D. 39 - How sin can be in the will

Division of the text

Having shown that rectitude and perversity of the will is from the end, here he inquires whether there can be perversity and sin in the will. This is divided into two parts.

In the first, he shows how sin can be in the will.

And because sin only exists in regard to deviation from that to which something is naturally ordered, in the second part he inquires how the will naturally tends to the good, at moreover, it is usual to ask how is to be understood what Ambrose says. (Sent. II, 39.3(251).1, quoting Ambrosiaster, Commentaria in Epistolas B. Pauli, at Romans 7:15 (PL 17:112).)

The first part is divided into two parts.

In the first, he raises a question.

In the second, he puts forward a response, at to this, it is easy for those to respond who say that all things that are, insofar as they are, are good. (Sent. II, 39.1(249).2.)

And this is divided into two parts.

In the first, he puts forth the response in accord with the first opinion recounted above, which posits that all things, inasmuch as they are good, are also from God.

In the second, he responds in accord with the other opinion, which posits that the acts of sins are in no way good and are not from God, at but those who say that evil wills are sins and in no way goods, answer more briefly. (Sent. II, 39.2(250).2.)

Concerning the first, he does three things.

First, he responds to the question.

Second, he makes an objection to the response and resolves it, at here it may reasonably be asked of them. (Sent. II, 39.1(249).3.)

Third, again he raises an objection against the solution to the objection and resolves it, at but now it is asked why an action of this natural power is a sin. (Sent. II, 39.2(250).1.)

Here there are three questions.

The first question is whether there is sin in the will. (Q. 1.)

The second addresses how man naturally wills the good. (Q. 2.)

The third concerns the statement that the higher spark of reason cannot be extinguished. (Q. 3.)

Question 1

Whether sin is in the will

Concerning the first, two questions are asked:

first, whether there can be the perversity of sin in the will;

second, whether there can be sin in the acts of other powers.

Article 1

Whether the will can be perverted by sin

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I-II.74.1.) It seems that the will cannot be perverted by sin.

Obj. 1: For the will pertains to the image of God not only, so it seems, as a power, but also by reason of its act, since as was said, (In I Sent., d. 3, q. 4, a. 2.) the perfect account of the image is preserved in regard to certain objects in three powers. Now, a power is only compared to an object by means of its act. Therefore, since the goodness of the image is not taken away by sin because it says that in the image, man passes (Ps 39:6 [38:7]), (RSV reads surely man goes about as a shadow.) it seems that there cannot be sin in the will.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, that which immediately receives an influence from the primary source unchangeably possesses what the influx into itself is, just as spiritual substances, which receive being immediately from God, possess incorruptible being, whereas the rest cannot always be preserved in being on account of being at a greater distance from the primary being, as it says in On Generation and Corruption 2. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 2.10, 336a18–33.) But the source of goodness is the end, from which the account of good is taken. Therefore, since the will bears on the end as its object or even as its last end immediately, it seems that it possesses goodness that it cannot lose. Thus, it cannot be vitiated by sin.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it says: every one who commits sin is a slave to sin (John 8:34). But slavery does not belong to the will, which is most free and the source of freedom, as was said above. (Above, d. 24, q. 1, a. 2.) Therefore, there cannot be sin in it.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the defect of sin should not be imputed to that in which the defect can only exist if it first exists in something else. But there can only be defect in the will if defect first exists in the reason. Therefore, sin should not be imputed to the will. Proof of the middle premise: the will is only of the good or of the apparent good. But the will possesses no defect as tending to the good. Therefore, it only falls short as tending to the apparent but non-existent good. But this occurs insofar as the judgment of reason is mistaken. Therefore, there is no defect in the will unless there is first one in the reason.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, fault and sin are to the appetitive power as error is to the cognitive power. But, as it says in the Metaphysics 4, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.5, 1010b1.) falsity is proper to the fantasy, which is sensitive cognition. Therefore, sin also is proper to the sensitive appetite, not the intellective appetite, which is the will.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Augustine, Retractions, bk. 1, ch. 9 (CCSL 57; PL 32:596).) that the will is that whereby one sins or lives rightly. But the deformity of sin is in whatever it is whereby one sins. Therefore, the deformity of sin can be in the will.

Furthermore, everything that is from nothing can turn back to nothing, as Damascene says, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 3 (PG 94:867).) either as regards being or as regards choice. But the created will is from nothing. Therefore, since it cannot turn back to nothing as regards being, since it is part of the image, it must be capable of turning to nothing as regards choice. And this only occurs by sin. Therefore, sin can be in the will.

I answer that nothing is imputed to someone as sin or fault unless he himself is the cause of it, because we are only praised or rebuked on the basis of our own acts. In contrast, what we are not the cause of does not occur through our own act. Hence, since we speak of the will in two ways, namely, as the will that is a power and the will that is an act, the will that is a power—seeing as it is not from us, but from God in us—cannot be a sin; but its act, which is from us, can be.

But it should be known that an act is from something in two ways. One way is both in regard to the act’s substance and the agent’s determination regarding the act. And this is properly said to be in the agent’s power, as it is in the will. For the power of the will itself, as far as it itself goes, is indifferent to more than one object. But the fact that it determinately proceeds to this or that act is not from anything else that determines, but is from the will itself. However, in natural things the act proceeds from the agent, though the determination to this act is not from the agent, but from the one who gave the agent a certain kind of nature whereby it is determined to this act. Thus, it is most properly the act of the will that is said to be from the will. Hence if there is some defect in its act, it is imputed to the same will as a fault and a sin. Now, every created will has the possibility of falling short in its act from its nature by virtue of the fact that it is from nothing and can be bent to the point of defect. Thus, it remains that there can be sin in the will as regards its act.

Reply Obj. 1: The will that is an act is not part of the image that is the image of likeness considered in the distinction of powers. For no will’s act remains always, whereas the image always remains. But that the image is particularly assigned among powers with reference to certain objects is not due to the fact that it actually bears on them, unless perhaps in a kind of confused way; thus it was said in Book I (In I Sent., d. 3, q. 1.) that the soul always understands itself, not by discerning or thinking something of itself, but as present to itself. Rather, it is due to the fact that it is able to bear on these objects. But it is true that the image of re-creation, which does not always remain, can be considered both as regards acts and habits.

Reply Obj. 2: The first principle’s influence on substances, on which it has its influence immediately, is through the activity of the first principle itself. Because this activity can possess no defect, they receive being from the first principle unfailingly. But the order of the will to the last end is not by way of the last end’s activity in the will, but through the will’s activity as it tends to the end. And because there can be defect in the will, it can fall short of this order through a defect in its activity, not through a defect in the end.

Reply Obj. 3: Because the will is most free, it consequently possesses the inability to be forced into slavery, but this does not exclude its being able to make itself subject to slavery, which is what happens when the will freely consents to the act of sin.

Reply Obj. 4: The error in the reason in accord with which it esteems as good what is not good is on the basis of the ignorance of the choice, as it says in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, 1111a31.) This ignorance does not cause involuntariness, since the will is in a certain way this kind of ignorance’s cause when it does not restrain the passions that absorb reason in its act of esteeming, seeing as restraining them is in the will’s power. Thus, sin is rightly imputed to the will.

Reply Obj. 5: Error or falsity is called “proper to the fantasy” not because it cannot be in the intellect, but because they are sometimes caused by error of the fantasy and imagination. Likewise, too, disorder of the sensible appetite is in a certain way the cause of sin, which is in the will, not by compelling it, but by introducing it. Hence philosophers named the lower part in which the soul’s passions exist the “vicious part,” as Augustine says in the City of God. (Augustine, The City of God, bk. 14, ch. 19 (CCSL 48; PL 41:427).)

Article 2

Whether there can be sin in the act of the intellect and powers other than the will

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: below, d. 41, q. 2, a. 2; ST I-II.74.2; II-II.10.2; On Evil, q. 7, a. 6.) It seems that there can be sin in the acts of other powers, particularly the act of the intellect.

Obj. 1: For thinking is the act of the intellect. But it is the case that one can sin by thinking. Therefore, it is possible for there to be sin in the act of the intellect.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, sin is an activity contrary to the activity that is due man precisely as man. For this kind of activity is right activity, to which sin is contrary. But the intellect’s activity belongs to man precisely as man. For man is called “man” on the basis of possessing intellect and reason. Therefore, it is possible for there to be sin in the activity of the intellect.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, contraries are naturally apt to occur concerning the same thing. But sin is opposed to virtue. Therefore, since there is a kind of virtue in the intellect, namely, intellectual virtue, as is clear from the Ethics 6, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.3–7.) it seems that there can be sin in the intellect.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, unbelief is a sin. But unbelief is in the intellect insofar as it dissents from the doctrine of the faith. Therefore, there can be sin in the intellect.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, only sin is forbidden. But some sciences are forbidden, such as necromancy and such things. Therefore, since science is in the intellect, it seems that there can be sin in the intellect.

On the contrary, what excuses sin is not a sin. But a defect in the intellect, such as ignorance, excuses sin. Therefore, there cannot be sin in the intellect.

Furthermore, what is not in our power is not a sin. But understanding something is not in our power. Therefore, if we fall short in understanding, we do not sin.

I answer that, since there is in sin the account of evil and, besides this, the account of fault, each is found in the act of the intellect and the act of the will in different ways. For in the will’s act there is evil from the object, but not in the act of the intellect. For to will what is evil is evil, but to understand what is evil is not evil.

The reason for this can be taken from the object of each. For the will’s object is the good, whereas the intellect’s object is the true. Now, good and evil, as it says in the Metaphysics 6, (This is implied but not explicitly said in Aristotle, Metaphysics 6.4, 1027b25.) are in things, while true and false are in the soul. Thus, by its act the will tends to its object as it is in the thing, and so the act of the will is good or evil from the goodness or malice of the thing willed. But by its act the intellect tends to the thing as it is in the soul. Now, the account of evils and goods in the soul is a good, and thus, to know evil or good is good in itself. Hence Boethius says that knowledge of evil cannot be lacking in good. But evil does occur in the intellect from an undue proportion of the intellect to the thing, namely, from the fact that it apprehends the thing otherwise than it is. For to understand a thing falsely is an evil in the act of the intellect, just as the true is its good, as it says in the Ethics 6. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.2, 1139b12.)

Therefore, the act of the intellect that is evil in this way does not also have account of a fault in the same way as an act of the will that is found to be evil in its own manner. For the account of fault is found primarily in the act of the will, whereas in the acts of the intellect and other powers, it is only found insofar as they are commanded by the will. For the account of fault in the deformed act is due to the fact that it proceeds from someone who has control over his own act.

Now, this exists in man on the basis of the power that is related to more than one object and is only determined to any of them from itself, which befits the will alone. For the powers connected to organs are constrained to a given act by the changing of the organs, without which they cannot proceed to the act. The intellect, in turn, although it is a power that is not connected to an organ, is still constrained to a given thing by reasoning or argument, or falls short of a given thing beyond its capacity due to lack of demonstration or intellectual light. However, the will is capable of itself of anything that has been apprehended, and cannot be violently held back from it by any argument. For, since the intellect bears on a thing as the thing is in the soul and characterized as true, in order to understand the thing the intellect needs a kind of middle light or demonstration whereby to lead the thing to the fact of being proportioned to its understanding. Hence even by reason it can be necessarily repelled from consenting to a given thing. But the will, as has been said, (Above: a. 1.) bears on its object as it is in the thing. Thus, it does not need to have any activity on the thing to make it proportionate to itself, whether by stripping it away from matter or any other such thing, as the intellect does. Rather, it bears on the apprehended thing directly as it is. Thus, it cannot fail to bear on whatever it wills, either by something else preventing it or through any defect of its own.

Reply Obj. 1: Sin can be in thoughts in two ways. Either it is precisely as thoughts, and in this way, the only sin in them is that of vanity, insofar as the intellect ought to be occupied with higher thoughts and is occupied with useless ones. Yet this is imputed as a fault only insofar as the intellect’s act is naturally apt to be commanded by the will. Or else, it is as thoughts sought out for the pleasure of the thing thought about. In this case, there is more sin in the pleasure of the thing thought about with respect to memory or appearance than in the thinking itself. But this pleasure is not in the intellect, but in the concupiscible and irascible parts, whose acts are thought about. Hence this kind of sin is traced back to the same genus (such as that of fornication or homicide) in which is the same act externally perpetrated.

Reply Obj. 2: The perfect activity of the intellect that belongs to man as man has the account of merit only insofar as it is commanded by the will, such as when one merits in contemplation of divine things. Likewise, on the contrary, there is only fault in the act of an errant intellect thinking about various matters insofar as its act is commanded by the will.

Reply Obj. 3: The sin about which we are now speaking, which has the account of a demerit, is not opposed to virtue taken in any way. Rather, it is opposed to virtue as the principle of the meritorious act deserving a reward. Now, although the perfecting of the intellect, as by science and wisdom, can have the account of a virtue due only to the fact that the perfecting of the intellect is a work of it that renders it good, insofar as it makes it to understand rightly, it only possesses the property of its act being deserving of reward and meritorious insofar as it is commanded by the will.

Reply Obj. 4: Unbelief is only a sin in the intellect insofar as the act of the intellect is commanded by the will. For this, too, is how faith is in it, since, according to Augustine, a man can only believe if he is willing. (Augustine, In Iohannis evangelium tractatus, tract. 27, sect. 2 (CCSL 36; PL 35:1607).) Likewise, too, unless a man voluntarily fails to do what he ought to do, he would not fall into unbelief because, if he did what is in him, God would reveal to him what he should believe.

Reply Obj. 5: These arts are not forbidden merely as lying within one’s knowledge, except incidentally inasmuch as they are an occasion for sinning, insofar as knowing the art disposes and inclines one to use the art, which cannot occur without sin. Even if the speculation of the art itself is called a “sin,” this will only be on the part of the one doing the speculation, who indeed is bound to focus on other matters if this kind of consideration withdraws him from the others.

Question 2

How man naturally wills the good

Then the question is asked of how man naturally wills the good. Concerning this, two questions are asked:

first, whether man wills the good naturally;

second, whether it is the same motion whereby man wills the good naturally and wills evil.

Article 1

Whether man naturally wills the good

To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that man does not naturally will the good.

Obj. 1: For what is natural is the same for all. But not all men will the good. Therefore, willing the good is not natural to them.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, we do not become accustomed to what is natural, as it says in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.1, 1103a20.) But by becoming accustomed, a man becomes more apt at willing good things. Therefore, willing the good is not natural to man.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, what is by nature is always in its act, and if it fails, it only fails in the minority of cases due to some incidental impediment. But man frequently fails to will the good. Therefore, it is not natural to him.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, we neither merit nor demerit on the basis of what is natural. But one merits by the fact that he wills what is good. Therefore, willing what is good is not natural.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, what is natural is not taken away by sin. For natural endowments remain integral even in the demons, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 23 (PG 3:726).) But by sin a man is estranged from the will for what is good. Therefore, willing the good is not natural.

On the contrary, in a Gloss on Matthew 4, (Glossa ordinaria, at Matthew 4:23, 5.91 (PL 114:88): docens naturales justitias, castitatem, etc.; John Chrysostom, Incomplete Commentary on Matthew, homily 8, para. 23 (CCSL 87B; PG 56:677).) it says that the virtues are natural to man, and the Philosopher even says this in the Ethics 6. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.11, 1143b7.) But on the basis of virtues, one is inclined to will the good. Therefore, willing the good is natural to man.

Furthermore, just as the intellective part is perfected in knowledge of the true, so also the affective part is perfected in the will for the good. But knowing what is true is naturally desired by all, since all men by nature desire to know, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.1, 980a24.) Therefore, willing the good is natural to man.

I answer that something is said to be natural to a certain thing which befits it in accord with the condition of its form whereby it is established in a given kind of nature, just as fire naturally tends upwards. Now, the form whereby man is man is his very reason and intellect. Hence he naturally tends to what is fitting for him in regard to reason and intellect. But the good of any virtue is fitting to man in accord with reason because this kind of goodness is from a commensurability of the act to circumstances and end produced by reason. Hence certain inclinations of the virtues or aptitudes preexist naturally in the rational nature itself. These are called “natural virtues” and are also filled out through practice and deliberation, as it says in the Ethics 6. (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.13, 1144b1–1145a11.) Thus, man naturally tends to the good.

But natural motion proceeds from form according to the form’s condition. But the will, as well as reason, are of such condition that they are not determined to one thing, such that they could be diverted to another. Thus, even though willing the good is natural to man, he can still will evil, not precisely as evil, but as esteemed to be good.

Reply Obj. 1: This natural inclination to the good is found in all men. But, as has been said, (Resp.) because the will is not determined to one thing by necessity, not all must actually will the good.

Reply Obj. 2: The will’s inclination to good, which is in human nature, is not by way of becoming accustomed; rather, the habit whereby this fitness is perfected is either by custom or by infusion.

Reply Obj. 3: In what is determined to one thing, the natural act always follows if it is not impeded, and an impediment occurs in the minority of cases. But the will is not a kind of nature determined to one thing, and, besides, it has an impediment that is always connected with it, namely, the flesh that resists it. Hence the Apostle says: but I see in my members another law at war with the law of my mind and making me captive to the law of sin (Rom 7:23). Thus, man is led away from willing the good simply to willing the apparent good.

Reply Obj. 4: The natural act in what is determined to one thing cannot be meritorious because these kinds of acts are not subject to the will, as is clear in the acts of the nutritive part. But the acts that are subject to the will’s command are meritorious, even if man naturally wills them.

Reply Obj. 5: The natural inclination is never taken away by sin, even though the fitness, as was said, is always lessened by sin.

Article 2

Whether the will whereby man naturally wills good is the same as that whereby he wills evil

To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that it is the same will whereby man naturally wills the good and whereby he wills evil.

Obj. 1: For a rational power is situated in relation to opposites. But the will is a rational power. Therefore, it relates to opposites. Therefore, it is the same for good and for evil.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the will considered as nature and as deliberate will are the same. But by will considered as nature, man naturally wills what is good, while by deliberate will man wills evil. Therefore, by the same will man naturally wills good and evil.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, free decision is that whereby good and evil are chosen, as was said above. (Above, d. 24, q. 1, a. 1, quoting Augustine, De actis cum Felice Manich., bk. 2, ch. 4 (PL 42:538).) But free decision is will, as is clear from what was settled before. Therefore, it is the same will that naturally tends to the good and that wills evil.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, good and evil are to affection as true and false are to knowledge. But the same power, that is, reason, is of the true as well as the false. Therefore, the same will that is naturally for the good is also for evil.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, a power determined to one thing cannot be the principle of a meritorious act. But if the will that bears on good is different from the one that bears on evil, one of them will be determined to good and the other to evil, or at least the other will be determined. Therefore, neither of them will be able to be the principle of merit or demerit.

On the contrary, the same thing does not resist itself. But the will whereby man naturally wills the good is resisted by the will whereby man wills evil. Therefore, both are not a single will.

Furthermore, the same thing does not naturally tend to two contraries. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore, it is not the same will that tends to good and to evil.

I answer that that whereby one wills good and evil can be spoken of in three ways.

In one way, it is the principle that inclines to good or evil, and in this way, it is not the same thing whereby one wills good and evil. For the will of sensuality inclines naturally to the pleasure of the flesh that is agreeable to it while it is evil to man precisely as man, whereas the rational will, as belonging to man’s nature or as following on the natural apprehension of the universal principles of law, is what inclines to the good.

In the second way, that whereby one wills good or evil can mean that whereby one chooses good or evil by following this or that inclination, and in this case it is the same will by which one wills good and evil.

In the third way, it can mean the very act of the will, and in this case, there is no doubt that the act of the will whereby the will wills good and by which it wills evil are different in act.

Reply Obj. 1: Even though the rational power relates to opposites, it is not equally ordered to both of the opposites but is, rather, ordered to one naturally and to the other insofar as it falls short of the perfection of its proper nature. Thus, there is one will that naturally tends to the good, namely, the will of reason, and another that naturally tends to what is evil to man precisely as man, namely, the will of sensuality, particularly to the extent that it has been corrupted by the fomes.

Reply Obj. 2: The will as deliberate and as nature do not differ in the power’s essence. For “natural” and “deliberate” are not differences of the will in itself but insofar as it follows the judgment of reason, since in the reason there is something naturally known that is like the indemonstrable principle in practical matters, related as an end, because the end holds the place of a principle in practical matters, as it says in the Ethics 6. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.2, 1139a1.) Hence that which is man’s end is naturally known in the reason as good and to be desired, and the will following on this knowledge is called the “will as nature.” But there is also something known in the reason by way of inquiry, both in practical as well as speculative matters. In both cases, speculative and practical, it is possible for the inquiring reason to err. Hence the will that follows on this kind of knowledge of reason is called “deliberate” and can tend to good or evil, though not from the same inclining factor, as has been said. (Resp.)

Reply Obj. 3: Free decision notes a power that chooses good or evil, not what inclines to both.

Reply Obj. 4: Although it is the same reason that can be of what is true as well as what is false, it does not belong to both on the same basis. Rather, it has the property of knowing the truth by virtue of the first principles that are naturally known, whereas it judges falsely due to the fantasy. Likewise, in choice, the will possesses rectitude from natural inclination with the help of grace, but there is sin in it due to the corruption of the lower powers that incline to sin.

Reply Obj. 5: The will is determined and naturally tends to one thing to the extent that it does not naturally tend to another, not that it tends to what it naturally tends toward of necessity, but voluntarily. Hence it can also not choose it. Likewise, too, it can not choose the sin to which corrupted sensuality inclines, since a natural inclination, as has been said, (Resp.) is in accord with the requirement of the nature in which is found such an inclination.

Question 3

The higher spark of reason

Then the question is asked about the higher spark of reason. Concerning this three questions are asked:

first, whether the higher spark of reason can be extinguished;

second, whether conscience can err;

third, whether an erring conscience binds.

Article 1

Whether the higher spark of reason can be extinguished

To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that the higher spark of reason can be extinguished.

Obj. 1: For an error of reason is called its being “extinguished,” since it is compared with darkness. But it can happen that this spark of reason errs, as is clear in a gloss of Jerome on Ezekiel 1, where besides the words quoted in the text, it adds a little later on: now we see that this conscience is often cast down. (Jerome, Commentary on Ezekiel, bk. 1, ch. 1 (CCSL 75; PL 25:22); see Sent. II, 39.3(251).3.) Therefore, the higher spark of reason can be extinguished.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the higher spark of reason seems to be the higher part of reason. But the higher reason can sin, even mortally, as was said above. (Above: d. 24, q. 3.) Therefore, this spark can be extinguished.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it is the property of this spark that as long as it remains it complains against evil. But in heretics there is nothing that murmurs against the sins that they perform in accord with their sect, since even in slaying the just they think they are offering worship to God, as it says in John 16:2. Therefore, the spark of reason has been extinguished in them.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the Philosopher says in the Ethics 7 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.8, 1151a15–19.) that the wicked, namely, those who have already acquired a habit of vice, have ignorance of the end. But there can only be a murmur of conscience with respect to the act insofar as the deviation from the end is known. Therefore, it seems that in those whose powers have been corrupted through such habits, this kind of murmur would cease. Thus, the spark of reason in them is extinguished.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, what murmurs against evil and what inclines to the good are the same. But in the damned there is nothing inclining them to the good. Therefore, there is also not anything in them that murmurs against evil. Thus, the spark of reason in them is extinguished.

On the contrary, the spark of reason cannot be extinguished while the light of the intellect remains. But the light of the intellect is never taken away by sin because this light pertains to the image, as is clear from what Psalm 4:6 [4:7] says: the light of your countenance has been marked upon us, O Lord. (RSV reads lift up the light of thy countenance upon us, O Lord!) On this passage, a Gloss explains the co-marking of the image. (Glossa ordinaria, at Psalm 4:7, 3.463 (PL 113:849).) Therefore, the spark of reason is not extinguished by sin.

Furthermore, what is natural is not taken away by sin. But the inclination to the good is natural to man, as has been said, (Above: q. 2, a. 2, resp.) and this is on the basis of the spark of reason. Therefore, the spark of reason is not extinguished by sin.

I answer that, according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 7, n. 3 (PG 3:871).) divine wisdom joins what is first among secondary things to what is last among primary things. For, as shown in the Book of Causes, (Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 30.) in the order of created things the subsequent must be like what precedes it, and this can only be insofar as it participates in something of its perfection, though it is in a lower mode in the secondary order of created things than in the primary. Hence that in which the lower creature participates in a likeness to the higher is the highest in the lower and the last in the higher, since it is received in a more deficient way than it exists in the higher.

Now, among created things the order is such that first there are angels and then, second, the rational soul. Because the rational soul is joined to a body, the knowledge owed it in its proper order is knowledge that proceeds from sensible things to intelligible things, and it arrives at knowledge of the truth only by a preceding inquiry, and this is why its knowledge is called “rational.” Because angels, in turn, are simply incorporeal and not united to a body, the knowledge due their nature is such that they apprehend the truth simply without inquiry. For this reason, their nature is given the name of “intellectual.”

Therefore, in the rational soul, which within the order of things created is made similar to the angel, there must be a participation in the intellectual power, on the basis of which it apprehends the truth without inquiry; for example, the first principles naturally known, both in speculative and in practical matters, are apprehended. Hence, too, this kind of power is called “intellect” in speculative matters and is also called “synderesis” in practical ones. This power is fittingly called a “spark,” for just as a spark is a tiny portion that shoots out from a fire, so also this power is like a tiny participation in intellectuality with respect to the intellectuality in angels. For this reason, too, the higher part of reason is called a “spark,” since it is highest in the rational nature. This is also why Jerome says that it is signified by the eagle, which transcends the other animals in its flying just as this power transcends the rational, which is signified by the man, the concupiscible, signified by the ox, and the irascible, signified by the lion.

Moreover, just as the intellect cannot err in speculative matters concerning the knowledge of first principles, given that it always resists what is said against these principles, so too it cannot err in practical matters in their first principles. For this reason it is said that the higher spark of reason called “synderesis” cannot be extinguished, but instead always resists everything that is against the principles naturally implanted in it.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as the intellect cannot err concerning principles considered in themselves, though it can err concerning them as virtually included in their conclusions due to bad reasoning, so too the light of synderesis is never extinguished in itself. Even so, as it leads to a practical matter’s conclusion by way of deliberation, there can be defect insofar as the conclusion is not rightly deduced from the principles due to the influence of pleasure, or of some passion, or even of the errors of a false induction. Thus, he does not say that synderesis is cast down, but that conscience, which is the conclusion, is cast down, as stated above. And there is in it the power of synderesis just as the power of the principles is in the conclusion.

Reply Obj. 2: Synderesis is different from the higher part of reason, since it is above the whole reason, as Jerome says in the Gloss cited. (Jerome, Commentary on Ezekiel, bk. 1, ch. 1 (CCSL 75; PL 25:22).) Hence it does not follow that if there is sin in reason there is sin in synderesis.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as the natural light of the intellect is insufficient in knowing what belongs to faith, so also it is insufficient in murmuring against what is contrary to faith, unless the light of faith is joined to it. Thus, synderesis also remains integral in the unfaithful as regards natural light. But because they have been blinded by being deprived of the light of faith, their synderesis does not murmur against what is contrary to faith.

Or else, we should say that synderesis always murmurs against evil in general, but that the fact that in a heretic it does not murmur against this particular evil occurs due to an error of reason in applying the universal principle to the particular work, as will be clear in the following article.

Reply Obj. 4: The ignorance of the wicked whereby they ignore the end is not ignorance opposed to general scientific knowledge. For if one were to ask a wicked person whether committing fornication is good, he would say no. But he does possess an ignorance of the end opposed to scientific knowledge of the end insofar as he attaches himself to the choice of this particular work as a principle is attached to a conclusion. Thus, on account of the inclination of a contrary habit, the wicked person falls short in the judgment of the end. For he judges that taking pleasure in a woman is the essential good. Thus, due to the inclination of habit and the influence of passion, his mind does not perceive the murmur of synderesis, because the soul is, as it were, drunk on passion. Hence even if he admits the contrary externally, his mind does not internally hold to it, just as those who are drunk state the words of the wise externally while not understanding them internally. And this is the Philosopher’s example in the Ethics 7 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.3, 1147a18–21.) when he speaks of this matter.

Reply Obj. 5: Even in a damned person the natural inclination whereby man naturally wills the good remains. But this inclination indicates not an act, but only the order of nature to the act. Now, this order and fitness never proceeds to act so that the person actually wills the good, on account of the perpetual impediment of obstinance binding his will. Even so, the natural knowledge remains. Thus, the murmur of reason against the will always remains, yet the will never obeys reason.

Article 2

Whether conscience ever errs

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.79.12, ad 3; On Truth, q. 16, a. 1.) It seems that conscience never errs.

Obj. 1: For in order for a judgment to be certain, there must be certain truth in the statements of the witnesses. But in divine judgment, which is most certain and which never strays from justice, conscience holds the place of a witness, as is clear in Romans 2:15: while their conscience also bears witness. Therefore, conscience possesses infallible truth and thus does not err.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, what is natural is the same always and for everyone. But, according to Basil, conscience is a natural power of judgment. (Basil the Great, Homiliae, homily 5: “On the Beginning of Proverbs” (PG 31:1761).) Therefore, conscience always remains in its rectitude and thus does not err.

Obj. 3: What is first in a given order must be fixed and stable. For every motion proceeds from what is unmovable, as Augustine says. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 8, ch. 21 (CSEL 28.1:261; PL 34:388).) But the law is what directs all human acts. Therefore, law retains its rectitude unmovably. But conscience is the law of our intellect, as Damascene says. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 4, ch. 22 (PG 94:1199).) Therefore, conscience is always right and never errs.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, conscience is a kind of science. But scientific knowledge is always of what is true, as is clear from the Posterior Analytics 1. (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.2–4, 71b15ff; 73a21.) Therefore, conscience cannot err either.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, as it says in the Ethics 7, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.3, 1147a18–21.) science is darkened in one who is incontinent insofar as he is overcome by the passions. But the passions do not overcome conscience. For when man acts in accord with his passions, conscience murmurs against this. Therefore, conscience does not deviate from its proper rectitude and thus does not err.

On the contrary, in a Gloss on Ezekiel 1:9, Jerome says, now we see that this conscience is sometimes cast down. (Jerome, Commentary on Ezekiel, bk. 1, ch. 1 (CCSL 75; PL 25:22).) But its being cast down is its error. Therefore, conscience sometimes errs.

Furthermore, to conscience seems to pertain a decision about what to do or not to do. But men are commonly deceived in this decision, as is clear from John 16:2: the hour is coming when whoever kills you will think he is offering service to God. Therefore, and so on.

I answer that, as is clear from the aforesaid, first principles that direct reason in what is to be done are known through themselves, and concerning them there can be no error, just as one giving a demonstration concerning the first principles cannot err. Now, these principles of what is to be done that are naturally known pertain to synderesis, such as that God is to be obeyed, and so forth. But just as in demonstrative sciences conclusions are only drawn from the common principles by means of proper principles determined to the given genus, principles containing the power of the first principles, so also in practical matters, wherein deliberating reason uses a kind of syllogism to discover what is good, as is clear from On the Soul 3, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.7, 431b2–9.) it arrives at the conclusion of this determinate work from the general principles by means of certain proper and determinate principles.

Now, these proper principles are not naturally known through themselves, as are the general principles. Rather, they become known either through reason’s inquiry or through the assent of faith. And because not all have faith, as it says in 2 Thessalonians 3:2, and, again, because when reason pieces things together it sometimes is deceived, it is possible to err concerning these principles, as a heretic errs in believing that all oath taking is illicit. And these determinate principles pertain to higher or lower reason whereas the truth of the conclusion depends on the principles of both. Thus, since conscience is a kind of conclusion forming a judgment of what good is to be done or to be set aside, as is clear from what was said above, (Above, d. 24, q. 3, a. 3.) it is possible for there to be error in the conscience due to reason’s being deceived in the principles taken as proper, as a heretic’s conscience is deceived when he believes that he ought not to swear an oath even for a legitimate cause when it is asked of him. For he is not deceived in the common principle, which is that nothing illicit should be done, but he is deceived in believing that every oath is illicit, which he takes as if it were a principle.

Reply Obj. 1: Conscience is said to be a witness inasmuch as it holds to that which the will has acted against, as if accusing the will on the point in which it did not obey the conscience. And in this it does not err, since it is a sin to act against conscience, as will be said below. But on this account the possibility of its erring in its opinion of what should be done or not done is not removed.

Reply Obj. 2: Conscience is called a “natural power of judgment” not by itself, but inasmuch as the force of synderesis remains in it, just as the force of the principles is preserved in conclusions. And from this angle it is not wrong.

Reply Obj. 3: Conscience is not the first law and the first thing that directs human acts, but it is an application of the first law, namely, of the general principles, to particular acts. For this reason, Damascene calls it the “law of the intellect.” (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 4, ch. 22 (PG 94:1199).) Hence it need not always be right.

Reply Obj. 4: Conscience is called “science” not simply, but in a certain respect, namely, according to the estimation of the one whose conscience it is. For it is called “conscience” insofar as someone is conscious of it. Now, although scientific knowledge is always of what is true, not everything that someone thinks he knows is true. Thus, conscience need not always be true.

Reply Obj. 5: Two defects can occur in concluding the particular thing to be done. One way is from the falsity of the principles whereby the syllogism is carried out. In this way, one holds in the conclusion what is contrary to the truth. And in this is an error of conscience. The other way is from the influence of passions that absorb and, as it were, bind the judgment of reason to a particular thing, so that it does not actually consider this or its opposite. Rather, the will follows the pleasurable object proposed by the senses. And this is an error of choice, not conscience.

Article 3

Whether an erring conscience binds

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I-II.19.5; On Truth, q. 17, a. 4; Quodl. III, q. 12, a. 2; VIII, q. 6, a. 3; IX, q. 7, a. 2; Commentary on Romans, ch. 14, lect. 2; Commentary on Galatians, ch. 5, lect. 1.) It seems that an erring conscience does not bind.

Obj. 1: For whoever does not do what he is bound to do sins. But sin, as was said above, is a word, act, or desire contrary to the law of God. (Augustine, Contra Faustum, bk. 22, ch. 28 (CSEL 25:621; PL 42:418).) Therefore, since erring conscience does not accord with God’s law, it seems that it does not bind.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, every sin is traced back to some genus of sin because nothing is in the genus that is not in the species, as it says in the Topics 2. (See Aristotle, Topics 2.4, 111a18–b10.) But if someone has a conscience to commit theft in order to feed his father, this theft is not traced back to a genus of sin, as is clear by going through all the individual cases. Therefore, such a person does not sin. Therefore, this kind of erroneous conscience does not bind.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the command of an inferior cannot bind against the command of a superior, as it will be said below (Below, d. 44, q. 2, aa. 2–3.) that the command of a proconsul does not bind one to do something against the command of the emperor. But God is superior to our conscience. Therefore, our conscience cannot bind us to do something against God’s command. And so, the same follows as before.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, God is of greater account and authority than our conscience. But God cannot bind us to commit sin by his command. Therefore, much less can conscience.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, no one sins by doing what he is bound to do. Otherwise he would be caught in an impossible paradox because then he would be sinning necessarily. But if one has an erroneous conscience that he ought to commit fornication and then does commit fornication, he is not excused from sin. Otherwise the tyrants who killed the saints would not have sinned, since they thought they were offering worship to God. Therefore, an erroneous conscience does not bind.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, the dictate of conscience does not make what is venial into something mortal. For conscience may dictate to someone that it is not good to speak idle words, and yet if he does say them, he does not sin mortally. But “evil” is at greater distance from “good” than “venial” is from “mortal.” Therefore, an erring conscience does not bind to what is evil in itself.

On the contrary, on the passage: for your conscience knows (Eccl 7:22), *(RSV reads *for your heart knows . . .) a Gloss says: with this (namely, the conscience) as judge, one who does harm is not absolved. (Glossa interlinearis, at Ecclesiastes 7:23 (in Glossa ordinaria 3.1790).) But a judge’s command binds one to do something. Therefore, conscience binds.

Furthermore, Romans 14:23 says: whatever does not proceed from faith is sin, meaning whatever is against conscience. A Gloss adds: even if what is done is good. (Glossa ordinaria, at Romans 14:23, 6.178 (PL 114:516).) But a conscience that forbids the good is an errant one. Therefore, an erring conscience binds.

Furthermore, say a man has a conscience such that if he does not commit fornication he sins mortally. Now, every mortal sin is from contempt of God. But whoever does something with the intention of giving contempt to God sins mortally. Therefore, he sins mortally. Thus, his erring conscience was binding on him.

I answer that concerning this there are two opinions. Some distinguish three kinds of works. Some works, they say, are essentially good, and a conscience that dictates they are to be done is not errant, but right. Hence this kind of conscience binds simply and can never be set aside. Other works are indifferent of themselves, such as lifting up a reed or something like this, and if conscience dictates that these kinds of works are to be done, it binds one to do them, not simply, but while such a conscience remains. Hence one is bound either to set aside conscience because it is erroneous or to do what conscience dictates. Otherwise, he sins. Finally, some works are evil of themselves, such as committing fornication, lying, and so forth, and conscience cannot in any way bind one to these.

But it is true that if someone believes that he would show contempt for God’s law by not committing fornication, he sins, not because his conscience binds him to commit fornication, but because it is out of contempt for God that he omits what should be omitted.

But if we see diligently how conscience binds, we find that it binds in all things, as another opinion states. For conscience is a dictate of reason. Now, the will is only moved to desire something presupposing some apprehension. For the object of the will is good or evil insofar as it is imagined or understood. But reason itself presents the aspect (Intentio can be taken in several ways, but here the translation “intention” may be misleading, since that implies an act of the will. We have given “aspect” here as meaning an intelligible aspect of a thing, not the decision to pursue it. Aquinas probably uses intentio here to avoid any confusion that might be caused by having used ratio earlier in the sentence to refer to the faculty of reason itself. On the word intentio more generally, see note in d. 24, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1.) of good or evil. Hence, since an act of the will receives specification from its object, the will’s act must be in accord with the judgment of reason and conscience. And conscience is said to bind in this way: if someone willingly flees what reason dictates is a good, there is flight from the good, and this flight is an evil, since the will is fleeing it as if it were good in accord with reason due to some sensible sadness. Likewise, if reason asserts that something good is an evil, the will cannot tend to it without being an evil will. For it tends to it as shown by reason. Thus, it tends to it as to an evil simply due to an apparent sensible good. Thus, whether reason or conscience judges rightly or not, the will is bound in such a way that if the will’s act does not follow the judgment or dictate of reason, which is conscience, it is disordered. This is what it means to “bind the will,” that is, to oblige it so that it cannot tend to something else without the harm of deformity, just as one who is bound up cannot go somewhere else.

Now, it should be known that an erring conscience binds in one way, a right conscience in another. For a right conscience binds simply and essentially, seeing as what it dictates is good in itself and also appears good from the judgment of reason. Hence it is evil if it is not done, and good if it is. But an erroneous conscience binds only incidentally and in a qualified sense. For if it dictates that something should be done, its being done considered in itself is not a good necessary for salvation, but is instead apprehended as a good. Thus, since it only binds precisely as good, the will is bound to it not essentially but incidentally—namely, by reason of the apprehension whereby it is judged good. Thus, if something that is in itself evil is done while erring reason judges it good, sin is not avoided, whereas if it is not done, sin is incurred. For one defect in goodness is enough to call something evil, whether the goodness lacking is incidental, insofar as the thing is apprehended with the account of good, or whether the goodness belongs to the thing essentially. But if it is only the former, namely, incidental goodness, the act will not be good on this account.

And this solution is taken from the words of the Philosopher in the Ethics 6, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.2–3, 1145b21–1147b19.) where the question is asked whether someone is called “incontinent” (That is, “lacking self-restraint.”) from the fact that by passion he departs from any sort of reason—whether right reason or not—or whether he is called “incontinent” because he departs from right reason. The Philosopher gives the solution that he is called “incontinent” essentially and simply speaking because he departs from right reason, but is called “incontinent” incidentally due to the fact that he also departs from any sort of reason, whether right or not.

Reply Obj. 1: Even though what reason dictates is not in accord with God’s law essentially and is not good through itself, it is in accord with God’s law incidentally and is also good in this way, inasmuch as reason apprehends it as in accord with God’s law and good. Thus, it follows that an erring conscience binds incidentally, not essentially.

Reply Obj. 2: An erring conscience, dictating that something is to be done, dictates that it is to be done in light of some account of a specific good, either because it seems pious or some other such thing. Hence one who acts against this conscience sins, and the sin is opposed to the virtue under whose account reason dictated the opposite.

Reply Obj. 3: Conscience binds not in virtue of itself, but in virtue of the divine command. For conscience does not dictate that something is to be done for the reason that it seems so to itself, but for the reason that it has been commanded by God. Hence it binds incidentally by reason of the divine command inasmuch as it dictates this as a command from God. Thus, the dictate of conscience binds more than the precept of a prelate, as also does divine command, in virtue of which it binds. This is clear as follows: if the king’s command only reached the people by means of a prince, then if the prince said that such-and-such is the king’s command, even though this were not true, his statement would bind as the king’s command in such a way that those who spurned it would merit punishment.

Reply Obj. 4: God cannot bind us to commit sin because he cannot err so as to judge that something should be done that should not be done. Conscience, on the other hand, can err. Thus, it is not a similar case.

Reply Obj. 5: No one is caught in a paradox simply, absolutely speaking, but positing a certain situation it is not unfitting that, while that condition stands, one would be caught in a paradox, as when an evil intention stands, whether a due act that is commanded is done or whether it is not done, sin is incurred. Likewise, too, while an erroneous conscience stands, sin is not avoided no matter what is done. But man can set aside an erroneous conscience just as he can a perverse intention. Thus, he is not caught in a paradox simply.

Reply Obj. 6: Conscience, as has been said, (Ad 3.) binds by virtue of divine command, under the account of which one apprehends what reason dictates. Thus, if it is apprehended as directly falling under a commandment, one sins mortally by failing to do what conscience dictates, even if it is venial and indifferent. Alternatively, if it is apprehended as not directly falling under a commandment or prohibition, then it is not done directly against conscience, but apart from it; and thus, one sins not mortally, but venially or even not at all, as when conscience dictates that it is good to do some work of a counsel, if one does not do it he does not sin. For he does not apprehend it as a due good, one necessary for salvation and subject to a commandment.

Exposition of the text

Although they become clouded and corrupted by vices and sins, they are nevertheless goods. (Sent. II, 39.1(249).1.) This clouding and corruption of the intellect is not understood as regards the proper act of the intellect considered in itself, since very acute intellectual talents are found in many sinners, but instead is understood with reference to fitness for grace, virtue, and good work, as it is also said that every wicked person is ignorant. However, there are certain sins that also cloud the intellect’s contemplation inasmuch as man is disturbed and distracted through them by his passions and impeded from the act of contemplation, as is especially clear in sins of the flesh. Hence, too, the Commentator says on the Physics 7 (Averroes, Commentary on the Physics, bk. 7, comm. 20.) that the moral virtues give perfection in regard to the sciences, especially the virtue of chastity.

They answer more briefly, saying that an action of the will is not among the natural gifts. (Sent. II, 39.2(250).2.) This response can be common to both opinions, particularly as regards the evil act to which the will is not naturally ordered.

But this will is ever deprived of effect. (Sent. II, 39.3(251).1.) This can be understood of the will’s final effect, namely, that whereby it is ordered to the last end, that is, by a meritorious act. And then by “grace” is understood sanctifying grace, without which there can be no merit. But if it is understood generally of the effect of a good will as regards any good whatsoever, then by “grace” we must understand the gratuitous help of God whereby he confers on all not only gratuitous gifts, but also natural ones, without which help there can be nothing good in us.

But others say that there is only one will. (Sent. II, 39.3(251).4.) This opinion seemed to posit that because the will naturally wills the good, this motion of the will always remains and is called “good” or “evil” simply with reference to an addition of an act of the will in a deliberative sense. But if by “motion” they understood an act of the will as an activity, then they were stating something false. For the will is not naturally determined to one thing so that it always does it. But if by “motion” they understood the inclination of the will to the good, then they were stating something true. For this inclination always remains the same, whether by deliberation one wills good or evil.