D. 24 - Natural power of man in his original state
Division of the first part of the text
After addressing the knowledge that man had in the first state, here he begins to address the natural power through which he could have avoided sin. This is divided into two parts.
In the first part, he shows that man had a natural power whereby he was able to avoid sin.
In the second, he shows what that would be, at here is to be considered what that help given to man at creation was by which he was able to remain steadfast, if he so willed. (Sent. II, 24.2(141).1.)
Concerning the first, he does two things.
First, he determines the truth.
Second, he removes two doubts.
First, at but how did man have an upright and good will, if through it he was neither able to deserve life, nor did he will to stand firm by it? (Sent. II, 24.1(140).5.)
Second, at but it is usual to make the following objection against what we said. (Sent. II, 24.1(140).6.)
Here is to be considered what that help given to man at creation was. (Sent. II, 24.2(141).1.) Here he shows what that natural power was, and he says that it is free decision. This is divided into two parts.
In the first, he shows what free decision is. (Liber arbitrium is commonly translated as “free choice” or “free will,” but throughout we have opted for “free decision” to preserve the character of judgment inherent in the meaning of arbitrium. For the relation of liber arbitrium to the will (voluntas), choosing (electio), and judgment (judicium), see articles 2 and 3 in q. 1, below. Distinction 25 deals with the extent of liber arbitrium in God, humans, and animals. Distinction 28, especially articles 1 and 2, treats the relationship between grace and liber arbitrium.)
In the second, he shows some conditions of free decision, at but let us now return to our subject. (Sent. II, 25.1(153).1.)
The first part is divided into two parts.
In the first, he addresses what free decision is.
In the second, he identifies certain powers of the soul to show which ones include free decision, at for sensuality is some lower power of the soul, from which comes a motion which is directed to the senses of the body and to the appetites for things that pertain to the body. (Sent. II, 24.4(143).1.)
Concerning the first, he does two things.
First, he shows that the potential for sinning could exist with free decision.
Second, he defines free decision, at free decision, (Silano reads choice instead of decision.) however, is a faculty of reason and will, by which the good is chosen with the assistance of grace, or evil without its assistance. (Sent. II, 24.3(142).1.)
For sensuality is, etc. (Sent. II, 24.4(143).1.) Here he identifies certain powers of the soul. And concerning this he does two things.
First, he identifies them.
Second, he shows how there can be sin in them, at it is also not to be passed over. (Sent. II, 24.6(145).1.)
The first part with the preceding matters belongs to the present reading.
Concerning it two questions are asked.
First, on free decision. (Q. 1.)
Second, on the powers connected with free decision. (Q. 2.)
Question 1
Free decision
Concerning the first, four questions are asked:
first, whether free decision (On the translation of liberum aribitrum as “free decision,” see note above in the division of the first part of the text.) is a power or a habit;
second, if it is a power, whether it is a single one or many;
third, if it is one, whether it is distinct from reason and will;
fourth, whether in the first state man was able to resist sin by his free decision.
Article 1
Whether free decision is a habit
To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.83.2; On Truth, q. 24, a. 4.) It seems that free decision is a habit.
Obj. 1: This is first through the fact that Bernard says that free decision is a habit of the spirit with freedom over itself. (Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153 AD), De gratia et libero arbitrio, ch. 1 (PL 182:1002).) Thus, it seems to be a habit and not a power.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, a power does not become easy to actualize except from a habit. But in the text (Sent. II, 24.3(142).1.) it says that free decision is a faculty of the will and reason. Therefore, since “faculty” names a certain aptitude, it seems that free decision is a habit.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, as is said below, philosophers define free decision as free judgment of the will. But judgment names not a power, but rather a habit. Therefore, it seems that it is not a power.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, Augustine says (Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity, ch. 30 (CCSL 46; PL 40:246).) that man, by making bad use of his free decision, lost both it and himself. But no natural power is taken away through sin. Therefore, free decision is not a power, but a habit.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, no power admits of greater or lesser degree. But free decision can be intensified and lessened. Hence, it was said above (Sent. II, 7.3(35).1 and 4(36).1.) that the good angels have more freedom of decision after their confirmation than they have before. Therefore, free decision is not a power, but a habit.
On the contrary, every power is determined by a habit to a single thing, either simply, as the habit of knowledge is determined to the true, or at least such that it adheres to one thing to a greater extent, as in the case of opinion. But through free decision man is open to either side equally. Therefore, free decision is not a habit.
Furthermore, a habit cannot be the subject of another habit. But free decision is the subject of grace, which is compared to it as rider to horse, as Augustine says. (Pseudo-Augustine, Hypomnesticon contra Pelagianos et Coelestianos, bk. 3, ch. 11 (PL 45:1632).) Therefore, free decision is not a habit.
I answer that concerning this some say that in the common use of the term “free decision” is the name of a habit, even though both a power and an act are signified by the same name, as is clear in the name “intellect,” which can signify a power, a habit, and an act. Now, they do not say that the habit designated by the name “free decision” is a quality super-added to a power, but rather the very aptitude of the power for act or the facility that one power has due to the assistance of another. For this reason, according to them, it is said to be a faculty of will and reason.
But this opinion does not use the name “habit” rightly, since habit, according to the proper meaning of its name, signifies a kind of quality that is the principle of an act, informing and perfecting a power. Hence, if taken in the proper sense, it must be something super-added to a power, as a perfection is to the perfectible. Moreover, reason and will can only be considered in three ways. Either both are considered in themselves, and in this way, it is obvious that both are powers. Thus, no matter which of them is put forward, free decision will be a power. Or else one is considered with respect to the other, and in this way, one cannot be called the “habit” of the other, since a power is not the habit of a power. Or, finally, the relation of one to the other can be considered, and this cannot have the name “habit.” Hence it does not seem a reasonable statement to say that free decision is a habit.
Thus, some say that “free decision” names a power, not an absolute one, but a habitual one, that is, as being perfected through a kind of habit, not acquired or infused, but natural, through which the power has such ease in its act that it is said to have control over its own act.
This, too, does not seem fitting. For the will has the fact of its control over its own act from the very nature of the power as commanding and not being commanded by anything. Hence it has this ease from itself, not from any other habit. Besides, each habit is related to an act in such a way that by it the act is carried out well, not carried out simply. But free decision is related to the act of choice as that by which such an act is carried out sometimes well indeed, but sometimes badly, and sometimes indifferently.
Hence it does not seem to designate a habit, if “habit” is taken in a proper sense, but rather that power whose act is properly to choose. For free decision is that by which good or evil is chosen, as Augustine says. (Augustine, Contra Felicem, bk. 2, ch. 4 (CSEL 25:832; PL 42:538).)
Reply Obj. 1: Bernard uses the name “habit” in a broad sense for a kind of aptitude. For man is said to have free decision from the fact that his spirit stands in such a way that it has free power over its own act.
Reply Obj. 2: “Faculty” in common parlance signifies the power by which something obeys one’s bidding. Hence even possessions are called “faculties,” since they are under the control of the possessor. Thus, free decision is called a “faculty,” not as if it were a habit, but because it possesses its act in free power and for this reason is given the name “free.”
Reply Obj. 3: Judgment, properly speaking, names neither a power nor a habit, but an act. However, there is no one habit that elicits every judgment, since judgment proceeds in different matters in accord with different habits, unless, perhaps, we speak of the habit of first principles whose knowledge is naturally implanted in us as directing us in all judgments. But no one would call this free “decision.” For it is not the proper and proximate director in the act of choosing. But every judgment of choice can be traced back to a single power. Thus, the name “act” more appropriately leads us to understand a power than a habit.
Reply Obj. 4: Man is said to have lost free decision not essentially, but rather because he lost a kind of freedom, namely, freedom from sin and misery, as is said below.
Reply Obj. 5: Every power is strengthened or weakened in its act through the addition of a habit or an impediment. Hence free decision is said to be more or less free not because that very power is made more or less intense in itself, but rather because it is either impeded through the corruption of sin or disencumbered through the habit of grace and glory.
Article 2
Whether free decision indicates one power or more than one
To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that free decision indicates not a single power, but more than one.
Obj. 1: For Augustine says: when we speak of free decision, we speak not of a particular part, but rather of the whole soul. (Pseudo-Augustine, Hypognosticon, bk. 3, ch. 5 (PL 45:1624); see also: Augustine, summary of Contra Julianum (opus imperfectum), bk. 5 (CSEL 85.2; PL 45:1431–1506), as presented in Albert the Great’s Commentary on the Sentences, bk. 2, d. 25, a. 1.) But the totality of the soul consists in a plurality of powers. Therefore, free decision combines more than one power.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, reason and will are different powers. But free decision is a faculty of will and reason, as it says in the text. Therefore, it combines in itself more than one power.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, powers are distinguished on the basis of acts, as the Philosopher says in On the Soul 2. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.4, 415a15‒20 and 416a20.) But free decision extends to the acts of more than one power. For, as Damascene says, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 27 (PG 94:959).) free decision seeks, disposes, and so forth. Therefore, it seems that it combines more than one power.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, choice is nothing other than to prefer one of two proposed objects to the other. But this belongs to any given power, since any power desires what befits it and resists what is harmful to it. Therefore, choosing belongs to any power. But in the text, (Sent. II, 24.3(142).1.) choosing is assigned as the proper act of free decision. Therefore, it seems that free decision is not a determinate power.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, virtue and vice can only exist in free decision. But they are found in all the powers of the soul: temperance in the concupiscible part, fortitude in the irascible part, and the opposed vices. Therefore, it seems that “free decision” does not name a determinate power, but instead several.
On the contrary, a determinate act belongs to a determinate power. But choosing is a determinate act, which is assigned to free decision. Therefore, free decision is a determinate power.
Furthermore, nothing that is one simply in a nature consists of more than one element, unless it or one of the other elements is transmuted from the nature of the thing. Therefore, if free decision is produced out of more than one power, either it will not be one single thing, or this thing will be one with the corruption of certain of the soul’s powers. Both of these are unfitting. Therefore, free decision does not combine different powers.
I answer that some posited that free decision is not a determinate power but rather combines all the powers of the rational soul, as a universal whole does its parts. But this does not seem fitting, both because free decision would have to be multiplied in being with the multiplication of powers (for many men are many animals, not one), and also because the account of free decision would have to be preserved in individual powers, which cannot be the case because the act assigned to free decision does not belong to any given power, but rather to a determinate one.
Thus, others say that free decision combines more than one power, as an integral whole combines its parts. But this, once again, seems not to be fitting. For powers cannot be integral parts of a single thing if “one” is taken simply, unless, perhaps, we are speaking of “one” as one in aggregation or order. But free decision should be one not in this sense, but simply, since one act is attributed to it.
But others say that free decision combines more than one power—namely, will and reason—as the habit of both, for which reason it is called a “faculty of the will and reason.” But this, too, is said improperly. For if the name “habit” is taken properly, there cannot immediately be one habit of two powers, since one habit is ordered to one act, which is the act of one power.
Thus, we must say otherwise, that is, that something is said to combine more than one thing in two ways. In one way, it does so essentially, as a whole combines its parts. In the other way, it does so virtually, as when the force of more than one thing is participated in within a single thing. Therefore, on this basis I say that free decision combines more than one power not essentially, but virtually, as a single determinate power. For in the powers of the soul it is the case that, although they all arise from the soul’s essence, like properties from the essentials of a thing, this sort of origin has a certain order, namely, in such a way that the origin of one power presupposes the origin of another, by the mediation of which it in a certain way proceeds from the essence of the soul. This can be seen from its acts. For the act of one power necessarily presupposes the act of another, as the act of the appetitive part presupposes the act of the apprehensive part. And so it is that just as the force of the soul’s essence remains in the power, so also the force of a preceding power remains in a subsequent one. And so it is that a power combines in itself the forces of more than one power. And this is the case in free decision, as is clear from its act. For choosing, which is given as its act, implies discernment and desire; hence to choose is to prefer one thing to another. But these two aspects cannot be accomplished without the force of will and reason. Hence it is clear that free decision combines the force of will and reason, which is why it is called the “faculty” of both.
Reply Obj. 1: It is possible for a power to be determinate in itself, but still have a universal command over all acts, as is clear in the case of the will. Hence free decision is hereby said not to be a part of the soul, but the whole soul. This is not because it is not a determinate power, but because it extends by way of command not to determinate acts, but to all of man’s acts that are subject to free decision.
Reply Obj. 2: Free decision is called a “faculty of will and reason” not because it encompasses both essentially, but instead virtually, as has been said. (Resp.)
Reply Obj. 3: An act can be attributed to a power in two ways. This is either because it elicits it as proper, just as sight elicits the act of seeing, and the intellect elicits the act of understanding. In this way, the act of choosing is attributed to free decision. Or, in the other way, it is because it commands it. In this way, the acts of all the powers that obey reason can be attributed to the will, which is the mover of all the powers. And so, too, the acts of different powers are attributed to free decision.
Reply Obj. 4: Choosing pertains not to all the powers but to one in a determinate way, even though each power tends to what befits it and resists what is contrary. For this does not happen by the fact of the power’s choosing, but either due to the natural order of power to object (as a stone naturally falls down and not by choice), or through the choice of free decision. For, as Augustine says, (Rather: Alcher of Clairvaux, The Spirit and the Soul, ch. 34 (PL 40:804). The work was formerly attributed to Augustine but is more commonly attributed to Alcher of Clairvaux, among others. Aquinas recognized the inauthenticity of this work in his later writings; for example, in the Disputed Questions on the Soul (see especially q. 12, ad 1), Aquinas says the work is not by Augustine but is said to have been written by a Cistercian monk, and in ST I.82.5, ad 2, Aquinas says it is not necessary to have faith in the words of this book.) an intelligence not only understands for itself, but for the whole soul, and likewise the will wills not only for itself; and likewise for the other powers.
Reply Obj. 5: Virtue and vice are said to be in something in two ways. Either as in a cause, and in this way, they are in free decision and the will, either with regard to habits, as in acquired habits, or at least with regard to acts. Or, in the other way, they are in something as in a subject, and in this way, it happens that there are virtues and vices in different powers of the soul, as was said above.
Article 3
Whether free decision is a power distinct from will and reason
To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.83.4; III.18.3, 4; On Truth, q. 24, a. 6.) It seems that free decision is a power distinct from will and reason.
Obj. 1: For the act of any given power is named after that power, as willing is named after the will and intellection after the intellect. But choosing is named after neither will nor reason. Therefore, since there is an act of free decision, it seems that free decision is a power distinguished from both.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, free decision implies judgment and freedom. But both of these at the same time is not befitting to the will, to which judging does not belong; nor to reason, which is compelled by the violence of argument. Therefore, free decision is a power distinguished from both.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 3, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.5, 1113b2–5.) the will is for the end, whereas choice is not of the end, but of what is directed toward the end. Therefore, since choosing belongs to free decision, free decision is a different power than the will.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.5, 1140b16; 7.8, 1151a15–19.) the end stands in practical matters as the principle stands in speculative matters. But principles and conclusions do not pertain to the same power in speculative matters, since understanding pertains to principles and science to conclusions. Therefore, neither in practical matters do the end and what is directed toward the end pertain to the same power. Thus, the will, whose object is the end, and free decision, which chooses what is directed toward the end, are not a single power.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, the power that has judgment of the acts of other powers is distinguished from them, as the common sense is from particular senses. But free decision has judgment of the acts of all powers, as even the name indicates, being imposed from “judging,” as well as over the act of the will itself, since philosophers define free decision as free judgment of the will. Therefore, it seems that free decision is a power distinguished from the will and from the other powers.
On the contrary, the affective and apprehensive powers sufficiently divide the powers of the intellective part. But will and reason sufficiently encompass affection and intellective apprehension. Therefore, free decision does not differ from both.
Furthermore, the Commentator says on the Metaphysics 11 (Averroes (Ibn Rushd, 1126‒1198 AD), Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 11, comm. 36.) that separated substances are divided only into will and intellect. But it is obvious that there is free decision in separated substances, as in God and the angels. Therefore, free decision is not a separate power from will and reason or intellect.
I answer that some say that free decision is a power distinct from will and reason. But different people are moved to posit this in different ways.
For some posit that free decision is a single power having judgment over the acts of all powers, which is why it is given the name “free decision,” which implies judgment. But this does not seem to be the case. For to judge concerning the acts of all powers cannot befit a power that is different from the will or reason, especially since Anselm says that the will is the mover of all the powers. (Anselm, De casu Diaboli, ch. 1 (PL 158:325).) For that which is most free must have dominion and command over the others.
However, others are moved to adopt this position in another, more apt, way, namely, from the differences among acts. For they see that choosing, which is the act of free decision, is something other than willing simply, and something other than reasoning. Thus, they trace this act back to a power distinct from will and reason, to which they give the name “free decision,” which they posit in a certain way as a mean between will and reason, and in a certain way posterior to both. For by order of nature and dignity it must follow both, that is, will and reason, since free decision proceeds from the essence of the soul on the presupposition of reason and will, as even its very act shows, since choosing only happens when an end has first been apprehended through reason and desired through will. It also falls short of the dignity of the will, whose object is the principal good, namely, the end, whereas the object of free decision is a secondary good, which can be chosen for the sake of the end. But as regards a participation in the property of both, it has the nature of a mean, having judgment from reason and desire from will, insofar as the forces of prior powers remain in those that follow, as has been said. (Above: a. 2, resp.)
But this seems far-fetched, even if it is stated as probable. For philosophers who have subtly examined the soul’s powers have posited no power in the intellective part besides will and reason or intellect. Thus, it does not seem that free decision is a different power from will and reason, as is even clear from its act. For the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.2, 1139b4.) that choice is either an appetitive intellect or an intellective appetite. And his words seem to sound more as if choice is an act of the will’s appetite, though insofar as the force of reason and intellect remains in it. This is clear in the following way. Whenever there is an act of some power insofar as the force of another remains in it, the act is always attributed to the power by which it is immediately produced. For example, understanding pertains to principles, whereas, as Isaac says, reason is properly what causes one to move along from cause to caused. (Isaac Israeli ben Solomon (ca. 855‒955 AD), Liber de definitionibus.) Hence the act of reason properly is to lead one from the principle to the conclusion. Therefore, drawing out conclusions is an act of reason insofar as the force of understanding remains in it. Hence it is more properly attributed to reason than to understanding. So also counsel precedes choice, as it says in the Ethics 3, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.3, 1113a2–13.) just as disputation precedes the conclusion. For choice is of a previously counseled desire. Thus, choosing is principally an act of the will, not absolutely, but insofar as the force of the intellect, or counseling reason, remains in it. Hence he gives the will the name “free decision,” when it is considered in this way, not in an absolute sense.
Reply Obj. 1: An act that is the act of a power absolutely takes its name after the power, whereas an act that belongs to one power in accord with its order to another is not named after one of them. For example, knowing is not named after either reason or understanding. So, too, choosing is not named after either will or reason.
Reply Obj. 2: Even though judgment does not pertain to the will absolutely, the judgment of choice, which holds the place of a conclusion, pertains to the will, insofar as the force of reason remains in it.
Reply Obj. 3: Each power is defined on the basis of what is its object through itself and formally. But since the object of the will is the good, it is described principally by the end, since this has the account of the good through itself. However, what is directed toward the end is not good by being what it is absolutely, but rather from its being ordered to the end. Even so, insofar as it participates in the account of the good, it is the object of the will, namely, insofar as the power of ordering reason is in the will.
Reply Obj. 4: Even though principles and conclusions pertain to different habits of the soul, they do not pertain to different powers.
Or we may better say that even if reason and understanding are posited to be different powers, it does not on this account follow that the will and free decision are different powers. For nothing is divided essentially through what is incidental to it, but rather through what is essential. But to consider and to order befit the apprehensive power through itself, and the appetitive only incidentally, insofar as the power of the apprehensive power is in it. Thus, the apprehensive power is fittingly divided into the power that receives the true absolutely, such as the intellect, and that which is with consideration, such as reason. But the appetitive power should not be divided into that which receives the good absolutely and that which receives the good in order to another, since the order is not from the will, but reason. Hence the will belongs more to what is ordered or considered than what considers or orders.
Reply Obj. 5: It is not necessary for judgment of the act of any given power to pertain to another power, since in this case we would go off to infinity. Rather, one must arrive at the highest powers, which reflect back upon their own acts, such as will and reason. Thus, it is not necessary for there to be another power that makes judgments about the act of will and reason. But the judgment of free decision is understood to be the judgment of choosing. Hence when it is called free judgment “of the will,” “of” denotes not a material cause, as if the will is that concerning which the judgment is made, but rather the origin of freedom. For the fact that choice is free comes from the nature of the will.
Article 4
Whether Adam could have avoided sin through free decision in the first state
To the fourth we proceed as follows. It seems that Adam in the first state could not have avoided sin through free decision.
Obj. 1: For, as Augustine says in On True Innocence, even if human nature had remained in that integrity in which it was created, it would in no way have preserved itself without the help of the Creator. (Augustine, Epistulae, epist. 186, “Ad Paulinum,” para. 57 (CSEL 57:77; PL 33:830).) But it was by God’s preservation that Adam was able to remain without sin. Therefore, it seems that he could not avoid sin through free decision.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, free decision, as it says in the text, is that by which evil is chosen when grace ceases. But Adam in the first state did not have grace. Otherwise, he could have progressed to the merit of life. Therefore, it seems that he would have to have chosen evil.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, a crown is due to one who overcomes. But to resist temptation is to overcome temptation. Therefore, if he could have resisted temptation through free decision, it seems that he could have merited a crown through free decision, which is false and is denied in the text.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, to avoid sin is a praiseworthy work. But a praiseworthy work leads to the merit of life, since a praiseworthy work is an act of virtue. Therefore, if he could have avoided sin by himself, he could also have progressed to the merit of life, which is denied in the text.
On the contrary, no one should be charged with what he could not avoid. But man was charged with and punished for not resisting sin. Therefore, he could have avoided sin.
Furthermore, in natural things a specific form is given to the thing generated together with the power of preserving itself in specific being. But the works of God are more perfect than the works of nature. Therefore, since he gave man uprightness of will, it seems that he gave him the power to preserve himself in that uprightness. But he could only do this by avoiding sin. Therefore, it seems that he could have avoided sin through free decision.
I answer that there are two ways in which to understand that someone is not able to avoid sin. One way is such that he is impelled to sin through violence. And this is altogether repugnant to the freedom of free decision, which suffers no compulsion. The other way is because free decision is inclined to evil either through a habit or through a passion to which the free decision succumbs. In neither of these ways can it be said that the first man was unable to resist sin, since he possessed true as well as integral free decision. Hence there were no passions in him impelling him to evil. Nor was there any perverse habit corrupting his nature. For all these things followed as a consequence of sin. Thus, he not only had the ability to resist sin, he was also able to do this easily. And this aggravated his sin, as has been said above. (Above: d. 21, q. 2, a. 2, resp.; d. 22, q. 2, a. 2.)
Reply Obj. 1: God works in both the will and in nature as the first cause in secondary causes. Thus, without his assistance, a stone would neither be preserved in being nor tend downwards. Likewise, without him human nature cannot stand firm nor have right motion of the will. But it does not follow from this that it needed any gift super-added to its natural endowments, that is, what it received in its creation, in order to avoid sin.
Reply Obj. 2: Here there are two opinions. For some say that man was created in grace. They say that there are two kinds of progress. One progress regards merit, and Adam was able to have this through what he had already received. The other progress regards confirmation in beatitude, and he was not able to have this through what he had received at that point. But even on the supposition, according to the other opinion, that he did not possess sanctifying grace, it still does not follow that he was unable to avoid sin. For when it said that free decision chooses evil when grace ceases, this is not understood of an obligation of free decision considered with respect to evil without grace. Rather, it is shown that free decision by itself without grace is capable of evil, whereas without grace it is not capable of meritorious good.
Reply Obj. 3: The crown of eternal life is not due to just any victory, but rather to one that is informed by sanctifying grace. For even sinners can frequently resist some temptation, but they do not thereby merit eternal life.
Reply Obj. 4: Not every praiseworthy act is informed by virtue. For acts that either cause an acquired virtue or dispose for an infused one are also praiseworthy. Nor is even an act informed by just any virtue meritorious, but rather only that which is informed by a virtue joined to sanctifying grace and charity.
Question 2
The powers connected to free decision
Then a question is asked concerning the powers connected to free decision. And four questions are asked:
first, what is sensuality;
second, concerning the higher and lower parts of reason;
third, concerning synderesis;
fourth, concerning conscience.
Article 1
Whether the definition of sensuality set forth in the text is fitting
To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that sensuality is unfittingly defined in the text. (Sent. II, 24.4(143).1: sensuality is some lower power of the soul, from which comes a motion which is directed to the senses of the body and to the appetites for things that pertain to the body.)
Obj. 1: For sensuality differs from reason, as it says in the text. (Sent. II, 24.4(143).1.) But the lower portion of reason is a kind of power from which the appetite for things pertaining to the body proceeds. For it is intent on the administration of temporal things, as it says in the text. (Sent. II, 24.5(144).5.) Therefore, sensuality is unfittingly described through these.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, as it says in the text, (Sent. II, 24.3(142).2.) whatever we have in common with the beasts pertains to sensuality. But sensitive apprehensive powers are common to us and dumb animals. Therefore, they pertain to sensuality. But appetite and motion do not proceed from apprehensive powers. Therefore, sensuality is unfittingly described through these.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in Sophistical Refutations 2, (Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations 17, 175b25.) the account of a reality and of the one reality is the same. But sensuality is not one power of the soul. For if it combines apprehensive and appetitive powers, it is obvious that it is more than one. The same is true even if it combines appetitive powers only, since the sensible appetite, which is common to us and dumb animals, is divided into two, namely, into desire and spirit, as it says in On the Soul 3, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.9, 432b5.) or into the irascible and concupiscible, which is the same thing. Therefore, it seems unfitting for the text to say that sensuality is a certain power of the soul.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, a single power has a single act. But he attributes two acts to sensuality, that is, appetite and motion. Therefore, he unfittingly describes it as a kind of single power.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, if sensuality is a single power, it can only be a sensible appetite. But an appetite does not come from an appetite. Therefore, it seems that he unfittingly says that sensuality is that which gives rise to the appetite for things pertaining to the body.
I answer that sensuality and sensibility differ. For sensibility encompasses all the powers of the sensitive part, both those apprehending outwardly and those apprehending inwardly, and even appetitive powers. But “sensuality” more properly names only that part through which an animal is moved to desire or flee from something. But just as in intelligible things, what is apprehended only moves the will by being apprehended under the account of good or evil, for which reason the speculative intellect says nothing about imitating or fleeing, as it says in On the Soul 3, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.9, 432b29.) so also it is the case in the sensitive part that sensible apprehension only causes a motion insofar as it is apprehended as under the account of the fitting or unfitting. Thus, it says in On the Soul 2 (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.3, 427b24.) that we regard things in the imagination in the way we would consider them if they were frightening things in pictures, which do not excite the passion of fear or anything of that sort. But the power apprehending the accounts of the fitting and not fitting seems to be the estimative power, through which a lamb flees a wolf and follows its mother. This is related to the appetite of the sensible part as the practical intellect is related to the will’s appetite. Hence, properly speaking, sensuality begins from the meeting point of the estimative and pursuing appetitive power in such a manner that sensuality is related to the sensitive part as will and free decision are related to the intellective part.
Now, this fitting object or the account of its fittingness that moves the sensuality is either apprehended by the senses, as what is delightful with respect to the individual sense, which animals pursue, or else it is not apprehended by the senses, as the sheep perceives the enmity of the wolf, not by seeing or hearing it, but only by esteeming it. Thus, the motion of sensuality has two tendencies. It tends to what is delightful with respect to the external senses. And this is what is indicated by saying that there is a motion from sensuality that is intended in the body’s senses. Or, it also tends to what is known to be harmful or agreeable to the body by estimation alone. And in this way, there is said to be an appetite, arising from sensuality, for things pertaining to the body.
Reply Obj. 1: There is also motion and appetite for things pertaining to the body from the lower reason, not as from a proximate principle, but as from a remote one, inasmuch as sensible powers move by way of command and are in some way obedient to reason, as it says in the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.13, 1102b30.)
Or we may say that such reason causes motion not by bringing together intentions (On the scope of intentio, see the previous volume, d. 3, q. 1, a. 4, c., and d. 13, q. 1, a. 3, c. “Intention” in this context seems to mean concepts or targets of thought.) that are particular and concrete in matter, as sensuality does, but rather universal intentions separated from the circumstances of matter.
Reply Obj. 2: Something can pertain to sensuality in two ways: either as being from its essence, and in this way, it seems to contain only the appetitive part; or as a preamble to it, such as how reason pertains to free decision, as has been said. (Above: q. 1, a. 3.) In this way, the sensitive powers of apprehension also pertain to sensuality, though in a certain order. For the estimative power is properly related to it as practical reason is to free decision, which also moves it, whereas simple imagination and the preceding powers are related more remotely as speculative reason is to the will.
Reply Obj. 3: “Sensuality” names not one power simply, but rather one generically, namely, the sensitive appetite, which is divided into the irascible and the concupiscible. Nonetheless, it should be known that sensuality and the irascible and concupiscible parts differ in account. For since, as Dionysius says, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 7 (PG 3:871).) lower nature at its height comes into contact with the lowest point of higher nature, sensitive nature is in a certain way joined to reason at one point. This is why a certain sensitive part, namely, the cogitative power, is called by the other name of “reason,” on account of its bordering on reason. And so I say that the irascible and concupiscible name the sensitive appetite as complete, distinguished by different objects, and having a tendency against reason. Hence, too, in man the irascible and concupiscible obey reason. However, “sensuality” names the sensitive appetite as incomplete, indeterminate, and more suppressed. Thus, it is said that there cannot be virtue in it and that it has the character of perpetual corruption. And from its very indeterminateness, it possesses a certain unity, such that it is spoken of as a kind of power.
Reply Obj. 4: If by “motion” external progressive motion is understood, then motion and appetite are not unfittingly attributed to sensuality, even if it is a single power, since they are acts not equally primary, but rather having an order vis-à-vis one another. For lower appetite causes external motion, and in this way, one proceeds from sensuality by the mediation of the other. But if by “motion” the internal motion of the appetite is understood, then these two acts are distinguished on the basis of different objects, though they do not differentiate the power generically. And how this can be was said previously.
Reply Obj. 5: Appetite is both the name of a power and the name of an act. Hence it is not unfitting for the appetite of the act to proceed from the appetite of the power.
Article 2
Whether higher and lower reason are a single power
To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.79.9; On Truth, q. 15, a. 2.) It seems that higher and lower reason are not a single power but instead different powers.
Obj. 1: For in the parts of the soul, “higher” and “lower” in the soul are not taken with reference to location, but with reference to dignity. But among the parts of the intellective soul we find that one part has greater dignity than another. For the agent intellect is more noble than the potential, as it says in On the Soul 3, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.5, 430a19; 3.7, 432a1.) and these are different powers, as was said above. Therefore, it seems that what is higher in reason and what is lower are different powers.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, “eternal” and “necessary” seem to be the same, as do “contingent” and “temporal.” But the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.1, 1139a5–15.) that the scientific part of the soul concerns necessary things, whereas the reasoning part concerns contingent things worked by us. Therefore, it seems that the scientific is the same as the higher reason, which perceives eternal things, and the reasoning is the same as the lower reason, which adheres to temporal things, as it says in the text. (Sent. II, 24.4(144).5.) But the reasoning and the scientific, as it says in the same place, are different powers. Therefore, it seems that higher and lower reason are also different powers.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the image of deity is in the higher part of the soul, as was said in Book I. (In I Sent., d. 3, q. 3, a. 1.) But the higher part of the soul is the higher part of reason. Therefore, the image is in the higher reason. But the image combines three powers: memory, intelligence, and will. Therefore, higher and lower reason indicate not one particular power, but several.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, ruling and ruled, commanding and commanded, cannot be the same thing, as neither can agent and patient. But higher reason is related to lower as ruling to ruled. Therefore, they cannot be a single power.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, powers are distinguished on the basis of acts. But the office names the act, as Cicero says. (See Cicero, On Duties (De officiis), bk. 1, sect. 8: officium est quod cur factum sit, probabilis ratio reddi potest, “the office is that for which a probable reason can be given as to why it has been done”; see also On the Ends of Good and Evil, bk. 5: quod ratione actum sit, id officium appellamus.) Therefore, it seems that since higher and lower reason are distinguished as two on the basis of different offices, they are different powers.
On the contrary, a difference among powers constitutes a difference in the thing. But in the text (Sent. II, 24.5(144).1.) it says that when we speak of higher and lower reason we are talking about a single thing. Therefore, it seems that they are not different powers.
Furthermore, a power is not differentiated through different habits. But reason is called “higher” as perfected by the gift of wisdom, and “lower” as perfected by the gift of knowledge, as it says in the text. (Sent. II, 24.5(144).5.) Therefore, it seems that higher and lower reason are not different powers.
I answer that “reason” here is taken as meaning what is related to will and free decision as sensitive apprehension is related to sensuality. For, as has been said, (Above: a. 1.) no appetite is moved to its object unless there is an apprehension of something under the aspect of good or evil, agreeable or harmful. Now, the aspect of agreeable and good is perceived by a man in one way and by a brute in another. For a brute knows that something is agreeable or harmful to itself, not by giving it consideration, but by a kind of natural instinct. However, man considers such aspects through an investigation and due consideration. Thus, the power through which he arrives at knowledge of such aspects is consequently called “reason,” which investigates and deduces from one thing to another.
But because the entire account of powers is drawn from the objects by whose species they are informed, reason must have in its constitution a kind of gradation in accord with the order of the objects to which it is directed. But in the matters that reason considers, we find distinction and order of such a kind that some things are proposed to them as eternal and necessary, distinct from temporal things. Hence reason also consequently has a kind of gradation due to its being directed toward these objects or the others. But because in the order of things what is higher directs and causes what is lower, so it is that they are directed in what is temporal through what is eternal, just as what exists uniformly is the measure of what is multiform, as can be gathered from the Metaphysics 10. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.1, 1052b15–1053b8.)
On this account it is clear that reason can adhere to eternal things in two ways: either by considering them in themselves, or by considering them as the rule of temporal matters to be arranged and carried out by us. The first consideration does not go beyond the limits of speculative reason, while the second pertains to the genus of practical reason. Hence it is clear that higher reason is partly speculative and partly practical. Thus, the text says (Sent. II, 24.5(144).5.) that higher reason gives attention to contemplating what is heavenly inasmuch as it is speculative, and to taking counsel from the heavenly inasmuch as it is practical.
Hence from this it is clear that higher reason, as distinguished from lower reason, does not differ from it as speculative from practical, as if regarding distinct objects about which to reason. Rather, they are distinguished on the basis of the means from which reasoning is drawn. For lower reason in its efforts toward choice takes counsel from the principles of temporal things, such as whether something is excessive or deficient, useful or upright, and so forth with respect to other conditions treated by the moral Philosopher. However, higher reason takes counsel from eternal and divine principles, such as the fact that something is contrary to God’s precept, or is offensive to him, or some such thing.
Now, a difference in the means by which the same genus of conclusion is reached cannot yield a different power, though sometimes it yields a different habit. Thus, higher and lower reason are not distinguished as different powers, but rather on the basis of habit, either one already actually possessed or one to which it is naturally ordered. For higher reason is perfected by wisdom, and lower reason by knowledge.
Reply Obj. 1: Higher and lower reason do not differ as agent and potential intellect, as is clear in the following way. For as it says in the text, (Sent. II, 24.5(144).5.) higher and lower reason have their acts with respect to different things. But agent and potential intellect always concur in the same object or means. For it is impossible for us to proceed to intellective activity without the activity of the potential and agent intellect. The species of the phantasms, which are the objects of our intellect, must be rendered actually intelligible, which pertains to the agent intellect. And they must be joined to the intellect as received in it, which pertains to the potential intellect. Hence from the difference between potential and agent, there does not follow a difference between higher and lower reason. Rather, the difference is due to the difference of means or object.
Reply Obj. 2: The scientific and the reasoning parts are not altogether distinguished as higher and lower reason. For the scientific in no way pertains to praxis, as higher reason does, as has been said—that is, inasmuch as it takes counsel from what is eternal. Besides this, the scientific extends to some things that higher reason as understood here does not, namely, to necessary created things. For the Philosopher teaches (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.6–7, 1140b31–1141a20.) that the scientific part of the soul is perfected not only by wisdom, which properly regards divine matters, but also by knowledge and understanding, which regard created things. Now, knowledge of temporal things—whether as regards things to be carried out by us or as regards things considered in these necessary demonstrations—pertains to lower reason, which is perfected by knowledge. Augustine extends it both to the speculative and to the practical consideration of temporal things. Hence the distinction of higher and lower reason is not the same as the distinction between the scientific and reasoning, even though the scientific, in a qualified sense of the term, agrees with higher reason and lower reason with reasoning.
Reply Obj. 3: Higher reason is not altogether identical with that part of the mind in which the image consists, but instead includes it and goes beyond it, as is clear in the following way. The image is most especially distinguished by the fact that the mind tends to God as its object, as was said in Book I. (In I Sent., d. 3, q. 4, a. 4.) Hence the powers of the image, precisely as they pertain to the image, regard eternal things only as an object, whereas higher reason considers them in two ways, namely, as an object, inasmuch as it contemplates them, and as a means, inasmuch as it takes counsel from them. Nevertheless, even if the image essentially combines more than one power, it is not necessary for higher reason to consist in more than one power. For the image encompasses both the cognitive and the affective, but reason encompasses the image with respect to the cognitive alone and goes beyond this, as has been said. (Above: d. 16, q. 1, a. 4.) Thus, higher reason and the mind, in which the image is, are related as exceeding and exceeded. For higher reason is speculative and practical, but the mind, only insofar as the image is in it, pertains to the speculative, since the object of the image is not something that can be the object of our operation. In this way, higher reason exceeds the mind. It is exceeded by the mind inasmuch as the mind encompasses affection and cognition, since reason implies cognition alone.
Reply Obj. 4: The difference between regulating and regulated does not demonstrate a difference of power, but rather a difference of habit. For one habit regulates another, as is clear in the speculative sciences, since wisdom, that is, metaphysics, directs all the sciences. So, too, higher reason is said to direct lower reason.
Reply Obj. 5: Not every difference in acts shows a difference of powers, but sometimes it also shows a mere difference of habits, as in the case of doing geometry and syllogizing. But sometimes it shows neither.
These points are clear in the following way. For it is according to the substance of each power insofar as it is naturally apt to act as regards its proper object, as the Philosopher says of the senses in On the Soul 2. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.4, 415a15–20.) Therefore, actions that differ according to different objects show a difference of powers. But the difference of objects should be taken with respect to what pertains to the proper account of the object. For man and stone differ in genus but agree insofar as they are the object of sight with respect to color. Thus, seeing a man and seeing a stone pertain to a single power, but to sense sound and to sense colors pertain to different powers. For sound and color, in accord with the proper accounts by which they are distinguished from one another, are proper objects of the senses.
But sometimes difference of acts arises from a difference of means or of the principle from which the same genus of object is arrived at. And such difference between acts shows a difference of habits. For different sciences proceed on the basis of different principles, even if they demonstrate the same conclusions, as the astronomer and the natural philosopher show that the earth is round by different means, as it says in the Physics 2. (Aristotle, Physics 2.2, 193b30–35.) Likewise, too, the moral virtues are distinguished by different ends, which are in practical matters like what principles are in speculative ones.
Sometimes the difference of the acts is caused by something incidental to the action. This can be on the part of the agent, insofar as it is stronger or weaker in acting, such as dullness or subtlety of intelligence, which differ in accord with speed or slowness in learning. Or it can be on the part of the means, such as believing or having an opinion, which differ in accord with efficacy and weakness of means. Or it can be on the part of the object, such as seeing a man and seeing a stone, for it is incidental to an object as colored whether it is a man or a stone. Such a difference of actions requires neither difference of power or difference of habit. For what is incidental does not cause a specific difference.
But the functions of higher and lower reason differ not as regards a difference in the account of the object, since both consider practical matters, but as regards a difference in the account of the means. For lower reason proceeds from temporal accounts, whereas higher reason proceeds from eternal accounts. Thus, it is not necessary for even these different functions to evidence different powers, but rather different habits, as has been said. (Resp.)
Article 3
Whether synderesis is a habit or a power
To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.79.12; On Truth, q. 16, a. 1.) It seems that synderesis (As Aquinas explains in ST I.79.12, synderesis is the specific habit whereby we are naturally endowed with the first principles in regard to actions. The word “synderesis” is derived from the Greek word syneidesis (Gk. συνείδησις), which etymologically means “knowing together” or “shared knowledge” (syn + eide) and is the basis for the Latin cognate conscientia (con + scientia), itself the source of the English word “conscience.” Although the word is not used in the Gospels, syneidesis frequently occurs in the letters of St. Paul. Historically speaking, it is thought that the word synderesis, rather than syneidesis, came into use due to a textual corruption in the works of St. Jerome.) is a power, not a habit.
Obj. 1: For things that fall in the same classification seem to have a single account. But synderesis is classified alongside other powers of the soul, namely, alongside the rational, concupiscible, and irascible, as is clear from Jerome’s gloss on Ezekiel 1. (Jerome, Commentary on Ezekiel, ch. 1 (CCSL 75; PL 25:22).) Therefore, it seems that it is a power.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, on the passage: keep your spirit (Mal 2:16), (RSV reads so take heed to yourselves and do not be faithless.) Jerome says that spirit refers, not to the animal part, which does not perceive the things of God, but to the rational part. (Jerome, Commentaria in Malachiam, ch. 2 (CCSL 75; PL 25:1562).) This is what he calls synderesis. But the rational part names a power. Therefore, it seems that it is a power.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, a habit is ascribed only to a power. But Augustine says (See Augustine, De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo parvulorum, ch. 25, para. 36 (CSEL 60:35; PL 44:129).) that the universal precepts of the law are written in a natural faculty of judgment, which is synderesis. Therefore, since there is a given habit of the universal matters of the law, it seems that synderesis, to which it is ascribed, is a certain power.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, from an identity of acts we can gather that there is an identity of powers. But, as is clear from the authority adduced, judgment pertains to synderesis. Therefore, since free decision is named after judging, it seems that synderesis is the same as free decision. But free decision is a power. Therefore, so is synderesis.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, a habit is lost through being forgotten or in another way. But synderesis always remains, since even after death it murmurs against sin, and this murmur is called its “worm.” Therefore, synderesis names a power, not a habit.
On the contrary, a rational power relates to opposites. But synderesis is related to a single thing in a determinate manner that never errs. Therefore, it seems that it is not a power but a habit.
Furthermore, opposites are traced back to the same genus. But the fomes (Fomes is an expression that originally signified the straw used for kindling or anything that is good to start a fire because it catches flame easily; the word became idiomatic for something that inclines one toward sin. See also Aquinas’s explanation of the term below, at d. 30, in the exposition of the text.) is opposed to synderesis. For just as the fomes always incites one to evil, so also synderesis always tends to the good. Therefore, since the fomes is a certain habit, as it says in the text, (Although the words fomes and habitus are not used by Peter Lombard in this distinction or even later when concupiscence is discussed, the essence of this claim is made in Sent. II, 30.8(198)‒9(199).2.) it seems that “synderesis” also names a habit.
I answer that, just as is the case in the motion of natural things—namely, that every motion proceeds from an unmovable mover, as Augustine says (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 8, ch. 26 (CSEL 28.1:265; PL 34:391).) and the Philosopher proves, (Aristotle, Physics 7.1, 242a20; 8.6, 258b10.) and all things that exist in unlike manner proceed from a single thing existing in the same manner—so also must it be the case in the progression of reason. For since reason holds a kind of variety and is in a certain way movable, insofar as it deduces conclusions from principles and can be deceived in its gathering them together, all reason must proceed from some knowledge having a certain uniformity and rest. This does not happen through the discursive process of investigation but is offered to the intellect all at once. For just as in speculative matters reason begins from certain principles known through themselves, the habit of which is called “understanding,” so also practical reason must begin from certain principles that are known through themselves, such as that evil should not be done, that the precepts of God should be obeyed, and so forth. The habit of these is synderesis.
Hence I say that synderesis is distinct from practical reason not by way of the substance of the power, but rather by way of the habit. This habit is in a certain way innate to our mind from the very light of the agent intellect, like the habit of speculative principles, such as that every whole is greater than its part, and things of this sort, (Aquinas never offers a complete list of such principles, though examples he gives elsewhere include: “man is rational”; “things equal to one and the same thing are equal to one another” (see ST I-II, q. 94, a. 2, for both); and of course the principle of non-contradiction and the law of the excluded middle (see Commentary on the Metaphysics, lect. 6–17, and Commentary on Aristotle’s On Interpretation, lect. 11, n. 5).) granted that for the determination of our knowledge of these we need the senses and memory, as it says in the Posterior Analytics 2. (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 2.19, 99b20–100a9.) Thus, as soon as the terms are known, these principles are known, as it says in the Posterior Analytics 1. (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.1, 71a11.) And thus, I say that synderesis names either the habit alone, or else the power, at least as it is subject to the habit thus innate in us.
Reply Obj. 1: Synderesis is distinguished from other powers, not as different by reason of the substance of the power, but by a certain habit, just as if the understanding of principles were distinguished from speculative reason.
Reply Obj. 2: The rational part is not called “synderesis” simply, but rather as taken together with a habit of this kind.
Reply Obj. 3: The universal principles of the law are not ascribed to synderesis as a habit is ascribed to a power, but rather as what is gathered in the habit is ascribed to the habit itself, as geometrical principles are ascribed to geometry.
Reply Obj. 4: Judgment does not pertain to free decision and synderesis in the same way. To synderesis pertains universal judgment, in accord with the universal principles of law. For judgment about the conclusions is always made through the principles. Hence, too, the art of judging is called “resolving knowledge.” But to free decision pertains the particular judgment about this given practical matter, which is the judgment of choice. Hence synderesis is not the same as free decision.
Reply Obj. 5: A natural habit is never lost, as is clear in the habit of speculative principles, which man always retains. And the case is likewise with synderesis.
Article 4
Whether conscience is an act
To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.79.13; On Truth, q. 17, a. 1.) It seems that conscience is not an act.
Obj. 1: For Origen says (Origen, Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, ch. 2 (PG 14:893).) that conscience is the corrector of the spirit and pedagogue of the soul, given to the soul that it may be separated from evils and cling to goods. But “spirit” names either a power or even the very essence of the soul. Therefore, it seems that conscience is not an act.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, conscience, as described by some, is a dictate of reason by which it judges and binds one to do or not do something. But a judgment about doing or not doing this given thing, as has been said, (Above: q. 1.) pertains to free decision. Therefore, conscience is free decision. But free decision is not an act. Therefore, neither is conscience.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, in a gloss on Ezekiel 1, after speaking about synderesis, Jerome says: but sometimes we observe that this conscience is troubled. (Jerome, Commentary on Ezekiel, ch. 1 (CCSL 75; PL 25:22).) Therefore, it seems that conscience is the same as synderesis. But synderesis names not an act, but a power or habit. Therefore, it seems that neither does conscience name an act.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, conscience is a kind of science. But science names a habit. Therefore, so too does conscience.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, Damascene says (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 4, ch. 22 (PG 94:1199).) that conscience is a law of our intellect. But the law of the intellect is the natural law itself, which is the habit of the principles of law. Therefore, it seems that conscience is a habit, not an act.
Obj. 6: Furthermore, every act either generates a habit or at least is governed by some habit. Therefore, if conscience is a certain act, a habit, which is called “conscience,” would have to be generated from these repeated acts, or at least such acts would have to proceed from some habit, which amounts to the same thing.
On the contrary, conscience is said to aggravate sin. But sin can only be aggravated by the fact that something contradicts the actual consideration of reason. Therefore, it seems that conscience names the actual consideration of reason.
Furthermore, as has been said, (Above: d. 7, q. 1, a. 2, resp.; Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 23 (PG 3:726).) some call conscience the “dictate of reason.” But “dictate” names a certain act insofar as reason judges about something to be done. Therefore, it seems that conscience names an act.
I answer that “conscience” can be taken in many ways. Sometimes the very thing under conscientious consideration is called “conscience.” This is how it is taken in charity issues from a good conscience (1 Tim 1:5); (RSV reads love that issues from a pure heart and a good conscience.) a Gloss adds: that is, hope, since the motion of hope arises from the merits held by conscience. (The general sense, but not these exact words, is found in Glossa ordinaria, at 1 Timothy 1:5, 6.684 (PL 114:624–25).) But sometimes “conscience” refers to the habit by which one is disposed to give conscientious consideration. In this respect the natural law itself and the habit of reason are customarily called “conscience.” Some even say that “conscience” sometimes names a power, but this seems too far-fetched and improperly stated, as is clear by diligent examination of all the soul’s powers.
But it is in none of these ways that “conscience” is taken as it has come into the usage of common speech as binding or aggravating sin. For no one is bound to do something except by virtue of the fact that he considers it as what needs to be done. Hence common speech seems to understand by “conscience” the actual consideration of reason.
But it remains to be seen what this actual consideration of reason is. Therefore, it should be known, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 6, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.3, 1147a1–9.) that reason uses certain syllogisms regarding things to be chosen and fled from. Now, in a syllogism there are three considerations in accord with the three propositions, the third being the conclusion of the other two. The same thing happens in the case in question, where reason in practical matters bases its judgment concerning particulars on universal principles. Because the universal principles of law pertain to synderesis, the accounts that are instead appropriated to the work pertain to habits, in which higher and lower reason are distinguished. Synderesis provides the major premise in this syllogism, its consideration being the act of synderesis. Higher or lower reason, in turn, provides the minor premise, its consideration being its act. Finally, consideration of the conclusion elicited is the consideration of conscience.
For example, synderesis proposes this: every evil is to be avoided. Higher reason adds: adultery is evil, since it is forbidden by God’s law. Lower reason would add to this, either that it is evil because it is unjust or because it is ignoble. But the conclusion, which is that this given act of adultery is to be avoided, pertains to conscience, in a manner indifferent as to whether the act pertains to the present, the past, or the future. For conscience murmurs about past deeds and speaks against those yet to be done. And so it is called “conscience,” as though to say, “science with another,” since universal knowledge or science is here applied to a particular act. Or it may also be because through conscience one is “conscious” of the things he has done or intends to do. For this reason it is also called the sentence or dictate of reason. For this reason it also happens that conscience can err, not due to an error of synderesis, but rather due to an error of reason. This is clear in the case of a heretic whose conscience dictates that he should rather allow himself to be burned than to swear an oath, since his higher reason is perverse in this, that he believes that an oath is forbidden simply.
And in this way, it is clear how synderesis, the natural law, and conscience differ. For “natural law” names the universal principles of law themselves, “synderesis” names the habit of these or the power with the habit, and “conscience” names an application of the natural law to something to be done after the manner of a kind of conclusion.
Reply Obj. 1: “Spirit” is sometimes taken to mean a certain spiritual activity or a spiritual gift. And this is the way in which spirit is taken here, not as meaning the nature of the soul.
Reply Obj. 2: Judgment pertains to free decision, conscience, and synderesis, though in different ways. It pertains to free decision as by participation, since it does not belong to the will through itself to judge. Hence the judgment of choosing belongs to free decision. But judgment through itself, when it is in general pertains to synderesis, and when it is in particular, though remaining within the limits of knowledge, pertains to conscience. Hence both conscience and choice are a kind of conclusion about a particular to be done. But conscience is a conclusion of knowledge alone, while choice is a conclusion of affect, since conclusions in practical matters are of this sort, as it says in the Ethics 6. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.8, 1142a23–30.)
Reply Obj. 3: The whole strength of a conclusion is drawn from first principles. And so it is that conscience and synderesis are frequently taken as meaning the same thing and judgment is attributed to both, especially universal judgment, which is not this kind of judgment that is corrupted through the delight of sin, but rather judgment of particulars. Thus, he did not say that synderesis is troubled, but conscience.
Reply Obj. 4: Conscience can name both an act and a habit. For there is knowing habitually and knowing actually. Hence, too, conscience can be taken in different ways, as has been said. (Resp.)
Reply Obj. 5: Conscience, taken as meaning the habit, can be called the “natural law,” since it is especially from this habit that the act of conscience is elicited.
Reply Obj. 6: The habit from which the act of conscience originates is not a separate habit from the habit of reason and synderesis. For there is not one habit of the principles and another of the conclusions drawn from them, especially of those that concern singulars, which do not have an associated habit of science, except as included in the universal principles.
Exposition of the first part of the text
But not to achieve the good. (Sent. II, 24.1(140).2. The first part of this text from Peter Lombard should here be supplied: poterat quidem per illud auxilium gratiae creationis resistere malo, sed non perficere bonum; “he was certainly able, through that help of the grace of creation, to resist evil, but not to achieve the good.”) This should be understood as referring to meritorious good.
Because there was nothing in him which might impel him to evil. (Sent. II, 24.1(140).7.) This reason seems to be insufficient. For in Christ, too, there was nothing impelling him to evil, yet he merited by resisting evil.
And it should be said, according to some, that this is not understood of just any merit, but rather of the merit of satisfaction, for which punishment is a requisite. But this does not seem to pertain to the case in question, since Adam was not in need of the merit of satisfaction. Thus, we may say otherwise that the account of merit can arise from two things: either from an informing habit, and in this way, every act, whether easy or difficult, that is informed by grace is meritorious; or else from the condition of the act, which is especially the difficulty, and this aspect of doing something meritorious is one that he did not possess in resisting sin.
Division of the second part of the text
It is also not to be passed over that the order and progression of temptation is the same now in a single human person as it was then in our first parents. (Sent. II, 24.6(145).1.) Having shown differences among the parts of the soul, here he shows how there can be sin in them. This is divided into three parts.
In the first, he shows how there can be mortal and venial sin in each part of the soul.
In the second, he assigns the reason for the sort of digression he had made, at we have inserted these things about the parts of the soul so that the nature of the soul itself may be known more fully. (Sent. II, 24.12(151).6.)
In the third, he removes a certain doubt that could arise by distinguishing the term “sensuality,” at but it is not to be passed over in silence that in Scripture by the term sensuality is often understood . . . also the lower portion of reason. (Sent. II, 24.13(152).1.)
The first is divided into two parts.
In the first, he fits the progression of sin in the powers of the soul to the sin of our first parents by way of a certain likeness with regard to the man, the woman, and the serpent.
In the second, he shows how there can be sin in each individual one of them, at now it remains to show how sin is consummated in us through these three. (Sent. II, 24.9(148).1.)
Concerning this he does three things.
First, he shows how mortal or venial sin occurs in the parts of the soul.
Second, he puts together what he had said in summary fashion, at and so to present a brief summary of the above. (Sent. II, 24.12(151).2.)
Third, he cites authorities to confirm it, at Augustine teaches these things, in On the Trinity, book 12, in the following terms. (Sent. II, 24.12(151).4.)
Question 3
How there can be sin in the parts of the soul
Here six questions are asked:
first, what is the motion of sensuality and of lower and higher reason;
second, whether the motion of sensuality can be a sin;
third, whether there can be sin in reason;
fourth, whether the delight of lower reason can in some way be a mortal sin if it lasts for a long time;
fifth, whether there can be venial sin in higher reason;
sixth, whether a venial sin can be a mortal sin by being multiplied or in some other way.
Article 1
Whether the motion of sensuality and of higher and lower reason are fittingly and sufficiently assigned in the text
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that in the text (Sent. II, 24.3(142)‒5(144).) the motion of sensuality and of lower and higher reason are insufficiently and unfittingly distinguished.
Obj. 1: For every power is naturally moved to its object. But the generative and nutritive power is a natural power. Therefore, it has a natural motion to the act of generation and nourishment. Thus, we must posit a natural motion besides the motion of sensuality and reason.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, motion is specified by reference to the term, and act by reference to the object. But some acts of sin are acts of the generative power, and the object of some acts of sin is the object of the generative and nutritive power. Therefore, the motion to this object pertains to the generative power, not to sensuality and reason. Thus, the motions of the soul are insufficiently distinguished.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, different powers have different associated delights, just as they have different activities. For delight follows on activity, as it says in the Ethics 10. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.4, 1174b23.) But sensuality and lower reason are different powers. Therefore, they do not possess delight with reference to the same thing. Thus, lower reason is unfittingly held to delight in the same thing as sensuality does.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, as was said above, (Above: q. 2, a. 2.) higher and lower reason are not essentially different powers. Rather, they are engaged with respect to the same object by way of different means. Therefore, if delight concerning sensible things is attributed to lower reason due to the fact that it is engaged with sensible things through civic principles and those drawn from created things, it seems that some delight concerning sensible things can be ascribed to higher reason as well, because it attends to the divine principles, in order to take counsel from it, as has been said. (Above: q. 2, a. 2, resp.)
Obj. 5: Furthermore, consent pertains to one to whom judgment belongs. But both judging and ruling are in the purview of the same person. Therefore, since higher reason is the rule of lower reason, it seems that consent to delight pertains not to lower reason, but to higher reason.
Obj. 6: Furthermore, there are not different acts of the same power. But lower reason is a single power. Therefore, it seems that two motions, namely, to delight and to consent to the delight, are unfittingly assigned to it.
On the contrary, there is the determination given in the text. (Sent. II, 24.4(143)‒5(144).)
I answer that motion, as the Philosopher says, is the way to being. Hence, in the parts of the soul, motion is properly said to be an inclination to something. Thus, motion is not properly attributed to the powers that do not have inclination. Now, inclination is in an appetite that moves to the doing of something. Thus, the acts of the appetitive powers are called “motions,” whereas the acts of the apprehensive powers are not properly called “motions.”
However, there are three appetites in us: natural, sensitive, and rational. A natural appetite, such as that for food, is one engendered not by the imagination, but by the very disposition of natural qualities by which natural powers carry out their actions. But this motion is not subject or obedient to reason in anything. Hence neither can there be sin in it, and so here it is not discussed. However, the sensitive appetite is that which follows from prior imagination or sensation. And this is called the “motion of sensuality.” Finally, the rational appetite is that which follows on the apprehension of reason. And this is called the “motion of reason,” which is the act belonging to the will.
But reason can have apprehension in two ways. One is simple and absolute, namely, when it forms a judgment of what is apprehended at once without reviewing it. The will that follows this kind of apprehension is called “indeliberate.” The other is inquisitive, namely, when it investigates whether something is good or evil, agreeable or harmful, by reasoning. And the will that follows this sort of apprehension is deliberate.
Thus, lower reason, which attends to the disposition of earthly matters, can elicit the motion of the will as concerns earthly things in both ways, either when it apprehends at once that this given thing is agreeable or harmful to the body, and then the motion of the lower reason, called “delight,” follows because it then accepts what is delightful to the body as something to be done, or else when it deliberates by inquiry, and then the appetite cannot follow before the deliberation is complete, in which case it is said to consent to the delight. But as for higher reason, since it does not attend to earthly realities through itself, but only as regulated by eternal principles, has only a deliberate motion following on it with respect to these earthly things. Thus, with regard to them delight is not attributed to it, but only final consent, which is consent in the carrying out of the work.
Reply Obj. 1: As was said, natural motion is not mentioned because there cannot be sin in it.
Reply Obj. 2: Since the higher powers in a way order the lower ones with reference to the act of the generative and nutritive part, its act can also belong to other powers, whether the senses or reason. For example, the maturation of the semen, the furnishing of the offspring with organs, and other such things pertain to generation in an absolute sense, and because the generative part is in no way obedient to reason, there can in no way be sin in these acts. But the appetite for delight, the delight itself that occurs in sexual intercourse, and other such things pertaining to the sensitive and motive power, can be ordered or avoided by reason. Hence there can be sin in these, though they pertain neither to the generative nor the nutritive power.
Reply Obj. 3: Just as the same thing can be apprehended through the senses and by reason, so also the same thing can be desired through both. Thus, even though both do not have the same activity, they can both have an activity concerning the same thing, and, consequently, there can also be the delight that follows on the activity. Hence it is not unfitting if the senses and reason delight in the same thing, though not in the same manner. Instead, the senses delight in it under the aspect of sensibly delightful, whereas lower reason delights in it as taken under the aspect of good or agreeable for the governance of the body.
Reply Obj. 4: As has been said, (Resp.) higher reason has a motion concerning temporal affairs only by a deduction to them from the eternal accounts in the mode of counsel. Thus, it only relates to them as deliberating about them. And so, delight in these things, which names a kind of indeliberate pleasure, is not attributed to it, but only consent, which follows on deliberation.
Reply Obj. 5: Higher reason regulates lower reason, while lower reason regulates sensuality and can also in a way direct itself. But whenever there is more than one principle being ordered, the ordering to what is final is attributed to the first and highest, as is clear in the subordinate arts. For the civic art considers the ultimate end of human life, whereas the military art considers victory, which is short of the final end, and so forth. On this basis I say that the judgment regarding what is final is reserved to higher reason, which is the carrying out of the work. Thus, consent to the work is attributed to it. However, to lower reason is attributed the judgment regarding things ordered to the work. Thus, consent to delight is attributed to it. But there is no doubt that higher reason can also judge about what lower reason judges. Hence consent to delight can also belong to higher reason, if there is inquiry on the basis of eternal principles.
Reply Obj. 6: Delight and consent to delight are not generically different acts requiring a difference of powers. Rather, they differ as deliberate and indeliberate, as has been said. (Resp.) Hence it is not unfitting for both to be attributed to lower reason.
Article 2
Whether there is sin in sensuality
To the second we proceed thus. (Parallel texts: ST I-II.74.3; On Truth, q. 25, a. 5; On Evil, q. 7, a. 6; Quodl. IV, q. 11, a. 1.) It seems that there cannot be sin in sensuality.
Obj. 1: For sensuality is common to us and beasts, as was said above. (Above: d. 24, q. 2, a. 1, obj. 2.) But there is no sin in beasts in the sense we are speaking of. Therefore, neither does sin belong to us on the basis of sensuality.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, every sin is in the will, according to Augustine. (Augustine, Retractions, bk. 1, ch. 15 (CSEL 36; PL 32:607); De duabus animabus, ch. 10 (CSEL 25:63; PL 42:103).) But sensuality is separate from the will, since the will is within the reason, according to the Philosopher. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.10, 433a8–b5.) Therefore, there is no sin in sensuality.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, virtue and vice, since they are contraries, exist in the same thing. But sensuality, since it belongs to perpetual corruption in accord with the state of the present life, cannot be the subject of virtue. Therefore, neither can sin exist in it.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, nothing is imputed to someone as a fault that is not in his power. But the motion of sensuality is not in our power, since it precedes the deliberation of reason. Therefore, it cannot be a sin.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, a proper and natural act cannot be a sin. But to be moved to what is delightful according to the flesh is the proper and natural act of sensuality, since it is the motion of a power to its proper object. Therefore, there can be no sin in this.
Obj. 6: Furthermore, sin remains in the soul even after death. But sensuality does not remain. For the intellect alone is separated, as the Philosopher says in On the Soul 2 and the Metaphysics 12. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.2, 413b25–29; Metaphysics 12.3, 1070a25–28.) Therefore, there is no sin in sensuality.
On the contrary, Augustine says that there is no little vice when the flesh lusts against the spirit. (See perhaps Augustine, Contra Julianum (opus imperfectum), bk. 2, para. 17 (CSEL 85.1:174; PL 45:1148).) But this only occurs with reference to inordinate motions of sensuality. Therefore, there is vice and sin in sensuality.
Furthermore, this is also expressly established by what it says in the text, (Sent. II, 24.9(148).3.) that if in sensual motion there is only an enticement to sin, this is a venial and very light sin. Therefore, it seems that there can be at least venial sin in sensuality.
I answer that all the first motions ascribed to sensuality, as the words of Augustine assert, are a sin. But the preceding motions, which we have called “natural” above, which do not follow the imagination, but only the action of natural qualities, lack the account of sin, insofar as we can take as true the statement of those who say that, at first, the first motions are not a sin, but that the next first motions are a sin. In this case by “at first, the first motions” we understand natural motions, and by “the next first motions” we understand motions of sensuality, in which sin can exist as in a subject. This is clear in the following way.
For sin, as far as the present consideration is concerned, is nothing other than an inordinate act pertaining to the genus of the moral. But no motion is included in the genus of the moral unless it has a relation to the will, which is the principle of moral actions, as is clear from the Metaphysics 6. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 6.1, 1025b24.) Thus, the genus of the moral begins in the place where we first find the will’s dominion. Now, the will has complete dominion in certain things and incomplete dominion in others. It has complete dominion in those acts which proceed from the will’s command, and these are the acts that follow deliberation and are ascribed to reason. But it has incomplete dominion in those acts which do not proceed by the command of reason, though the will could have impeded them, so that in this way, they are subject to the will in a certain way, as regards the acts’ being impeded or not being impeded. And so, the disorder that occurs in these acts causes the account of sin, though of incomplete sin. Thus, in these acts the sin is most light and venial, not mortal sin, which is a perfect sin. However, the deformity of any act is attributed to the power that is the principle of the act as to a subject. And thus, since sensuality is the principle of these acts, sin is fittingly said to be in it as in a subject.
Reply Obj. 1: Even though sensuality is common to us and beasts, something befits sensuality in us that does not befit it in brute animals, namely, to be in a manner subject to reason, for which reason there can be sin in human sensuality, but not in the sensuality of brute animals.
Reply Obj. 2: Every sin is in the will, not as in its subject, but as in its cause. But the will can be the cause of a sin in two ways: either through itself, as when the act of sin proceeds from the will’s command, or as it were incidentally, when the will does not impede what it can impede. In this latter way, someone is said to do that which he does not impede when he can impede it. This is the way in which the will is the cause of first motions.
Reply Obj. 3: Choice is principal in virtue, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.5, 1113b2–15.) Hence every act of virtue must proceed from choice, for which reason even a habit of virtue is said to be elective in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.6, 1106b35.) Thus, virtue can only exist in those acts that proceed from the will, even if they also belong to the sensitive parts. This is why we posit virtue in the irascible and concupiscible powers. The case is likewise in what has the perfect account of sin, which is opposed to virtue through itself. Thus, the act of the irascible and concupiscible powers can be an act of virtue or an act of mortal sin. But sensuality, as was said above, designates the sensitive part insofar as it is more deeply embedded in the flesh, as not following the will’s command in its operation but, rather, as moved by its own proper motion. Thus, there cannot be an act of virtue or of mortal sin in it, though there can be something incomplete in the genus of the moral, which is venial sin.
Reply Obj. 4: These motions are in one way in our power and in another way not in our power. For if we were to consider any of them individually, they are in this way in our power. For we are able to impede any of them in advance. But if we consider them all at once, they are not in our power. For when we are intent on eliminating one, an illicit motion can creep in from another side. For the will’s intention to resist cannot actually be directed against different things at the same time.
Reply Obj. 5: An act can be proper to sensuality simply that is not proper to sensuality as human. For it belongs to human sensuality that its motion not be contrary to the rectitude of reason. Hence it follows that an act in brute animals is praiseworthy that in man is deserving of reprimand.
Reply Obj. 6: Even though the sensitive powers, according to the opinion of some, do not remain in their essence after death, they do remain in their root, namely, in the essence of the soul, from which the powers flow. In this way, the sin of sensuality remains in the soul, insofar as the sin of one power overflows into the whole.
Article 3
Whether there can be sin in reason
To the third we proceed thus. (Parallel text: ST I-II.74.5.) It seems that there cannot be sin in reason.
Obj. 1: For “reason” is the name of the cognitive power. But sin pertains to the affect. Therefore, there is no sin in reason.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, in On the Soul 3, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.10, 433a26.) the Philosopher says that the intellect is always right. But where there is perpetual rectitude, there cannot be the crookedness of sin. Therefore, sin cannot exist in reason, which pertains to the intellect.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, Dionysius says (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4 (PG 3:734).) that sin is contrary to reason. Therefore, if there were sin in reason, something contrary to reason would exist in reason, which is impossible. Therefore, the initial premise is also impossible, namely, that sin is in reason.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, the act of the higher reason is to cling to the contemplation of eternal things, as was said above. (Above: d. 24, q. 2, a. 2, resp.) But one does not sin by clinging to what is eternal. Therefore, in reason, at least in higher reason, there cannot be sin.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, among the parts of the soul, we find one possessed of perpetual corruption, namely, sensuality. We also find one in which there can be both the crookedness of sin and the rectitude of virtue. Therefore, for the perfection of the soul’s powers there must be one possessed of perpetual rectitude. But this cannot be ascribed to any more appropriately than to higher reason. Therefore, there cannot be sin in it.
On the contrary, choosing pertains to reason. But sometimes choice is right and sometimes it is not right. Therefore, it seems that there can be sin in reason.
Furthermore, as speculative reason is to what is knowable, practical reason is to what is practical. But in the case of what is knowable, there can be sin in speculative reason by someone not rightly reasoning. Therefore, it seems that in the case of what is practical, too, there can be sin in reason by someone not rightly choosing.
I answer that we can speak of reason’s sin in two ways. One way is from what belongs to reason in itself. In this way, we say that there is a sin in reason when it errs in judging, whether it be in speculative or in practical matters. This is a sin in cognition, arising from poor syllogizing. In the other way, there is said to be sin in reason on the part of the will, which is regulated by reason’s judgment, so that we then say that there is a sin in reason when a perverse choice follows it.
Thus, it should be known that some philosophers posited that sin in reason happens in the second way only when reason also errs in the first way. They say that every sin is ignorance and that one who knows better cannot sin. The first of these was Socrates, as is said in the Ethics 7, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.2, 1145b22–31.) citing the argument that it does not seem fitting for that which is most noble, which is knowledge, to be overcome by ignoble passions. Hence if there were knowledge in us, base passions would not follow. But because this is apparently false, the Philosopher, in the same book, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, 1110b30–33; 7.3, 1147a1–9.) shows how it happens that someone with knowledge sins, distinguishing knowledge of the universal and particular, and, likewise, knowledge in habit and act. Furthermore, he distinguishes knowledge in habit into two: for a habit is sometimes bound so that it does not proceed into action, as is clear in the case of those who are drunk, and sometimes it is not bound.
And so, he says that while it may be the case that a sinner knows a thing in the universal and actually, it may also be the case that the person does not know it actually in the particular, but rather only habitually when bound by a passion, whether of anger or of concupiscence, such that reason does not lead to right choice, but instead follows the motion of passion. Even if someone subject to passion states orally what is in accord with right reason in the particular, he does not hold to it mentally, just as a drunk person can pronounce the words of wise men orally while not grasping them intellectually. Thus, since reason syllogizes in a certain way in acts to be carried out, reason’s judgment is found in the major proposition, which is universal. But in the minor proposition, which is particular, there is an admixture of passion, which is vigorous concerning the particular. Hence a corruption of reason follows in the conclusion of the choice.
For example, if someone says, “one must never commit fornication,” reason’s judgment is in this regard perfect. Again, he may hold another proposition, that “all fornication is delightful.” One particular proposition is assumed under these two, namely, “to approach this woman is fornication.” If reason is strong enough not to be overcome by passion even in this particular case, it will come to the negative conclusion, choosing not to commit fornication. But if it is overcome by passion, it will elicit the affirmative conclusion, choosing to be delighted in fornication. This is the way sin is understood to be in reason, namely, when after reason’s deliberation, perverse choice follows by the fact that reason is corrupted in the particular through passion. If deliberation occurs by way of divine principles, sin will be said to be in higher reason, as if proceeding from the fact that everything prohibited by God’s law must be avoided. However, if deliberation takes place by way of created principles, the sin is said to be in lower reason, as if proceeding from the fact that everything that goes beyond the mean of virtue must be avoided, or something of this sort.
Reply Obj. 1: Even though reason is a cognitive power, it directs the will. Hence there can be no sin in the will unless it is somehow in reason, especially since the will is only for the good or the apparent good. Hence false estimation in some way precedes evil will. But sin occurs in reason in two ways, as has been said. (Resp.)
Reply Obj. 2: Understanding is not the same as reason. For “reason” implies a kind of discursive process from one thing to another, whereas “understanding” implies sudden apprehension of a thing. Thus, understanding is properly of principles, which yield themselves to knowledge at once. From these principles, reason draws conclusions, which come to be known by inquiry. Hence just as in speculative matters there can be error, not in the understanding of principles, but instead in the deduction of conclusions from principles, so also in practical matters the understanding is always right, but reason can be right or not.
Reply Obj. 3: Corrupt reason is not reason, just as a false syllogism is not properly a syllogism. Thus, the rule of human acts is not just any reason, but right reason. Thus, the Philosopher says that the virtuous man is the measure of others. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.4, 1113a31–33; 9.4, 1166a13.) Hence from this it does not follow that there is not sin in reason, but that there is not sin in right reason.
Reply Obj. 4: As was said above, higher reason not only clings to the perception of what is eternal through contemplation, but also takes counsel from the eternal in order to direct one’s work. However, reason’s deduction from eternal principles can be corrupted through passion, just as deduction from civic principles can be. Hence there can be sin in both higher and lower reason.
Reply Obj. 5: In the soul there is something that has the character of perpetual rectitude, namely, synderesis. This is not higher reason, but instead is to higher reason as the understanding of principles is to reasoning about conclusions.
Article 4
Whether there can be mortal sin in lower reason’s delight
To the fourth we proceed thus. (Parallel text: ST I-II.74.6.) It seems that there is not mortal sin in lower reason’s delight.
Obj. 1: For one can sin mortally only if he attends to the aspect of a divine precept, since mortal sin is determined by the fact that it is contrary to the divine law. But to attend to a divine precept belongs not to lower reason but to higher reason, which takes counsel from eternal principles. Therefore, mortal sin cannot be in lower reason but only in higher reason.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, as is commonly said, no circumstance aggravates a sin to infinity, since the quantity left behind by an accident cannot be greater than the sin’s essential quantity. But lower reason’s delight, if it is not held to for a long time, is a venial sin, as it says in the text. (Sent. II, 24.12(151).1.) Therefore, it does not become a mortal sin even through the fact of being held to for a long time.
Obj. 3: One might say that delight is not called “drawn out” or “morose” from the passage of time, but from the arrival of consent.
On the contrary, consent to a venial sin is only venial. But the delight taken by itself is venial, as has been said. (Above: a. 2.) Therefore, consent to it will not be mortal.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, what is not prohibited by divine law is not mortal. But to consent to such delights, as long as consent is not given to the work, is not forbidden by divine law. Therefore, it is not a mortal sin.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, the sin of homicide is greater than that of fornication. But if someone thinks about the slayings of many, takes delight in the thought, and consents to the delight, he does not seem to sin mortally. Therefore, it seems that neither does he sin mortally even if he consents to the delight of the flesh, as long as he does not consent to the act.
On the contrary, there is what the text says in many passages. (Sent. II, 24.12(151).1–5.)
Furthermore, in the coming-together of our first parents, just as the man was able to sin mortally, so also was the woman. But lower reason expresses the figure of the woman. Therefore, there can be mortal sin in it, but not with respect to sudden delight. Therefore, it is mortal with respect to morose delight.
I answer that, as was said above, lower reason’s delight is nothing other than the contentment (The Latin word complacentia is not rendered well by any one word in English; “complacency” is the evident cognate, but in modern usage this word has other connotations that are not intended here; “rest” would also be defensible as a translation, though it lacks the notions of “agreeableness” or “pleasure”; we have thus used the word “contentment” as in imperfect compromise in our translation.) of the will in what is apprehended as fitting by lower reason. Now, as it says in the text, (Sent. II, 24.9(148).3.) if a man puts this delight out of his mind authoritatively as soon as it reaches the mind, it is a venial sin. For this occurs when such contentment follows a sudden apprehension of reason. But if it is held to for a long time, it is a mortal sin. We should judge this duration not on the basis of quantity of time, but rather on the basis of reason’s deliberation. For if the delight is still pleasing after the deliberation of lower reason, it will be called “morose delight,” and in this case there will be consent to the delight, and then it is a mortal sin, as the Master says, and as it sounds as though Augustine says, though some contradict the Master on this point when expositing the texts of Augustine. But the Master’s opinion is much more probable and safer, as is clear in the following way.
For some activities are mortal sins by their genus, such as fornication, theft, and the like. That certain ones of these sins not be mortal can only be incidentally, namely, inasmuch as its subject is not capable of mortal sin, such as when it is only in the sensuality. But the Philosopher is of the opinion that the judgment is the same in the case of activity and in delight. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.3, 1174a5–9.) Hence if the activity is good through itself, then the delight is also good through itself, and vice versa. Therefore the fact that the delight following on an activity that is a mortal sin through itself is not mortal is only incidental, namely, due to the defect of its subject. Hence whenever evil delight or activity is traced back to that in which there can be the perfect account of sin or virtue, it necessarily begins to be a mortal sin. Now, the perfect account of virtue or mortal sin cannot exist without the choice of reason advising and deliberating. Thus, any aspect of fornication found incidentally before this point is not a mortal sin, but when it reaches this point, it immediately begins to be a mortal sin. Hence even if the functioning of the external members and their delight were present, there would be no sin without this kind of willing, as blessed Lucy said: if you cause me to be violated unwillingly, my chastity will receive a double crown. (Jacobus de Voragine, OP (ca. 1230–1298 AD), The Golden Legend, ch. 4.) But when consent comes to the external act, this makes it a mortal sin. Likewise, the appetite of sensuality and the delight following on the appetite is not a mortal sin before the consent of deliberate reason. But mortal sin is incurred after the consent of deliberating reason.
Reply Obj. 1: Just as lower reason rules the sensible powers, so also higher reason rules the lower reason. Hence, just as in the sensible powers there is virtue and vice from their participation in the rule of reason, so also in the lower reason there can be mortal sin from the fact of its being ruled by higher reason, to which it belongs to attend to divine precepts.
Reply Obj. 2: As has been said, (Above: obj. 3.) delight is not said to be “drawn out” on account of a length of time, but instead due to the consent of deliberate reason.
Reply Obj. 3: Consent to something venial that is venial from its genus, such as an idle word, is not mortal. But consent to something venial that is venial incidentally can well be mortal. For by such consent the accident that took away the account of mortal sin—namely, not reaching the point of reason’s deliberation—is removed.
Reply Obj. 4: Even internal delight is forbidden by divine precept, as is clear from the saying: you shall not covet your neighbor’s goods (Exod 20:17). But even if there were no such precept, the argument still would not follow. For from the very fact that an activity is forbidden it is designated as evil of itself in whatever way it exists, both the activity and the delight in it, unless it is forbidden incidentally.
Reply Obj. 5: A difference among delights follows on a difference of activities. Hence the delight that follows the activity of the appetitive power and the delight that follows the activity of the cogitative power have different natures. For just as thinking about homicide or lust without any desire for it is not traced back to the genus of lust or homicide, unless the thought is inordinate, but instead to another genus, either curiosity or vanity, so also delight that follows on such a thought does not pertain to the genus of homicide or fornication. Hence consent to such delight is not a mortal sin but a venial one. This is because vanity of thought is not mortal from its genus. But the delight following on the appetite for homicide or fornication is traced back to the same genus of sin as the appetite itself. Hence just as in fornication, if someone consents to the delight that follows on the concupiscible appetite for fornication, it will be a mortal sin, so also, and much more so, if someone consents to the delight that follows on the irascible appetite for homicide, it will be a mortal sin.
Article 5
Whether there can be venial sin in higher reason
To the fifth we proceed thus. (Parallel texts: ST I-II.74.9; On Truth, q. 15, a. 5; On Evil, q. 7, a. 5.) It seems that there cannot be venial sin in the higher part of reason.
Obj. 1: For higher reason can only sin by being turned away from eternal principles. But one can only be turned away from these principles through mortal sin. Therefore, in higher reason there will be no sin but mortal sin.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, contempt makes a sin mortal. But it cannot be the case that someone consents, after deliberation, to an act of sin without contempt. Therefore, since higher reason does not sin without deliberation, it seems that in it, sin is always mortal.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, consent to an act of mortal sin is always a mortal sin. But the motion of the higher part of reason is said to be the consent to the act. Therefore, at least in the genus of mortal sin higher reason never sins venially.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, among the parts of the soul we find something in which there can be only venial sin, namely, sensuality. We also find something in which there can be both venial and mortal sin, namely, lower reason. Therefore, for the sake of completion among the parts of the soul, there should be something in which there can be only mortal sin. Now, this is not synderesis, since there is no sin in that. Therefore, it remains that this is higher reason.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, venial sin arises from the corruption of the flesh, since, as was proved above, (Above, d. 21, q. 2, a. 3.) Adam was not able to sin venially in the first state. But higher reason is at the utmost point of being removed from the flesh. Therefore, in it, sin cannot be venial.
On the contrary, consent to an act of venial sin is not more grave than the act itself. But some acts are venial sins, such as speaking idle words and the like. Therefore, consent to something of this sort is also venial. But consent to an act pertains to higher reason. Therefore, there can be venial sin in it.
Furthermore, as in the case of other sins there can be sudden motions that come on unexpectedly, so also there can be sudden motions of infidelity. But we should not say that such motions are mortal sins. Therefore, since they are motions only of the higher part of reason, to which it belongs to perceive what is divine, it seems that there can be venial sin in it.
I answer that a given motion can be a venial sin due to two factors. Either it is from the very genus of the act, which is venial, as in the case of idle words, or it is on the part of that to which the motion belongs, that is to say, inasmuch as the motion precedes choice, in which the pre-eminence of virtue and vice consists.
Therefore, it should be known that every power that can in some way be elevated to what is above it, can have a sudden motion to that which befits it in itself, and it can have another motion to that which befits it by reason of its being elevated to something higher, as is clear in the sensible appetite. For it has a sudden motion in what befits it according to the senses, but inasmuch as it is regulated by reason and more perfectly by a habit of virtue, it has a motion after deliberation to that which is fitting according to reason. But just as the sensible appetite is elevated by the rule of reason to what is above it, so also higher reason is elevated by the light of faith to what is above its natural knowledge. Thus, the sudden motion of higher reason’s apprehension is according to its natural knowledge, and if it conflicts with some matter of faith, then there will be an unexpected motion of infidelity. In this case, on account of the lack of deliberation, there will be a venial sin.
Therefore, in this regard we must make a distinction. For either the motion of higher reason is toward that which is venial from its genus—and in this case its motion, too, will be venial—or else it is toward that which is mortal from its genus. The latter occurs in two ways: either that is its proper object, and in this case it has two motions concerning it—one is sudden, preceding deliberation, and this will be a venial sin; the other is deliberate, and this will be mortal, as is clear in the motions of infidelity—or else it is the object of a lower power, such as sensuality, as is clear in delights relative to the flesh. In this latter case higher reason only has a motion of counsel toward it, as if furnishing the middle term whereby a syllogism can be formed about the matter. Therefore, it only has deliberate motion concerning it. Thus, in such cases the motion of higher reason is always a mortal sin, though in the other two ways there can be venial sin in it.
Reply Obj. 1: The sin of higher reason is through its being in some way turned away from eternal principles. But this occurs in two ways. Either it occurs simply, as in mortal sin, through which someone is turned away from God’s law both in act and in habit, acting not only apart from it, but against it; or else it occurs in a qualified sense, as in venial sin, whereby someone forsakes God’s law in act, but not in habit, acting not against it, but apart from it.
Reply Obj. 2: Deliberate consent to a venial sin does not always proceed from such contempt as would render the sin mortal. For when consent is given to something venial in a manner such that, if it were against God’s law, one would in no way do it, it remains within the limits of venial sin, even if one adverts to the fact that it is a venial sin. But if consent is given to it such that, even if it were forbidden by precept, one would still do it, such consent to what is venial would be mortal as well.
Reply Obj. 3: Toward mortal sin pertaining to the object of a lower power, higher reason has no other motion than deliberated consent, because it does not pertain to higher reason in itself to consider what is fitting to the body, but only to counsel about these matters. Thus, in such matters it only sins mortally. But the case is otherwise with mortal sins committed concerning its proper object, as was said above.
Reply Obj. 4: The fact that sensuality only sins venially is due to its imperfection. But venial sin is caused not only from imperfection of the agent, but also from the very genus of the act. Thus, it is not necessary for the motion of a power to be unable to be venial, however perfect it may be. Yet this would follow if venial sin were caused only from the imperfection of the agent. For in this case the most perfect would correspond to the imperfect by way of opposition.
Reply Obj. 5: Venial sin derives from the corruption of the flesh not as from its proximate cause, but as from its first cause. For by the fact that corrupt flesh is passed down, all the soul’s powers are in a certain way corrupted. Thus, corruption overflows to higher reason itself, even though it is most removed from the flesh.
Article 6
Whether venial sin can become mortal
To the sixth we proceed thus. (Parallel text: ST I-II.88.4.) It seems that venial sin can become mortal.
Obj. 1: For Augustine, on 1 John, speaking of venial sins, says: do not neglect these light sins. If you dismiss them as trivial when you weigh them out, tremble in fear when you count them up. Many light sins will make one massive sin. Many drops fill a river; many grains make a pile. (Augustine, In Iohannis epistulam ad Parthos tractatus, ch. 1, tract. 1 (CCSL 37; PL 35:1982).) But a sin is not called “massive” unless it is mortal. Therefore, one mortal sin is made from many venial sins.
Obj. 2: Again, Augustine says in On the Ten Chords: do not dismiss venial sins as trivial because they are the least. Rather, be afraid, for they are many. For it often happens that many tiny beasts kill. If anyone is cast into a place full of fleas, does he not die there? And grains of sand are the smallest, yet if enough sand is thrown onto a ship, it sinks it and the ship is lost. How small are raindrops! Yet do they not fill rivers and ruin houses? (Augustine, Sermones ad populum, serm. 9, “De decem Chordis,” ch. 11 (PL 38:88).) And so, we must fear the ruin that comes from multitude, even if we do not fear ruin from magnitude.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, everything finite is capable of proportion to everything finite. But the contentment whereby someone in mortal sin turns toward a changeable good is finite. Therefore, it is proportional to the contentment whereby someone in venial sin turns toward to a changeable good. Therefore, venial sin, when multiplied, makes one mortal sin.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, delight before the deliberation of reason is a venial sin. But after deliberate consent it becomes mortal. Therefore, venial sin can become mortal.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, as it says in the Physics 5, (Aristotle, Physics 5.4, 228a20.) motion that is continuous is one. But it happens that a continuous inordinate motion, though it does not take place in its first portion to the point of contempt of God (and so it is venial), it then later on reaches the point of contempt of God and so will be mortal. Therefore, what was at first venial can become mortal.
Obj. 6: Furthermore, disposition becomes habit, as the Philosopher says in Categories. (Aristotle, Categories 8, 9a1.) But venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin. Therefore, venial sin can become mortal sin.
Obj. 7: Furthermore, there is the same distance from mortal to venial as from venial to mortal. But mortal sin becomes venial through confession, as Ambrose says. (See Ambrose, De paradiso, bk. 1, ch. 14, paras. 71–72 (CSEL 32.1:328; PL 14:310–11); bk. 1, ch. 5 (CSEL 32.1:285–86; PL 14:286–87); De interpellatione Job et David, bk. 1, ch. 6 (CSEL 32.2:222; PL 14:843–44); De apologia David, verse 12 (PL 14:911–16).) Therefore, venial sin can also become mortal in some way.
Obj. 8: What it says in the text is also to this effect, (See Sent. II, 24.12(151).2.) that certain sins are only damning if they are done frequently or the determination is made that they ought to be done frequently, as in the case of idle words and such things. But damnation is only through mortal sin. Therefore, if an idle word is repeated frequently it will be a mortal sin.
On the contrary, in the case of things that are at an infinite distance, one cannot be transmuted into the other. But mortal and venial sin are at an infinite distance, as their punishment shows. For temporal punishment is due to venial sin and eternal punishment to mortal sin. Therefore, venial sin cannot become mortal.
Furthermore, repetition of an act does not make it a different species. But venial and mortal are different genera of sins. Therefore, a venial sin will not become mortal through the fact of its being multiplied.
I answer that when the question is asked of whether a venial sin can become mortal, this can be understood in three ways. It can be understood such that one and the same act numerically is at one time venial and later becomes mortal. And this cannot be, since one act is only once. For from the fact that it has once passed, it cannot be again resumed as the same numerically. Thus, if it was once venial, it will never be mortal.
Or else, the question can be understood such that an act that is venial from its genus becomes mortal in some way. And this is possible if it is preferred enough that one’s end is established in it. For since it is impossible for there to be two last ends, whenever a changeable good is set up as the last end of life, it must necessarily result that God is not held to be the last end. Since the end is always the most beloved, that in which the end is established must be loved above God. This is obviously a mortal sin. Now, the most express sign of this kind of contentment is when someone clings to a thing, even something that is not forbidden, so much that he senses that even if it were forbidden he could not give it up. This is especially clear in some drunks, who have set their whole life on wine, and in some persons of drama, who seek after idle words.
Or else, it can be understood such that many venial sins would reach the quantity of a mortal sin. This, speaking essentially, is impossible. For the guilt and stain of mortal sin are at an infinite distance from those belonging to venial sin, since mortal sin deprives one of an infinite good, which is the uncreated good, whereas by venial sin a caused good is taken away, such as the fervor of charity. Now, the distance of privations is measured on the basis of what is deprived. To one of these, too, an eternal punishment is due, and to the other a temporal punishment. But it is possible incidentally. For since venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin, from the fact that someone frequently sins venially, he also becomes prone to sinning mortally. For the more one becomes accustomed to some work, the more it pleases him, since delight in a work is a sign of habit, as it says in the Ethics 2. (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.3, 1104b4–13.) Still, this does not happen of necessity. For however great this propensity to sinning grows through the repetition of venial sins, freedom always remains in the will not to slip into mortal sin.
Reply Obj. 1–2: And in this way, the reply to the first two authorities is clear. For they are understood not as if many venial sins make one mortal sin through itself, but rather incidentally, as has been said. (Resp.)
Reply Obj. 3: We need not admit a proportion among all finite things, as there is no proportion between a line and a number. For, as it says in the fifth book of Euclid’s Elements, (Euclid, Elements, bk. 5, definition 3.) proportion is a certitude of the measure of two quantities of the same genus. Thus, even though the contentment of mortal sin is finite, it is not necessary for it to be proportionate to the contentment of venial sin, since they are of different accounts. For in one account the end is pleasing, and the things directed toward the end, however great they are, are pleasing in another account, for the end is always more pleasing. Thus, however much the contentment of venial sin is multiplied, it will not become equal to the contentment of mortal sin.
Or else we may say that the contentment of mortal sin can be considered in two ways: either on the part of the one who is pleased, and in this way, it is finite, since an infinite act cannot proceed from a finite power; or else on the part of that which pleases, and in this way, it is infinite, since it pleases as the end, and the end is desired as the infinite good, for all things are desired for the sake of the last end.
Reply Obj. 4: The motion of delight in sensuality in no way becomes mortal. Rather, what becomes mortal is the consent of reason that enters in, which is different, since there one act numerically does not belong to different powers. Hence it does not follow that an act that was at first venial later on becomes mortal.
Reply Obj. 5: The continuous act, although it is one considered according to the being of nature, is not one considered in moral being but is, instead, reckoned as two acts.
Reply Obj. 6: That is properly called a “disposition” which in motion stands as what is incomplete to what is perfect, which is the term of the motion, as one who is learning has the disposition of the science whereby he is perfected in the term of the motion of learning. Now, something can be the terminus of a motion in two ways, since either it belongs to the same genus, or else it belongs to a different one. For example, the terminus of alteration is quality as belonging to the same genus, but it is substantial form as belonging to another genus. Therefore, if a disposition is compared to that which is the terminus of a motion of the same genus, then in this case it is obvious that the disposition can become that to which it disposes, as imperfect heat becomes perfect heat. However, if it is taken as the terminus of motion of another genus, this never occurs, just as imperfect heat, no matter how much it grows, never becomes the substantial form of fire. Therefore, I say that venial sin is not a disposition to mortal sin as to a terminus of the same genus, but rather of another. Thus, venial sin never becomes mortal.
Reply Obj. 7: This is an equivocation on “venial.” For when it says that mortal fault becomes venial through confession, this is not understood as venial from its genus, as we are now speaking of what is venial. Rather, it is understood of venial from the result, which is called “venial” by way of a certain likeness to what is venial. This is because liability to temporal punishment remains for a mortal fault that confession has eradicated, not that the fault is changed into another fault.
Reply Obj. 8: What the Master says should be understood not as so through itself, but by way of an occasion, namely, inasmuch as venial sins are frequently the occasion leading to mortal sin inasmuch as they make one prone to it.
Exposition of the second part of the text
‘And so forgiveness is also to be sought for such thoughts.’ (Sent. II, 24.12(151).4, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 12, ch. 12 (CCSL 50; PL 42:1007).) It seems that this is contrary to the determination that was made previously. For beating the breast and the Our Father have the power to remit venial sin, and this is proper satisfaction for venial sins. Therefore, it seems that morose delight, about which we are speaking here, is a venial sin.
But it should be said that even though satisfaction of this sort is sufficient for venial sin and not for mortal sin, these have the power to remit mortal sin. Hence we should say the Our Father and strike the breast even for mortal sins.
‘For our reason cannot be brought to consent to sin, except when pleasure is moved.’ (Sent. II, 24.12(151).5, quoting Augustine, De Genesi contra Manichaeos, bk. 2, ch. 14 (PL 34:207).) This seems to be false, since there are some spiritual sins in which there is no fleshly delight.
But we should say that this is understood as applying in the genus of carnal sins, the appetite for which pertains to sensuality.
But it is not to be passed over in silence that in Scripture by the term sensuality is often understood . . . also the lower portion of reason. (Sent. II, 24.13(152).1.) Here by Scripture he means not the canon of the Bible but the statements of the saints. Now, the reason for the statement is on account of the agreement between sensuality and lower reason, since both attend to what pertains to the body, granted that lower reason does this under universal aspects, and sensuality does it under particular aspects and concrete material features.
Chapter 74 of 186