D. 34 - Actual sin as regards the account of evil

Division of the text

After he has addressed the original sin that passes from our first parents to their offspring by fleshly origin, here he begins to address the actual sin that passes from parents to their children by imitation of the work. This is divided into two parts.

In the first, he addresses actual sin as regards the account of evil.

In the second, he addresses it on the side of the act in which the deformity is founded, whereby the evil is said to be an actual sin, at after these things, we must see what sin is. (Sent. II, 35.1(231).1.)

The first part is divided into two parts.

In the first, he addresses evil, showing the truth.

In the second, he rules out a certain objection, at but some make the following objection to the statement, ‘evil is that which is good.’ (Sent. II, 34.5(230).4.)

Concerning the first, he does three things.

First, he states what he intends.

Second, he pursues his proposal, at the cause and first origin of sin was a good thing. (Sent. II, 34.2(227).1.)

Third, he follows up what was said, at from these arguments is revealed what we said above was to be investigated first and second. (Sent. II, 34.5(230).3.)

The first part is divided into two parts.

In the first, he inquires as to the cause of evil.

In the second, he inquires as to its subject, at after the origin of evil has been shown, it remains to see in what thing evil exists. (Sent. II, 34.4(229).1.)

Concerning the first, he does two things.

First, he shows the first proper cause of the evil of fault, which is outside the genus of evil.

Second, he shows the proximate cause, which is like a univocal cause in the same genus, at and that evil will, both of the angel and of man, is also the cause of subsequent evils. (Sent. II, 34.3(228).1.)

After the origin of evil has been shown, it remains to see in what thing evil exists. (Sent. II, 34.4(229).1.) Here he inquires about the subject of evil.

And he first shows that the subject of evil is good.

Second, from this he draws a conclusion: from this it is gathered that, when man is called evil, nothing else is meant than an evil good. (Sent. II, 34.4(229).3.)

Third, he shows that the rule of the art of dialectic fails in this, at and so, ‘in these opposites which are called good and evil, that rule of the dialecticians fails, by which they say that two opposites cannot be in the same thing at the same time.’ (Sent. II, 34.5(230).1, quoting Augustine, Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate, ch. 14 (CCSL 46; PL 40:238).)

Question 1

Actual sin as regards the account of evil

Here five questions are asked:

first, whether there is evil;

second, what evil is;

third, if good is the cause of evil;

fourth, if evil is in good as a subject;

fifth, if an entire good is corrupted by evil.

Article 1

Whether there is evil

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 46, q. 1, a. 3; ST I.48.2; SCG III.71; Disputed Questions on the Power of God, q. 3, a. 6, ad 4; Compendium theologiae, ch. 142; Commentary on Dionysius’s On the Divine Names, ch. 4, lect. 16.) It seems that there is no evil.

Obj. 1: For everything that is either exists or is in what exists, since it is either a substance or an accident. But evil neither exists nor is in what exists, as Dionysius proves. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 33 (PG 3:734).) Therefore there is no evil.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, everything that is said to be is either a being of reason or a being of nature. Now, everything that is a being of reason is either existent or non-existent. Therefore, what is not an existent being and not a non-existent being cannot in any way be said to be. But evil is far from what is existent, and even farther from what is non-existent, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 33 (PG 3:734).) Therefore, there is no way in which evil can be said to be.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, God pre-possesses in himself every affirmation and negation, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Mystical Theology, ch. 11, n. 3 (PG 3:139).) For everything we posit must be posited in him, and everything we deny must be denied in him. But evil in no way pre-exists in God. Therefore, evil is neither an affirmation nor a negation. But there is no mean between affirmation and negation, as is proved in the Metaphysics 4. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.7, 1011b24.) Therefore, there is no way for there to be evil.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, it is impossible to posit a position that destroys itself, such as when one who denies that there is truth is positing truth, as Augustine (Augustine, Soliloquiorum libri duo, bk. 2, ch. 2 (CSEL 89; PL 32:885).) and Anselm say; (Anselm, On Truth, ch. 1 (PL 158:468).) and those who deny demonstration are positing that there is such a thing as demonstration, as it says in the Metaphysics 4. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.4, 1005b35–1006a29.) But evil destroys itself, as it says in the Ethics 4. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.5, 1126a13.) Therefore, there is no evil.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, each provident artisan keeps evil away from his work as much as possible. But divine providence rules all things, as we have it in Book I. (In I Sent., d. 39, q. 2, a. 2.) Therefore, since God is omnipotent, he completely expels evil from the universe. Therefore, there is no evil.

On the contrary, just as appetite is only for the good, flight is only from evil. But there are many things that are fled from in accord with right reason. Therefore, there is evil.

Furthermore, nothing is judiciously prohibited or justly punished except evil. But it is obvious that there are many judicious prohibitions and just punishments. Therefore, it is obvious that there is evil.

I answer that the Philosopher shows that we speak of being in many ways. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.7, 1017a7.) In one way, we speak of being as what is divided into the ten kinds. And in this way, “being” means something existing in a nature, whether it be a substance, like man, or an accident, like color. In another way, we speak of “being” as what signifies the truth of a proposition, as when we say that an affirmation is true when it signifies being of that which is, and a negation is true when it signifies non-being of that which is not. And this latter “being” signifies the composition that the intellect discovers as it compounds and divides.

Therefore, whatever are called “beings” in the first way are beings in the second way, since everything that possesses natural being in things can be signified as existing by way of an affirmative proposition, as when we say, “color exists” or “man exists.” But not all beings in the second way are beings in the first way. For an affirmative proposition can be formed of a privation, as in the case of blindness, when it is said that “blindness exists,” and yet blindness is not a thing in the real world but is rather the removal of a given being. Thus, privations and negations, too, are said to be beings in the second way, but not in the first way.

Now, in both of these ways, “being” is predicated in different ways. For taken in the first way it is a substantial predicate and pertains to the question “what is it?” But in the second way, it is an incidental predicate, as the Commentator says in the same place, (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 5, comm. 12–14.) and pertains to the question “whether it is?”

Therefore, taking “being” as spoken of in the second way, as the question was asking, we say simply that there are evils in the universe. For experience also teaches this, and reason shows it, since, as Dionysius proves, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 20 (PG 3:718).) evil is nothing other than an imperfect good. Now, if there were not any good lessened in any respect, all goods would be equal, and so the universe’s beauty would perish, seeing as it is composed of degrees of goodness. The essential order of causes among the universe’s parts, in accord with which the more noble have an influence on the less noble, would also perish. The unfitting conclusion would come to the same thing if we posited that no thing could lack a perfection due to it because in that case there would be equal stability of goodness in all beings, and not all the degrees of goodness would be filled if there were not certain goods that could not be deprived of their perfections and others that could be deprived of their perfections on account of their distance from the supreme good.

Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius is taking “exists” in the first way of understanding being, and in this way, evil is not something that exists and is not in existing things. For it is not a given nature in the universe, nor is it anything in something that exists, as a part of its perfection. This is how his proofs proceed, wherein case-by-case he shows that evil is not in anything that exists. But he does not remove the possibility of evil being in existing things as privations are in a subject, as blindness is in the eye.

Reply Obj. 2: Dionysius is taking as “non-existent” that which in no way is. And evil differs even more from this than it does from what exists, since evil is in what exists as in a subject, even though evil itself in itself is not something that exists, but evil is absent from the non-existent because what simply is non-existent cannot be the subject of a privation. And a privation itself is also not an absolutely non-existent thing. Rather, it is non-existent in that a privation is a negation in the subject, as it says in the Metaphysics 4. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.2, 1004a14–15.) For blindness is nothing other than the negation of seeing in that which is meant to see.

Reply Obj. 3: Even though the negations of all created things are quite truly in God on account of his abundance, there is no privation in him, because nothing is naturally suited to him that he does not possess. Now, evil is spoken of in the second way of talking about being, as a negation—not an absolute one, but a privation. Otherwise, everything would be evil, since there is nothing that something cannot be denied of.

Reply Obj. 4: The Philosopher does not state simply that evil destroys itself, but that evil, if it is total and complete, destroys itself. For there can only be a total evil if every good is corrupted, and when this is corrupted, the being that can be the subject of evil is corrupted. Now, when the subject is corrupted, the privation that was in the subject also ceases to be. Hence from this it is effectively concluded that there can be no highest evil, not that there is no evil absolutely.

Reply Obj. 5: A provident craftsman only expels evil from his work if it preserves the condition of his work. Now, since some things were created by God, to whose condition it belongs that they can incur the defect of malice or introduce it into other things, if evil were restricted from them simply, the condition of his work would be destroyed. Thus, it is becoming that he permits the doing of evils without being the one doing them. But this was spoken of in Book I. (In I Sent., d. 46, q. 1, a. 4.)

Article 2

Whether evil is a kind of positive being

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.48.1, I.48.2; SCG III.7–12; On Evil, q. 1, a. 1; Compendium theologiae, ch. 115; Commentary on Dionysius’s On the Divine Names, ch. 4, lect. 14.) It seems that evil is a being, as a kind of nature, taking “being” in the first way as what predicates something positively.

Obj. 1: For every genus is a kind of nature. For non-being possesses no species or differences, as the Philosopher says, though every genus is divided into species by differences. But good and evil are genera of other things, as it says in the Categories. (Aristotle, Categories 11, 14a24.) Therefore, evil is something that predicates positively.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, every contrary is a kind of nature, since contraries are in the same genus and only a nature is in a genus as a species. But good and evil are contraries, as it says in the text. (Sent. II, 34.5(230).1.) Therefore, evil is a nature.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, every difference constituting a species is something that predicates positively. But “good” and “evil” are differences in the first species of quality constituting different species of habit. Therefore, evil predicates something positively.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, nothing fights or corrupts except by acting. But nothing acts unless it has a given nature. Therefore, since evil corrupts good and fights against it, it seems that evil is something that possesses a nature.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, everything that corrupts generates something because the corruption of one thing is the generation of another, as it says in On Generation and Corruption 1. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.3, 318a26.) But evil corrupts, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 19 (PG 3:715).) Therefore, it also has the ability to generate. But nothing generates unless it has a given nature that it passes to what is generated. Therefore, evil is something that possesses a nature.

On the contrary, everything that is from the first good is good, since all goods are good by the fact that they are from this good, as Boethius says. (Boethius, Hebdomads, question (PL 64:1311).) But every nature is from God, who is the highest good. Therefore, evil is not a nature or a being stated positively.

Furthermore, nothing desires its contrary. But every nature desires the good because each thing desires its own perfection. Therefore, since good is opposed to evil, evil will not be a being that possesses a nature.

I answer that Avicenna, in his Metaphysics, (Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā, ca. 980‒1037 AD), Metaphysics, tract. 9, ch. 6. Avicenna’s Metaphysics (al-Ilāhiyyāt) is itself a section of the Book of Healing or al-Shifa’.) posits a very useful division of evil that can be gathered from his words. For he says that something is called “evil” in two ways: either through itself or incidentally.

“Evil through itself” means the very privation of a perfection, whereby something is evil; some also call this “evil taken abstractly.” Now, there are two versions of this. For the privation is either the privation of a perfection that should be present in a thing as primarily necessary, and this kind of privation is evil in everyone, such as, for example, the privation of a foot, a hand, and so forth, or it is the privation of a second perfection, such as the privation of geometry and so forth. And this kind of privation is not always evil to everyone, but is only so to one who has been devoted to possessing it or who ought to possess it.

There are, in turn, two kinds of evil in the incidental sense: either that which is the subject of this kind of privation, or that which causes this kind of privation in another. Both of these are “evil” taken concretely.

Now, that which is the subject of a privation can be understood in four ways: as an action, a habit, a passion, or a substance. An action will have the account of the evil of fault if it has a privation of the due end and due circumstance. Because like habits are generated from like actions, the habits themselves that remain from such actions are evil, as are the habits of vices. Next, a passion has a privation whereby something is corrupted in the patient, and this kind of passion is called the “evil of punishment,” or the “defect of nature” in those in whom there can be neither fault nor punishment. Because no accident can be the subject of something said by way of privation or positively, except by reason of the substance underlying it, we must understand that the subject of this privation that is evil essentially is the substance, in accord with which we say that a man is evil or a soul is evil.

However, if we are speaking of evil in the incidental sense as what causes this kind of privation, this can occur in two ways. For the cause of the privation of a due perfection is either on the side of the matter, being indisposed to receive the agent’s power completely, such as is the defect in the case of monsters and other things occurring from a defect of matter, or else it is on the side of the agent. And this latter occurs in two ways. Either an agent is joined to the agent in a way contrary to its due perfection, such as in the case of a burning fire and a cutting sword, and from this follows the evil that is called the “punishment of sense” in those who can sense, in whom fault and punishment can exist, because an agent of this kind, which deprives of a due perfection by its being attached, is felt.

Or, there is an agent that is not joined but that impedes the influence of the perfecting cause, such as when we say that “the clouds are bad” inasmuch as they prevent the sunlight from reaching us. Because this kind of cause is felt only by the very subtraction of the perfection—since it does not take the perfection away by acting on that which suffers the privation, but rather by impeding the agent—though perhaps it is felt in another way incidentally, as when the clouds are observed. Thus, the evil following from this is not called the “punishment of sense,” but the “punishment of loss,” albeit in those who are receptive to punishment.

Among the evils spoken of in this way, there is an order such that what is evil essentially is spoken of first and everything else in relation to it. Incidental evil that is the subject of evil so called, due to its having in itself a privation that is essentially an evil, holds the second rank. In the third rank is incidental evil, called such as the cause that introduces an evil. For this latter does not necessarily possess a privation in itself, but produces something that possesses a privation. Hence the first kind is called “evil” absolutely, the second is called “evil” according to its order to the first, and the third in order to the second.

Therefore, it should be said that “evil” denotes non-being. Hence what is through itself evil does not posit anything, but is said to exist the way a privation exists. But the evil thing that is the subject of the privation is something positively, but not from the fact that it is evil, just as an eye is something, but not from the fact that it is blind, since blindness is in it only as the negation of seeing. Next, evil spoken of as the cause of an evil is something considered in itself. But in its order to an effect, by reason of which it is called “evil,” it is also spoken of in the sense of a privation. For it is called “evil” from the fact that it introduces a privation. And in this way, too, the account of non-being redounds to it in a causal sense, as does the account of evil.

Reply Obj. 1: “Genus” can be spoken of in two ways. In one way, it is spoken of properly, as it is predicated of many things in regard to what that thing is. And in this way, neither good nor evil are genera, but they are among the transcendentals because good and being are convertible. In the other way, in a common way of speaking as we call a “genus” everything that by its commonality includes and contains many elements. And this is the way in which good and evil are spoken of as the genera of all contraries. For, as it says in the Physics 1, (Aristotle, Physics 1.9, 192a17–18.) all contraries are related in such a way that one is more noble and another more base, and this is why the more base includes a privation in itself, as black does with regard to white and cold with respect to hot. For this reason, in On Generation and Corruption 1, (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.3, 318b17.) it is said that cold is the privation of heat. And in this way, one contrary always pertains to the good and the remaining one to evil. Hence, too, Pythagoras posited two orders of things: one good, under which he catalogued all perfect things, such as “right,” “triangular,” “equilateral,” and similar things, and another evil, under which he put everything implying imperfection, like “left,” “woman,” and so forth.

Reply Obj. 2: If we consider evil essentially or in the abstract, then evil is opposed to good as a privation. On the other hand, if we consider evil in the incidental sense, as it is in an action or in a habit, then it is opposed to the good as a contrary, as prodigality is opposed to liberality and timidity to fortitude.

Reply Obj. 3: Evil understood through itself or abstractly is not a specific difference; but evil understood as incidental or concretely is. For all moral realities take their species from the end. Now, it is from the order to the due end that a good action and a good habit are specified, by reason of which we posit the good of a habit and a moral action by a specific difference. Therefore, an evil action is specified from its order to an undue end, with which is mixed the privation of a due end whereby it incurs the account of evil. Hence it is clear that a privation alone does not specify an evil habit or action, but rather the positing of an order to a certain end together with the privation of the due end. In this way, it is clear that evil, as a difference, is not evil through itself, but evil incidentally, or taken concretely.

Reply Obj. 4: Evil can be understood as corrupting in two ways: formally or efficiently. For just as whiteness makes a thing white formally, so also a privation deprives formally and a corruption corrupts formally. Now, evil taken through itself is the privation or corruption itself. Hence it does not follow that it is a being stated positively, since it does not deprive or corrupt by acting. On the other hand, if it is taken in the efficient sense, this cannot be understood of evil through itself, or taken abstractly, because a privation produces nothing. Rather, we must take evil in the incidental sense, meaning the subject and cause of an evil. And this does produce something, not as deprived, but as a given being that can act. Thus, Dionysius says (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, nn. 31–32 (PG 3:731).) that evil does nothing except by the power of the good, and that the good itself can only put up resistance by the power of the good. For nothing prevents one good from being contrary to another, as heat is contrary to cold.

Reply Obj. 5: Corruption and generation, although always joined together, are not the same essentially, but incidentally. This is clear from their end points, whereby motions and changes are specified. For the end point of generation is the form because it is a change to being, while the end point of corruption is a privation because it is a change to non-being. Now, the form of one and the privation of another, such as the form of fire and the privation of air, are the same in subject, but differ in account. Thus, too, what corrupts and generates is not characterized as generating and corrupting on the same basis. Instead, by the fact that it introduces its form, it generates. Thus, as a being it generates, whereas it corrupts from the fact that its form is necessarily connected with the privation of another form. Hence it is clear that in what possesses a privation or is a non-being, something corrupts. This is why Dionysius says (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 19 (PG 3:715).) that, speaking of the essential meaning, good has the property of generating and preserving, while evil has that of corrupting. Hence it does not follow that evil in its evilness is a thing.

Article 3

Whether good is the cause of evil

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In II Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2; ST I.49.1; I-II.75.1; SCG II.41; III.10, 13; On the Power of God, q. 3, a. 6; On Evil, q. 1, a. 3; Commentary on Dionysius’s On the Divine Names, ch. 4, lect. 22.) It seems that evil’s cause cannot be good.

Obj. 1: For, as Dionysius says, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 19 (PG 3:715).) it belongs to good to preserve and produce. But evil is a kind of corruption. Therefore, good is not the cause of evil.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, one of two opposed elements is not the cause of the other, except incidentally, just as cold in a certain way heats, as it says in the Physics 8. (Aristotle, Physics 8.1, 251a32.) But evil has a cause not only incidentally but essentially, since what is incidental is in fewer cases, whereas evil seems to be in more cases. Therefore, the first cause of evil must be evil.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, every effect of a second cause is traced back to the first cause. But every good is an effect of the first cause. Therefore, if an evil is caused by a good, then the first cause, which is God, will be the cause of evil. Thus, in a certain way God would be evil, which is absurd.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the effect must follow the condition of its cause. But every evil is deficient. Therefore, there must be a deficiency in some way in its cause. Therefore, either the deficiency is in it actually or potentially. If the deficiency is actual (and whatever is actually deficient is an evil), then the cause of the evil will not be good but evil, and this will not be the first evil, whose cause we looked for. Alternatively, if the deficiency is in the cause only potentially (and what is only potential is insufficient to educe something actually, since it says in the Physics 2 that actual building is the cause of what is actually built, and potential building is the cause of what is potentially built, (Aristotle, Physics 2.4, 195b4–6.) then from this kind of cause there will not be able to arise actual evil.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, Dionysius says (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, nn. 31–32 (PG 3:731).) that evil does not have a cause. But what is caused by good does have a cause. Therefore, evil is not from good.

On the contrary, whoever does something upon whose occurrence something else follows necessarily, is also the latter’s cause. But a good thing is the cause of a given good on which evil follows, due to the fact that from its arrival the privation of another good takes place, as is clear in the case of a burning fire, which by introducing its own form takes away the form of the thing that is burned up, and yet both forms are a good. Therefore, good is the cause of evil.

Furthermore, everything incidental is traced back to what is essential. But evil only causes incidentally because it only acts by the power of the good, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, nn. 31–32 (PG 3:731).) Therefore, evil’s causality must be traced back to the good as to its first cause.

I answer that nothing acts except insofar as it is actual. But nothing is actual except as having a given form or perfection. Hence everything that acts must act inasmuch as it is perfect, and thus, inasmuch as it is good, since everything perfect, precisely as perfect, is good. Now, the intention of any agent is to produce its own likeness in another. Thus, what is essentially intended by the agent is that some good be produced. Hence good has a cause essentially, but a defect occurs apart from the agent’s intention.

This can happen in three ways. Either it is on the part of what is intended by the agent, when it excludes a certain other perfection with which it is incompatible, as is clear in natural generation. For fire intends to introduce its form in matter, but because the form of fire is incompatible with the form of air, the privation of the form of air follows apart from the agent’s intention. Or, it is on the part of the matter that receives the action, when it is indisposed to obtain the perfection that the agent intends to introduce, as is clear in natural things, such as in the case of monstrous births; and also in artificial things, such as in a knotty piece of wood that does not comply with the artisan’s action and results in an artifact that possesses a defect. Or, it is on the part of an instrument, as is clear in lameness, since a distorted gait follows from the power of taking steps due to a bend of the leg.

Now, the evil of fault can occur due to two of these ways: on the part of what is intended, or on the part of an instrument. For the evil of fault does not result from a defect of matter because moral activities are not acts of making in the sense that something would be set up in matter by them, as it says in the Ethics 6. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.4, 1140a1–6.) Rather, they are actions that remain in the agents themselves, which either perfect or corrupt them. For in all sins that proceed by reason’s deliberation, evil occurs on the part of what is intended. For just as in natural things there cannot be two final substantial forms actually perfecting the same piece of matter, so too there cannot be two last ends of the will. Hence just as a natural agent causes the defect of one form by the fact that it introduces another, so too the will, by the fact that it clings to something as its last end that is not its due end, turns away from the last end due it, and in this the account of the evil of fault is fulfilled apart from the will’s intention. But sins that proceed apart from reason’s deliberation, such as primary motions, occur from an instrumental defect, that is, one of the lower powers, which are like the will’s instruments, or of reason, as is clear in primary motions.

Therefore, in this way, it is clear that in the way wherein evil can have a cause, good is evil’s efficient cause (incidentally, that is), but not the perfect and highest good. This is clear by way of likeness in natural agents, in which we find a universal agent and a particular agent. A particular agent, having an action determined to a single form, being the cause of that form, is also the cause of the privation of another form, as is clear in fire or water. However, the sun, since it is a cause acting universally on every lower bodily form, is not the cause of the privation of a form except by its departure, as it says in On Generation and Corruption 2. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 2.10, 336a32–b10.) Likewise, too, by causing a determinate good, something excludes another good incompatible with it. However, the complete good—which is universally the cause of every good—is not the cause of the defect of a good, not even by its absence. For as far is it itself goes, it is always present, not subject to the interchange of absence and presence.

Reply Obj. 1: Good’s essential effect is to preserve and produce, but even corruption or privation can be the effect of the good incidentally, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 2: Throughout the whole universe, good occurs in the majority of cases, while evil is in fewer cases. For there are more parts of the universe in which evil of nature cannot occur—higher bodies—than there are in which evil of nature does occur—lower bodies. Yet, even in the latter, evil of nature is in fewer cases because natural causes only fall short of their ordained effects in the minority of cases. The situation is similar in voluntary matters if we consider the complete cause, which is the will perfected by a habit, since this falls short of the act of a virtue in the minority of cases. But a will not yet perfected by a habit is an incomplete cause, since it leans to both sides. And just as evils occur in more ways than goods do, so also the will is bent toward evils in more cases than it is turned to what is perfectly good, seeing as in no case does the will fall short in such a way that it is not converted to at least some goods. For evil, if perfect, destroys itself, as it says in the Ethics 4. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.5, 1126a13.)

Reply Obj. 3: A second cause has an essential effect to the extent that it falls under the first cause. Thus, the kind of effect that essentially belongs to it is traced back to the first cause, but if it has a defect incidentally, inasmuch as it departs from the order of the first cause, this effect need not be traced back to the first cause. This is clear in the case of a lame leg. For whatever of the account of walking is in limping is entirely brought about by the power of walking by means of the leg, but the leg, inasmuch as it is disproportioned to the power of walking, introduces the deformity that there is in limping. Hence this kind of deformity need not be the effect of the power of walking. So, too, particular goods are not incidental causes of given defects except to the extent that they fall short of the perfection of the highest good. Hence the defects that result need not be traced back to the highest good as a cause.

Reply Obj. 4: In the created will, we find two defects. One is a potential cause of evil, namely being from nothing. For from the fact that it is from nothing, it can fall short by sinning in accord with the power of choice to be turned. Yet this defect is not an actual cause of evil, since it would follow that the will would always be falling short, like a lame leg that always limps. The other kind of defect is an actual defect, insofar as it actually falls short. And whatever proceeds from the will as falling under this defect is totally evil. Now, the defect that actually belongs to the will need not have as a cause another defect actually preexisting in the will, since then it would go to infinity. Rather, the will itself, considered in itself, is the cause of this defect. For the defect is in the will insofar as the will is turned to something in an undue way. But the will has control over being turned to a created good in an undue way, since it is free in regard to both sides. For the will is not like a natural agent, since a natural agent is determined to one thing from its nature. Hence it cannot be the cause of a disordered action unless there is a defect in the agent itself. The will, in contrast, is not determined to one thing, but determines itself to the extent that it clings to this or that. And in this kind of clinging consists the will’s first evil. Hence the first evil of fault that belongs to the will actually has a good thing, namely, the will, as its cause, though incidentally, as was said. The second evil, that which is in the external act, has the will already rendered evil by its internal act as its cause.

Reply Obj. 5: Evil has not an essential cause, but an incidental one, as was said. And this is how Dionysius means it. In this way, good can be the cause of evil incidentally.

Article 4

Whether evil is in good as a subject

To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.17.4, ad 2; 48.3; SCG III.11; On Evil, q. 1, a. 2; Compendium theologiae, ch. 118.) It seems that evil is not in good as a subject.

Obj. 1: For, as Dionysius says, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 33 (PG 3:734).) evil is neither an existing thing nor within existing things. But we speak most properly of being in another when we speak of being in another as a subject. Therefore, an existing thing is not the subject of evil. But every good is an existing thing. Therefore, evil is not in good as a subject.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, evil is related to good as non-being to being. But being is not the subject of non-being, since there cannot be both at the same time. Therefore, neither is good the subject of evil.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, no contrary is the subject of its contrary. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore, good is not the subject of evil. The first premise is clear from the fact that the Physics 1 says (Aristotle, Physics 1.7, 190b34.) that a subject is neither of the contraries.

Obj. 4: One might say that this rule is fallacious in the contraries that are good and evil, as it says in the text. (Sent. II, 34.5(230).1.)

On the contrary, the prior is always included in the posterior. But the first opposition is that of affirmation and negation. Therefore, affirmation and negation are included in all contraries. But an affirmation and a negation cannot simultaneously be true. Therefore, neither can contraries be. Now, a subject is simultaneous with that whose subject it is. Therefore, good cannot be the subject of evil.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, what is essentially the subject of another is also its cause essentially. For, as Avicenna says, (Avicenna, Metaphysics, tract. 1, ch. 1.) a subject is something complete in itself that offers the opportunity of existence to another. But evil is not essentially caused from the principles of good. Therefore, good is not universally and essentially the subject of evil.

On the contrary, everything that is a subject is a being. But every being, precisely as being, is good, since being and good are convertible. Therefore, evil’s subject must be good.

Furthermore, the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics 9 (Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.9, 1051a17.) that there is no evil apart from things. But it would be apart from things if it were not in things. Therefore, evil is in things as a subject. But each thing, precisely as a thing, is good because there is no thing that is essential evil. Rather, evil is a privation, as was said. (Above: d. 30, q. 1, a. 2, s.c.) Therefore, good is the subject of evil.

I answer that, as was said on the basis of Avicenna’s statements, (Avicenna, Metaphysics, tract. 9, ch. 6.) evil is essentially a privation. Now, as it says in the Metaphysics 4, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.2, 1004a15.) a privation is a negation in a substance, that is, it has its subject in a substance. In contrast, a negation that does not determine a subject cannot be called a “privation,” but is a simple negation. Hence evil must have a given being as its subject. But every being, precisely as such, is a good. Hence the subject of evil must be good.

But it should be known that not every good can be the subject of evil.

For there is a good that lacks no goodness, being perfect, and can lack no goodness, since all goodnesses are one in it such that one cannot be separated from another because it is simple. In this kind of good, evil can neither exist nor be conceived of. This is the highest good, which is God.

On the other hand, there is a good that, although it does not perfectly combine every goodness, but falls short in some respect of the highest good, still cannot be lacking any goodness that is due it. This is clear in the angels and in the heavenly bodies, which cannot in any way lose natural goodness. This kind of good, too, cannot be the subject of evil. For not every lacking of goodness is an evil, but only lacking one that a thing is meant to possess and that is due it. For lacking sight is not an evil in a stone, though it is one in an eye, since requiring an aptitude to act in the subject is common to every privation.

There is, in turn, a good that does not attain every perfection and due to its distance from the highest good can also lack a perfection that is due it and that it is meant to possess. This kind of good is the subject of evil, whatever it may be. Hence Dionysius says that a particular good is the subject of evil. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 20 (PG 3:718).)

Now, as to what this good is that can be the subject of evil, we must take our consideration from the perfection that suffers privation through the evil, due to the fact that privation and habit concern the same thing. There is a kind of perfection, namely, second perfection, whose subject is a being actually complete in first being. This same being is the subject of that evil whereby the perfection suffers privation, just as the soul is the subject of the fault whereby grace is taken away. There is also a kind of first perfection, such as substantial form, whose subject is only potential, namely, prime matter, which just as it is an incomplete and potential being, so too it is the subject of the privation of a substantial form, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Physics 1.9, 192a2–15.) saying that matter is not evil essentially, but incidentally, namely, by reason of the privation of which it is the subject.

Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 33 (PG 3:734).) understands being in the existing thing as a given part constituting the existing thing’s perfection. In this way, there is not evil in any existing thing. Rather, it is present like a privation in the subject.

Reply Obj. 2: Evil is not related to good as non-being, taken absolutely, to being. For non-being taken absolutely is a pure negation that has no determinate subject, whereas evil is a certain kind of non-being, a privation. Thus, it must possess a determinate subject, which can only be a being and good.

Reply Obj. 3: Not every evil is contrary to every good directly, just as not every vice is contrary to every virtue. Rather, it is contrary only to the good whose perfection suffers deprivation by the evil. Now, evil is not present as in a subject in the good taken away by the evil, just as man’s natural life is not taken away by the evil of fault. Hence the evil of fault is not opposed to the good living with natural life. Thus, it is not unfitting if this particular evil is in this good as a subject.

Reply Obj. 4: We can consider evil’s opposition to good in two ways. Either it is considered with reference to the determinate account of this good and this evil, and in this way, the dialecticians’ rule maintaining that contraries cannot exist simultaneously does not fail in the case of the opposites “good” and “evil.” For, as was said, taking the opposition of good and evil in this way, evil is not opposed to that good.

Evil’s opposition to good can also be considered with respect to the common account of both. In this way, evil simply is opposed to good simply, just as this evil is to this good. And in this way, the dialecticians’ rule does fail in the case of these contraries, since evil is in the good. The reason why it fails is this: good is not imposed by a determinate perfection, but by perfection in general. Hence whatever perfection a thing possesses attains the general account of good. Likewise, too, in whatever perfection it suffers deprivation, it incurs the general account of evil. Now, it can be the case that something may possess first perfection and be deprived of second perfection, and thus it will simultaneously have the account of good and evil, but in different respects. From this it does not follow that contradictories would be simultaneously true.

Reply Obj. 5: Evil does not have a subject like an accident does in an essential way, but as the privation of a perfection. Thus, it need not be essentially caused by the principles of its subject. Instead, it suffices that it requires in the subject only an aptitude and a debt.

Article 5

Whether evil can corrupt the whole good

To the fifth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.48.4; I-II.85.2; SCG III.12; On Evil, q. 12, a. 12.) It seems that evil can corrupt the whole good.

Obj. 1: For, as it says in the Physics 1, (Aristotle, Physics 1.4, 187b25–188a5.) every finite thing is used up when a certain element is taken away. But created good, which alone can be the subject of evil, is finite. Therefore, by multiplying evil it can be entirely used up.

Obj. 2: One might say that, although actually finite, it is infinite virtually and potentially.

On the contrary, virtual or potential quantity is measured on the basis of the object. Now, the object can possess infinity either with reference to the account of continuous quantity or with reference to the account of discrete quantity. But in neither way is the potential or power for natural good diminished by sin, since, just as before sin the soul was capable of the infinite good, which is God, so also it is afterwards. Likewise, too, just as before sin it had power to perform infinite acts, so also afterwards. And the potential for a given act, at least the remote potential, is not taken away from it. Therefore, we do not note the lessening of the good by evil with reference to virtual quantity. Therefore, virtual infinity cannot exclude using up all good or evil.

Obj. 3: One might say that the lessening of good by evil does not always regard the same quantity, but takes place in the same proportion, as in the diminution of a continuum, and thus it is always lessened to infinity and never totally taken away.

On the contrary, whenever there is lessening in the same proportion, what is taken away second is always less than what was taken away first. For if a third of the whole was taken away first, what is taken away second will be a third of what is left, and so forth. But a second evil does not take away less good than the first evil took away, since it can be as great an evil and good is not stronger in resisting it but is, in fact, weaker. Therefore, the lessening of good by evil is not always in the same proportion.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, we call it “evil” because it corrupts the good. Therefore, as long as evil lasts, it corrupts continuously. But what corrupts continuously eventually leads to non-being. For just as there is not a thing that possesses an infinite generation, neither is there one that has an infinite corruption, since the time of corruption of any given thing is equal to its time of generation, as it says in On Generation and Corruption 2. (Aristotle, On Generation 2.10, 336b10.) Therefore, it is necessary for good to be totally taken away by evil.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, if evil lessens good, either this is the good that is its subject or it is the good that is opposed to it. But it is not the evil that is its subject, since no accident lessens its subject. Therefore, we understand it to lessen the good opposed to it. Therefore, since it totally deprives of that good—since opposites cannot exist simultaneously—it seems that the good lessened by evil is totally taken away.

On the contrary, among other evils, the evil of fault is the worst. But the evil of fault does not totally take away the good. For Dionysius says (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 23 (PG 3:726).) that natural goods remained intact in the sinful angels, even though their sin was most grave. Therefore, evil does not totally take away good.

Furthermore, the Philosopher says that evil, if integral, would destroy itself. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.5, 1126a13.) But evil that totally takes away good will be an integral evil. Therefore, it would also destroy itself. But whatever destroys itself cannot possibly exist. Therefore, it is impossible for there to be an evil that totally corrupts the good.

I answer that, as is clear from what has been said, (Above: a. 2.) “evil” taken through itself is a kind of privation. Now, three things are required for the account of any privation: an opposed habit, a subject both of the habit and of the privation, and an aptness in the subject to receive the habit. Thus, we can consider the good in three ways: the good that is the perfection opposed to the same evil, the subject of the perfection and the opposed privation, and the aptness itself for the perfection. This latter, since it is like a kind of beginning of the perfection, is also a kind of good. For example, the evil of fault has as its subject the soul’s very nature, which is a good, and has grace as its opposite. Again, there is present in the soul a certain aptness to possess grace.

Therefore, it should be known that the evil of fault totally takes away the good of grace that is opposed to it, but as for the soul’s nature, which is its subject, nothing is taken away, though it does lessen the aptness, and this is the good of nature that is lessened by fault.

Now, the lessening of this aptness is not by way of subtracting some part of it. Just as qualities and forms are not increased by way of addition, as was said, (In I Sent., d. 17, q. 2, a. 1.) but by intensification, neither is this aptness lessened by subtraction, but by being rendered less intense. The lessening of intensity in this sort of aptness relates to how far it is from actuality, namely, from grace. For the closer a potency is to its act, the more complete it is.

However, it is the case that this aptness can be distanced from its act to infinity, in such a way that there will always remain an aptness, due to the fact that any act of sin produces some distancing from grace. Hence there always remains a lesser and lesser aptness and a greater distance from grace. And after the first sin the potential for a second sin is not taken away but, in fact, there is greater propensity to it. Thus, there can be a greater distancing. Even so, the aptness for grace is never totally taken away. For the aptness is caused by the principles of nature, and these principles, as has been said, are neither taken away nor lessened by fault. And the case would be similar in natural things: if there were a heat that could become hotter and hotter to infinity, there would always still remain the matter, which would have an aptness for cold by its nature and would in no way lose this, although the aptness would become farther and farther from the act.

Reply Obj. 1: This lessening does not occur by subtraction, but by distancing from actuality, as was said.

Reply Obj. 2: Nothing of the virtual or potential quantity is subtracted, so that after sin it is not in potency for as great a good as before or for as many goods as previously, even though by any sin the potency is distanced from the act. And it possesses infinity to the extent that this can take place to infinity, as was said.

Reply Obj. 3: I concede the third objection, since this solution avails nothing on this point.

Reply Obj. 4: Evil, that is the privation itself that is in a given subject, does not corrupt anything by efficient cause in that subject such that there is a continuous using up of it, as moisture is used up by what is hot. Rather, it corrupts speaking in a formal sense, that is, it is the corruption itself whereby it is corrupted. Thus, the argument does not proceed.

Reply Obj. 5: The good of nature that is lessened by sin is a mean between the soul, which is the subject of fault, and grace, which is opposed to fault, namely, the aptness itself. This aptness is rooted in the soul and perfected by grace. Thus, on the side of its approach to grace, it is opposed to fault, and for this reason is lessened by fault as to be ever distanced from grace. But, on the side of its being rooted in the soul, it is not opposed to fault, but is its subject. Thus, it always remains in the soul for as long as the nature remains.

Exposition of the text

‘It is manifest that all evil deeds arise from an evil will, like evil fruits from an evil tree.’ (Sent. II, 34.2(227).2, quoting Augustine, De nuptiis et concupiscentia, bk. 2, ch. 28, n. 48 (CSEL 42:303; PL 44:464).) He says this to rule out an objection that arises from the Lord’s words in Matthew 7:18: a sound tree cannot bear evil fruit, nor can a bad tree bear good fruit, from which it seems to follow that a good thing cannot be the cause of evil.

But it should be said that the tree is the proximate cause of the fruit, while the first cause in the genus is the sun or the earth. And the first cause is common to both good and bad trees and good and bad fruits. Thus, the will’s very nature, like a first cause, is the principle of good and evil wills, and of good and evil external acts, one and the same. But the evil will that is being compared to a tree is the proximate cause of the evil external act, which is compared to the fruit.

See, you have here that the first will of a changeable good. (Sent. II, 34.3(228).1.) He does not say this because if the first angel or the first man had not sinned then other subsequent ones could not have sinned, but rather, because subsequent sins were occasioned from these first sins.

And where there is not a good, there cannot be a corruption. (Sent. II, 34.4(229).2.) We should not understand this of the good that suffers privation due to evil, since then his argument would not be valid. For this good exists before evil comes onto the scene, but after evil’s arrival it does not remain. Rather, it is understood of the good that is the subject of evil, which is corrupted inasmuch as it is deprived of a due perfection. If this ceased to exist, it could not suffer privation, and thus, it could not be corrupted.

‘Are privations of natural goods.’ (Sent. II, 34.4(229).2, quoting Augustine, Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate, ch. 11 (CCSL 46; PL 40:236).) This should be understood of the natural good or of that to which nature is ordered, such as grace or virtue, or of the aptness to these goods. For if we understood it of natural goods that belong to the being of nature or that follow on nature, then it would be false, since these kinds of goods remain integral after sin, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 23 (PG 3:726).)

‘That rule of the dialecticians fails, by which they say that two contraries cannot be in the same thing at the same time.’ (Sent. II, 34.5(230).1, quoting Augustine, Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate, ch. 14 (CCSL 46; PL 40:238). Silano’s translation has been slightly modified.) How it does fail and how it does not has been stated. But according to the understanding whereby it is proposed as a rule, it never fails, although it does fail in a way, in the case of good and evil, that it does not fail in other contraries that denote specific forms, as has been said. (Above: a. 4, ad 4.)

‘Of those very things by which men are evil,’ (Sent. II, 34.5(230).4, quoting Augustine, Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate, ch. 19 (CCSL 46; PL 40:241).) that is, of sins. Even these, precisely as things, have a kind of goodness; but as falling short, they are evil.