then in baptism it is cleansed so that the soul of a given human being can no longer be infected by that pollution. But, inasmuch as it regards the nature, it is not purged, since the infection is propagated to the offspring from nature’s act.

No prejudice to the truth follows from this, they say. (Sent. II, 32.2(214).4.) This is true if understood of the truth of the faith, because it is not contrary to the faith. But it is contrary to the truth that reason can discover and that experience teaches.

Yet it shares pleasure with the flesh when it is infused in the body. (Sent. II, 32.4(216).2.) This cannot be, since this pleasure would indicate either some kind of activity, and in this case it would be an actual sin, as the Master says. Or it would indicate the natural inclination whereby the soul is joined with the body, and there can be no sin in this because what is natural cannot be evil.