D. 38 - The act of the will

Division of the text

After addressing the acts in which sin exists in general, inquiring whether, precisely as acts, they are good and from God, here he addresses these same acts specifically. And because sin consists in an internal as well as an external act, this part is divided into two parts.

In the first, he addresses the will’s internal act.

In the second, he addresses the external act, at after these matters, it appears that we must add something concerning actions. (Sent. II, 40.1(252).1.)

The first is divided into two parts.

In the first, he addresses the act of the will, showing where rectitude and sin come from in it, that these are from the end.

In the second, he inquires how there can be vice in the will, at here arises a very necessary question. (Sent. II, 39.1(249).1.)

The first part is divided into two parts.

In the first, he shows that the rectitude of the will is based on the intention of the end.

In the second, he addresses the will by comparing it to intention and end, at it is also usual to ask what difference there is among will and intention and end. (Sent. II, 38.4(248).1.)

The first is divided into two parts.

In the first, he shows that good wills have a single end, from which they possess rectitude.

In the second, he inquires whether this one end is the only end right wills have or whether there can also be other ends, at but it is asked whether all good wills have only one end. (Sent. II, 38.3(247).1.)

Concerning the first, he does two things.

First, he posits that charity is the end of good wills.

Second, he shows that with this end, God is the end, at and so, he who has charity as his end, has God as his end. (Sent. II, 38.2(246).1.)

But it is asked whether all good wills have only one end. (Sent. II, 38.3(247).1.) Here he inquires whether right wills can have more than one end. And it is divided into three parts.

In the first, he presents the truth.

In the second, he puts forward an objection to the contrary, at and yet, Augustine’s warning elsewhere not to set two ends for ourselves appears to contradict this sentence in which it is said that some righteous wills of the faithful are allotted different ends, and yet are referred to one end. (Sent. II, 38.3(247).2.)

In the third, he addresses it, at but one who attends . . . understands that they are not in opposition. (Sent. II, 38.3(247).3.)

It is also usual to ask what difference there is among will and intention and end. (Sent. II, 38.4(248).1.) Here he addresses the will by comparing it to intention and end. Concerning this, he does two things. First, he makes the said comparison. Second, he inquires also whether intention can be called “will” and whether intention is the same act as the will that is commonly called “will,” at but one asks whether such an intention is also a will. (Sent. II, 38.4(248).5.)

Question 1

The act of the will

Here five questions are asked:

first, whether all right wills have only a single end;

second, what it is;

third, what intention is;

fourth, if it is the same will that concerns the end (which is called “intention”) as that which concerns what is directed to the end, which is commonly called “will”;

fifth, if the will possesses goodness on the basis of the end.

Article 1

Whether there is only a single end of right wills

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I-II.1.5.) It seems that there is not only a single end of right wills.

Obj. 1: For the charity by which we love God is not God, as was shown in Book I. (In I Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 1.) But the end of right wills is God as well as charity, as is shown in the text. (Sent. II, 38.1(245).2.) Therefore, two right wills do not tend to a single end.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, where there is found gradation in referring a thing to an end, there is not a single end. But in the three persons there is found gradation when one considers the relation of things to an end. Hence Hilary says: the head of all is the Son, but the head of the Son is the Father, and to the one God all things are referred by this gradation. (Hilary of Poitiers, De synodis, sect. 60 (PL 10:521).) Since, therefore, each of the three persons is the end of right wills, as it says in the text, (Sent. II, 38.2(246).1.) it seems that right wills tend to more than one end.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as natural things possess species from their form, so also moral affairs have species from their end. Hence they are right or perverse with reference to the end, as it says in the text. (Sent. II, 36.6(242).5; 38.1(245).1.) But there is not a single form for natural things. Therefore, neither will moral acts have a single end to which they ought to be directed.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the end of action is that on account of which action takes place. But each agent, in acting, thinks about that on account of which he is acting. Since, therefore, many who are doing right acts are not actually thinking about God, it seems that God is not the end of all right actions. Thus, different agents will have various ends, insofar as they have various considerations of the end.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, that without which something would not happen is that for the sake of which it happens. But there are many who would not do spiritual works if they did not thereby acquire certain temporal things. Therefore, those temporal things they seek to acquire are the end of their works and of their wills, and, nevertheless, they are not said to be sinning in doing this. For, as the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 9:10: the plowman should plow in hope and the thresher thresh in hope of a share in the crop, speaking literally in that passage. Therefore, besides God and charity, there can be another end for right wills. Thus, not all right wills tend to a single end.

On the contrary, every will that tends to different things is divided among more than one thing. But a right heart is not divided, but unified. Hence Hosea 10:2: their heart is divided; now they shall perish. (RSV reads their heart is false; now they must bear their guilt.) Therefore, a right heart has a single last end.

Furthermore, the account of good is from the end. Therefore, where the highest good is, there is the last end. But the highest good is one alone, as was proved above. (In I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 1.) Therefore, there is a single last end of right wills.

I answer that things are referred to their end in the same order by which they proceed from their principle, seeing as each agent orders its effect to a given end. Thus, the order of ends is according to the order of agents. Now, in the procession of things from a principle we find one first principle of things common to them all, under which are found the other proper principles, which differ in different things. So, too, in referring things to an end there is found one end common to them all, which is the last end. But we discover different proper ends in accord with the differentiation of beings. For the good is found in things in two orders, as it says in the Metaphysics 12. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.10, 1075a11–14.) One is the order of one thing to another thing, and this order is similar to the order that parts of an army have to each other. The other is an order of things to the last end, which is similar to the order of the army to the good of the leader. Because things are referred to a common last end by means of the end proper to each, differentiating the proper end brings about different relations of things to the last end.

And so, it should be said that just as there is a single last end of all things, namely, God, so also there is a single last end of all wills, namely, God. Nevertheless, there are still other proximate ends. And if the due relation of the will to the last end is preserved in regard to those ends, the will will be right, but if not, it will be perverse. Now, the due relation of the will to the last end is preserved in regard to that end through which the will, in accordance with its nature, is able to participate in the last end. In this, it is distinguished from other things that participate in the last end in another way. And this is charity or beatitude. Therefore, it is not only God, but also charity that is the end of all right wills.

Reply Obj. 1: Charity is not the last end, since it is not the common end that all things desire. But it is an end proper to the will whereby it reaches the last end. And so, it does not follow that there is more than one last end.

Reply Obj. 2: The Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit are a single last end, as it says in the text, (Sent. II, 38.2(246).1.) because the account of the end befits each of them, insofar as each is the highest good. These three are not three highest goods but one. Hence Hilary’s statement, to the one God all things are referred by this gradation, (Hilary, De synodis, sect. 60 (PL 10:521).) should be understood as meaning that there is a gradation in how created things are traced back to the Son, not between the Son and the Father, between whom, as Jerome says, there is no gradation. Yet if the term “gradation” is taken in a broad sense for “order,” then there is gradation between the Father and the Son, that is, the order of a principle to that of which it is the principle, but not the order of an end to that for which it is an end.

Reply Obj. 3: Moral acts are specified not by the last end, but by their proximate ends. There is more than one of these for the different moral acts, just as there is more than one natural end.

Reply Obj. 4: For the end of an action to be God or charity, it is not necessary for someone, in carrying out that action, to be thinking of God or charity. Still, it is not enough for someone to possess God and charity by way of habit alone (for then someone would be ordering even an act of venial sin to God, which is false). Rather, there must first be a thought about the end, which is charity or God, and reason must have ordered the subsequent actions to this end in such a way that the rectitude of that ordering is preserved in the actions that follow, as is clear in the example Avicenna gives of the artisan (Avicenna, Metaphysics, tract. 6, ch. 4.) who, if he were constantly thinking about the rules of his art while he is working on an artifact, would be much hampered in his work. Instead, just as it was previously thought through according to the rules of the art, so too it is later executed.

Reply Obj. 5: That without which something could not happen need not be that for the sake of which it happens. For everything that is required for action is that without which an action cannot come to be, for example, instruments. Yet, the action is not done for the sake of the instruments. So, too, they who, in the undertaking of spiritual works, seek for temporal things do not seek them as the proximate or remote end of their actions, since a lesser good cannot be the end of a greater one. Instead, they seek them for the support of nature and the upkeep of their condition, so as to be able to undertake the spiritual works in due manner.

Article 2

Whether beatitude or charity is the common and single end of right wills

To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that the common and single end of right wills cannot be charity or beatitude.

Obj. 1: For nothing that is near the last end is the single end common to all. But charity surrounds the last end, namely, God, as do beatitude, good delight, and so forth. Therefore, things of this sort cannot be the common end of right wills.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, nothing undesired can be an end, nor can anything hidden be desired. Since, therefore, beatitude is hidden, according to what Isaiah 64:4 says, eye has not seen, O God, apart from you, what you have prepared for those who wait for you, (RSV reads no eye has seen a God besides thee, who works for those who wait for him.) it seems that beatitude cannot be the end of right wills.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, bodily good is not the end of spiritual good, since the end is always better than what is directed to the end. But eternal life seems to name a certain bodily thing: the eternal joining of our soul with our body. Therefore, eternal life is not the end of spiritual works.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, no end is possessed prior to the possession of what is directed to the end, since one arrives at the end through what is directed to the end. But charity is possessed prior to meritorious acts. Therefore, charity is not the end of right works.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, a work is called “right” insofar as it is informed by some virtue. But just as an act is informed by charity, so too is it formed by other virtues. Therefore, just as charity is posited as an end, so too ought other virtues to be called “ends.”

Obj. 6: Furthermore, what is simply good is not ordered to what is good for a particular thing as to its end, since what is good simply is better. But to be engaged in activity is good through itself, whereas delight is good for a particular thing, namely, the one engaged in the activity, and so right activity is better than delight. Therefore, right activity is not ordered to delight as to an end.

On the contrary, an end without which there cannot be a joining with the last end must itself be intended as a common end. But without charity, beatitude, and things of this sort, there cannot be the joining of man’s will to the last end, which is God. Therefore, all of these have the account of the common end.

I answer that, as was said above, (Above: d. 38, q. 1, a. 1.) although there is one last end of all things just as there is one first principle, nevertheless a proper end is owed to each thing just as there is a proper principle for each. And so, just as things that belong to one genus share in the proper principle of that genus, so too they share in one end. This is common to everything in that genus, but not to all things. And it is not possible for anything to have its due relation to the last end except through the mediation of the end that is owed to its genus. Now, the end proper to each thing whereby it is ordered to the last end is its own proper activity. Hence the end of the rational nature, through which it is ordered to its proper end, is the perfect activity proper to that nature.

But perfection of activity consists in three things: namely, object, habit, and delight. For the higher the object, the more beautiful and more perfect is the activity tending to that object. Hence an activity has its perfection from the object, and its highest perfection from the noblest object. In like manner, too, for man there is no perfect activity unless it comes from a habit. Hence, the more perfect the habit is, the more perfect the activity will be, and the most perfect activity will come from the noblest habit. Likewise, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 10, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.4, 1174b32.) delight perfects activity as beauty perfects youth, for delight itself is a kind of adornment of activity. Thus, one of these must be a common end of wills described as right.

Now, this perfect activity is beatitude, the highest object is God, the most perfect habit is charity, and the purest delight is spiritual delight, as is proved in the Ethics 10. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.7, 1177a24.) Thus, it says in the text (Sent. II, 38.1(245).1–2.) that God is the end of right wills as well as charity, good delight, and beatitude. Yet, this is in such a way that God is nonetheless the last end; and beatitude embracing charity and delight is like an end under the end, joining one to the last end, since an activity tends to the object itself. And there is not a right relation of the will to God except by means of these three things.

Reply Obj. 1: An end that is near the last end is not an end common to all things, but it can be common to everything in a given genus. And so it is with beatitude. For since irrational creatures cannot arrive at beatitude, beatitude is not their end. But it is the end of the rational creature that can arrive at it.

Reply Obj. 2: Although beatitude is hidden with respect to its substance, yet the account of beatitude is known. For all understand by “beatitude” a certain most perfect state. But what that perfect state consists in—whether it is in this life or after this life, or in bodily goods or spiritual goods, and in which of these spiritual goods—is hidden.

Reply Obj. 3: We speak of “life” in two ways. In one way, life is the same as the being of a living thing, as when it is said in On the Soul 2 (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.4, 415b12.) that for living things, to live is to be. And in this way, the man’s life comes from the joining of the soul to the body, and eternal life from their eternal joining. This is not the way in which eternal life is the end of right wills. In the other way, life means the activity of a living thing. And in this way, that perfect activity whereby blessed men will see God for eternity is called “eternal life,” as is said in John 17:3: this is eternal life, that they know you the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent. And in this way, eternal life is the end of right wills and is the same as beatitude.

Reply Obj. 4: Charity may be considered in two ways: either in habit, or insofar as its good results in an act, just as the goodness of any habit results in an act proceeding from the habit. Therefore, if charity is taken in the first way, then good activities done before the infusion of charity are ordered to charity as to an end, insofar as they dispose the soul to the reception of infused charity. But here, charity is not being understood in this way. Rather, it is being understood insofar as the good of charity results in an act, as when the Philosopher says in the Ethics 3 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.9, 1117b1–16.) that the person with fortitude acts on account of the good of fortitude, insofar as he refers his activities to the end of fortitude, which is to act with fortitude. Likewise, too, the one who has charity refers his activities to the good of charity, which is the very activity proceeding from charity, namely, the love of God and neighbor.

Reply Obj. 5: Only an act of the proper virtue or an act of another virtue commanded by it are ordered to the good of any virtue, just as an act proper to fortitude is ordered to the good of fortitude, or an act of magnanimity, which is a tending toward the doing of great and arduous things, is ordered to an act of fortitude insofar as fortitude commands it. But no virtue universally commands all virtues except for charity, which is the mother of all virtues. And it has this property on the one hand from its proper object, the highest good on which it bears immediately, and on the other hand from its subject, the will, which commands the other powers. Thus, charity alone among the virtues is called the “common end of all right wills.”

Reply Obj. 6: Activity simply speaking is better than delight. Thus, as physicians say, nature placed delight in the act of generation, so that animals, content with their own welfare, would not neglect the welfare of the species that comes about through generation. Hence delight is for the sake of activity. Now, delight does not follow upon any activity whatsoever, but instead upon perfect activity. Thus, just as imperfect activities are ordered to perfect activities, so too they are ordered to delight, which adorns perfect activity.

Or else, it should be said that an end can be attributed to something in two ways: either as considered in itself, and in this way, activity is not for the sake of delight, but vice versa, or else, on the side of that which tends to end. And in this latter way, activity is perfected by delight and is for its sake as for its own perfection. For proper delights, as it says in the Ethics 10, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.5, 1175a30.) increase in proper activities, since one who is doing such activities, insofar as he is refreshed by the delight they bring, carries them out more diligently.

Article 3

Whether intention is an act of the will

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I-II.12.1; On Truth, q. 22, a. 13.) It seems that intention is not something belonging to the will.

Obj. 1: For, as it says in the Ethics 2, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.5, 1105b20.) everything in the soul is either a passion, a habit, or a power. But intention does not name the very power of the will, since in this case every act of the will would have to be called “intention.” Likewise, too, it is not a habit of the soul, since the soul’s habits are virtues or knowledge. Again, it is not a passion in the will, since passions are in the sensitive part, not the intellective part, as is proved in the Physics 7. (Aristotle, Physics 7.3, 247a15.) Therefore, intention does not seem to be something that pertains to the will.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, as is proved in the Physics 2, (Aristotle, Physics 2.8, 199a6.) nature intends the end in its activity. But one that acts by nature does not act by will. For in the same book, one acting by a plan is distinguished in contrast to one acting by nature. Therefore, intention does not pertain to the will.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, on the passage: when your eye is not sound, your body is full of darkness (Luke 11:34), a Gloss says: the eye, that is, the intention. (Glossa interlinearis, at Luke 11:34 (in Glossa ordinaria 5.857).) But the account of an eye befits not the will, but more reason. Likewise, too, directing, which is attributed to intention, belongs to reason, not the will. Therefore, intention pertains not to the will, but to reason.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, will is the principle of actions that can be taken, pertaining to the practical intellect. But intention is not in practical matters alone, but also in speculative ones, in which an end is also found. Therefore, intention does not pertain to will.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, only two acts can be attributed to a power: what befits it essentially and what befits it in an order to another power. But intention cannot be an act of the will considered essentially, since it does not take its name from the will, while an act that belongs to a power essentially does take its name from it, as to understand does from the understanding. Likewise, it is not an act of it in an order to reason, since then its act is to choose, as was said above. Therefore, intention is in no way an act of the will.

On the contrary, merit and demerit are founded in the will alone. But we especially note merit and demerit with reference to intention. Therefore, intention pertains to the will.

Furthermore, as it says in the text, (Sent. II, 38.4(248).2.) intention has to do with the end. Now, the end has the account of the good. Therefore, since the good pertains to the will, being its object, it seems that intention belongs to the will.

I answer that we can discern the power to which intention pertains from its very name. For “intending” means, as it were, “tending-to” something else. Now, to intend something belongs to the power to which pursuing or fleeing something pertains. And this is appetite or will, not intellect. But it is true that the practical intellect indicates something about what is to be fled or pursued, as it says in On the Soul 3. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.10, 433a18.) Hence the judgment of flight or pursuit pertains to the practical intellect, but not the pursuit or flight itself. However, the speculative intellect does not flee or pursue, and does not even indicate anything about fleeing and pursuing. Thus, intention is an act not of the cognitive power, but of the appetitive power.

However, the fact that something is said to tend to something implies it has a distance from that to which it tends. Thus, when the appetite bears on something immediately, there is not said to be an “intention” of it, whether this is the last end or something directed to the last end. But when through one thing that it wills it attempts to arrive at another, there is said to be the intention for that at which it attempts to arrive. This is the end, and for this reason “intention” is said to concern the end, not insofar as the will bears on the end absolutely, but insofar as it tends to the end from what is directed to the end. Hence intention in its own account implies an order of one thing to another.

Now, the order of one to another is only through the intellect, to which it belongs to order. But in some the intellect that orders the appetite to the end is joined to the appetite itself, such as in the case of those possessing intellect, as in man and the angels. However, in others the intellect that orders is separate, such as in natural things, which are directed to the end by the intellect that establishes nature and marks out the end for them in advance. The appetite joined to an intellect is called the “will,” but the appetite separated from an intellect is a sensible and natural appetite. However, although intention is common to any of these appetites, it is found with greater priority in the will, which is directed to the end by an intellect joined to it. Thus, “intention” primarily and essentially denotes an act of the will insofar as in it there is the power of the intellect that gives order.

Reply Obj. 1: Activity is also understood to be in passion. For the soul’s activities are also kinds of passions, since to understand is to undergo something, as is to sense. Or, activity is also understood to be in habit, which is the principle of activity. Or else, it is because activity is not signified as existing in the soul, but as proceeding forth from the soul.

Reply Obj. 2: Although natural things do not possess a will, they do intend something by natural appetite, insofar as they are directed to their end by the divine intellect, which bestows an inclination to the end on nature, and this inclination is called “natural appetite.” Thus, in this case it is not properly intention in them as it is in the agents at issue.

Reply Obj. 3: To direct or to be an eye is attributed to the intention, not insofar as it is an act of the will simply speaking, but insofar as the power of the ordering reason remains in the will.

Reply Obj. 4: Since the will moves all powers to their acts, it is not only with respect to those that pertain to the practical intellect, but also of those that pertain to the speculative intellect. For just as man wills to walk or to do some such thing, so also he wills to consider or to discover the truth of some question.

Reply Obj. 5: Intention is an act of the will not absolutely, but in an order to the reason that gives order to the will’s act. But reason can order the act of the will in two ways: either insofar as the will concerns the end, and then the act of the will in an order to reason is intention, or else insofar as it concerns what is directed to the end, and in this case the act of the will in an order to reason is choice.

Article 4

Whether it is by one and the same act that the will wills the end and what is directed to the end

To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I-II.8.3; 12.4; On Truth, q. 22, a. 14.) It seems that it is not one act of the will which concerns the end and what is directed to the end.

Obj. 1: For all acts are distinguished by their objects, as it says in On the Soul 2. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.4, 415a20.) But the end and what is directed to the end are different objects. Therefore, the motions of the will bearing on them are also different.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the motion that is to the final end point and that which is to a mid point are not the same specifically, as it says in the Ethics 10, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.4, 1174a20–29.) for example, a motion to blackness and a motion to paleness from whiteness. But that which is directed to the end is like a mid point whereby we reach the end as the final end point. Therefore, it is not the same motion of the will that belongs to the end and to what is directed to the end.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the will’s act follows on the act of the intellect. But thinking about the end and about what is directed to the end are not the same. Therefore, neither are the will’s motions the same.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, contraries cannot exist in the same thing at the same time. But in one who wills to give alms for the sake of vainglory, the will of the end is evil, and the will of what is directed to the end is good. Therefore, it is not the same act of the will on both sides.

On the contrary, the Philosopher says, (See Aristotle, Topics 3.2, 117a18–20. Nicolaï notes that even though marginal notes cite Ethics 10.2, the quote is not found there or anywhere else expressly, though he adds that the principle can be gathered from Aristotle’s On Memory and Recollection. Aquinas proposes the same axiom further on, but without referring to Aristotle, at In IV Sent., d. 9, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 3, obj. 3.) where one thing is desired on account of another, there only the one thing is desired. But what is directed to the end is desired on account of the end. Therefore, one desire belongs to the end and to what is directed to the end.

Furthermore, it is not possible for a power to be in two acts at the same time. But one wills the end and what is directed to the end simultaneously. Therefore, there is not a different motion of the will to both.

I answer that when something is said with reference to a relation to another, we can consider it in two ways. Either we can consider it as a thing in itself absolutely, and in this case there is not the same consideration of it and of that in relation to which it is said, but rather both are considered separately. Or else, we can consider it insofar as it is said in relation to the other, and in this way, the same consideration belongs to both. For one who knows one of the relatives knows the remaining relative, as it says in the Categories. (Aristotle, Categories 7, 8a35.) For example, if one considers an image as the image of a given thing, the same consideration will belong to the image and to that whose image it is. However, if the image is considered precisely as a given thing, such as a shape depicted in stone, the consideration of the image will be different from the consideration of that whose image it is.

This, too, I say concerning what is directed to the end. For there are some things that are sought on account of the end that they nevertheless possess in themselves, whereby they might be desired. And the will can bear on these kinds of things in two ways: either as seeking them on account of the end, and in this case there is the same motion of the will to the end and to what is directed to the end; or else insofar as they themselves are things that are essentially desirable, and then there are different wills for both. But there are other things that are only desired in relation to the end, such as cutting and burning. And in these kinds of things, the will’s motion never differs to the extent that the will bears on them or on their end. For the will only bears on them as considered under the relation to the end.

Reply Obj. 1: The end and that which is directed to the end, considered precisely as such, are not different objects, but only one single object in which the end is like the formal element, being, as it were, the given reason for willing, but what is directed to the end is like the material element, just as light and color are also one object.

Reply Obj. 2: When the will bears on what is directed to the end precisely as directed to the end, what is directed to the end is not its final end point. Thus, there need not be two motions in this case. So, too, there is one continuous motion from extreme to extreme that passes through the mid point, unless it uses the mid point as an end point (by resting at the mid point).

Reply Obj. 3: Even thinking about what is directed to the end, considered precisely in its order to the end, is the same as thinking about the end, but this is not the case when thinking about what is directed to the end as a given thing, and, likewise, neither is the will.

Reply Obj. 4: When someone wills to give alms for the sake of vainglory, there is one act of the will. And this act is completely evil, granted that it never possesses malice with respect to everything in it. For a single particular defect suffices for something to be called “evil” simply. But it is true that if one willed the fact of giving alms as a given thing not in order to this kind of end, then that act of the will would be good, but it would be an act of the will different from the one whereby one wills vainglory.

Article 5

Whether the will should be judged as right on the basis of the end

To the fifth we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I-II.18.4.) It seems that the will should not be judged as right on the basis of the end.

Obj. 1: For it is possible to will an evil for the sake of good, as in the case of one who wills to steal in order to give alms. But such a will is evil, and yet the will’s end is good. Therefore, the will’s rectitude is not judged from the end.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is possible for one to do something small intending to do something great, as when one gives an obol if he intends to have as great a return as if he gave a hundred marks. But it does not follow that he is doing as great a good as the end he intends. Therefore, the rectitude of the will is not measured on the basis of the end.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, everything desires the good, as it says in the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.1, 1094a1.) Therefore, if the will should be called “right” due to the will of the end, every will will be good.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, in order for something to be called “good,” everything that perfects the thing in goodness must come together. For the good is from a single, total cause, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 30 (PG 3:730).) But the goodness of an act is caused by habit, circumstances, and end. Therefore, the rectitude of the will cannot sufficiently be judged from the end.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the rectitude of an act is judged on the same basis as its goodness is measured. But the goodness of an act, particularly in its power to merit, is measured from the root, which is the habit that elicits the act. Therefore, the rectitude of the will is judged on the basis of the habit that is the act’s principle rather than from the end.

On the contrary, every motion receives its species from the end point. But the end point of the will’s act is the end. Therefore, it is from the goodness of the end that an act of the will should be judged good.

Furthermore, an act receives its species from the form of the agent. Hence actions are differentiated specifically with reference to different forms, as in the case of heating and cooling. But the form of the will is the end, which is the desirable object, just as the intelligible object is the form of the intellect. Therefore, an act of the will is called “good” or “evil” with reference to the goodness or malice of the end.

I answer that an act of the will can bear on the end in two ways: either it bears immediately on the end itself, and in this case the act of the will manifestly possesses goodness or malice from the end, since to will a good end is good, and to will an evil end is evil. For the goodness of the end does not depend further on anything else, just as the goodness of what is directed to the end depends on the end. And this kind of act is properly called “the will of the end,” as in the case of willing beatitude. In the other way, an act bears on the end by means of what is directed to the end. This is properly called “intending the end.” And then we must distinguish. For in the case of evils, it should be said absolutely that an act possesses malice from the end, since if the intended end is evil, the will is evil, no matter how good is the good that is ordered to such an end, by the fact that a single particular defect suffices for malice.

However, in goods we must distinguish: either we are speaking of the end of the one willing or of the end of the act of the will. The end of the one willing means the end the one willing has set for himself. In this case it does not follow that if the end is good the will is good, since what is willed can be evil and one evil alone suffices for the malice of the will, whether it is the end, or what is willed, that is evil. And although in one way the act of the will bearing on the end and on what is directed to the end is the same, “intention” denotes the act with reference to the act’s order to the end, while “will” denotes the same act with reference to the order to the proximate object that is ordered to the end. Thus, in this sort of case the will is evil, but the intention is good.

Now, the “end” also means that to which the act is proportionate. And in this case if the end is also good, so is the act, since an evil act is not proportionate to a good end. Hence the Philosopher says in the Ethics 6, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.9, 1142b22–25.) concerning those who intend to attain good ends by evil acts, that they seek to be allotted the end by an unfitting means. For just as not every matter is disposed for every form, neither is every instrument disposed for every effect, and neither is every means disposed for every result, and so too not every act is disposed for every end.

Reply Obj. 1: When one wills evil for good, this good is not the end of the act of the will considered by itself but is, rather, the end inordinately selected by the one willing.

Reply Obj. 2: And this is also what we should say to the second objection. For in evils it holds simply that one sins to the extent that he wills evil, whereas in goods it does not hold if we understand it of the end of the one willing, but instead only if we understand it of the end of the act.

Reply Obj. 3: Although every will desires the good, it does not always desire what is truly good for it. Rather, it desires what appears good. Although every man desires beatitude, he does not always seek it where there is true beatitude, but instead where it is not. Thus, he attempts to reach it through what is not the right way. For this reason not every will must be good.

Reply Obj. 4: An act is called “good” by circumstances insofar as the circumstances make the act proportionate to the due end. Thus, the act’s goodness principally depends on the end.

Reply Obj. 5: Rectitude of the end is included in the habit. For to have a virtue, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 2, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.4, 1105a30–b1.) three elements are required. First, one must have knowledge. Then, he must will for the good, in which is included the order to the end. Third, he must act firmly and unchangeably. Thus, if the act’s goodness proceeds from a habit, this does not prevent its being judged on the basis of the end.

Exposition of the text

Also: ‘All the interconnected wills are righteous, if that will is good to which they are all referred.’ (Sent. II, 38.3(247).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 11, ch. 6 (CCSL 50; PL 42:992).) This should be understood if they are referred to the right will as if of themselves ordered to it, in such a way that the right will is the end of the act of the will, not only that of the agent, as has been said. (Above: a. 5.)

‘We must not preach the Gospel in order to eat.’ (Sent. II, 38.3(247).2, quoting Augustine, De sermone Domini in monte, bk. 2, para. 54 (CCSL 35; PL 34:1292).) This is true simply. For eating cannot be the end of preaching the Gospel, whether proximate or final. Rather, it is something sought by the one preaching to preserve the faculty of preaching the Gospel. Thus, the Master does not explain this statement in the solution below.

But the end of the will is either that which we will . . . or rather something else for the sake of which we will what we will. (Sent. II, 38.4(248).2.) For every good holds the account of an end, while the good is the object of the will. Thus, whatever is willed, which is the object of the will, can be called an “end.” But that is more properly called an “end” to which the will tends last, since this is what is willed first by it. Thus, in the Ethics 3 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.5, 1113b2.) it says that the will is of the end, but choice is of what is directed to the end.

Intention, however, is sometimes taken for the will, sometimes for the end. (Sent. II, 38.4(248).2.) Intention, properly speaking, signifies the act of the will, as has been said, (Above: a. 5, resp.) but only signifies the end if the term is taken in a material sense, namely, taking “intention” for the thing intended, just as “faith” is taken for the thing believed.

And the end of the will is the good or evil pleasure. (Sent. II, 38.4(248).3.) A pleasure is called “good” when it follows on a good activity, and “evil” when it follows on an evil one, as is clear from the Ethics 10. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.5, 1176a10–29.)

Intention looks to that for the sake of which we will. (Sent. II, 38.4(248).4.) For intention includes the act of reason, and thus regards that to which something is ordered, but “will” denotes the act of the will absolutely, to which it does not belong to order or confer. Thus, the will regards that on which it bears immediately.

And the will by which I will to have eternal life seems to be one thing, and that by which I will to help the poor another. (Sent. II, 38.4(248).7.) How they are the same and how they are different has been said. Hence both opinions are true in a certain respect.