D. 42 - Parts and modes of sin

Division of the first part of the text

After he has addressed sin in general, here he addresses sin in comparison to its classes. And it is divided into two parts.

In the first, he addresses the different classes and modes of sin.

In the second, he specifically addresses a certain sin that transcends all the others, at moreover, there is a genus of sin which is more grave . . . than the others. (Sent. II, 43.1(267).1.)

The first is divided into two parts.

In the first, he inquires about what elements can come together to constitute a single sin, as if merging together and forming a sin.

In the second, he pursues different divisions of sins, at and the modes of sinning are distinguished in a variety of ways in Scripture. (Sent. II, 42.4(262).1.)

The first is divided into two parts.

In the first, he inquires whether an external action and the will come together to constitute a single sin.

In the second, he inquires whether there is still some other element in sin besides the internal and external act, at moreover, it is usual to ask: when a sin has been voluntarily committed by someone, and the will to commit it and the action have ceased . . . whether that sin is in him until he repents. (Sent. II, 42.2(260).1.)

Concerning the first, he does two things.

First, he raises a question.

Second, he addresses it in accord with the opinions of different people, at some say that there is one sin. (Sent. II, 42.1(259).2.)

And this is divided into three parts in accord with the three objections, wherein one opinion is directed against another.

The second begins at but another objection is made to the same. (Sent. II, 42.1(259).3.)

The third begins at still pressing on with the question. (Sent. II, 42.1(259).4.)

Moreover, it is usual to ask: when a sin has been voluntarily committed by someone, and the will to commit it and the action have ceased . . . whether that sin is in him until he repents. (Sent. II, 42.2(260).1.) Here he inquires whether, apart from the internal and external act, there is something else that remains in sin when the act ceases.

Concerning this, he does three things.

First, he shows that when the internal and external act ceases, guilt remains.

Second, he shows how many ways there are in which we speak of guilt, at and liability in Scripture is taken in several ways. (Sent. II, 42.3(261).1.)

Third, in accord with the differentiation in guilt, he assigns different kinds of sins, at for there are two kinds of sins. (Sent. II, 42.3(261).2.)

Question 1

The integral parts of sin

Here five questions are asked:

first, if the will and the external act are one sin;

second, if guilt remains once the act passes;

third, on the division of sins into venial and mortal, which is taken on the basis of guilt;

fourth, on the difference of venial and mortal, particularly as regards the genus of the work;

fifth, whether mortal sin merits an eternal punishment and differs in this respect from venial sin.

Article 1

Whether the will and act of sin are two sins

To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that the will and the act are two sins.

Obj. 1: For Augustine says (Augustine, Contra Faustum, bk. 22, ch. 27 (CSEL 25:621; PL 42:418).) that something is a sin by being contrary to the divine laws. But there are two distinct commandments whereby the internal will and the external act are forbidden, as is clear in Exodus 20:15 and 17: you shall not steal, and: you shall not covet your neighbor’s property. Therefore, the external act and the internal act, that is, the depraved will, are different sins.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, one can only become more evil and a worse sinner by accumulating sin upon sin. But one who sins by will and act sins more than one who sins only by will or act, as is clear from Matthew 5:25, where a more serious punishment is given to one who speaks insults against his brother than only being angry with him. Therefore, the addition of the external act must be another sin.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, different habits have different acts. But the habit that perfects what is rational by essence and that which perfects what is rational by participation are not the same. Therefore, since the will’s sin is in the act of what is rational by essence because the will is in the reason, as Damascene (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 18 (PG 94:1075).) and the Philosopher say, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.10, 433a13–b5.) while the external act is in what is rational by participation, by means of which the external motion proceeds from our intellect, it seems that the will and the external act do not have one single sin.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, when the higher is multiplied, the lower is multiplied, (“Higher” and “lower” here indicate the sense in which a genus is said to be “higher” than its species, that is, a genus is greater in its universality than its species. The reasoning here suggests that act divides first into interior and exterior, while sin falls under the interior act (presumably along with meritorious acts); the multiplicity of species of act seems incompatible with any supposed union of the two acts being one sin (or one act).) since one man is not many animals. But act is higher in relation to sin because sin is nothing other than a kind of disordered act. Therefore, since the act of the will and the external act are different acts, seeing as they proceed from different powers, it seems that the internal will and the external act are not one sin.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, one accident cannot be in different subjects. But the internal act is in the will whose act it is as its subject, while the external act is in the power that moves the organ. Therefore, they cannot be one sin, since sin is a kind of accident.

On the contrary, different sins are due different punishments. But a different punishment is not enjoined in making satisfaction for the internal will and the external act. Rather, there is only one. Therefore, there is one sin.

Furthermore, where one thing is on account of another, there is only one thing, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Topics 3.2, 117a18.) But the external act is only a sin on the will’s account. Therefore, the will and the external act are not two sins but one.

I answer that, since “one” and “being” are convertible, we must base a judgment about a thing’s unity or multiplicity on the same thing whereby it has existence, as is clear in natural things, where a thing that has existence by form also has unity by form. Hence different things must have different forms. Although perhaps the principle of multiplicity of form is the division of matter, as in things that differ only numerically, yet there could not be a plurality of men if there were not more than one human form, and so forth.

Now, as was shown up above, an act is only included in the genus of the moral on account of the will, namely, as elicited or commanded by the will. Thus, a judgment about the unity of what is said in the genus of the moral must be based on the unity of the will. Hence something that is one considered in the genus of nature, such as one continuous motion, can be more than one as turned back to the genus of the moral if the will varies in the act, such as when one begins with a good intention and ends with an evil one, as was shown above. (Above, d. 40, q. 1, a. 4.) Conversely, there can be more than one act as referred to the genus of nature, that are one as considered in the genus of the moral, as is clear in one who steals. For all his acts that are ordered to the end of theft are a sin, since they are done with an evil intention. These can be very many, and yet they are all reckoned as one sin because they have the account of a sin only insofar as by one will they are ordered to one perverse end.

And so, we must make a distinction in the point at issue. For when we ask whether the will and the external act are different sins, either this is understood of the will connected with the external act, or of the will that precedes. If it is of the connected will, then the internal will and the external act must be one sin because the will’s act is not multiplied. But if it is of the separated will, then it is another sin because the will’s act is multiplied. For when it completes the external act, it also repeats the act of the will. Thus, there must be two sins, not due to differentiating the internal and external acts, but due to differentiating two internal acts of the will.

Reply Obj. 1: In the commandment, you shall not covet your neighbor’s property, it is not the will to steal connected to the act that is forbidden, but that which is separate from the act, which possesses a certain wicked joy even without the act, whereas that which is connected to the act is forbidden by the commandment that forbids stealing. For nothing falls under a commandment or prohibition except to the extent that it is voluntary.

Reply Obj. 2: Intensification and lessening in things that are spoken of according to degrees does not take place by an addition, as it does in what is increased with respect to quantity, in which a quantity is added to a quantity to produce a larger quantity. For a heat is not added to a heat to produce a greater heat, nor is curvature added to curvature to produce a greater curve, as it says in the Physics 4. (Aristotle, Physics 4.9, 217a29–b10.) Rather, intensification is caused by the fact that what is intensified is found to be more complete and not mixed with its opposite. Hence for one to sin more, there is no need for a sin to be added (since then every aggravating circumstance would be a sin). Instead, the deformity of sin must become more complete. This occurs when one sins by an external act because deformity in both the internal and external act is greater than that which is only in the will, unless perhaps the will is complete and counted as an act.

Reply Obj. 3: Different acts are elicited by different habits. Still, it is not always necessary for these different acts to be different sins or different merits. Rather, they can be one, as is particularly clear when one sin demands the act of another sin, as when one commits theft for the sake of gluttony. For then there is one sin possessing different deformities, although there is more than one act in this case.

Reply Obj. 4: “Act” taken simply is only the genus of sin insofar as it falls under the will. Thus, where the will’s act is not multiplied, sin is not multiplied.

Reply Obj. 5: Sin is in the will as its primary subject, as was said above. (Above, d. 41, q. 2, a. 2.) Thus, it is not unfitting for sin also to consist in different acts. For precisely as acts, they have different subjects, namely, the powers that elicit them, whereas inasmuch as they pertain to the genus of the moral, they have the will as their single subject.

Article 2

Whether the guilt of sin remains after sin

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In IV Sent., d. 14, q. 2, a. 1, resp.; ST I-II.87.6; III.86.4; SCG III.158; Compendium theologiae, ch. 181; Commentary on Romans, ch. 11, lect. 4.) It seems that guilt does not remain after the act of sin.

Obj. 1: For when the cause ceases, the effect ceases. But one is only guilty of punishment due to an act. Therefore, guilt does not remain after the act.

Obj. 2: One might say that one is guilty and liable to punishment not only because he does a given thing, but indifferently because he either does it or did it.

On the contrary, while the cause remains, the effect remains. But due to the fact that one committed a sin, he cannot not have done it. For not even God can make it so that what is past has not been, as was said. (In I Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 2.) Therefore, one could never be absolved of the guilt of fault.

Obj. 3: One might say that guilt remains after the act due to the effect that the act leaves in the subject, which can be removed.

On the contrary, the effect left from an act is the disposition of a habit. But on neither of these accounts is a man held guilty and liable to punishment, since a man can be absolved of guilt and liability to punishment while the disposition to sin introduced by custom still remains in him. Likewise, sometimes the disposition and habit are taken away and yet the guilt remains, as when one who sins by greed acquires a habit of greed that is afterwards corrupted in the same person by acts of prodigality, whereby a contrary habit is generated, even without the intervention of grace, which absolves guilt. Therefore, it cannot be said that guilt remains after the act on account of the effect left by the act.

Obj. 4: One might say that guilt does not remain after the act due to the aforementioned effect, but instead due to a stain.

On the contrary, if this stain is not a disposition or habit, then it cannot be anything other than the privation of grace. But the privation of grace is common to all mortal sins. Therefore, one stain remains from all mortal sins and thus one guilt, which is false.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, when grace is infused the privation of grace ceases. But guilt still remains, whereby man is obliged at least to temporal punishment. Therefore, it does not seem that guilt remains after the act by the privation of grace.

On the contrary, no one is punished justly if he is not obliged to punishment. But sinners are justly punished at a later point when they are not actually sinning. Therefore, they are obliged to punishment. Therefore, there is guilt in them, which is nothing other than the obligation to punishment.

Furthermore, the act of sin is to punishment as the act of virtue is to reward. But when the act of virtue passes, the merit for the reward still remains. Therefore, when the act of sin has passed, the guilt and liability to punishment still remains.

I answer that, we speak of guilt insofar as one is guilty and liable to punishment. Thus, in the proper sense guilt is nothing other than the obligation to punishment. Because this obligation is in a certain way the mean between fault and punishment by virtue of the fact that it is because of fault that one is obliged to punishment, the name of the mean is extended to the extremes, so that sometimes fault itself or even punishment is called “guilt,” as it says in the text. (Sent. II, 42.3(261).1 and 5(263). 1.) But since punishment is a kind of medicine, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 2, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.3, 1104b18.) and medicine is only given against some deficiency, one must be for punishment obligated for some deficiency; it is not that the deficiency is always healed by the punishment in the one in whom it is, as is clear in the damned and in a thief who is hanged, but rather that the punishment compensates for the deficiency in the state of the universe or the republic due to the order of justice that appears in the punishment. However, not just any deficiency obliges to punishment (for there are certain involuntary deficiencies that incite more to mercy than to wrath). Instead, only deficiencies remaining from acts of the will merit punishment in the one who is voluntarily led into the deficiency. Hence, since a deficiency remains when the act has passed, guilt must also remain after the act.

Reply Obj. 1: The proximate cause of guilt is the very deficiency introduced by the act of sin, while the act is like the remote cause. Hence it is not necessary for the guilt to pass when the act passes.

Reply Obj. 2: Not only because it is true to say that someone at one time committed an act of sin is he obliged to punishment (for in this case, he would be liable to punishment no matter when it would be true to say that he had done this). Rather, it is because the deficiency still remains in him on account of the act that he previously performed.

Reply Obj. 3: Speaking of the essential meaning, guilt is not founded on a disposition or habit, though it is incidentally insofar as this kind of disposition or habit is connected with a certain deficiency.

Reply Obj. 4: The privation of grace has the account of a stain only insofar as it is introduced by a preceding act. Thus, there are also different stains on the basis of the differences among acts. For although by any act of mortal sin every virtue suffers deprivation, this does not occur in the same way. Rather, by an act of lust, chastity suffers deprivation essentially and the other virtues by consequence, insofar as they are connected to chastity, whereas by theft the act of justice is deprived essentially and that of the other virtues by consequence, and so forth. Thus, there is no need for all sins to have one stain or one guilt.

Reply Obj. 5: There are two defects in the sinner. One is in the very act of sin insofar as one transgresses the limits of divine law and right reason. The other is in the sinner himself: the privation of virtue introduced by a previous deficiency of act. Now, even though the second defect is taken away when one recovers grace, the first is not totally removed. For to the extent that one has obeyed his own will apart from God’s law, he must make contrary recompense so that in this way, the equality of justice may be preserved. Thus, after recovering grace, satisfaction is enjoined and man is still liable to temporal punishment.

Article 3

Whether sin is fittingly divided into “mortal” and “venial”

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I-II.72.5; 88.1; SCG III.139; On Evil, q. 7, a. 1.) It seems that sin is unfittingly divided into “mortal” and “venial.”

Obj. 1: For things that differ to infinity do not agree in one genus, such as “creator” and “created,” or “being” and “non-being.” But “venial” and “mortal” are this sort of thing, since one is due temporal punishment and the other eternal, as is clear in the text. (Sent. II, 42.3(261).1.) Therefore, sin ought not to be divided into these two classes.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a determination that lessens the account of that to which it is added implies its opposite. For this follows with valid logic: there is a dead man; therefore, it is not a man. But “venial” is a determination that lessens the account of sin. For from the fact that something is a sin, it is worthy of punishment, not pardon. (The Latin word veniale, “venial,” originally comes from venia, “pardon,” so that the word could even be translated as “pardonable.”) Therefore, “venial sin” should not co-divide “sin” in contrast to “mortal,” just as “dead animal” does not co-divide “animal” in contrast to “living animal.”

Obj. 3: Furthermore, every division ought to be made through opposites. But “venial” and “mortal” are not opposites, since they are simultaneously compatible. Therefore, sin is unfittingly divided into mortal and venial.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, fault is opposed to grace. But “venial” is not opposed to grace because it stands together with it. Therefore, what is venial is not a sin, and so it should not divide the genus of sin in contrast to “mortal.”

Obj. 5: Furthermore, in every sin there is turning away from the unchangeable good as the formal element. But venial sin does not possess a turning away from the unchangeable good, since one who sins venially is not turned away from the last end, but instead inordinately clings to the way. Therefore, venial sin is not properly a sin. And so, the same follows as before.

On the contrary, 1 John 1:8 says: if we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. But it is obvious that it is not speaking of mortal sin, since the saints are without this. Therefore, we must posit venial sin.

Furthermore, disposition and habit pertain to the same species of quality. Hence we find that science is a disposition and a habit. Therefore, by similarity, (A simili is idiomatic and signifies the dialectical “topic” or commonplace that allows one to draw a parallel conclusion for a parallel (or analogous) thing. See Aristotle, Topics 3.1, 114b25–27.) we must find in sin an element that stands in the mode of a disposition, and one that possesses the complete account of sin. Now, the disposition to mortal sin is venial sin. Therefore, mortal sin requires positing venial sin.

I answer that there are two ways of dividing the common into what lies under it, just as there are two modes of commonality. For there is a division of the univocal into species through differences whereby the nature of the genus is participated in equally in the species, as “animal” is divided into “man” and “horse,” and so on. But there is also a division of what is common by analogy, which is predicated of one of the dividers according to the complete account and of the other incompletely and in a qualified sense, as “being” is divided into “substance” and “accident,” and “being in act” and “being in potency.” This latter division is like a mean between the equivocal and the univocal.

And this is the kind of division of “sin” into “mortal” and “venial,” since the account of sin is found completely in mortal sin, whereas in venial sin it is found only incompletely and in a qualified sense. Hence the minimum that can belong to the account of sin in an act is in venial sin, just as the minimum that can belong to the nature of being is in the being in potency and the accidental being. And the names themselves show this. For “pardon” is only due sin insofar as it is sin in an incomplete sense, whereas “death” is due sin precisely as sin. Thus, mortal sin indicates something complete in the genus of sin, while venial sin indicates something incomplete.

Reply Obj. 1: “Mortal” and “venial” agree in sin as a genus, not as predicated of them univocally, but instead as in them there is something common by analogy.

Reply Obj. 2: Pardon is due something in two ways: either as that which is forgiven, or as that which is the reason for forgiveness. As that which is forgiven, it is only due sin because only what merits a punishment is forgiven. As that which is the reason for forgiveness, pardon is never due sin, but it is due either to infirmity or to something that produces imperfection in the genus of sin. Now, venial sin is called “venial” not as the reason for remitting it, but as that which is easily remitted due to the sin’s imperfection. Hence, by its being called “venial,” the whole account of sin is not taken away as the whole account of being called a “man” is taken away by being called “dead.” Hence it follows not that venial sin is not sin, but that it is something incomplete in the genus of sin.

Reply Obj. 3: The opposition of “venial” and “mortal” is on the basis of complete and incomplete. Hence they are not totally mutually exclusive. Instead, one is a disposition to the other.

Or else, it should be said that it is not unfitting for opposites to be in the same thing not in the same respect. Thus, since venial sin and mortal sin are not in man by the same act, but by different ones (which also are not simultaneous), the opposition between “venial” and “mortal” need not be taken away.

Reply Obj. 4: Sin possessed of the complete account of fault is directly opposed to grace, whereas venial sin, which has the incomplete account of fault, is only indirectly opposed to grace, that is, as a disposition to mortal sin. Now, it is not unfitting for things that are opposed in this way to exist simultaneously, as dryness, which is a disposition to heat, can exist together with cold. Hence it is not unfitting for venial sin both to be a fault and to exist together with grace.

Reply Obj. 5: There are two ways to be turned away from the unchangeable end: in habit or only in the act. In habit, one is turned away when he sets up for himself another, contrary end. And this is in mortal sin. Hence one who sins mortally is like one who departs from the way. But in merely the act one is turned away when he does an act whereby he does not tend to God, in that he inordinately clings to what is directed to the end, though not in such a way that he sets up what is directed to the end as if it were the end. And this is in venial sin. Hence one who sins venially is likened to one who tarries too long on the way. And this is only being turned away in a qualified sense, just as one who slows down the motion of a heavy bodily object does not take away its heaviness and inclination to the end, though he would take it away if he gave it a contrary motion, as when something heavy is made light.

Article 4

Whether venial sin is distinguished from mortal sin

To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I-II.88.2; On Evil, q. 7, a. 1; q. 10, a. 2.) It seems that venial sin is not distinct from mortal sin.

Obj. 1: For whatever takes away virtue is a mortal sin. But every sin takes away virtue because every sin is a departure from equality, and virtue is a kind of equality. Therefore, venial sin is not distinguished from mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, things that are essentially distinct are not changed into one another. But venial and mortal sin can be changed into one another. For nothing is so venial that it cannot become mortal when one pleases. Likewise, every mortal fault becomes venial by confession, as Ambrose says. (See Ambrose, De paradiso, bk. 1, ch. 14, paras. 71–72 (CSEL 32.1:328; PL 14:310–11); bk. 1, ch. 5 (CSEL 32.1:285–86; PL 14:286–87); De interpellatione Job et David, bk. 1, ch. 6 (CSEL 32.2:222; PL 14:843–44); De apologia David, verse 12 (PL 14:911–16).) Therefore, venial and mortal sin are only distinguished incidentally.

Obj. 3: One might say that mortal sin is distinct from venial sin because mortal sin is against a commandment while venial sin is apart from a commandment.

On the contrary, the precepts of disciplinary law differ from the precepts of natural law in the fact that the precepts of disciplinary law forbid what is only evil because it is forbidden, whereas the precepts of the natural law forbid what is forbidden because it is evil. Therefore, in what is forbidden by natural law, the distinction of evil is taken not from the law’s prohibition, but rather from the very nature of the act.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, apart from affirmation there is only negation, and apart from negation there is only affirmation, since there is no middle ground between affirmation and negation. But one who does not do what he is commanded by an affirmative precept omits something, in opposition to the precept. Likewise, one who does what is forbidden by a negative precept acts against the precept. Therefore, whoever sins apart from a commandment sins against the commandment. Thus, the distinction is null.

Obj. 5: One might say that venial and mortal sin differ in that venial sin is a departure from the mean of virtue, though close to the mean, whereas mortal sin is a departure far from the mean, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 2 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.9, 1109b18–20.) that one who withdraws a little from the mean is not rebuked.

On the contrary, because, as it says in the same place, it is not a determinate to us when there is great withdrawal from the mean and when there is a small one. Therefore, if venial sin differs from mortal sin only on the basis of small or great withdrawal, it could not be determined for us which sin is mortal and which is venial. This would be very dangerous.

On the contrary, differences in punishments correspond to differences in fault. But temporal punishment differs from eternal punishment. Therefore, venial sin also differs from mortal sin, since one is due temporal punishment and the other eternal punishment.

Furthermore, in every genus the complete and the incomplete possess a determinate distinction. But venial and mortal sin differ as complete and incomplete in the genus of sin, as is clear from what was said before. (Above: a. 3, resp.) Therefore, they must possess a determinate mutual distinction.

I answer that, as is clear from what has been said, (Above: a. 3.) “venial sin” means that whose guilt is easily loosed. Thus, we say “venial” in three ways. In one way, we call it “venial” by its cause; this is easily forgivable because the cause of the sin has a certain account of pardon, as in the case of those committed through ignorance or weakness. Second, we call it “venial” by its outcome, namely, because the punishment of the sin becomes readily capable of being loosed through something that is added to the sin over and above it, as a confession added to a mortal sin makes its punishment proportionate to the strength of the penitent by the power of the keys. Third, we call it “venial” when the act itself is essentially forgivable by not completely attaining to the full account of sin. And this last sense is the proper meaning of “venial” that is now at issue and is being distinguished from “mortal.” For in the first and second way, what is called “venial” is not distinct from the “mortal,” because mortal sin can be done through ignorance, and what is mortal becomes venial through confession.

Now, sin can be incomplete in two ways: by the genus of the act, or on the part of the sinner. The genus of the act itself is based on the matter and object. Hence just as good by genus means that there is due matter, so also “evil by genus” means that there is undue matter, and there is “venial by genus” because of the matter in which the sin is committed. But sin is found completely in matter wherein, if the sin is committed, the virtue of charity toward God and neighbor is lost, that whereby the soul has life. Thus, when one sins in matters that, if not rightly observed, man’s subjection to God or the covenant of human society no longer remains, then there is mortal sin by genus. And these kinds of sins are what the Philosopher calls those of malice. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.8, 1135b9–25, especially 1135b25; see Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics, bk. 5, lect. 13.) Hence his opinion is that not every vicious person is malicious. Just so, it is clear that a man cannot be duly subject to God if he does not believe God, obey him, and so forth.

Likewise, too, the society of human life could only be preserved if each one preserved what is his own. Thus, theft and other species of injustice are mortal sins by genus, and likewise for all the others. Alternatively, those things without which human society can be preserved do not make a sin mortal by genus, even though it is also a deformed act, as in the case of excess play, and things of this sort. These kinds of sins are called “venial by genus.”

But just as what is good by genus can be done in an evil way, though not vice versa, so too what is venial by genus can be done in such a way that it will be mortal, as when one believes that what is venial is mortal, or when one takes such great pleasure in a temporal thing that he sets it up as end for himself. For in this case, due reverence to God, who is the last end and who is to be loved above all else, is not preserved.

On the part of the sinner, in turn, sin is incomplete due to the incompleteness of the power eliciting the act, such as those of the first motion of sensuality preceding deliberation are venial sins, even if they belong to a mortal sin materially. But these are venial incidentally. Thus, when the consent of deliberate reason is added, they become mortal.

Reply Obj. 1: Venial sin does not corrupt virtue as regards the habit (for this is proper to mortal sin). Rather, it departs from the equality that reason identifies in the act of virtue.

Reply Obj. 2: The solution is clear through what has been said. (Resp.) For the objection proceeds with reference to venial by outcome. Again, it is not unfitting for what is venial to become mortal, just as what is good by genus can be done in an evil way.

Reply Obj. 3: The law’s commands intend to order man to love of neighbor and God because the end of the commandment is charity (1 Tim 1:5). Thus, only those sins are mortal by their genus that have been spoken of. For they are committed directly against the law’s commands, not only those of the written law, but also the natural law. But even though something is not evil because forbidden by the external law, it is evil if forbidden by the internal law. For the internal law is the very light of reason whereby we discern what must be done. And whatever in human acts is in harmony with this light is wholly right, whereas what is contrary to this light is unnatural to man and evil. And it is thus called “evil” because it is forbidden by the internal law.

Reply Obj. 4: An affirmation opposed to a negative precept is apart from the precept and against the precept. It is likewise in the case of a negation opposed to an affirmative precept. But there are some negations and affirmations that are not opposed to these affirmative and negative precepts directly, though they are indirectly because they dispose to what is directly opposed. Thus, such things are apart from the precept. For things done in this way also are not out of harmony with the light of reason as leading away from the last end, but instead as kinds of impediments to the end.

Reply Obj. 5: Being close to the mean or far from it makes a sin mortal or venial, not as the objection treats it, but, as was stated, in such a way that the difference is based on being led away from the end of virtue or not being led away from it, not only on the basis of the intensification or lessening.

Article 5

Whether mortal and venial sin differ by eternal and temporal punishment

To the fifth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In IV Sent., d. 16, q. 2, a. 1, resp.; ST I-II.72.5; 87.2; 88.1; III.87.4; On Evil, q. 1, a. 4; q. 7, a. 1.) It seems that mortal and venial sin do not differ on the basis of eternal punishment and temporal punishment.

Obj. 1: For whatever things are finite can possess some proportion to one another. But the turning toward in a venial sin is finite, as is that which is in mortal sin. Therefore, they are capable of proportion. But the amount of punishment is based on the measure of pleasure on the side of the turning toward: as she glorified herself and played the wanton, so give her a like measure of torment and mourning (Rev 18:7). Therefore, venial punishment should also be proportioned to mortal punishment. Thus, they do not differ with respect to “eternal” and “temporal.”

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the amount of punishment accords with the amount of fault. But one who sins mortally does not sin for an infinite time, even though he sins against an infinite good. Therefore, he also ought not be punished with an eternal punishment, but only with the loss of the infinite good for a set time.

Obj. 3: One might say that one is punished eternally because he sinned in his own eternity.

On the contrary, there are many who do not continue in the act of sin for their entire lifespan. Rather, when they sin they think that they will at some point withdraw from the act of sin. Therefore, someone like this has not sinned in his own eternity and thus ought not be punished with an eternal punishment.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, no judge, unless he is cruel, inflicts a punishment as if he takes pleasure in the punishment, but instead does it for the sake of making amends. Therefore, if God is the most pious judge, he inflicts a punishment for mortal sin only for the sake of the emendation of those whom he is punishing. Thus, it seems that he does not punish for eternity.

On the contrary (5), it seems that venial sin is also due an eternal punishment. For it is possible for someone to continue in venial sin for his whole lifespan. Therefore, if one is punished eternally, as Gregory says, (Gregory the Great, Dialogorum libri iv, bk. 6, ch. 44 (PL 77:401).) because he has sinned in his own eternity, it seems that such a person ought to be punished eternally.

Furthermore (6), let us posit that someone dies in both mortal and venial sin. It is established that as soon as he dies he descends immediately to hell. Therefore, since venial sin does not remain unpunished, he is punished there not only for mortal sin, but also for venial sin. But the punishment of hell is eternal because there is no redemption in hell. Therefore, venial sin is punished with an eternal punishment.

Furthermore (7), let it be the case that someone remains unbaptized up to the complete age at which he can be held guilty and liable to the punishment for sin, and sins venially in the very first instant of that time. It is obvious that he is punished for venial sin. Now, it is not in the limbo of children, since sensible punishment, which is due venial sin, does not exist there. Nor, again, is it in purgatory, since he does not have grace, without which there can be no purgation of sin. Therefore, he will be punished in hell for venial sin. Thus, venial sin obliges one to eternal death just as mortal sin does.

I answer that the reason why mortal sin obliges to eternal punishment can be drawn from three sources.

The first is on the side of the one against whom the sin is committed, who is infinitely great, namely, God. Hence an offense against him is also worthy of infinite punishment, since the more worthy the one sinned against, the more the sin is punished.

The second is by the will of the sinner. For it is established that one who sins mortally sets up as the end of his own pleasure that whereby he sins mortally, in such a way that he also regards God with contempt for its sake.

Now, it is obvious that whoever loves something supremely, as the end of his will, by this very fact would will to cling to it always. Thus, one who sins mortally, by the act of the will whereby he chooses mortal sin, chooses to cling to the sin always, unless this is withdrawn incidentally either by fear of punishment or something of this sort. But if he could cling to it infinitely, he would always cling to it. Thus, he sins in his own eternity and for this reason is worthy of eternal punishment.

The third is from the very state of the one who sins mortally, who by the sin is deprived of grace. Hence, since without grace there can be no remission of fault, if he dies in mortal sin, he will always remain in fault, since he is no longer capable of receiving grace. But while fault remains, he is always liable to punishment. Otherwise, there would remain something disordered in the universe. Thus, this kind of person will be punished for eternity. On the other hand, venial sin is neither against God, nor established as an end, nor does it deprive of grace. And thus, it is not due eternal punishment, but only temporal punishment.

Reply Obj. 1: The turning toward in mortal sin and venial sin are not capable of proportion because by one, a person clings to a temporal thing as the end, while by the other, he clings to it as something directed to the end. And these two are not capable of proportion because they do not belong to the same genus. For proportion is the commensurability of quantities belonging to the same genus, as it says in Euclid’s Elements 5. (Euclid, Elements, bk. 5, definition 3.)

Reply Obj. 2: By the fact that one sins against the infinite, he is due an infinite punishment. Now, this cannot be by an infinite harshness because there cannot be an infinite quality in a finite creature. Instead, recompense is made for an infinite duration because the rational creature is capable of duration to infinity.

Reply Obj. 3: One is said to have sinned in his own eternity not because he continued always in the act of sin, but because in one act of the will he clung to sin in such a way that he would cling to it for eternity if he could do so with impunity.

Or, it should be said that one is said to have sinned in his own eternity when he has sinned mortally, because by sin he has deprived himself of grace, without which man cannot be freed from sin. Thus, he has rendered himself unable to rise again. (That is, unable to recover sanctifying grace after losing it.) Hence as far he himself was concerned, he has obliged himself to continue in sin for eternity.

Reply Obj. 4: God inflicts an eternal punishment not as if he took pleasure in punishment for punishment’s sake, but because he takes pleasure in the order of his justice, whose beauty is apparent in perpetual punishment for its proper fault.

Reply Sed Contra 5: One who sins venially does not sin in his own eternity because he neither clings to venial sin as his end, since then it would be mortal, nor renders himself unable to rise again. Thus, he is not due an eternal punishment, even if he were perhaps to continue in venial sin for his whole lifespan.

Reply Sed Contra 6: One who dies with both mortal and venial sin is punished in hell for venial sin and is punished for eternity, though with far less harsh a punishment than for mortal sin. Now, this occurs for venial sin inasmuch as it is connected with mortal sin, which deprives of grace, without which no punishment can be purgative or expiative.

Reply Sed Contra 7: The posited scenario is impossible, which is clear as follows. For if something is sufficient to excuse from a greater sin, much more does it suffice to excuse from a lesser one. But imperfection of age excuses mortal sin so that a child who does not yet have the use of free decision is not held guilty of mortal sin even if he does an act that is a mortal sin by its genus. Hence much more does infancy excuse from having venial sin imputed. Thus, it cannot be that a man may sin venially before the time when he has the use of reason so as to be able to sin mortally. But as soon as he reaches that point in time, he either possesses grace or is in mortal sin. For if he does what is in him, God infuses grace for him, whereas if he does not do it, he sins mortally, since then is the time to think about his salvation and apply oneself to it. Thus, the posited scenario is impossible. However, if we posit what is impossible, then such a person will be punished with sensible punishment in hell and the punishment will be eternal. But this occurs in a way incidental to the venial sin, that is, inasmuch as the person is without grace.

Exposition of the first part of the text

Some say that there is one sin. But others say that there are different sins. (Sent. II, 42.1(259).2.) Both opinions are true when understood in a certain way. For if we take the will as connected with the act, then the will and the external act are one sin. But if we take the will as separate from the act, then there are two sins numerically, but one specifically.

And to this too they respond. (Sent. II, 42.1(259).3.) Besides the reply put forth here, there can be another, which was included in the first article.

Moreover, it is usual to ask: when a sin has been voluntarily committed by someone, and the will to commit it and the action have ceased . . . whether that sin is in him until he repents. (Sent. II, 42.2(260).1.) Since in sin there is not only the act and the guilt, but also the stain, this seems to proceed in an insufficient manner, because it makes no mention of the stain.

But it should be said that the stain is a mean between the act of sin and the guilt of sin, being like an effect of the act and the foundation for the guilt. Thus, the mean is understood through the extremes.

Apart from the original one, no sin is ever in anybody by action without being there also by liability. (Sent. II, 42.2(260).2.) The reason for this is that sin’s disordered act causes the stain and guilt. Now, positing the cause, the effect cannot not be. Thus, it is impossible that while the act of sin remains the guilt should at the same time pass away. But how this can be in original sin has been said above. (Above: d. 41, q. 2, a. 2; d. 35, q. 1, a. 3.)

For there are two genera of sins. (Sent. II, 42.3(261).2.) This is said to show that the division of sin into mortal and venial is not a division of the univocal, since then “mortal” and “venial” would mean two species of sins. Rather, it is a division of the analogous, and “mortal” and “venial” are called “two genera” of sins as not sharing a single genus.

Division of the second part of the text

And the modes of sinning are distinguished in a variety of ways in Scripture. (Sent. II, 42.4(262).1.) In the preceding section, the Master addressed some things that are required for sin as integral elements of it. Here he addresses different divisions of sin. And it is divided into two parts.

In the first, he pursues the divisions that concern sin taken generally; in the second, he pursues the division of capital sins, at ‘moreover, it is to be known that there are seven capital or principal vices.’ (Sent. II, 42.6(264).1, quoting the Glossa ordinaria, at Exodus 23:22, 1.717 (PL 113:263), from Gregory the Great, Moralia in Job, bk. 31, ch. 45, para. 87 (CCSL 143B; PL 76:621).)

The first part is divided into two parts.

In the first, he puts forward some ways of distinguishing sins taken from the perspective of the thing.

In the second, he puts forward one taken from the perspective of the name, at it also has different names. (Sent. II, 42.5(263).1.)

Concerning the first, he does three things.

First, he distinguishes modes of sins on the basis of the motives or roots.

Second, he distinguishes on the basis of the acts in which the sin consists, at but elsewhere, sin is said to be committed in three ways. (Sent. II, 42.4(262).2.)

Third, he distinguishes on the basis of the objects, at man is also said to sin against God, against himself, and against his neighbor. (Sent. II, 42.4(262).3.)

‘Moreover, it is to be known that there are seven capital or principal vices.’ (Sent. II, 42.6(264).1, quoting the Glossa ordinaria, at Exodus 23:22, 1.717 (PL 113:263), from Gregory the Great, Moralia in Job, bk. 31, ch. 45, para. 87 (CCSL 143B; PL 76:621).) Here he lays out the distinction of the capital vices. And this is divided into two parts.

In the first, he lists the capital vices.

In the second, he traces them back to one beginning, at and yet all evils, both these and others, arise from pride. (Sent. II, 42.7(265).1.)

And concerning this he does three things.

First, he shows that pride is the origin of the capital vices.

Second, he raises an objection to the contrary, at but what the Apostle says: the root of all evils is cupidity, seems to contradict this. (Sent. II, 42.7(265).3, quoting 1 Timothy 6:10.)

Third, he gives the solution, at but each of these is understood to be rightly described. (Sent. II, 42.8(266).1.)

Concerning the first, he does two things.

First, he shows that pride is the beginning of all sins.

Second, he assigns the species of pride, at and there are four kinds of pride. (Sent. II, 42.7(265).2.)

Question 2

Divisions of sins

Here five questions are asked:

first, on the distinctions of sins taken on the basis of the roots;

second, on the division of sins taken on the basis of the act;

third, on the division of the capital vices;

fourth, on the distinction of species of pride assigned in the text;

fifth, whether there can be equality in how grave the fault of the sins so distinguished is.

Article 1

Whether sins are distinguished on the basis of the roots

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I-II.72.1, 3, 8; On Evil, q. 2, a. 6.) It seems that sins are unfittingly distinguished on the basis of their roots.

Obj. 1: For a root is like a foundation. But sin has no foundation, as it says in a gloss on Matthew 7:26. (Sedulius Scotus, In Evangelium Matthaei, B. Löfstedt, Vetus Latina, Aus der Geschichte der lateinischen Bibel (Freiburg: Herder, 1989), vol. 14, bk. 1, ch. 7, p. 235; cf. Bede, Commentary on Luke, bk. 2, ch. 6 (CCSL 120; PL 92:413); Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job, bk. 26, ch. 37 (CCSL 143B; PL 76:388); the general sense is also found in: Glossa interlinearis, at Matthew 7:26–27, 5.154 (in Glossa ordinaria 5.154 [PL 114:112]).) Therefore, it has no root. Therefore, sins ought not be distinguished on the basis of the roots.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the root of the tree is not the tree. Therefore, the root of sin should not be sin. But evilly smoldering cupidity and evilly humiliating fear are sins. (See Sent. II, 42.4(262).1, quoting Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, Psalm 79:17, para. 13 (CCSL 39; PL 36:1026).) Therefore, they are unfittingly assigned as the roots of sins.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, fear is born of love. But that from which something is born can be called its “root.” Therefore, love is the root of fear, and thus of everything generated by fear. And in this way, fear should not be contradistinguished against cupidity, which is a love, as a root opposite to it.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, whatever things agree in one element are not distinguished with respect to it. But all sins agree in one root: for cupidity is the root of all evils (1 Tim 6:10). Therefore, sins ought not be distinguished on the basis of their root.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, Augustine says (Augustine, The City of God, bk. 14, ch. 28 (CCSL 48; PL 41:436); Enarrationes in Psalmos, Psalm 64, para. 2 (PL 36:773).) that just as love of God makes the city of God, so also excessive love of self makes the city of Babylon. But whatever belongs to the genus of sins pertains to the city of Babylon. Therefore, all sins have one root, namely, love of self, and it is not the one assigned here.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, 1 John 2:16 says: all that is in the world, the lust of the flesh and the lust of the eyes and the pride of life, and from these all other evils arise. Therefore, since these are left out here, the roots of sins are not sufficiently touched upon.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, the beginning of all sin is pride (Sir 10:15). Again, Ambrose says (See Ambrose, De paradiso, ch. 8, para. 39 (CSEL 32.1:295; PL 14:292).) that every sin is from contempt. And Augustine says (See Augustine, De libero arbitrio, bk. 2, ch. 9 (CCSL 29; PL 32:1254).) that every sin is from error. Therefore, sins seem not to be distinguished by root, but to agree in one root. Again, it seems from the aforementioned that the roots of sins are not sufficiently touched on in the text.

I answer that a root is found in trees properly speaking, but in sins only transumptively. (The Latin word transumptive is analogous to the Greek word metaphora (μεταφορά), which word Aquinas also frequently uses to signify metaphorical speech. The original meaning for both words indicates a “carrying over/across” of the meaning of one word to another.) Hence the root in sins must be found after a likeness to the root in trees. Now, a tree’s root is that whereby the tree takes in nourishment, through which it becomes strong and bears fruit. But sin becomes strong due to that whereby man is inclined to sin. This is the intended good, to which the sinner turns in a disordered way, since the end moves efficiently. Hence we must assign the root of sin from the perspective of the turning toward and call that from which sin arises its root. (See above, d. 30, q. 1, a. 3, resp.; see also note above, at d. 33, q. 2, a. 1, obj. 2.)

However, the act of sin can arise from three things: from another act of sin, in accord with which we assigned above (Above, d. 36, q. 1, a. 1.) that one sin can be the cause of another; the corrupted habit that elicits the act of sin; or from a passion or propensity to have the passion following from the corruption of nature. But the act of sin does not properly have the name root, since it is, rather, from the root. Hence the origin of sin from sin is more like the origin of a branch from a branch. Likewise, too, a habit taken in the proper sense cannot be from the first root of sin. For, since the habit of sin is neither natural nor infused, it must be acquired by the act of sin. Therefore, it remains that the root of sin must mean in us either a passion or a propensity to a passion that follows from the corruption of original sin.

However, since in the changeable goods to which man turns in a disordered way through sin there is an order, in accord with which one is the end of another, while things directed to the end must always be more than the end itself, it must be that the closer to the last end we take the root of sin, the fewer roots we find. But the last end in the love of changeable goods is the man himself, seeing as he seeks everything else for his own sake. Thus, if we take the root from the perspective of the sinner, it will be one, whereas if we take it from the perspective of what the sinner seeks for his own sake, there will be more than one. Likewise, too, the appetite concerning the changeable good is in two ways: either as pursuing what he esteems fitting for himself, or as fleeing what is evil or harmful. But just as evil only possesses being as a privation of the good, so also it is only fled inasmuch as the good is loved. Thus, the flight from evil is traced back to the desire for the good as its first cause.

Therefore, in accord with this it should be known that roots are assigned by the saints in various ways. For passion that is the root of sin is either with reference to the appetite’s inclination to what is the last end of changeable goods, and in this way, Augustine posits that love of self is the root of sin; or else it is with reference to the appetite’s inclination to what is sought for the sake of this end. And this latter is in two ways: either with reference to the appetite’s inclination only to the good for whose sake evil is fled from, or by comparison of the appetite to both. If it is in the second way, with reference to the appetite’s inclination to the changeable good and the opposite evil, then there are the roots of sins assigned in the text, namely, “evilly smoldering cupidity” and “evilly humiliating fear.” (Sent. II, 42.4(262).1.) However if it is in the first way, this is in two ways: either with reference to the appetite’s inclination to external good universally, and in this way, there will be one root, that is, cupidity, or to different goods in particular. These different goods are three, and so there will be three roots: the concupiscence of the flesh concerning good that is pleasant to the senses, the concupiscence of the eyes concerning external goods ordered to use, and the pride of life concerning goods in opinion, such as honor, dignity, and so forth.

Reply Obj. 1: Sin has no foundation from the perspective of its being a turning away because in this way it is nothing. Rather, it is from the perspective of the turning toward, whereby it is something, that it can have a root.

Reply Obj. 2: Fear and cupidity are roots not as naming the act of sin, but as naming a passion or propensity to a passion, such that the more remote root of the sin be taken.

Reply Obj. 3–6: The replies to objections 3, 4, 5, and 6 are clear from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 7: These are all taken from the perspective of the turning away. Thus, properly speaking, they do not hold the account of a root because no one acts intending to do evil, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, nn. 19, 31 (PG 3:715, 731).) But they do have the account of a beginning. This is the reason it is said that the beginning of all sin is pride, since a preexisting deficiency can be the beginning of a deficient act precisely as deficient. Now, the deficiency that precedes sin can be either in the reason that directs, and this is how we say that every sin is from error, error being identical to the ignorance of choice with respect to which every wicked person is ignorant as it says in the Ethics 3, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, 1110b31.) or it is in the will that commands the act, insofar as it does not intently and solicitously cling to what belongs to God. And in this way, it is contempt and pride, in accord with which one does not take care to be subject to the command or the one who commands. Just as one sin is in reality both turning away and turning toward, differing by comparison to different terms, so also pride taken in this way, as a beginning, and cupidity, as a root, are really identical and differ in account in the aforementioned way. For this reason Augustine says (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 11, ch. 15 (CSEL 28.1:347; PL 34:436).) that pride and cupidity are not like two evils, but one single evil.

Article 2

Whether sin is fittingly divided

Quaestiuncula 1

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I-II.72.7; 100.5–6; III.90.3, ad 1.) It seems that the second division assigned in the text is incongruous. (Sent. II, 42.4(262).2, referring to Jerome, In Ezechielem, bk. 13, ch. 43, verses 23–25 (PL 25:427; CCSL 75) and Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John, tract. 49, para. 3 (CCSL 36; PL 35:1718): elsewhere, sin is said to be committed in three ways, namely, in thought, word, deed. . . . Sometimes a fourth way is added to these three, namely, that of habituation.)

Obj. 1: For the same genus has the same primary differences that divide it. But sin is one genus, at least as analogous. Therefore, it is unfitting to distinguish it into such a great variety of divisions.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, an affection has more of the account of sin than does thought, which pertains to cognition. But he makes no mention of affection. Thus, he divides sin in an insufficient way.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, external acts are carried out by the external members. But the tongue is one of the external members. Therefore, a word pronounced by the tongue ought not be divided in distinction from a sin of deed, which is a sin of external act.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, act should not be divided in distinction from act by circumstance. But custom is a kind of circumstance of sin. Therefore, sin of custom ought not be divided in distinction from sin of deed.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, sin of omission is a species of sin, yet it is not contained under any of these members. Therefore, the division is insufficient.

Quaestiuncula 2

Obj. 1: Further, there is a question about another division, the one based on objects. It seems that it is insufficient. For a sinner is said to sin against the person he harms by his sin. But we cannot harm God by sinning, as it says in Job 35:6: if you have sinned, what do you accomplish against him? And if your transgressions are multiplied, what do you do to him? Therefore, it is unfitting to say that one sins against God.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, that which is the reason for loving cannot be hated. But man is the reason for loving with respect to himself, since man loves nothing except inasmuch as it is good for himself. Therefore, no one can hate himself. But we sin against one whom we hate. Therefore, no one sins against himself.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, sin is opposed to charity. But among the commandments of charity, man is not given a distinct commandment to love himself. Rather, it is included in the love of God and neighbor. Therefore, we would not have to posit it as one determinate mode of sin by the fact that one can sin against himself.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, whoever sins against his neighbor sins against himself and God. Therefore, sin against neighbor ought not be divided in distinction from sin against self and sin against God.

Quaestiuncula 3

Obj. 1: Further, there is a question about another division, the one based on names. For it is not characteristic of a wise person to care about names. But the theologian is wise most of all. Therefore, he ought not get himself caught up in dividing sins by their names, but instead to make use of them as various people use them.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as “fault” (delictum) is said due to something’s being left out (derelinquitur), so also “sin” is said due to someone’s deviating from the path, since turning away is the formal element in sin, from which it takes its name. Therefore, the first difference he assigns seems to be null.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, by ignorance one can sin not only by a sin of omission, but also by a sin of transgression. Therefore, since a “fault” properly sounds like an omission because it is said as if being left derelict, the second explanation seems to be incongruous, wherein a fault is explained as what is done by ignorance.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that this division is assigned on the basis of the progressive degrees of sin’s completeness. We note these degrees insofar as one act is added to another act to complete sin. Hence the second degree must include sin in itself. Thus, it is like a division of a potential whole. (On “potential” or “potestative” wholes—that is, a whole whose account is found completely in one of its parts, but found in the other parts by a participation—see In I Sent., d. 3, q. 4, a. 2; d. 8, q. 5, a. 3; In II Sent., d. 9, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1; In III Sent., d. 33, q. 3, a. 1, resp.; In IV Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 1, resp. and ad 2; ST 1.77.1, ad 1; On Spiritual Creatures, a. 11, ad 2.) Now, the addition of act to act can be in many ways, and in regard to this there are the different degrees in sin.

Hence the first degree of sin is in the first act of sin, to which other things are added. This is the internal act, namely, that of the will. And this is the first member of the division, namely, sin of thought.

To this act there is added over and above another act that expresses and is a sign of this act, namely, the act of speaking. Thus, this is the division’s second member.

Again, to the act of speaking is added an external act whereby the body’s members are moved to carry out the will’s end. And here there will be a third degree and a third member, which is the sin of deed.

Fourth, external act is added to external act. And this is the final degree and the fourth member, namely, sin of custom. For, since after the external act there is not another act of another type, the final degree of sin must be on the basis of multiplying these kinds of acts.

Reply Obj. 1: There are many ways to divide something: genus into species, subject into accidents, or even other ways, which Boethius enumerates. (Boethius, De divisione, ch. 1 (PL 64:877).) Therefore, the division of genus into species or primary differences is only one. But the division of subject into accidents can be manifold insofar as many things are incidental to one. Therefore, it should be said that the division of sin into its essential species is by opposing the virtue. For it must be on the basis of the object that sin and virtue are specified. And this kind of distinction of sins is not given here. Rather, the distinctions put forward are in accord with certain accidents of sin. Thus, it is not unfitting if there is more than one.

Reply Obj. 2: Every sin that consists in an internal act alone is understood in “sin of thought.” Thus, there is also included the affection, without which there is no sin.

Reply Obj. 3: Even though the tongue is an external member, it is the closest among the others to the internal act, insofar as it is fitted for speech. For speaking is a sign of the internal act. Thus, speaking holds a degree on the progressive scale of sin between sin of thought and that of deed.

Reply Obj. 4: Custom is a kind of circumstance that aggravates sin by multiplying its acts, and thus the final progression of sin is in custom. Thus, custom is not included as if divided in distinction from act simply, but as divided in distinction from non-customary act, as it is in the division of the total potential power.

Reply Obj. 5: According to the opinion of those who say that an internal or external act is required in a sin of omission, the sin of omission is included in the sin of thought, speech, and deed. It is likewise according to others who say that an external act is not required in it. For in this case, acting includes not acting, and so forth, as was said above. (Above: d. 35, q. 1, a. 3.)

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the next question, I answer that just as every virtue is in some way justice, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 5, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.1, 1129b26–1130a10.) so also is every sin injustice. Now, injustice is from someone’s being deprived of something due him. Thus, injustice has, as it were, two objects: that which is deprived, and this is properly the matter of the act and that whereby the sin is specified, and the one who is deprived of it, such as the man whose possessions are taken away by injustice. This division of sin is taken on the basis of this object, since man owes something to God, to himself, and to his neighbor. To God he owes love, reverence, and so forth. Hence when he fails at these, he is said to sin against God. To himself, he owes cleanness, ordering of himself under the regime of reason, and so forth. When he fails at these, he is said to sin against himself. To his neighbor, what he owes is clear. And when he fails at this, he is said to sin against his neighbor. And it is the same if he were to do the contrary of these.

Reply Obj. 1: Man is not said to sin against God because he harms God in any respect, but because he takes away from God what he owes him and, as far as he himself goes, lessens his glory, even though he cannot do this.

Reply Obj. 2: Everyone naturally loves himself. Thus, each person loves what he esteems himself to be. Now, some esteem themselves—and truly—to be what they are in regard to intellect, since it is that whereby man is man. Thus, they desire for themselves what is good according to intellect and reason, either directly or indirectly. But others esteem themselves—and falsely—to be what they are not on account of the sensible nature that is externally apparent. Thus, they love the sensible nature in themselves, desiring what is pleasurable to the senses. Because these sorts of things are evil and harmful to them with respect to what they truly are, they harm themselves and hate themselves in act, but not in affect.

Reply Obj. 3: For a man to love himself is nothing other than to will himself to be united to God because man should love himself for God’s sake. Thus, love of oneself is included in love of God. But sin against God is not the reason for the sin man commits against himself. And thus, there is not a similar rationale in both cases.

Reply Obj. 4: This distinction is based on that which is sinned against directly. But when one sins against his neighbor, he does sin against himself and God, though by consequence. Likewise, when he sins against himself, he sins against God and vice versa. Thus, the objection does not proceed.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To the next question, I answer that we note the division of sins by their names on the basis of that whereby the act is regulated, namely the precepts of the law. And this is in two ways. Either it is according to the distinction of the precepts in itself, and in this way, “fault” regards the affirmative precepts, and “sin” the negative ones; or else it is insofar as the sinner fails at the precepts in different ways. For he either fails at the precepts in his reason by ignorance, and this is a fault, or else in his will by contempt, and this is a sin. And so, the rationale for the two explanations is clear.

Reply Obj. 1: A wise person does indeed care about names, insofar as they express what is proper to things, not on their own account. Because we discover the essential differences of sins from different rationales, it was not unfitting to posit this division.

Reply Obj. 2: Although “sin” denotes turning away, properly speaking, it denotes not omission, but an act connected with turning away. For omission and turning away are different: omission means lacking a due act, whereas turning away means withdrawal from the end.

Reply Obj. 3: One who does something out of ignorance does it involuntarily. Thus, he sins more in the fact that he puts aside knowledge of what he is bound to know than in the fact that he does such-and-such. For this reason a sin by ignorance can be called a “fault.”

Article 3

Whether the division of the capital vices is suitable

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I-II.84.4; On Evil, q. 8, a. 1.) The division of the capital vices put forward in the text seems unsuitable. (Sent. II, 42.6(264).1, quoting Gregory, Moralia in Job, bk. 31, ch. 45, para. 87 (CCSL 143B; PL 76:621), found in Glossa ordinaria, at Exodus 23:22, 1.717 (PL 113:263): it is to be known that there are seven capital or principal vices, as Gregory says on Exodus, namely, vainglory, anger, envy, sloth or sadness, avarice, gluttony, lust.)

Obj. 1: For that from which other things arise and which serves as a principle for other sins seems to be the head of sins. But pride, as Gregory says, (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Job, bk. 31, ch. 45 (CCSL 143B; PL 76:620).) is that from which all sins arise and is like the queen of other sins. Therefore, it alone ought to be called the “capital vice,” or at least it and greed, from which others arise, as it says in the text.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, “capital” means principal. But what imperfectly has the account of a sin is not a principal sin. Therefore, since venial sin imperfectly has the account of sin, it seems that venial sin cannot be a capital sin. But many of the vices reckoned among the capital vices—nearly all of them—are sometimes venial. Therefore, they are unfittingly called “capital vices.”

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the member corresponds to the head. But the vices that arise from the vices enumerated here are called by Gregory “daughters,” not “members.” (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Job, bk. 31, ch. 45 (CCSL 143B; PL 76:620).) Therefore, these vices ought to be called “mothers,” not “heads” (capita).

Obj. 4: Furthermore, where Proverbs 6:16 says: there are six things which the Lord hates, seven which his soul detests, a Gloss enumerates seven capital vices. (Glossa ordinaria, at Proverbs 6:17, 3.1629–30 (PL 113:1089).) But none of those indicated there is one that is enumerated here. Therefore, it seems that there are at least fourteen.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, there is no vice that cannot sometimes arise from another. Therefore, if a capital vice is that from which others arise, then it seems that all sins are capital sins.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, there are more vices than virtues, since more than one vice opposes a single virtue. But there are seven principal virtues: three theological and four cardinal. Therefore, there ought to be more than seven capital sins.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, faith is the foundation of the virtues, as Romans 11:20 says. But faithlessness is opposed to faith. Therefore, faithlessness ought to be reckoned among the capital vices, especially because of what Wisdom 14:27 says, that the worship of abominable idols is the beginning and cause of every evil.

I answer that “capital vice” means a vice from which other vices arise. Hence a capital sin differs from the root of sin in that a capital sin is a sin, while the root of sin, if taken in the proper sense, is not a sin, as is clear from what has been said previously. (Above: a. 1.)

Now, sin arises from sin in four ways, as was said above. (Above: d. 36, q. 1, a. 1.)

One way is on the side of the turning away, insofar as this deprives grace, and when grace is deprived man falls into the ruin of sin. But this origination is only incidental because the first sin causes the second as what removes a restraint, whereas “head” (caput) names an essential origin. Thus, in this way, it cannot properly be called a “capital vice.”

Another way is on the side of the turning toward, insofar as from the act of sin there remains a habit and from the habit there again proceeds an act. With reference to this origination we cannot speak of a capital vice because here there is not the origin of a sin from a sin directly, but only by the mediation of the habit.

In another way, sin is caused by sin inasmuch as one sin supplies the matter for another, as gluttony does lust. Because a thing has being not with respect to matter, but with respect to form, a sin does not completely arise from the sin that affords its matter. For this reason we still do not find the complete account of capital vice.

In the fourth way, a sin arises from a sin that is ordered to its end, such as, when one commits theft in order to have money, theft is born of greed. Because in moral matters the species is from the end, this is the formal and complete origination of sin from sin. With reference to this origination we properly speak of a capital vice. And the metaphor of a head is preserved there insofar as we call the leader of an army the head in the army, to whose good the whole army is ordered, as is clear from the Metaphysics 12. (See Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.10, 1075a15–20.) In this way, the vice to whose end others are ordered is called their “head.” Thus, Gregory treats (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Job, bk. 31, ch. 45 (CCSL 143B; PL 76:620).) the capital vices like the captains of an army and the other vices arising from them like their army when he explains Job 39:25: he hears the thunder of the captains, and the shouting. Because the end is always more desirable than what is directed to the end, those sins must especially be called “capital” to whose ends the corrupted appetite is most naturally apt to tend. These kinds of sins are those that concern the principal objects of the sensible powers, since sins arise in us from the corruption of the sensuality.

Now, the sensible appetite is divided into two powers: the irascible and the concupiscible. The object of the concupiscible is the pleasant and fitting to the senses. Thus, the capital sin in the concupiscible power is either from the fact that it desires what is pleasant to the senses in an inordinate way, or from the fact that it flees an impediment to this kind of pleasure in an inordinate way. If it is in the first way, this can occur in two ways: either from the appetite’s tending to what is ordered to sensible pleasure as found in external goods, and in this case it is “greed,” or from the appetite’s tending to sensible pleasure itself. Now, perfect sense pleasure is in touch as well as taste (being a kind of touch), since this means the application of the thing itself to the senses. Thus, concerning what is pleasant to the touch absolutely there is one capital vice, namely, “lust,” and concerning what is pleasant to the taste, being a kind of touch, there is another, namely, “gluttony.” But from fleeing an impediment to sensible pleasure in an inordinate way, there is “sloth,” which is tedium at the spiritual good insofar as it impedes some dissolute pleasure.

Next, the object of the irascible power is properly something difficult or great that man attempts. Therefore, there can be a capital sin in the irascible power in two ways: either from the irascible power’s bearing on the difficult in an inordinate way, and in this case properly there is “pride” or “vainglory,” or from its tending on the contrary to what is an impediment to the difficult. But this can be in two ways. For a possible impediment to a tendency either impedes by acting directly to the contrary, as one who fights someone impedes him, and in this case there is “wrath,” which is an appetite for revenge; or else it impedes indirectly, and in this case there is “envy,” which is sorrow at another’s good, insofar as that good is esteemed to be something impeding one’s own excellence.

Reply Obj. 1: We speak of greed or cupidity in three ways. In one way, it denotes a passion or propensity to a passion left from original sin, and in this way, it is not a sin, but the root of sin. In another way, it means the inordinate appetite for any changeable good, whether knowledge, honor, money, or whatever. And in this way, greed or cupidity is the genus of all sins. Hence on Romans 7:7, I should not have known what it is to covet if the law had not said, ‘You shall not covet,’ a Gloss says: the law is good: when it forbids concupiscence, it forbids all evils. (Glossa interlinearis and Glossa ordinaria, at Romans 7:7, 6.91 (PL 114:491).) In the third way, we speak of greed or cupidity as the inordinate appetite for external things pertaining to life’s use. And in this way, it is a specific sin.

Likewise, too, we speak of pride in three ways. In one way, it means the habitual contempt of the commandment, and the one who gives the commandment, that comes from the corruption of nature or from whatever defect of the creature. And in this way, it is not a sin but the beginning of sin. In another way, it means the appetite for excellence in anything whatsoever, since whoever desires something in an inordinate way wills in a certain way to excel in it. Thus pride in this way, as bearing on all sins, is general insofar as it is the desire for any kind of excellence. In the third way, we speak of it as the inordinate appetite for the determinate excellence that is due honor and reverence. And in this way, it is a specific sin.

Therefore, it should be said that, taking pride and cupidity in the first way, all vices arise from them as from a root and a beginning, not as from a capital sin. Speaking of both in the second way, all sins arise from them as species do from a genus. Speaking of them in the third way, specific vices arise from them, though sometimes all vices can arise from them. And more frequently they all arise from one of them than from any other vice, the reason for which is the commonality of the objects. For the object of greed, namely, money, promises sufficiency in all man’s necessities. Thus, the affection most easily inclines to this. Likewise, too, excellence, which is the object of pride, seems to be the good closest to man himself. Thus, the appetite easily inclines to this, even more than to greed, since no one loves money except for the sake of something that he intends to obtain with it, as it says in the Ethics 1, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.5, 1096a6–8.) whereas excellence is something desired for its own sake.

Reply Obj. 2: Although venial sin does not have the quality of a principle in the account of sin, it can have the quality of a principle in the end to which other sins are ordered. Thus, nothing prevents venial sin from being a capital vice.

Reply Obj. 3: One vice is called the “head” of another insofar as another vice arises from it. Because in the term “filiation” origination is expressed more than in the term “member,” the vices generated from these are called “daughters” rather than “members,” and the vice from which the generation occurs is rather called a “head” by way of origin, as was said.

Reply Obj. 4: “Capital vice” is taken there as a grave vice that is to be punished with capital punishment. Thus, there is an equivocation on “capital.”

Reply Obj. 5: Even though any vice can arise from anything, there are some vices to which man is more easily inclined in themselves, and these are given as capital vices, while there are also vices to which one only is easily inclined for the end of another vice, and these kinds are said to be the daughters of the capital vices. And insofar as we can trace one back to the end of one vice more directly than another, one vice is assigned as the daughter of one capital vice more than another, although at times it arises from different ones.

Reply Obj. 6: There are more vices than virtues, but there need not be more capital vices than principal virtues. For concerning the same matter in which there is virtue, there can be different vices. Even so, they do not all have a principal object to which the spirit easily inclines.

Reply Obj. 7: Faith is the foundation inasmuch as it in itself has the account of knowledge, since affection is in a certain way generated from knowledge. But faithlessness is the privation of a certain kind of knowledge. Thus, it can cause affection not essentially, but incidentally, as removing the knowledge that prevents sin, after the manner in which ignorance is the cause of sin. And this is the way in which the worship of idols is said to be the origin of all evils. But this is not the way in which other vices arise from the capital vices, as has been said. (Resp.)

Article 4

Whether the species of pride are fittingly assigned

To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST II-II.162.4; On Evil, q. 8, a. 4; Commentary on 1 Corinthians, ch. 4, lect. 2.) It seems that the species of pride are unfittingly assigned. (Sent. II, 42.7(265).2, quoting Gregory, Moralia in Job, bk. 23, ch. 6 (CCSL 143B; PL 76:258), found in Glossa ordinaria, at Job 32:8, 3.303–4 (PL 113:840): there are four kinds of pride, as Gregory says: ‘The first is when someone attributes to himself the good which he has; the second, when he believes that the good is given by God, and yet for his own merits; the third, when he boasts that he has what he does not have; the fourth, when he has contempt for all others and wishes to seem unique’.)

Obj. 1: For to believe something that is contrary to an article of faith is the sin of faithlessness. But that all goods are from God is contained in the articles of faith, as is clear in the creed, where he is called the “maker of things visible and invisible.” Therefore, it seems that when one attributes the good he has to himself and does not recognize it as from God, this is the sin of infidelity and not pride.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, no one sins by believing what is true. But it is true that many goods are given to man for his merits. Therefore, it seems that it is not the sin of pride to believe that something is given to one by God for his merits.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, one thing cannot be contrary to two things. But the Philosopher posits ostentation as contrary to the virtue called “truth” in the Ethics 4. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.7, 1127b34.) Therefore, it is not contrary to humility. Thus, it is not a species of pride, as it says in the text. (Sent. II, 42.7(265).2, quoting Gregory, Moralia in Job, bk. 23, ch. 6, para. 13 (PL 76:258).)

Obj. 4: Furthermore, one to whom everything seems small despises everything, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 4. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.3, 1124a19–20.) Therefore, it is characteristic of the magnanimous person to despise other things. But what belongs to a virtue does not belong to pride. Therefore, it does not belong to pride that man wills to be seen in a singular way, despising others.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, ingratitude, disobedience, and many other vices, are assigned as species of pride. Therefore, since mention is not made of these in the text, it seems that the species of pride are insufficiently assigned.

I answer that, according to the Philosopher, the right is judge both of itself and of the deviant, as it says in On the Soul 1. (Aristotle, On the Soul 1.5, 411a5: note that rectum, “the right,” can also be translated as “the straight.” The straight is a measure both of other straight lines and even of the curved.) Thus, we should proceed from virtue to the knowledge of the opposite vice. But because a vice must be opposed to the virtue with which it shares an object, as lust is to chastity, and the object of pride is the lofty or difficult, it is opposed to magnanimity, to which it belongs to tend to great things.

But it should be known that the magnanimous person tends to great things in a measured way. But this measuredness is noted not in regard to the greatness of that to which he tends, since what the magnanimous person tends toward is the greatest it can be, but is instead noted in two respects: in the choice of the great, and in the proportion of oneself to the great.

In the choice of the great, I say that he tends to what is great simply, namely, what belongs to the perfect act of virtue, whereas he does not tend principally to that which is great in a qualified sense, as are external goods, among which the particularly great thing is honor. For the magnanimous person does not seek honor as the end of his will, for he regards this as too small for himself, since it is a vain and passing good. Hence he does not care much about being honored, but about becoming worthy of honor, insofar as honor is a witness to virtue.

Again, this measuredness is noted in the fact that he tends not to just any great thing disproportionate to himself, but to what is great that can be proportionate to himself. Thus, only a virtuous person can be magnanimous, seeing as he is fit for great things.

For this reason, too, the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.3, 1124a2.) that magnanimity is the ornament of all the virtues because magnanimity inclines to doing great things in all the virtues, such as performing the greatest acts of fortitude, temperance, and so forth. And in these two respects, vainglory and pride are the opposites of magnanimity. For vainglory tends not to what is great simply, which magnanimity essentially seeks, but to what is great externally, for praise, honor, and so forth, while pride tends to what is great simply, but not in its own proportion. Thus, because an act of fortitude is most arduous and difficult, the proud person is especially eager for a superabundance of fortitude. Thus, the Philosopher says in the Ethics 3 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.7, 1115b30.) that the proud man wants to seem brave.

Now, tending to something great that is not proportionate to oneself can occur in two ways. Either it is because he falls short of it simply in itself and absolutely, and in this respect there is the third species that is called “ostentation.” Or else, although he does possess it, he does not possess it in the excellent way that he attempts to.

Now, this excellent way is twofold, in accord with the two ways whereby something is more excellently in the cause than in what it causes. For the cause possesses a thing more abundantly and perfectly than the caused does, just as fire possesses heat more than what results from the elements. And in this way of excellence there is the fourth species, since one wills to be seen in a singular way. Again, what is a cause possesses it not from another, but from itself, precisely as cause of what is from another in the effect. And in this respect there are the first two species of pride. For in the first species of pride one attributes to himself what he has as if it were not given to him by another, while in the second he attributes it to himself as its meritorious cause.

Reply Obj. 1: The sin of pride is not only in thought, but in affection. For the proud person does not believe that there is a good that is not from God, but magnifies himself at the good he possesses as if he did not have it from another.

Reply Obj. 2: Our merits are insufficient for what is rendered for the merits. Furthermore, we are not the only cause of these merits. Rather, the principal cause is grace that is from God alone.

Reply Obj. 3: Ostentation, as indicating an external showing-forth by words or gestures of what is not held within, is opposed to truth. But insofar as ostentation indicates a kind of excess whereby man’s spirit extolls itself interiorly as to what it does not possess, it is opposed to humility and is a species of pride.

Reply Obj. 4: To the magnanimous person everything seems small, not because he despises the goods of others, but because there is nothing in human acts that he marvels at as uncommon, since his thought is for doing very great things. For this reason the Philosopher says that the magnanimous person does not marvel. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.3, 1125a3.)

Reply Obj. 5: Disobedience and ingratitude are not species of pride as if dividing pride essentially, but are called “species of pride” as possessing a certain participation in pride, insofar as they are commanded by pride.

Article 5

Whether all sins are equal

To the fifth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I-II.73.2; SCG III.139; On Evil, q. 2, a. 9.) It seems that all sins are equal.

Obj. 1: For virtue is a kind of equality, seeing as it consists in being in the middle. But there is equality in only one way, as being indivisible. Therefore, what deprives of virtue deprives of the whole thing. But privation does not admit of greater or lesser degree, except perhaps insofar as a habit is deprived of either in whole or in part. Therefore, sin, too, spoken of as the privation of virtue, does not admit of greater or lesser degree.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the whiter is the more unmixed with the black, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Topics 3.5, 119a28.) But every vice is totally unmixed with virtue, since there is nothing of virtue in vice. Therefore, one vice is not graver than another.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, if someone were commanded not to trespass beyond a chain, then whoever passed by it would be punished without any difference whether he passed it by one step or two, since he would be punished equally for both. But it is a commandment of the divine law and the natural law that man not pass beyond the rectitude of virtue. Therefore, no matter how something outside the rectitude of virtue occurs, it makes no difference. Thus, all sins are equal.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the same inexperience is attributed to a sailor whether a ship sinks in the ocean or at the shore. But just as a sailor governs his ship to avoid its perishing, so also man is governed by his virtue not to sin by act. Therefore, the same fore-judgment belongs to virtue no matter how a man falls into the ruin of sin.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, something is evil because it does harm, as Augustine says. (Augustine, The City of God, bk. 12, ch. 3 (CCSL 48; PL 41:351); On the Customs of the Church and the Manichees, bk. 2, ch. 3 (CSEL 90:91; PL 32:1346).) But every mortal sin does equal harm by the fact that any mortal sin deprives of all the virtues. Therefore, all sins, at least mortal sins, are equal.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, equality is in all the virtues on account of charity, which is their mother, as Revelation 21:16 says that the city’s sides are all equal. But, likewise, the mother of all sins is cupidity, as it says in the text. (Sent. II, 42.8(266).1; however, Lombard calls cupidity the “root” (radix), not “mother” (mater), following 1 Timothy 6:10.) Therefore, all sins are equal.

On the contrary, sin is nothing other than a deviation from the rectitude of virtue. But one line can be more curved than another, as can be gathered from the Physics 4. (Aristotle, Physics 4.9, 217b5–13.) Therefore, one sin can be greater than another.

Furthermore, just as falsity is a withdrawal from the equality of truth, so also sin is a withdrawal from the equality of virtue. But falsity can be more or less, as the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics 4, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.4, 1008b33–1009a2.) that the error of the one who esteems that 3 = 5 is not as great as the error of the one who esteems that 3 = 1000. Therefore, it is also the case that a sin can be graver than another sin.

I answer that the opinion of the Stoics (whom Cicero imitates, as is clear in The Stoic Paradoxes) was that all sins are equal. The reason for this position was that they esteemed the goodness of virtue as being in something indivisible, from the fact that virtue is only from due proportion of all circumstances to the act, which can only be in one way. Thus, virtue is compared to things whose account lies in an indivisible point, that is, things that can only be in one way, just as it is compared to equality, rectitude, and the center of a circle. Hence they thought that, no matter how little one departs from this indivisible point, no goodness at all remains. Because one departs from this indivisible point by any sin, they thought it follows that all sins are equal.

But this position seems to follow from four false suppositions.

The first is because, according to the opinion of Socrates touched on in the Ethics 6, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.13, 114b417–30.) they posited that virtue and scientific knowledge are the same. Thus, since there is the same science of righting oneself in all human acts, they conflated all the virtues into one, which they called “wisdom.” Thus, there was no disparity of vices due to being opposed to different virtues. But this is false, as the Philosopher shows in the same place. For virtue, beyond science, is a habit inclining to what is fitting to reason.

The second is because the account of virtue does not totally lie in an indivisible point. For, as it says in the Ethics 2, it is not needed to always attain the mean in order to have a work of virtue. Rather, it suffices to be around the mean, though it is true that the perfection of virtue consists in an indivisible point.

The third is because, even if the account of virtue did totally consist in an indivisible point, the account of goodness does not consist in an indivisible point, as the account of the perfect does not due to the fact that a perfection can be super-added to a perfection, where each of them causes the account of goodness. Thus, the goodness is less if two perfections are subtracted than if only one is. And in regard to this, if there were only virtue when an act were perfect in all the circumstances coming together totally at the mean, each circumstance would still have its own goodness; and thus, an act in which two circumstances were corrupted would be worse than one in which only one were corrupted.

The fourth is because although the account of goodness lies in an indivisible point and we do not state a negation in itself in greater or lesser degree, it is intensified or lessened as regards its cause, as one whose eye is totally plucked out is called “more blind” than one who loses sight due to some humor’s flowing to the pupil, even though both are blind. And in this way, too, inequality is stated in greater or lesser degree. For the distance from equality, which takes away equality, can be greater or lesser. And in this way, too, on the basis of greater or lesser distance from goodness, an act could be called “more” or “less” evil.

Thus, it should be granted simply that one sin is graver than another.

Now, this can be the case in two ways. One way is on the side of the sin in itself. The other way is on the side of the sinner.

On the side of the sin, greater or lesser gravity of sin arises from the cause whereby the act is called “evil” in itself. This is insofar as the act is out of harmony with the rectitude of reason. For a natural inclination to its end is implanted in each nature. Thus, in reason there is a natural rectitude through which one inclines to the end. And thus, what draws one away from that end is out of harmony with reason. Because the natural law is that in accord with which one’s reason is right, Augustine says (Augustine, Against Faustus the Manichean, bk. 22, ch. 27 (PL 42:409).) that sin is spoken of as being out of harmony with the eternal law, of which the same natural law is an expression.

Therefore, the more an act draws away from the end of human life, the graver in itself the sin is, whether this occurs from the matter concerning which the sin is committed or from the corruption of more or fewer circumstances.

On the side of the sinner, in turn, sin is also graver as regards two things: either on account of greater contempt, or also on account of greater desire. The first of these regards sin’s turning away and the second regards its turning toward. But this latter gravity is incidental to sin as considered in its genus. For what is lighter by its genus can be graver when done with greater desire or contempt.

Reply Obj. 1: Although virtue is an equality, the being of virtue does not require that we arrive at total equality in every respect. For this pertains to the perfection of virtue. Thus, virtue is intensified or lessened either on the side of the act, which is more virtuous the more it approaches equality, or on the side of the one acting, whose act will be more virtuous the more perfect is the habit with which he acts, even if the act belongs to the same genus. And the case is likewise with sin. Furthermore, even if virtue only existed in one way, the argument would not proceed, as is clear from what was said previously.

Reply Obj. 2: In every sin there is something of virtue. For virtue is constituted by equality of all circumstances. Now, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.5, 1126a9–12.) it is not possible for there to be a corruption of all the circumstances. Thus, something of virtue remains in the act of sin. Thus, sin has some mixing with virtue. Thus, the argument does not proceed.

Reply Obj. 3: There is such a thing as evil in itself and such a thing as evil only by being forbidden. Therefore, in what is evil only because it is forbidden, it makes no difference whether one strays a little or much from the precept on the side of the act itself, though it does differ on the side of the agent, insofar as he can act with greater or lesser contempt. The reason for this is that in these matters the account of the malice is wholly from the fact of not observing the precept. Thus, the account of goodness in it is by way of the precept. Thus, if this is taken away, no goodness remains. But not all sins are of this type, and thus, the argument does not proceed.

Reply Obj. 4: In the sinking of a ship, no matter where it sinks there is equal loss, since the same thing is lost in any place. But there is not equal loss in every sin. In fact, in one sin one particular due circumstance is lost, in another two, and so forth. Thus, the case is not similar.

Reply Obj. 5: Although any mortal sin takes away all the virtues, one takes away more of the aptness for a virtue than another. Furthermore, one sin takes away the virtue to which it is opposed essentially and another virtue, as it were, incidentally.

Reply Obj. 6: Charity does not make all the virtues equal in quantity because one virtue is more noble than another, but in proportion. For as much as one virtue grows, the other grows proportionally. And it is the like growth of the fingers on a hand. Thus, too, not all sins need be equal. Furthermore, charity is the love of one thing, namely, God, whereas cupidity relates to more than one thing. Thus, it does not have the account of uniting and making equal, like charity does.

Exposition of the second part of the text

Moreover, it is to be known that there are seven capital or principal vices. (Sent. II, 42.6(264).1.) He seems to enumerate the capital vices in an unfitting way. For pride is different from vainglory. Therefore, vainglory is incorrectly put in place of pride.

Rather, it should be said that because pride has a greater aptitude for giving rise to other vices than do the others, as has been shown, Gregory (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Job, bk. 31, ch. 45 (CCSL 143B; PL 76:620).) did not list pride as a specific head among the vices, but instead listed it as the universal head of them all and named it queen of all vices. And in place of it, he put vainglory among the capital vices, which is its closest daughter. Isidore, in turn, considering all other vices are generated from pride, but some with greater frequency when they agree more with it, lists pride as a specific head of those vices that frequently arise from it. Thus, he reckoned it among the seven capital vices, as is clear from the Gloss on Deuteronomy 7. (Isidore, Quaestiones in Vetus Testamentum, seu Mysticorum expositiones sacramentorum, ch. 16 (PL 83:459).)