D. 25 - Conditions of free decision

Division of the text

After he has addressed free decision by showing what it is and, subsequently, has addressed the soul’s other powers to show in which of them free decision is included, here he addresses certain conditions of free decision. This is divided into two parts.

In the first, he shows what free decision’s objects are.

In the second, he shows what its subjects are, at according to the above description, free decision appears to be only in those who can change their will and bend it to contrary things. (Sent. II, 25.1(153).4; here and throughout, Silano reads choice instead of decision in his translation of the Latin arbitrium.)

Concerning the first, he does two things.

First, he shows that free decision is related to both of two opposites.

Second, he shows that it only belongs to future contingents, at and this is to be known. (Sent. II, 25.1(153).3.)

According to the above description. (Sent. II, 25.1(153).4.) This part is divided into two parts.

In the first, he shows those to whom free decision belongs, namely, God, angels, and men.

In the second, he shows how it is found in men in different ways according to different states, at from what has been said, it has become very clear that the first freedom of decision was greater than the second. (Sent. II, 25.5(157).1.)

Concerning the first, he does two things.

First, he introduces an objection, that free decision is not in God or in the blessed.

Second, he settles on the truth, at but Augustine teaches that God has free decision. (Sent. II, 25.1(153).5.)

And concerning this he does two things.

First, he addresses it as regards God.

Second, as regards the angels, at the angels and saints, however . . . do not lack free decision. (Sent. II, 25.3(155).1.)

Concerning the first, he does two things.

First, he shows that there is free decision in God.

Second, that it is not in God in the same way as it is in others, at but free decision is understood otherwise in the Creator than in the creature. (Sent. II, 25.2(154).1.)

From what has been said, it has become very clear that the first freedom of decision was greater than the second. (Sent. II, 25.5(157).1.) This part is divided into two parts.

In the first, he shows how free decision increases or decreases in men according to different states.

And because this happens by reason of different freedoms, in the second part he makes a distinction about the freedom of the will, at indeed, freedom of decision is threefold. (Sent. II, 25.8(160).1. Aquinas seems to have added the word arbitrium to the Lombard’s text.)

Concerning the first, he does three things.

First, he shows from the aforementioned that the freedom of decision is sometimes greater and sometimes less.

Second, he distinguishes the states of man in accord with which freedom is varied, at and four states of free decision can be noted in man. (Sent. II, 25.6(158).1.)

Third, he introduces a corollary from what was said, at and so it is manifest that, in addition to other penalties, because of that sin man incurred a punishment in the corruption and suppression of free decision. (Sent. II, 25.7(159).1.)

Indeed, freedom is threefold. (Sent. II, 25.8(160).1.) This part is divided into two parts.

In the first, he shows that freedom of decision is manifold.

In the second, he shows what the cause of each kind is, at and so freedom from sin and from misery is through grace. (Sent. II, 25.9(161).1.)

The first part is divided into two parts.

In the first, he lays out a distinction regarding freedom.

In the second, he draws a conclusion from what was said before, at from the above, it is already apparent what it was in which free decision was diminished or corrupted through sin. (Sent. II, 25.8(160).10.)

Concerning the first, he does three things.

First, he distinguishes three kinds of freedom and continues with the first one, which is freedom from compulsion.

Second, he continues with the second one, which is freedom from sin, at there is also another freedom, namely, from sin. (Sent. II, 25.8(160).3.)

Third, he continues with the third one, which is freedom from misery, at there is likewise a freedom from misery. (Sent. II, 25.8(160).9.)

Concerning the second, he does three things.

First, he shows what freedom from sin is.

Second, he shows to whom it belongs, at those alone whom the Son frees and restores through grace now have this freedom, which is from sin. (Sent. II, 25.8(160).4.)

Third, he raises a doubt, at here it can be asked whether this freedom, by which one is free to do evil, is freedom of decision. (Sent. II, 25.8(160).6.)

And concerning this he does three things.

First, he raises the doubt and puts forth the opinions on either side.

Second, he settles the matter in accord with his own opinion, at but it pleases us more that freedom of decision itself be both that by which one is free to do evil, and that by which one is free to do the good. (Sent. II, 25.8(160).8.)

Again, concerning this he does two things.

First, he raises the question of freedom for evil.

Second, he raises the question of freedom for good, at similarly, it is also usual to ask whether that true liberty, which is the one to do justice, is freedom of decision itself. (Sent. II, 25.8(160).7.)

Question 1

Conditions of free decision

Here five questions are asked:

first, in which beings free decision is found;

second, whether free decision is always free from compulsion such that it cannot be compelled;

third, whether free decision extends to all human works;

fourth, whether free decision is increased or diminished;

fifth, on the definition of freedom touched on in the text.

Article 1

Whether there is free decision in God

To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that there is not free decision in God.

Obj. 1: For, as the Philosopher says in On Sleep and Sleeplessness, (Aristotle, On Sleep and Sleeplessness 1, 454a8.) the one who has the potency has the act and vice versa. But the act of free decision, which is to choose, does not befit God, since choice follows on counsel, as it says in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.3, 1113a2–13.) But counsel is a kind of inquiry with a certain discursive process of reason, which does not belong to God. Therefore, it seems that in God there is no free decision.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in things that are naturally determined to one direction there is not free decision. For we do not say that a stone tends downward by free decision. But God always wills the good from the condition of his nature. Therefore, it seems that he lacks free decision.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it seems that neither is there free decision in any creatures. For it pertains to the freedom of free decision that one be master of his own act. But in the case of any agent whose act is caused by a prior agent, that agent is not the master of his own act. Therefore, since the act of anything created is traced back to a prior cause, which is God himself, who works all our works in us, as Isaiah 26:12 says, it seems that free decision is not found in any creature.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, it seems that at least there is not free will in the blessed. For choice is of what is directed toward the end. But when the end comes, what is directed toward the end ceases. Therefore, since the blessed are joined to the last end, it seems that choice does not pertain to them and, consequently, that neither does free decision.

Obj. 5: Again, it seems that neither is it in those journeying on this earthly path. For their choice of what is directed toward the end is drawn from the account of the end. But, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 3, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.4, 1113a23–b1.) as each man is, so the end seems to him. But someone’s quality is determined by his nature. Therefore, it seems that the choice of what is directed toward the end is determined for someone by his nature. Therefore, it seems that men do not possess free decision to choose what pertains to them.

On the contrary (6), it seems that free will exists even in brute animals. For in whatever beings the voluntary exists, free decision exists. But, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 3, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.2, 1111b7–10.) both children and other animals have a share in the voluntary. Therefore, it seems that other animals have free decision.

Furthermore (7), free decision consists in choosing what is fitting and declining what is harmful. But other animals flee what is harmful and pursue what is fitting. Therefore, it seems that they have free decision, especially since they do this spontaneously.

I answer that nothing acts except insofar as it is in act, and so it is that every agent must be determined to one side. For what is equally related to one or the other side is in a certain way in potency with respect to both of them. And so it is that, as the Commentator says on the Physics 2, (Averroes, Commentary on the Physics, bk. 2, comm. 75–87.) nothing follows from what is toward one or the other side unless it is determined.

Now, the determination of the agent to a given action must be from some knowledge furnishing an end for the action. But knowledge determining the action and furnishing the end is joined together in certain agents, as man furnishes for himself the end of his own action; whereas in others it is separated, as in things that act through their nature. For the actions of natural things are not pointless, as is proved in the Physics 2, (Aristotle, Physics 2.8, 198b10–199b32; 8.1, 252a11–19.) but are ordered to certain ends by the intellect that instituted the nature, such that the whole work of nature is in a certain way a work of intelligence, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Physics 2.8, 198b10–199b32; 8.1, 252a11–19.)

Therefore, in this way, it is clear that the difference among agents is that some determine the end, and act to that end for themselves, and others do not. No agent can furnish for itself an end unless it knows the account of the end and the order of what is toward that end, which is only the case in those who possess an intellect. And so it is that judgment of one’s own action exists only in those who have intellect, the choice of this or that action being established as within their power. Hence they are also said to have mastery over their own act. For this reason free decision is found only in those who have intellect, not in those agents whose actions are not determined by the agents themselves, but instead are determined by certain other prior causes.

Reply Obj. 1: What is said of God and of creatures, as stated in Book I, (In I Sent., d. 4, q. 1, a. 1; d. 22, q. 1, a. 2.) is always found more eminently in God. Thus, choice is preserved in God by casting aside what pertains to imperfection and retaining what pertains to perfection. That choice would occur after an inquiry of counsel belongs to imperfection and attaches to free decision as it exists in an ignorant nature. Hence choice is not preserved in God in this regard. Rather, choice is preserved in God as regards the fact that the determination of his act is his not from another, but from himself. Hence he is most truly the master of his own work. For this reason the text (Sent. II, 25.2(154).1.) also says that free decision is found in God in a way different from how it is found in others.

Reply Obj. 2: It does not pertain to the account of free decision that it be related indeterminately to good or to evil. For free decision is through itself ordered to the good, since good is the object of the will, and it only tends to evil on account of some defect whereby it is apprehended as good, because will or choice is always of the good or the apparent good. Thus, where there is the most perfect free decision, it cannot tend to evil, since it cannot be imperfect. But it pertains to the freedom of the decision that it can perform an action or not perform it, and this befits God. For he is able not to do the good things that he does, though he cannot do evil.

Reply Obj. 3: God works in all things, though in such a way that he works in each in accord with its condition. Hence in natural realities he works as supplying the power to act, and as determining the nature to such action. However, in free decision he acts such that free decision supplies for itself the power to act, and with him working free decision acts. But the determination of the action and the end are established as being in free decision’s power. Hence it remains master of its own act, though not in the way that the first agent does.

Reply Obj. 4: There are two kinds of things ordered to the end: one is distant from the end, and one is joined to the end. This is clear in natural generation. For imperfect heat is a disposition to the form of fire when in the preceding alteration it is not joined to the end itself. But the final hotness that is in the term of the alteration is joined to the substantial form and not excluded by it. Thus, I say that there are some things ordered to the last end of beatitude that are joined to the end itself, such as seeing, loving, and so forth. For these there will be everlasting and free choice, but not for imperfect things that are distant from the end, such as faith, hope, and other such things.

Reply Obj. 5: There are two ways in which something can have a quality: one is from habit, and the other is from natural makeup. With reference to what is from habit, the last end appears to someone as he himself is. For example, for someone who has a habit of lust, sexual pleasure seems best, because it bears a likeness to his own habit. But it is in our power to be such or not to be such. For either the works cause the habit, as in the case of acquired habits, or at least they are dispositions to the habit, as in the case of infused habits. As for a quality that is due to natural makeup, it does not make the end seem to be of this sort, but is, rather, a disposition to this, as it is clear in those who are prone to lust based on their natural makeup. For not all of them pursue sexual pleasure, though their natural makeup in a certain way inclines them to this.

Reply Sed Contra 6: The Philosopher is taking “voluntary” in a broad sense, not as being said of the will, but as distinguished from what is violent. Hence since the violent is that whose principle lies without, the voluntary will be that whose principle lies within. And so it is that animals that move themselves are said to have voluntary motions, though they do not have choice or will, as the Philosopher shows in the same place. Hence neither do they have free decision.

Reply Sed Contra 7: Animals do not apprehend the account of fittingness by a comparison, but through a kind of natural instinct. Thus, animals have estimation but not knowledge, just as they have memory but not recollection, even though these all belong to the sensitive part. Thus, they carry out their acts from a determination of their nature, not from a proper determination of the agent. Hence all the animals of the same species perform similar activities, just as every spider makes a similar web, which would not be the case if they arranged their own works by working from themselves, as by an art. For this reason there is no free decision in them.

Article 2

Whether free decision can be compelled

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In IV Sent., d. 29, q. 1, a. 1; ST I-II.6.4; On Truth, q. 22, aa. 5, 8.) It seems that free decision can be compelled.

Obj. 1: For what is changed by an agent is compelled by it. But, as a Gloss on Romans says, God can change the will of men to whatever he wishes. (Glossa ordinaria, at Romans 9:16, 6.124 (PL 114:501), which refers to Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity, ch. 98 (CCSL 46; PL 40:277).) Therefore, it seems that the will can be compelled by God, and so also the free decision.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, every agent that cannot work otherwise than determined for it by another is compelled by that other. But free decision cannot work otherwise than God has foreknown or predestined. Therefore, it seems that free decision is compelled by God.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a higher power can compel a lower power. But in the order of the universe there are some powers higher than free decision. Therefore, they are able to compel it.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the intellect is a higher power than the will. But the intellect is compelled in demonstrations, as is apparent from the Metaphysics 5. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.5, 1015a20–b8.) Therefore, it seems that the will and the free decision can be compelled as well.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, lower motions are regulated according to higher motions. For everything that is not uniform is regulated by something that is uniform. But the motions of free decision are supremely non-uniform. Therefore, it seems that they need to be regulated by uniform activities. Now, there are no such motions in nature except the motions of the heavens. Therefore, the works of free decision are regulated by the motions of the stars and can be compelled by their power. This is clear from the fact that, by way of the course of the stars, astronomers announce in advance certain matters pertaining to the activities subject to free decision.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, everything that is overcome by another is compelled by it. But the incontinent, who are led by passions, are so overcome, as is clear from the Ethics 7. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.7, 1150b6–16.) Therefore, it seems that free decision can be compelled.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, it is more difficult to deprive someone of his act altogether than to change his act. But the use of free decision can be impeded by violence, as is clear in the case of the insane. Therefore, it also seems that it can be compelled to do something by violence.

On the contrary, as Augustine says against Cicero, what is necessary is not voluntary. (Augustine, The City of God, bk. 5, ch. 9 (CCSL 48; PL 41:148).) But free decision holds the voluntary in its own account, since it is the faculty of reason and will. Therefore, it seems that it cannot be compelled by necessity.

Furthermore, whatever is compelled does not have mastery of its own act. But we speak of free decision in ourselves precisely from the fact that we are the masters of our own acts. Therefore, it seems that it is contrary to the account of free decision that it be compelled.

I answer that there are two kinds of compelling: one is sufficient, which is called “compulsion”; the other is insufficient, which is called “impulsion.”

Thus, it should be known that among the parts of the soul there are some that can be compelled, though in two ways. For some are compelled on the basis of the subject, such as those powers that are attached to organs. For since their activities cannot be had without organs, when the organs are compelled, the powers themselves are restricted or compelled, their acts being violently extorted. But there are others that are not compelled by means of the subject, since they are not attached to organs, but are instead compelled by the object, such as the intellect. For the intellect is not the act of any part of the body, as the Philosopher says in On the Soul 3, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 429a24–25.) and yet it is compelled by force of demonstration.

Now, the will can be compelled neither by means of the subject, since it is not attached to an organ, nor by means of the object. For however good something is shown to be, it remains in the will’s power to choose it or not to choose it. The reason for this is that the object of the intellect is the true and the object of the will is the good. But we find something true in which no appearance of falsity can be commingled, as is clear in the case of axioms. Hence the intellect cannot help assenting to them. Likewise, too, we find something false that has no appearance of truth, as is clear in the opposites of axioms. Hence the intellect can in no way assent to it. Likewise, too, if a good is proposed to the will that has the complete account of the good, as does the last end, for whose sake all things are desired, the will cannot not will this. Hence no one can not will to be happy or will to be wretched.

However, as for those things that are ordered to the last end, we find nothing so evil that it has no good mixed with it, and nothing so good that it is sufficient in every respect. Hence, however good or evil it seems, the will can always cling to it or flee to the contrary by reason of some other aspect that is in it—that is, if it is evil simply, by taking it as an apparent good, and if it is good simply, as an apparent evil. So it is that, in everything that falls under choice, the will remains free, possessing a determination only in the fact that it naturally desires happiness, but not determined to this or that.

But even though the will cannot be compelled, it can still be inclined to do something through given dispositions and habits from which it becomes more prone to choose one side over the other.

Reply Obj. 1: God works in the will and in free decision according to its specific requirement. Hence even if he changes man’s will to something else, he nevertheless does this by his omnipotence in such a way that the person voluntarily wills that to which his will is changed. Thus, the account of compulsion is taken away. Otherwise there would be an implied contradiction, if one were said not to will that to which his will is changed and to be compelled to it. For compulsion’s necessity is contrary to the will, as the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics 5. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.5, 1015a26–30.)

Reply Obj. 2: The divine foreknowledge does not impose necessity on free decision, even though it is impossible for what is foreknown not to occur. How this can be the case was shown in Book I. (In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 5.)

Reply Obj. 3: Other than God, no power is higher than the act of free decision, though perhaps another created power is stronger simply. Hence no created power can compel or change free decision. However, God can change free decision, but he cannot compel it, in the way that we say he cannot make two contradictories to be at the same time.

Reply Obj. 4: Even though the intellect is a higher power than the will by reason of order, since it is prior to the will and presupposed by it, the will is also higher in a certain way, insofar as it has command over all the soul’s powers on account of the fact that its object is the end. Hence it is most fitting that we find the height of freedom in it, for that is called “free” which is the cause of itself, as it says in the Metaphysics 1. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.2, 982b25.)

Reply Obj. 5: The heavenly motion is related to free decision as inclining one toward doing something, inasmuch as the impression of a heavenly body leaves a disposition in the body in accord with which the soul is rendered prone to this or that action, just as by natural makeup some are more prone to one vice than others are. This is how astronomers can announce in advance something that depends on free decision, by way of conjecture and not by scientific certitude, since the heavenly bodies do not have sufficient compulsive power over free decision. Hence, too, Ptolemy says (Ptolemy, Centiloquium, proposition 5.) that the wise man is master of the stars, since by his wisdom he can avoid what the stars dispose him to. But Avicenna seems to be of the opinion, as was said above, that the motions of the will are traced back to the souls of the heavenly bodies as to their regulator. For he posits that the lower souls are from the higher souls. Hence it is no wonder if a higher soul makes an impression on a lower soul. But according to the Catholic faith, this cannot stand, for the faith asserts that souls are created immediately by God. Hence he alone can work in the will and make an impression on it. Thus, the differences between human wills are reduced to the uniformity of the divine will as to the first rule.

Reply Obj. 6: One who is incontinent is said to be overcome by the passions not as if they compelled him, but because they forcefully incline him to act in a certain way.

Reply Obj. 7: The use of free decision is impeded not through itself, but incidentally, that is, inasmuch as the use of reason is required for the use of free decision, and the use of reason requires the use of the imaginative power, which is impeded by harm to the organ.

Article 3

Whether free decision extends to all human works

To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that free decision does not extend to all human works.

Obj. 1: For, as we have said, free decision cannot be compelled. But some human works can be compelled. For by violence a human being is prevented from moving. Therefore, not all human works belong to free decision.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in the Ethics 1 (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.1, 1094a1–18; see also 1.7, 1.13.) it says that some human works are ends. But a choice is not for the end, as it says in the Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.3, 1112b12.) Therefore, since choosing is an act of free decision, it seems that free decision does not belong to all human acts.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, all the acts of free decision are in our power. But there are some acts in us that are not within our power, such as the acts of the generative, nutritive, and augmentative parts. Therefore, not all our acts belong to free decision.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a determinate power is to determinate acts. Therefore, if free decision were to belong to all human acts, it would be not a determinate but a universal power, which we said above is false.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, what is outside the will is also outside free decision, since free decision is a faculty of will and reason, as was said above. (Above: d. 24, q. 1, a. 1, obj. 2.) But, as Dionysius says, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 1 (PG 3:731).) evil is outside the will. Therefore, men’s free decision does not extend to evil works.

On the contrary, Damascene says (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 25 (PG 94:955).) that by free decision man inquires, chooses, puts a work into effect, and so forth. Therefore, it seems that all human acts pertain to free decision.

Furthermore, as was said above, free decision is the will. But all human acts are voluntary. Therefore, they also belong to free decision.

I answer that the act or habit of a power can exist in two ways: either the power elicits it or the power commands it. That act is properly said to be elicited by a power that immediately proceeds from the power itself, just as understanding proceeds from the intellect. And not all human acts belong to free decision in this way. Rather, its proper act is choosing, as was said above. But by the command of the will and free decision other powers, too, are moved to their acts. Hence the appetitive power is called a mover because it commands a motion, and the motive power attached to muscles and nerves is called a mover because it carries it out. In this way, all human acts belong to free decision, since they are commanded by it.

Reply Obj. 1: Free decision cannot be compelled in its proper act, which is choosing, though it can be compelled in certain acts commanded by it on account of the powers that carry out these acts being compelled.

Reply Obj. 2: That which belongs to the end with respect to some things can also be ordered to a more final end, unless it is the last end. Now, no human activity is the last end except incidentally, namely, inasmuch as it joins one to the last end. Thus, there can be choice regarding all human activities, not as belonging to the end, but as being directed toward the end. For even though to conquer belongs to the end of military power, it is still ordered to a more final end. Hence it can fall under choice.

Reply Obj. 3: Man is called “man” because he has reason. Hence only those acts are called “human acts” which belong to the rational powers either essentially or by participation, such as acts of the concupiscible and irascible parts. However, the powers of the nutritive part in no way participate in reason, as it says in the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.13, 1102b12.) Hence their acts are not called human activities.

Reply Obj. 4: This argument would follow if all human works belonged to free decision as elicited by it, but this is not true, as has been said. (Resp.) Hence it does not follow that it is a universal power.

Reply Obj. 5: Evil precisely as evil is outside the will. But a human activity, inasmuch as it appears good, can fall under the will. Thus, one can choose it and it can be subject to free decision.

Article 4

Whether freedom of decision is increased or diminished

To the fourth we proceed as follows. It seems that the freedom of decision is neither increased nor diminished.

Obj. 1: For what pertains to the account of a power is not varied by acts or habits, since what is prior is not varied by what is posterior, but the latter are subject to the former. But freedom pertains to the account of the power that is called “free decision.” Therefore, it cannot be increased or diminished by acts or habits of virtue or vice.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, what follows on a given nature is found equally in all that have that nature. But free decision follows on intellective nature, as was said. (Above: d. 24, q. 1, a. 1, obj. 2.) Therefore, it is neither increased nor diminished in them.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, free decision takes its name from the fact that it cannot be compelled. But negations do not admit of more and less. Therefore free decision is not spoken of in terms of more and less in diverse matters or in the same one in reference to diverse states.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the stronger is not overcome or reduced to servitude by the weaker. But free decision is stronger than the passions of sin, since it can resist them and make them subject to itself. Therefore, it seems that free decision is not diminished by the servitude of sin.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, in a matter that anyone is capable of through himself, one is not more free than another. But anyone is capable of evil through himself and without grace. Therefore, it seems that the free decision of one is not more free for evil than another’s. Thus, it seems that free decision is not increased or diminished.

On the contrary, it is said: I do not do the good I want (Rom 7:19). Now, this is said in the person of a condemned man, as one Gloss explains it. (Glossa ordinaria, on Romans 7:19, 6.97 (PL 114:493).) Therefore, since in the state of innocence there would be no impediment to the good, it seems that free decision is increased and diminished.

Furthermore, only that which was in servitude is redeemed. But we have been redeemed from sin by the blood of Christ, as it is said in 1 Peter 1:18–19. Therefore, we are drawn into servitude through sin, and thus, freedom is diminished.

I answer that free decision takes its name from the fact that it cannot be compelled. Now, as we said before, there are two sorts of compulsion: one that compels, and another that induces or impels. Now, it is natural and essential to free decision that it not be sufficiently forced by a compelling force, and this follows on it in any state. Hence this kind of freedom is neither increased nor diminished through itself, but only incidentally. For in the case of every property that follows on a given nature, the more nobly that nature is found in a given individual, the more perfectly the property is also participated in by it, after the manner whereby man is called “less intelligent” than angels. And so, too, freedom from necessary compulsion is found more nobly in God than in angels, in one angel more than in another, and in angels more than in man.

On the other hand, freedom from what impels and disposes to one side is indeed increased and diminished, as well as gained and lost, insofar as the disposing factors are increased and diminished or gained and lost. Hence this kind of freedom is through itself even increased and diminished in man in accord with different states.

Reply Obj. 1: Freedom from necessity is what follows on the nature of the power. Thus, it is not varied by acts and habits. But freedom from dispositive factors follows on habit and act. Thus, it is varied in accord with the differences of acts and habits.

Reply Obj. 2: In those things in which one nature is equally found, what follows on that nature is also equally found. But the intellective nature is not found equally in God, angels, and man. Hence neither is freedom from compulsion found equally in all.

Reply Obj. 3: Although a negation is not receptive of more or less through itself, it can be rendered more or less intense incidentally, namely, by the intensification or lessening of its cause. In this way, the darkness is called “greater” the greater an obstacle it is to light. Hence, too, insofar as the cause of freedom, which is intellective nature, is found to be more or less noble, freedom itself is also in a certain way found to be respectively more or less intense.

Reply Obj. 4: Free decision is never so overcome or made subject to servitude by the passions of sin that it is compelled to sin, for in that case sin would not be imputed to it. Rather, it is said to be subject to sin inasmuch as from sin it is inclined to sin as by something dispositive, not as by something compulsive.

Reply Obj. 5: Even though anyone is through himself capable of evil, not just anyone is capable of doing evil in the same way as one who has a habit of malice. For to everyone who has a habit, the activity that follows on that habit is delightful. Thus, those who have corrupt habits carry out abominable deeds with delight and without abhorrence. Thus, they are said to act freely, inasmuch as what reason says against it is repressed by the corrupt habit, with reason being darkened. This cannot be the case in those who lack such habits. Thus, the Philosopher says in the Ethics 5 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.9, 1137a16–25.) that the just man cannot do works of injustice at once as the unjust man does.

Article 5

Whether there is a threefold distinction in free decision

To the fifth we proceed as follows. It seems that three kinds of free decision are unfittingly distinguished. (Sent. II, 25.5(157).1: the first freedom of decision was that in which there was the power to sin and not to sin; but the last will be that in which there be the power not to sin, and no power to sin; and the middle one is that in which there is the power to sin, and no power to sin: before restoration of grace, even mortally; after restoration, not even venially.)

Obj. 1: For the will’s freedom is varied in accord with different states. But four states of man are assigned in the text. (Sent. II, 25.6(156).1: and four states of free decision can be noted in man. For before sin, nothing impeded man from the good, nothing impelled him to evil; he did not have a weakness toward evil, and had a help toward the good. Then, reason was able to judge without error, and the will was able to desire the good without difficulty.—But after sin, before the restoration of grace, he is pressed down and overcome by concupiscence; he has a weakness toward evil, but does not have grace toward good; and so he can sin and cannot not sin, even damnably.—After the restoration and before confirmation, however, he is pressed down by concupiscence, but not overcome; and he also has weakness toward evil, but grace toward good, so that he is able to sin because of his freedom and weakness, and he is able not to sin unto death because of his freedom and the help of grace. Nevertheless, he does not yet have the power not to sin entirely or the inability to sin, because his weakness has not yet been entirely removed and grace has not yet been entirely perfected.—But after the confirmation, when the weakness will have been entirely destroyed and grace achieved, he will have the power to be neither overcome nor pressed down, and then he shall have the inability to sin.) Therefore, four freedoms of decision should be distinguished as well.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, sin differs more from justice than sin does from misery, since the first two are opposites and the latter two are related as cause and effect. Therefore, if different freedoms from sin and from misery are assigned, much more should we also distinguish different freedoms from sin and from justice.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Anselm says that to be able to sin is neither freedom nor part of freedom. (Anselm, De libero arbitrio, ch. 1 (PL 158:489).) But freedom from justice regards precisely the ability to sin. Therefore, it seems that he unfittingly assigns such a freedom.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, just as sin and justice differ, so do glory and misery. Therefore, if he posits freedom from sin over and against freedom from justice, it seems that he should also posit freedom from glory over and against freedom from misery.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, necessity is a kind of misery. But the part should not be contradistinguished from the whole. Therefore, freedom from necessity is unfittingly contradistinguished from freedom from misery.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, Bernard distinguishes three kinds of freedom: freedom of decision, freedom of counsel, and that of liking. (Bernard of Clairvaux, On Grace and Free Will, ch. 4, sect. 11 (PL 182:407).) Therefore, since the Master makes no mention of these, he seems insufficient in how he distinguishes freedom.

I answer that freedom includes the negation of compulsion in its account. For every privation is distinguished in accord with what a thing is deprived of. Hence we must make distinctions between freedoms insofar as a thing can compel or impede. Now, as we said before, (Above: a. 4, resp.) there are two types of compulsion: one that is perfect, which can be called “compulsion” simply speaking, and one that is imperfect, which is better called “impulsion” than “compulsion.” Therefore, if we consider freedom as removing perfect compulsion, then this will be freedom from compulsion and necessity. This follows from free decision through itself and always. Hence in the text it says that this freedom is found in all, without which sin could not be imputed. (Sent. II, 25.7(159).2; 8(160).2.) However, if we speak of freedom as removing what impels or impedes, this is in two ways. For what impels or impedes free decision either does this through itself, as do habits and dispositions that come about in the soul itself—and in this case there is freedom from sin—or else, it does it incidentally, as do impotencies and penalties that exist on the part of the body and impede the use of free decision—and in this case there is freedom from misery.

Reply Obj. 1: Freedoms are not distinguished in accord with the different states of man, since in the different states a single freedom is participated in. For freedom from necessity is common to all the states. Freedom from sin, in turn, is common to three of the states, namely, the first state of innocence, the third state, after the reparation of grace, and the fourth in glory, though to greater or lesser extent, as denoted in the text. (Sent. II, 25.8(160).3‒5, 11.) Finally, freedom from misery is common to two states, namely, the state of innocence and the state of glory.

Reply Obj. 2: Although it is capable of good and of evil, free decision is through itself ordered to the good. Thus, it is that which impedes it from the good that is an impediment and its corruption simply. For this reason freedom from what impedes from the good is called “freedom” simply. This is freedom from sin. But what impedes it from evil, which is what corrupts it, is not an impediment to it except in a qualified sense, just as when ignorance is corrupted in a man, we are speaking of corruption in a qualified sense. Now, that which impedes from sin is the uprightness of justice in the reason. And so it is that freedom from justice is not freedom simply, but in a qualified sense. Thus, it should not be assigned among the principle classifications of freedom, but instead reduced to freedom from sin on account of likeness in its mode. For just as sin through itself impedes from the good by way of habit or disposition, so also justice impedes from evil.

Reply Obj. 3: As has been said, freedom from justice is not freedom simply, but in a qualified sense. For this reason neither is it reckoned among the principle classifications, but instead is reduced, as a consequence, to one of the other freedoms, as was said.

Reply Obj. 4: It pertains to the account of beatitude or glory that one possess all that he wills and wills nothing evil, as Augustine says. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 13, cc. 6–7 (CCSL 50; PL 42:1020).) Thus, glory does not impede the use of free decision in anything. For this reason we do not assign a freedom from glory. For there is no will that seeks misery and flees glory, since all naturally will to be blessed.

Reply Obj. 5: Misery does not include the compulsion that is excluded by freedom from necessity because one never sinks into so much misery such that free decision can be compelled. Thus, it is not unfitting if freedom from necessity is contradistinguished from freedom from misery.

Reply Obj. 6: As is clear from what has been stated, the Master distinguishes free decision on the basis of the things from which one can be free. This is the division of free will through itself, as has been said. But Bernard distinguishes freedom according to its aim. And this is what falls under choice. Therefore, since nothing falls under choice except insofar as it has the aspect of good, he distinguishes different freedoms in accord with different grades of goodness in human acts. For there is in human acts that which is licit, forbidden by no law. It is with respect to this that he identifies freedom of decision, since it consists in our judgment whether we pursue it or not. There is, furthermore, what is not only licit but also useful, for all things are licit but not all are expedient, as the Apostle says. (See 1 Corinthians 6:12.) In accord with this, he assigns freedom of counsel, since counsel pertains to the better good, which is expedient for salvation. There is also what gives delight. And with respect to this sort of thing, he assigns freedom of liking. Hence he says that freedom of decision has the task of discerning what is licit, freedom of counsel that of testing what is expedient, and freedom of liking that of experiencing what it pleases. (Bernard of Clairvaux, On Grace and Free Will, ch. 4, sect. 11 (PL 182:407).)

Exposition of the text

In defining it, the philosophers called it ‘a free judgment concerning the will.’ (Sent. II, 25.1(153).2, quoting Boethius, In libro Aristotelis De interpretatione, editio secunda seu maiora commentaria, bk. 3, on ch. 9 (PL 64:487).) It should be known that this is not a true definition but a kind of illustration. Hence he takes the definition broadly. Now, it differs from the aforementioned definition assigned above, for above the definition was given according to that which free decision regards, namely, that it is directed toward good and evil. But this latter definition is given according to freedom’s cause. And so, when it is said a free judgment concerning the will, the preposition “concerning” denotes the cause of freedom. For the will, as was said previously, is the end of all freedom.

According to the above description, free decision appears to be only in those who can change their will and bend it to contrary things; (Sent. II, 25.1(153).4.) not according to the philosophers’ description, which he includes with his own explanation, adding it when he says it is free toward either, but instead according to the description he takes from the words of Augustine above.

And no power not to sin: before restoration of grace, even mortally; after restoration, not even venially. (Sent. II, 25.5(157).1.) For the present, since the question will be asked below, it should be understood that not to sin means not being in sin, even as “seeing” is taken in two ways, as meaning having sight and as meaning making use of sight.

And so freedom was corrupted through sin and was in part lost. (Sent. II, 25.7(159).2.) He says “corrupted” because of freedom from necessity, which is natural, as also other natural goods are corrupted through sin, granted that they always remain. But he shows that it was “lost” because of freedom from sin, which is completely taken away when sin comes onto the scene, as the other goods of innocence and grace are also taken away.

Here it can be asked whether this freedom, by which one is free to do evil, is freedom of decision. (Sent. II, 25.8(166).6.) It should be known that if freedom means the faculty of the power itself, in this case the freedom of decision from sin and from justice is the same, being disposed through them as through certain habits. But if it means the faculty of a habit, then freedom from sin and that from justice are different, and both are superadded to freedom of decision, as a habit is superadded to a power. Hence either opinion is correct in some sense.

It is freer toward the evil which it can do by itself than toward the good which, unless it is freed and helped by grace, it cannot do. (Sent. II, 26.8(160).11.) This seems to be false. For, as was said, freedom is only for evil in a qualified sense, and what is simply is greater than what is in a qualified sense.

It should be said that we do not consider this comparison with reference to what is proper to freedom. For freedom for the good is more freedom than freedom for evil. Rather, we consider it with reference to the sufficiency of free decision, which by itself is capable of any given evil, but not of any given good.