D. 40 - How external acts are good or evil

Division of the text

In the preceding part he addressed sin insofar as it consists in the act of the will. In this part he addresses it insofar as it consists in the external act.

And it is divided into two parts.

In the first part, he shows the basis on which external acts are called “good” or “evil.”

In the second, he raises some questions concerning what was addressed before, at and since, as was said above, intention makes a work good, and faith directs the intention, it is not irrelevant to ask whether every intention and every work of those who do not have faith is evil. (Sent. II, 41.1(253).1.)

The first part is divided into two parts.

In the first, he shows that external acts are good or evil due to the will.

In the second, he inquires whether this is generally true in all things, at but it is asked whether all the works of man are good or evil from affective disposition and end. (Sent. II, 40.1(252).4.)

And it is divided into two parts.

In the first, to address the question he cites two opinions.

In the second, he cites a third opinion that contradicts both in a certain respect, at but Augustine most clearly teaches . . . that all actions are to be judged good or evil according to intention and cause, except for some. (Sent. II, 40.1(252).7, quoting Augustine, Contra mendacium, ch. 7, para. 18 (CSEL 41:490; PL 40:527).)

And it is divided into two parts.

In the first, he confirms this third opinion by statements of Augustine.

In the second, he shows how those who maintain the other opinions resolve the authorities cited, at nevertheless, some contend that such things never have a good cause. (Sent. II, 40.1(252).13.)

Question 1

How external acts are good or evil

Here five questions are asked:

first, whether “good” and “evil” are specific differences of action;

second, if the goodness or malice of the external act depends on the will;

third, if the external act adds something to goodness or malice over and above the will’s internal act;

fourth, if the same action can be good and evil;

fifth, if an action can be indifferent in such a way as to be neither good nor evil.

Article 1

Whether “good” and “evil” are essential differences of action

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I-II.21.1.) It seems that “good” and “evil” are not essential differences of action.

Obj. 1: For no essential difference befits a thing in a qualified sense, but rather in an essential sense. But “good” and “evil” do not befit an action precisely as an action, but instead with reference to the object and end. Therefore, “good” and “evil” are not essential differences of action.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, as it says in the Metaphysics 4, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.2, 1005a15.) every difference is susceptible of the predicates “being” and “one.” But evil, since it is a privation, is non-being. Therefore, it cannot be an essential difference of action.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, an essential difference pertains to the essence of that of which it is the constitutive difference. Therefore, if “good” and “evil” are essential differences of action, there will be an action where “evil” pertains to its essence. But no evil is from God. Therefore, there will be an action whose essence is not from God, which was disproved above.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, things that differ by essential differences do not agree in species. But in some cases good and evil actions are the same in species, such as marital intercourse and the intercourse of fornication, since the same effect in species, the generation of a human being, follows through both actions. Therefore, “good” and “evil” are not essential differences of action.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, just as good and evil are found in man’s actions and habits, so also they are found in other things. But in other things “good” and “evil” are not essential differences. Therefore, neither are they in human actions.

On the contrary, what is included in something’s definition is essential to it. But “good” is included in the definition of virtue by Augustine, who says that a virtue is a good quality of the mind, as was said above. (Augustine, De libero arbitrio, bk. 2, ch. 18 (CCSL 29; PL 32:1266); see Sent. II, 27.1(173).1.) Therefore, “good” and “evil” are essential differences of habits. But on the basis of a difference of habits there is a difference of the actions that proceed from the habits, since like habits yield like acts, as it says in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.1, 1103a25–b22; 2.3, 1105a15.) Therefore, “good” and “evil” are essential differences of actions.

Furthermore, every difference that results in differentiation by species is an essential difference. But “good” and “evil” distinguish species of habit. Therefore, they are essential differences of habits. And so, the same follows as before.

I answer that actions differ in species on the basis of the differentiation of forms, which are the principles of the actions, even though the agents do not differ in species, just as heating and cooling are different in species like hot and cold. Now, the form of the will is the end and the good, which is its object and what is willed. Thus, in the will’s acts we must discover a specific difference according to the account of the end. Because acts are in the genus of the moral by being voluntary, there is in the genus of the moral a differentiation of species on the basis of how the ends differ. And because “good” and “evil” are taken with reference to their order to the end, they must be essential differences in the genus of the moral.

Now, it should be known that things can be traced back to a given genus in two ways: either essentially, as whiteness and blackness are traced back to the genus of color; or incidentally, by reason of something in them, as a white thing and a black thing are traced back to the genus of color. Thus, things in a genus simply differ in species through essential differences of the genus, whereas things traced back to the genus incidentally differ not through differences of the genus simply, but only in a qualified sense, namely, insofar as they belong to the genus, as is clear especially in artificial things. For artificial forms are accidental (Or “incidental.”) forms. Hence a dagger and a key also differ in species as pertaining to the genus of artifact, but they are the same in species as regards substance, since the substance of both is from natural matter and not artificial form, as the Commentator says on On the Soul 2. (Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 2, comm. 8; cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 2.1, 412b10–17.) And because, as has been said, something belongs to the genus of the moral by being voluntary, the same acts of the will that essentially and immediately pertain to the will are essentially in the genus of the moral. Hence the will’s internal acts are divided in species simply by “good” and “evil” as by essential differences. But acts commanded by the will, elicited through other powers, pertain to the genus of the moral incidentally, namely, insofar as they are commanded by the will. Thus, these acts are not according to species distinguished in substance by “good” and “evil,” though they are incidentally as pertaining to the genus of the moral.

Reply Obj. 1: Although “good” and “evil” are not differences of action precisely as action, they are differences of action as voluntary. This is just as even “rational” and “irrational” are not differences of substance as substance, but insofar as they are considered as ensouled. So too, in the genus of actions, nothing prevents actions from differing by “good” and “evil.”

Reply Obj. 2: As was said above, “evil” as meaning mere privation cannot be called an “essential difference.” But it can be such as founded in some undue end for the will, which end yet is not totally lacking in goodness. Hence, in this way, evil is contrary to good, whereas the privation is not.

Reply Obj. 3: In this way, the reply to the third objection is clear. For evil pertains to the essence of action with respect to the fact that there is some entity there, not by reason of the privation connected with it, since privation does not belong to the essence of any being included in a genus, since no being is non-being.

Reply Obj. 4: Intercourse is an act commanded by the will by means of another power. Thus, it befits it to be in the genus of the moral incidentally. Hence it can be considered in two ways: either with reference to the genus of nature, and in this way, marital intercourse and fornication do not differ in species, and so also they have the same natural effect in species, or else as pertaining to the genus of the moral. In this way, they have in species different effects, such as meriting or demeriting, and so forth. And so, they differ in species.

Reply Obj. 5: The reply to the fifth objection is clear through what has been said, that the end is the form of the will in accord with which an activity is called “human.” Thus, “good” and “evil” are essential and specific differences in the genus of human acts, just as other actions differ in accord with the different forms of the agents. Thus, there is not a similar rationale for these actions and others. For this reason, the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics 5 (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.16, 1021b24–30.) that the end in agents who act with a plan is good or evil in a specific mode.

Article 2

Whether action should be judged as good or evil simply on the basis of the will

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I-II.20.2.) It seems that an action should be judged good or evil simply on the basis of the will.

Obj. 1: Matthew 7:18 says: a sound tree cannot bear evil fruit, nor can a bad tree bear good fruit. But a good will is compared to a good tree and a bad will to a bad one. Therefore, since the will’s fruits are external acts, it seems that external acts should be called “good” or “evil” simply on the basis of the goodness or malice of the will.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, as was said, (Above: d. 35, q. 1, a. 4.) external acts are only traced back to the genus of the moral insofar as they are commanded by the will. But they only participate in moral goodness or malice as pertaining to the genus of the moral. Therefore, it seems that it is in accord with the goodness or malice of the will that they should be called “good” or “evil.” This, too, seems to be signified by Ambrose when he says: your affection names your work. (Ambrose, De officiis, bk. 1, ch. 30, sect. 147 (CCSL 15; PL 16:71).)

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics 3, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 3.2, 996b25.) the account of good is taken from the end. But the will’s act possesses an order to the end by means of the will, whose object is the end. Therefore, it is in accord with the goodness or malice of the will that the external act should be called “evil” or “good.”

Obj. 4: Furthermore, evil is not more powerful than good. But if the will is evil, it necessarily follows that the external act is evil. Therefore, it also follows that if the will is good, the external act is good.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, Augustine said above that the will is that whereby one sins and lives rightly. (Augustine, Retractions, bk. 1, ch. 9, para. 4 (CCSL 57; PL 32:596), cited in Sent. II, 26.11(172).1.) But the will, insofar as one sins by it, is evil, and, insofar as one lives rightly by it, is good. Therefore, sin as well as good activity, which is living rightly, should be judged with reference to the will’s goodness or malice.

On the contrary, the Philosopher says in the Ethics 2 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.6, 1107a10–17.) that there are some things that cannot be done in a good way, given that, as extremes, there is no middle ground in them. Now, one can enter upon such works due to a will for some good end. Therefore, the external act should not be judged good because of the will’s goodness.

Furthermore, above we said that if one acts against an erring conscience that judges that what is evil is to be done, he sins; and likewise if he acts in accord with it. But one who wills to do something because his conscience dictates it to him seems to have a good will. Therefore, good will is not enough for the external act to be called “good.”

I answer that the will can be considered in two ways: either insofar as it intends, as bearing on the last end; or insofar as it chooses, as bearing on the proximate object ordered to the last end. If considered in the first way, then the will’s malice suffices for the act to be called “evil” because what is done with an evil end is evil. Yet, the goodness of the will in intending is not enough for the goodness of the act, because the act can be evil of itself such that it cannot in any way be done in a good way. However, if the will is considered as choosing, then it is universally true that the act is called “good” from the will’s goodness, and evil from its malice.

For, as it says in the Ethics 5, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.4, 1105a30–1105b1.) three things are required for the goodness of a deliberation, which precedes choice. One is that the one deliberating sets up for himself a due end, since if one finds many effective ways of attaining an evil end, he will not be called a “good deliberator.” Second, to attain the end, he must find a good work whereby the end may be attained. Hence if someone intends to attain a good end through an evil action, he is not a good deliberator. For, as he says, he participates in the end by an unfitting means due to the fact that what he orders to the end is not proportionate to that end, just as if one drew a true conclusion through an irrelevant middle term. Third, it is required for him to find both at a fitting time, lest he be hasty in rushing in too quickly or useless in delaying too long. But this last element pertains to the goodness of the deliberation insofar as the deliberation exists in reason as it inquires and discovers; whereas from a different perspective it belongs to the reality and the deliberator. Therefore, since a choice is like the conclusion of deliberation, as it says in the Ethics 3, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.5, 1113b3–5.) the goodness of the end and the goodness of that which is ordered to the end must come together for the goodness of the will as it chooses. If this is the case, then without a doubt the external act will be good, while if either is missing, the will will be evil and the act will be evil.

Reply Obj. 1: The tree is that from which the fruit proceeds immediately. Hence the will as choosing is compared to the tree, since the work follows immediately from choice.

Reply Obj. 2: The external act is called “good” or “evil” on the basis of the will, not on the basis of the will as it intends only, but instead on the basis of the will as it chooses.

Reply Obj. 3: For a thing’s goodness, there is required not only the goodness of the last end, which is what the will as it intends regards, but also the goodness of the proximate end, which is what the will as choosing regards. Thus, it does not follow that the goodness of the will as intending suffices for the goodness of the act.

Reply Obj. 4: Because good is more perfect and more powerful than evil, more elements are required for good than for evil. For good consists of a single, total and perfect cause, but evil consists of particular defects, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 30 (PG 3:730).) Thus, a defect of the will concerning the last end suffices for the malice of the action, but the goodness of the last end is not enough for the goodness of the action.

Reply Obj. 5: The reply is the same as that to the second objection.

Article 3

Whether the external act adds any goodness or malice over and above the goodness or malice of the will

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I-II.20.4; 24.3; II-II.76.4, ad 2; On Evil, q. 2, a. 2, ad 8.) It seems that the external act adds no goodness or malice over and above the goodness or malice of the will.

Obj. 1: This seems, first, to be the case through what a Gloss on Matthew 12 says: you do as much as you intend. (Glossa interlinearis, at Matthew 12:35 (in Glossa ordinaria 5.228).) Therefore, if there are two people who both intend the same good, and one follows through with it while the other does not, it seems that no goodness is added by the external act.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Bernard says that a good will suffices for merit, but good action is required for example. (Bernard of Clairvaux, De gratia et libero arbitrio, ch. 14, para. 51 (PL 182:1029).) And this agrees with what the Philosopher says in the Ethics 10, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.8, 1178a24–34.) that external acts are for the manifestation of virtue. But the absolute and perfect account of goodness in human acts is insofar as they are meritorious. Therefore, the whole goodness consists in the internal act. Thus, no goodness or malice is added by the external act.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, man arrives at beatitude and happiness through good activities. But human beatitude and happiness are not subject to fortune, as proved in the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.10, 1100a10–21.) Therefore, neither can fortune take anything away from a work’s goodness or malice. But the external act of a moral virtue can be impeded by fortune, as it says in the Ethics 10, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.8, 1178a24–34.) as is clear in the case of a poor person who has no way to carry out an act of liberality, and in a sick person who cannot carry out an act of fortitude. Therefore, the external act adds nothing to and subtracts nothing from the goodness of a human action.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the better an action is, the greater the reward it is due. But the whole quantity of the reward is measured with reference to the quantity of the root, namely, the habit that informs the act. Therefore, since the habit first elicits internal activities, it seems that the entire efficacy of merit consists in internal acts. Thus, no goodness accrues through the external acts.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, if the external act adds some goodness to the goodness of the internal act, then the greater the external act is, the more a man will merit. But this is false, which is clear from the sentence the Lord pronounced about the widow who put two small coins in the collection box (Luke 21:1–4). Therefore, the external act does not add goodness to the internal act.

On the contrary (6), if something can be done through one factor in just the same way as through two, it is superfluous to introduce two factors for it. Therefore, if there exists goodness in the external act together with the internal equal to that in the internal act alone, it seems that the external act would be superfluous. Thus, we would not have to do anything, but only will.

Furthermore (7), a twofold good is better. But the internal and external act both possess goodness. Therefore, both are better than one of them alone.

I answer that the will’s external act and internal act are compared to each other in such a way that each is in a certain way the cause of goodness for the other and that each, as far as it itself goes, possesses a goodness that it gives to the other. For the external act possesses goodness from being commensurable to the circumstances, with respect to which it is proportionate to attain man’s end. Because the external act is compared to the will as its object, the will’s internal act has this goodness from the external one, not as carried out, but as intended and willed, since as carried out it follows the will’s act. But a certain account of goodness consists in the will’s internal act in itself, insofar as it is master of its own acts, a goodness with respect to which the act has the account of merit or the praiseworthy. And this goodness proceeds from the internal act to the external.

Therefore, speaking of the goodness that the will offers the external act, the external act adds no goodness so long as the will is equally intense. I say this for the reason that some acts are pleasant and in them the will cannot be as intense before the act as it is in the act, as is clear in the act of fornication. Hence one who wills to commit fornication does not demerit equally to one who actually fornicates, since the will cannot be as complete before the act as in the act. Alternatively, there are some acts that are difficult wherein the will is lessened in the act. And in these the will can be more complete before the act than in the act.

But if we speak of the act’s goodness that the external act possesses in itself, then the external act completes the internal one in goodness or malice, just as the terminus of motion completes motion. For it is compared, as was said, to the will as its object. Because an act is ordered to its essential reward through the primary goodness that it has from the will, as rendered liberally and out of love, the external act adds nothing to the essential reward. For one who possesses a complete will to do some good merits as much as if he did it, and if he does one act, he merits as much as if he performed many, while his will remains equally complete.

However, it is ordered to the incidental reward through the goodness that belongs to the external act in itself. Thus, the external act does add something to the incidental reward. For example, inasmuch as he suffers externally, a martyr has victory over the faith’s adversaries, and from this fact a golden crown is due him. Likewise, too, from the fact that one frequently proceeds to the external act, he becomes more fit for the good, and from this it follows that he grows in charity. Likewise, one is punished more through an external act than through the will alone. Thus, the external act adds something to satisfaction. And it is likewise for everything else that follows on the goodness of the act as carried out.

Reply Obj. 1: When it says that you do as much as you intend, “as much as” can be an adverb or a noun. If it is a noun, it holds in the case of evils, since one sins as much as he believes he is sinning or intends to, but not in the case of goods, since one with a lukewarm will can intend to please God much, but not please him to that extent. The reason for this difference is clear from what was said above. For more elements are required for good than for evil. On the other hand, if “as much as” is an adverb, then it is true in the case both of goods and of evils, with reference to the goodness or malice, that the act possesses from the will as it chooses. But there is something added through the external act as regards the goodness that belongs to that same external act in itself.

Reply Obj. 2: Bernard’s statement is understood as meaning when the faculty to do an action is lacking while the complete will does exist. And he is speaking only as regards the essential reward, not as regards the incidental one.

Reply Obj. 3: As it says in the Ethics 1, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.8, 1099a35–b7.) the goods of fortune organically serve happiness. Thus, it is not unfitting if they contribute to happiness incidentally and if the lack of them impedes happiness in regard to some incidental element of happiness.

Reply Obj. 4: This is understood of the essential reward, which is measured with reference to the quantity of the root. This receives no addition through the external act if the will is complete. But something is added as regards the incidental reward.

Reply Obj. 5: The widow is said to have put in more than the others because she gave it with a more effective will. Hence before God she merited more of the essential reward than those who gave greater gifts with less devotion. But as regards the incidental reward, they were able to merit more, insofar as they made greater satisfaction through the greater gifts, or also by encouraging the ministers of the temple to pray more for them, or whatever other things of this sort follow on the external act in itself.

Reply Sed Contra 6: The will tends to the external act as its object. Hence if the faculty to act is present, the will could not be complete if it did not perform the action. Thus, it is not superfluous to act, since without action the will itself could not be good. Furthermore, the external act falls under a commandment; and again, it contributes to the incidental reward.

Reply Sed Contra 7: The external act possesses the goodness in accord with which it merits eternal life entirely from the will informed by grace, insofar as it is voluntary. Thus, there is no need for it to add anything pertaining to the essential reward of eternal life to the goodness of the complete will.

Article 4

Whether the same action can be good and evil

To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I-II.20.6.) It seems that the same action can be both good and evil.

Obj. 1: For, as it says in the Physics 3, (Aristotle, Physics 3.3, 202a14–b23.) the motion that is action in the agent is the same in substance as that which is passion in the patient, differing in account, just as it is the same road from Athens to Thebes as from Thebes to Athens. But it is possible for an action to be evil while the passion is good. Hence it is said: the action was displeasing, namely, that of the Jews, while the Passion was welcome, namely, Christ’s. (See Sent. I, 48.2(208).3; Alexander of Hales (ca. 1185–1245 AD), De officio praedicationis, q. 23; q. 29, membrum 3, para. 24; John Chrysostom, Homilies on the Acts of the Apostles, homily 6, at Acts 2:23 (PG 60:57); Leo the Great, Sermon 67 (“On the Passion,” sermon 16), ch. 2 (PL 54:369).) Therefore, the same act can be good and evil.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, as it says in the Physics 5, (Aristotle, Physics 5.4, 228a20.) one motion is continuous and, for the same reason, a single action is one that is continuous. But it is possible in the same continuous action or motion, for example going to the church, first to have a good intention and then an evil one, and vice versa. Therefore, since an action is judged good or evil on the basis of the intention, the same action can be evil and good.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the first motion is a sin, as was said above. (Above, d. 24, q. 1, a. 2.) But one who resists the first motion does not sin and, in fact, merits. But it can happen that while this first motion is still going on one who previously did not resist it later does resist it. Therefore, there can be goodness and malice concerning the same motion.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, let it be the case that a master commands his servant to give alms and that the master commands this with a good intention and out of charity, while the servant gives the alms involuntarily and under constraint. It is obvious that the giving of the alms belongs to the master and the action to the servant. But the master merits in this giving, while the servant sins. Therefore, there can be merit and sin in the same action.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, let us posit that someone in the state of mortal sin performs some suffrages for a deceased person in Purgatory. It is obvious that the one who performs the suffrages does not merit for himself, since he does not have charity, but he does merit for the one in Purgatory a lessening of punishment or plenary absolution. Therefore, the same action can be meritorious and not meritorious and, for the same reason, good and evil.

On the contrary, Matthew 6:24: no one can serve two masters. But God is served by good action and the devil through evil action. Therefore, since the action belonging to a single agent is one action, it seems that one action cannot be good and evil.

Furthermore, contraries cannot be in the same thing at the same time. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore, they cannot be in the same action.

I answer that, since “one” and “being” are convertible, a thing relates to unity as it does to existence. Now, we can consider two sorts of existence in a thing: the existence that belongs to it in itself, which is primary and substantial, and additional existence, which is secondary and incidental. Thus, it is the case that something considered in itself is one while with respect to something incidental to it, it possesses a plurality. For example, a continuous piece of wood, of which one part is white and another black, is in itself, precisely as a piece of wood, one. But with reference to the existence whereby it is colored, it is many and non-continuous.

Therefore, since external acts participate in moral goodness and malice as something additional and incidental to them, inasmuch as these kinds of acts are commanded by the will, it will be the case that such an act is one considered in itself and yet many insofar as it is referred to the genus of the moral as being called “morally good” or “morally evil.” Thus, goodness and malice can never be in one action insofar as it is one, but they can insofar as it is many. And so, in this way, the action can be one and many.

Reply Obj. 1: Since action is in the agent and passion in the patient, it cannot be numerically the same accident that is action and that is passion, since one accident cannot be in different subjects. Hence, too, Avicenna says that it is not the same equality numerically that is in two equals, but only specifically. But because the difference in them is only on the basis of the termini, the agent and patient, and motion abstracts from both termini, the motion is signified without this difference. And this is the reason why we say that the motion is one. Accordingly, as we held above, merit is not in the passion precisely as passion, but in the activity of the patient whereby he voluntarily undergoes the passion for the sake of God. It is obvious that this activity is not the same as the activity of the agent.

Reply Obj. 2: Although this action is one considered in the genus of nature, as referred to the genus of the moral it is one or another insofar as it is carried out with different intention and will.

Reply Obj. 3: The first motion has the account of a fault only insofar as it is in some way within the will’s power. Hence, as long as the will does not resist, it has the account of sin. But when the will already begins to resist, man merits, though not because the first motion of sensuality to which resistance is given is meritorious, losing the account of a sin after the resistance is given to it. Rather, the merit is in the very act of the will as it resists, which is not the same as the first motion of the sensuality.

Reply Obj. 4: The servant who gives alms at his master’s command is like the master’s instrument. Hence the Philosopher says in the Ethics 8 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.11, 1161b3.) that the slave is like an animated organ. Now, an instrument moves the motion, and it is obvious that the action of the one who moves the instrument is different from the action whereby it itself moves something else. For the same thing cannot be both mover and moved with respect to the same motion. Hence the action of the master and the servant are numerically different. Thus, nothing prevents one from being good while the other is evil.

Reply Obj. 5: There are two opinions about this. Some say that if we consider the work as one working, then the suffrages that one in the state of mortal sin performs are meritorious neither to the agent nor to the one for whom they are done. However, if we consider the work worked, such as the sacrifice itself or something of this sort, they are meritorious for the one for whom they are done, but not the one doing the work. Thus, it does not follow that the same activity is meritorious and non-meritorious. For the activity itself is in no way meritorious, but because the efficacy of suffrages is measured with reference to the charity of the one for whom they are done, availing each just as much as he has merited that they would avail him, as Augustine says, (Augustine, Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate, ch. 110 (CCSL 46; PL 40:283).) others say more truly that even the activity itself done without charity is of value to the one for whom it is done by virtue of his charity, not that of the one doing the activity. It does not follow then that the activity is good simply, but that it is good for the particular person for whom it is done. For that is good simply which is good to the one who does it, as was said in Book I. (See In I Sent., d. 46, in the exposition of the text; see also Sent. II, 46.4(200).2.) And it is not unfitting that something be evil simply while still being good to someone, as it also says in that place.

Article 5

Whether there is human action that is indifferent

To the fifth we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I-II.1.8–9.) We seem to find some indifferent action in human acts.

Obj. 1: For there can be no mean between “good” and “evil” except “indifferent,” which is neither good nor evil. But good and evil are mediated contraries, as it says in the Categories. (Aristotle, Categories 10, 12a17–19.) Therefore, there is indifferent action.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, there cannot be any merit without charity. But it should not be said that one who does not possess charity sins or demerits in every act of his, since counsel is given him to perform certain acts from the genus of the good. Therefore, it seems that there is some act that is neither meritorious nor demeritorious. And so, the same follows as before.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, no act or will possesses goodness unless referred to the end of delight, as was said above. But it is frequently the case that one also does things that are not evil in themselves, but that are not referred to the end of delight. Therefore, such things will be neither good nor evil; and thus, they will be indifferent.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, to approach a woman is a certain kind of action, and does not of itself indicate moral goodness or malice, since this act is not vested with any circumstance on whose basis an order of reason appears in it. Therefore, it is possible for an act to be indifferent.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the kinds of acts that are indifferent by their genus, such as lifting up a reed and so forth, can possess goodness or malice only based on the intention whereby they are referred to the end. But it can happen that the end to which they are referred is indifferent. Therefore, the act will remain totally indifferent.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, our works can only be meritorious if done for the sake of God. Therefore, either a habitual relation to the end suffices for the act’s goodness, or else an actual relation is required. If a habitual relation is sufficient, then if once a year someone referred all the works he was going to do that year to God, they would all be meritorious. Thus, the way to salvation would be very easy, which is contrary to Matthew 7:14: the way is hard, that leads to life. On the other hand, if an actual relation of the work to God is required, then the work could never be good unless one were actually thinking about God. Therefore, if no act is indifferent, every act that someone carries out without thinking about God will be evil and a sin, which is very harsh. Therefore, it is necessary for some acts to be indifferent.

On the contrary (7), 1 Corinthians 10:31 says: do all to the glory of God. Therefore, either one refers his work to the glory of God or not. If he does refer it, it is fitting that the act have a share in goodness from the end, so long as it can be referred to that end, which befits every act that is not evil of itself. If he does not refer it, then he transgresses the Apostle’s command and thus sins. Therefore, every act is necessarily either meritorious or demeritorious.

Furthermore (8), it is more to act than to speak. But one who speaks idle words without cause sins. Matthew 12:36: on the day of judgment men will render account for every careless word they utter. Therefore, all the more does a man sin if he does something without referring it to the due end. But if he does refer it to the due end, the act is good. Therefore, every act is necessarily either good or evil and none is indifferent.

I answer that concerning this there are three opinions.

Some say that in speech there can be nothing indifferent while in deeds there can. For a word is ordered to something because it is a sign of a thing, whereas a deed, not being a sign, is not ordered to something. Thus, deformity occurs in a word if it is pronounced idly, but not in a deed if it is done without legitimate cause.

But this argument is null. For although a deed is not ordered to something as a sign to what is signed, it is ordered to something as an end, since everything that is from a principle tends to a given end. Now, idleness is opposed to the order that belongs to what is directed to the end, not the order of sign to signed.

Thus, others say that both in speech and in deeds there can be indifferent matters that are neither good nor evil, as are those things which are not ordered to fulfilling God’s commandments in such a way as to be done for the sake of God, and yet which are also not contrary to the commandments, whether in word or in deed. An example would be if one speaks to someone out of a kind of civil friendship or carries out some friendly work for him.

But this does not seem to be a counter-example because an act of political virtue is not indifferent, but is good of itself and, if informed by grace, will be meritorious. Now, we cannot accept something to which a human act is ordered that either is not right with reference to political virtue or is even adverse to rectitude. For there cannot be an act that proceeds from someone deliberately without an intention of the end, as it says in the Metaphysics 2. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.2, 994b15.) But the end is a good that befits man either in soul or in body or even in external things, which are ordered to both. And this is good unless the contrary to the good that is man’s good by reason possesses the rectitude of a civil virtue, since civil virtue is directive in everything belonging to the body as well as what is sought on the body’s account. Hence, if one uses these in a moderate manner, it will be a right usage, whereas if he uses them with excess or defect, it will be a vicious usage opposed to virtue.

Thus, we should say otherwise, in accord with what others think, that there cannot be any act that proceeds from the deliberate will that is not good or evil, not only according to the theologian, but also according to the moral philosopher. Moreover, there cannot be any act proceeding from a deliberate virtue in one who possesses grace that is not meritorious, though in one who does not possess grace there can be a deliberate act that is neither meritorious nor demeritorious, though it is good or evil.

The reason for this is that evil, precisely as evil, is not opposed to good except as a privation is to a habit. But contrary opposition is due to the fact that the being upon which that kind of privation is founded is incompatible with a good that is good simply, as immoderate pleasure in food is incompatible with the good of sobriety, which is good simply. Thus, this immoderate pleasure is connected with a privation of the good and so is called “evil.”

Therefore, if we find in actions a mean between good and evil, this will only be inasmuch as good and evil are contraries or inasmuch as evil is a privation of good. It is not inasmuch as they are contraries that there can be a mean in them that is neither good nor evil. For they are called “contraries” insofar as something is considered positively in both, from which the account of evil cannot be drawn. Hence, because a mean is distant from the extremes, insofar as they posit something in a positive sense, it does not become distant from the account of good and evil in such a way as to be called neither “good” nor “evil.” For there is not contrary opposition and a distinction from good and evil in them on the same basis. Rather, the first is from the perspective of positing in both, while the second is from the perspective of privation in evil and positing in good. If, then, there is a mean between good and evil in actions, this will only be insofar as evil is opposed to good in the sense of privation.

But in things opposed by privation, a mean is only found through a subject’s not being receptive to a habit; hence, a stone, not being receptive of sight, is said to be neither seeing nor blind. This is the way in which a mean between good and evil must be understood, such that if there is something that is not receptive of a certain goodness, the malice will not be opposed to it. Hence it remains indifferent.

However, this is possible in two ways.

Either it is by abstraction, insofar as a given universal is signified as abstract from the contrary differences that divide it. Hence in its commonality what is signified is signified as related indifferently to either of the differences, as “animal” is signified neither as “rational” nor as “irrational.” Yet, every particular animal must be rational or irrational. And it is similar in this case. For if an act is signified precisely in the sense of acting, it possesses natural goodness as a being, but it relates indifferently to moral goodness and malice. Likewise, good by genus relates indifferently to good and evil by circumstance or end, though no good is found in a particular genus that is not invested with some circumstance and ordered to some end. Hence it must contract goodness or malice. On the basis of this consideration, some have said that all acts are indifferent as acts, and some have said that not all of them are, but some are. They take the term “acts” more specifically as those not expressing a factor—such as matter, end, or circumstance—whereby the act would be determined to malice or goodness, such as “eating,” “having intercourse,” and so forth.

The other way this is possible is insofar as a particular designated thing fails to be receptive of a given perfection, as a stone fails in receptivity to sight. This is the way in which some acts that fail to be receptive to moral goodness are called “indifferent.” Now, an act is receptive to moral goodness insofar as it is human. It is human, in turn, insofar as it is derived in some way from reason, which occurs only in acts that are commanded by the will following on the deliberation of reason. On the other hand, acts that follow on the apprehension of the immediate imagination, such as stroking one’s beard and such things, will be called “indifferent” in this way. But none of those following on the deliberate will will be indifferent but, of necessity, will be good or evil with civil goodness or malice. Still, an act perfected by civil goodness is only receptive to the efficacy of meriting in one who possesses grace. Thus, in one lacking grace, it is indifferent to merit and demerit, but in one who has grace, it must be meritorious or demeritorious. For just as an evil act will be demeritorious, so also a good one will be meritorious. For, since charity commands all the virtues just as the will commands all the powers, whatever is ordered to the end of a given virtue must be ordered to charity’s end. Since every good act is ordered to the end of a virtue, it will remain ordered to charity’s end, and thus will be meritorious. And so, eating and drinking, preserving temperance, as well as playing for recreation, preserving pleasantness of soul, which holds the mean in games, as it says in the Ethics 2, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.7, 1108a23.) will be meritorious in one who has charity, whereby he has established God as the last end of his life.

Reply Obj. 1: As the Commentator says on the Metaphysics 10, (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 10, comm. 16; cf. Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 10, lect. 6, n. 2057.) a man is called neither “good” nor “evil” who is not receptive of civil goodness or malice, such as is a peasant, who is outside civil life, and, consequently, his actions are neither good nor evil in a civil sense, inasmuch as they are not ordered to the civil good.

Or, we should say better that the Philosopher calls evil not every disordered act, but only one that is harmful with respect to another. Hence he says in the Ethics 4 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.2, 1123a25–27.) that a prodigal person, who spends his resources inordinately to show off, is not evil, but vain. And he speaks similarly for many other vices. And so, it is clear that he takes “evil” in a stricter sense than when we say that every disordered act is evil.

Reply Obj. 2: Although there is no meritorious good outside charity, there is a good either from circumstance or from civil virtue. Hence it does not follow that the acts of those lacking charity are demeritorious or indifferent.

Reply Obj. 3: Not only is the act of charity meritorious, but also the acts of the other virtues are meritorious insofar as they are informed by grace, granted that they can only be meritorious as traced back to charity’s end. However, the acts do not always need to be traced back to that end. Rather, it suffices for the efficacy of meriting that they actually be traced back to the ends of the other virtues. For one who intends to preserve chastity, even if he is not thinking about charity at all, obviously merits if he possesses grace. Now every act that tends to a good has the good of a virtue as its end, unless it tends to it in a disordered way, because the virtues sufficiently perfect everything capable of being man’s goods. Thus, it is clear that the argument does not proceed.

Reply Obj. 4: There is nothing in a genus that is not in some species of it, as it says in the Topics 2. (Aristotle, Topics 2.4, 111a15–b10.) Thus, it is never possible to approach a woman without approaching a certain kind of woman at a certain time and with reference to certain other circumstances as well. And thus, even though the stated act is indifferent considered in its genus, it is not indifferent as actually carried out.

Reply Obj. 5: Since nothing is desired except as good, it is impossible for the end to which an action arising from deliberation is ordered to be indifferent. For either reason is deceived and judges what is not good to be good for it, and this is only when the end is evil, out of harmony with reason’s rectitude, although what is desired is perhaps good for the one who desires it with respect to something of his, such as what is pleasant to taste or touch, or else it is good simply. In this case, the act will also be good by the end.

Reply Obj. 6: The habitual ordering of an act to God is not entirely sufficient because no one merits from the fact of having a habit, but instead from the fact of actually acting. Even so, an actual intention ordering to the last end need not always be joined to every action that is directed to a given proximate end. Rather, it suffices that at some time all those ends be actually referred to the last end, as occurs when one thinks of himself as directing himself totally to the love of God. For then whatever he orders to himself will be ordered to God. And if it is asked when he must refer the act to the last end, this is nothing other than asking when the habit of charity must proceed to act. For whenever the habit of charity proceeds to act, there takes place an ordering of the whole man to the last end and, consequently, of everything that is ordered to him as good for him.

But because we are positing that some acts are indifferent, we must respond to the other statements to the contrary.

Reply Sed Contra 7: The statement do all to the glory of God can be understood in two ways: affirmatively or negatively. If it is negative, then this is the sense: do nothing against God. And in this way, it is a commandment. And so, the commandment is transgressed either by mortal sin, which is done against God, or by venial sin, which is done apart from the commandment and apart from God. If it is understood as affirmative, this can be in two ways. Either it is such that an actual relation to God is joined to any action of ours, not actually but virtually, insofar as the force of the first ordering remains in all subsequent actions, just as the force of the last end remains in all the ends ordered to it. And in this way, it is still a commandment and it is the case that failing to keep it is venial or mortal as has been said. (Resp.) Or else, it is such that the actual ordering to God is actually connected with every action of ours. And in this way, it can be understood in two ways: distributively or collectively. If it is distributive, then this is the sense: no matter what action you do, it is better if you order it actually to God. And in this case it is a counsel. On the other hand, if we take it as collective, then this is the sense: do all your works so that there is none of them that you do not actually order to God. And this is neither a commandment nor a counsel but is, rather, the end of a commandment that is arrived at by fulfilling the commandments. For this is how the saints in heaven refer their acts to God. Yet it should be known that no matter how it is explained in an affirmative sense, it is only understood of the works of the deliberate will, since only these works can be properly called “our own,” as has been said. (Resp.)

Reply Sed Contra 8: The word is reason’s immediate effect, and thus, a word can be less apart from deliberation than a deed. For this reason an idle word is more a venial sin than an idle deed. Yet it should be known that, according to Gregory, (Gregory the Great, Regulae Pastoralis, pt. 3, ch. 14 (CCSL 141; PL 77:74).) the idle is that which lacks the intention of a pious will or the reason of just necessity. Hence not every jocular word is idle, if it is referred to recreation. For there can be the virtue of pleasantness of spirit even in jokes, as the Philosopher addresses in the Ethics 4. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.8, 1127b34–1128b7.)

Exposition of the text

‘Your disposition gives a name to your deed.’ (Sent. II, 40.1(252).2, quoting Ambrose, De officiis, ch. 30, sect. 147 (CCSL 15; PL 16:71).) If this is understood universally, it must be explained as meaning the disposition that chooses, not only as that which intends, as has been said. (Above: a. 2.)

‘Where there was no faith, there was no good work.’ (Sent. II, 40.1(252).2, quoting Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, Psalm 31, sermon 2, para. 4 (CCSL 38; PL 36:259).) This means meritorious work. This will be raised as a question in the following distinction. (In II Sent., d. 41, q. 1, a. 2.)

Who say that all actions are indifferent. (Sent. II, 40.1(252).5.) They considered acts only with reference to the account of the genus, since inasmuch as an act is taken generally it is indifferent to moral goodness or malice, even though it possesses natural goodness. Alternatively, if they understood this of act taken in particular, then this opinion was simply false. But this does not seem to be what they understood. For they said that action taken in particular is connected with a certain end, from which it possesses goodness or malice, such as committing theft and so forth.

But it seems to others that some actions are evil in themselves. (Sent. II, 40.1(252).6.) These took acts in the sense of being determined to a given species, but not as individuated. Because some acts possess goodness by their species, some malice, and some neither, such as lifting a reed, they distinguished acts into three kinds. And because that which is in something by its species never withdraws from it, they said that acts that are not indifferent, if they are good, remain good no matter the intention with which they are performed, and likewise for evil acts. And they understood goodness to mean that of the genus or species of the act, not that an act that was good by genus or circumstance would be good simply if it were done with an evil intention, but that it remained good by genus.

But Augustine most clearly teaches . . . that all actions are to be judged good or evil according to intention and cause. (Sent. II, 40.1(252).7.) Here the third opinion is put forward. This one takes “good act” or “evil act” in a simple sense. Because an evil intention suffices for the act’s being evil simply, whereas a good intention does not suffice for an act’s being good simply, and therefore acts are judged evil, though not good, by intention, according to this opinion. In this way, it is clear that any of the three opinions is true in a certain respect.

‘Who, in crucifying Christ, judged that they were paying homage to God.’ (Sent. II, 40.1(252).11, quoting John 16:2.) This is understood of the lesser, who were deceived by the deception of their superiors, who persecuted him out of malice, knowing that he had come from God due to the signs that he did.

Nevertheless, some contend that such things never have a good cause. (Sent. II, 40.1(252).13.) They say this in reference to the first opinion, or even the second. And they take “cause” not as the last end, but as a proximate end that is evil. For these are things connected with an evil end such that they cannot be done in a good way.