D. 29 - Grace in the original state of man

Division of the text

After he has addressed grace absolutely, here he addresses it by comparison to the state of the first man in his first state. This is divided into two parts.

In the first, he inquires whether man in the first state had grace.

In the second, he addresses what punishment he incurred for sin, at and also as a punishment for that sin, he was ejected from paradise. (Sent. II, 29.3(187).1.)

Concerning the first, he does two things.

First, he inquires whether man in the first state needed grace.

Second, he inquires whether he had gratuitous virtues, at moreover, it is usual to ask whether man had virtue before the fall. (Sent. II, 29.2(186).1.)

And also as a punishment for that sin, he was ejected from paradise. (Sent. II, 29.3(187).1.) Here he addresses the punishment man incurred for sin, whereby he lost grace and virtue. This is divided into two.

First, he addresses the punishment.

Second, he shows the truth of a certain question occasioned by something said before, at it may be asked whether man before sin had eaten of the tree of life. (Sent. II, 29.6(190).1.)

Concerning the first, he does two things.

First, he shows that for his sin Adam lost both the place of delights and that most health-giving food.

Second, he shows how he was impeded from recovering these, at ‘but so that man should not be able to enter it, God placed the Cherubim before paradise.’ (Sent. II, 29.5(189).1, quoting Genesis 3:4.)

Concerning the first, he does two things.

First, he shows the punishment from the words of Scripture.

Second, he raises a certain doubt from these words.

First, he raises it, at by these words it seems to be implied that he would never have died, if he had afterwards taken from that tree. (Sent. II, 29.3(187).1.)

Second, he resolves it, at but because, through sin, he already had a dead body, those words may be taken in the following sense. (Sent. II, 29.4(188).1.)

It may be asked whether man before sin had eaten of the tree of life. (Sent. II, 29.6(190).1.) Here he raises a doubt occasioned by what had been said before, namely, whether man ate of the tree of life before sin.

First, he addresses the affirmative.

Second, he raises another doubt that arose against this and addresses it, at but why, then, were they not clothed in perpetual soundness and blessed immortality? (Sent. II, 29.6(190).2.)

Question 1

Grace in the original state of man

Here five questions are asked:

first, whether man in the state of innocence needed grace;

second, whether he did have grace;

third, if he did have it, whether the grace of the human race, if it had remained steadfast in innocence, would have been greater than it is;

fourth, whether human acts would have had greater efficacy to merit;

fifth, concerning the punishment posited in the text that man received because of his first transgression.

Article 1

Whether nature in the state of innocence needed grace

To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that man in the state of innocence did not need grace.

Obj. 1: For grace is given to men that they may be received by God. But when human nature was integral, without any corruption of sin, man was received by God from natural goodness. For every good, especially one not mixed with evil, is received by God. Therefore, he did not need a superadded grace.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, grace is divided into operating and cooperating. But man did not need operating grace in that state because he was not ungodly, since the effect of operating grace is to make a godly person out of an ungodly one. Again, he did not need cooperating grace because he suffered no difficulty in doing good, but cooperating grace is given that man may be able to accomplish the good. Therefore, he did not need any grace.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as is said in Deuteronomy 32:4: his works are perfect. But there would not be perfection in the divine works if there were some possible degree of nobility that were not established by God. Therefore, every degree of goodness possible in created things is found in reality. But God was able to create a nature such as could merit eternal life through its proper natural endowments, since otherwise he would not be omnipotent. Therefore, since no other creature seems more to possess this property than man or the angels, it seems that this befits them. Thus, if human nature were pure, as it was in the first state, man would not need grace to merit eternal life.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, punishment never precedes fault, since it is its effect. But lack of the vision of God is the punishment of original fault. Therefore, if there had not been fault in human nature, there would not have been in it the lack of the vision of God. But man in the state of innocence was able to lack all fault without grace. Therefore, he also did not need grace to arrive at the vision of God.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, grace is given to man that through it he may be configured and likened to God. But man was made according to the image and likeness of God from the condition of his nature. Therefore, if nature remained integral in this, it would need no other grace.

On the contrary, it is said: the free gift of God is eternal life (Rom 6:23). But it was necessary for man that he reach eternal life. Therefore, he needed grace, through which it is reached.

Furthermore, sin has not changed human nature. Rather, it remains the same before and after. But the merit of eternal life exceeds the power of nature after sin. Therefore, it also exceeded its strength before sin. Therefore, it needed grace through which to merit eternal life.

I answer that there are two sorts of necessity. One is absolute, being from prior causes, like the material and formal causes of which a thing is composed, such as the necessity that what is composed of contraries is corrupted, and things of this sort. The other is conditioned by the supposition of the end, as, for example, if a saw has to do the work of a saw, namely, cutting, then it is necessary for it to have iron teeth.

Now, this latter necessity is of two sorts: one without which the intended end cannot be had, as the preservation of life cannot be had without food, and another without which one cannot attain the end with ease, as a horse is said to be necessary for a man to complete a journey. And the term “utility” is common to both of these last modes of necessity, but the term “need” is related more to the first mode of these. For we are properly said to “need” that without which we cannot obtain an end.

On this basis I say that man before sin did need grace because without grace he would have in no way been able to obtain the end of eternal life. For the end is only reached through works proportionate to the end. But eternal life is an end altogether exceeding the faculty of human nature. Hence it even surpasses understanding and desire: no eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart of man conceived, what God has prepared for those who love him (1 Cor 2:9). Thus, the works through which eternal life is reached must exceed the powers of human nature. Hence man is not capable of them without some gift added to his natural endowments. Thus, no matter how integral human nature may be, man still needs grace to obtain eternal life.

Reply Obj. 1: God accepts each good in accord with the measure of its goodness. But God is said, simply speaking, to accept that for which he prepares the glory whereby he himself is glorious, namely, the vision of him in his essence.

Reply Obj. 2: Man before sin also needed operating and cooperating grace. For there is one thing that befits operating grace through itself and another that befits it incidentally. Through itself, it befits operating grace to make a man formally just and pleasing to God. But it is incidental to it that, on the part of the subject in whom the justice is found, it make a just man out of an unjust one. It is also fitting to operating grace as such to make a just person out of one who is not just or to make a pleasing person out of one who is not pleasing, just as it belongs to whiteness to make something white out of what is not white, but is incidental to whiteness to make something white out of what is black. Likewise, too, it not only belongs to cooperating grace to produce ease in working—since this is what the Pelagian heresy posited—but also to afford a new kind of efficacy and power to men’s works, namely, that of meriting eternal life.

Reply Obj. 3: There cannot be any creature that can merit eternal life from its own proper natural endowments, just as there cannot be any creature that is equated to the divine nature. Nor does this take away from God’s omnipotence. This is clear from what has been said above.

Reply Obj. 4: Lacking the vision of God can be understood in two ways. Either it is understood negatively, and in this way, it is not a punishment, but a deficiency consequent on created nature. For no created nature is of itself sufficient for the vision of God. This is the way in which the lack of the vision of God would have been in man before sin if he had not had grace. In the other way, it can be taken as privative, so that it be understood as a forfeiture of the vision of God. And in this way, it is a punishment for sin and would not have existed in the first state.

Reply Obj. 5: The likeness to God that befits man according to his natural endowments is different from that whereby man is likened to God through grace. And it is not unfitting for man to be likened to God in several respects, by the fact that following on every superadded degree of goodness a new likeness to God arises in created things.

Article 2

Whether man before sin had grace

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In II Sent., d. 20, q. 2, a. 3; ST I.95.1; On Evil, q. 18, a. 4, ad 3.) It seems that man before sin did not have grace.

Obj. 1: For whoever has grace can progress to the merit of life by the fact that through grace one merits an increase of grace and its consummation. But, as the Master said above, (Sent. II, 24.1(140).2.) man in the first state did not have that whereby he could progress to the merit of life. Therefore, he did not have grace.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, grace has greater power than nature. But the greater a sinner’s power, the more grave his sin. Therefore, if man had fallen from a state of grace, since the angels did not possess grace before their fall, as many say, it seems that man’s sin would have been more grave than the sin of a demon, which was denied above.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, grace has more in common with glory than with nature. But in man grace preceded glory in time. Therefore, much more did nature precede grace. And so, in the first state man did not have grace.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, in and of itself, grace moves man toward God. Therefore, since in man before the state of sin there was nothing drawing him downward, it seems that if he had had grace he would never have sinned. But he did sin. Therefore, he did not have grace.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, what man lost through the first sin has not been restored to him, such as impassibility, and so forth. Therefore, if he had had grace in the state of innocence, he would not have recovered it through penitence when it was lost through sin. But this is false, since in this case the whole human race would perish. Therefore, he did not have grace in the first state.

On the contrary, no one is despoiled of what he does not possess. But through sin man was wounded in his natural endowments and despoiled of his gratuitous ones, as a Gloss on Luke 10 says. (Glossa ordinaria, at Luke 10:30, 5.843 (PL 114:286).) Therefore, he had grace.

Furthermore, charity is never formless. But in the text (Sent. II, 29.1(185).2.) it is proved that Adam had charity in the first state. Therefore, he also had grace, without which there is no charity.

I answer that concerning this there are three opinions. Some say that man in the first state had neither grace nor the gratuitous virtues. Now, they explain all the authoritative sayings of the saints that the Master cites in the text to prove that the “virtues” in man refer to the natural virtues that were most excellent in him, because of the integrity of human nature. But this does not seem to fit with those authoritative sayings, in which it is asserted that Adam had charity, which cannot be had without grace. And several other things are said that can be made to refer to the natural virtues only by twisting them.

Others distinguish the state of innocence into two states. For they say that man at the beginning of his creation was created without grace in a state of natural endowments alone. On the basis of this distinction they attempt to harmonize various statements of saints and doctors. But this does not seem to fit with the statements of the saints and doctors, who speak of the state of innocence as one state, not distinct states. Thus, this position does not enjoy great authority.

Thus, others say that man was created in grace at the beginning of his creation. And this position seems to agree well enough with the opinion of Augustine, who posits that things were perfected all at once when they were created, both in matter and in form. Now, the first opinion seems to agree with the opinion of other saints who say that created things were perfected through a succession of time.

But which of these opinions is more true cannot be proved by a very efficacious argument, as neither can any of the things that depend on God’s will alone. Yet it is more probable that when man was created in integral natural endowments, which could not have been idle, he was turned to God in the first instant of creation and received grace. Therefore, maintaining this opinion, this is what we should say:

Reply Obj. 1: Just as, according to Augustine, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 4, ch. 33 (CSEL 28.1:131; PL 34:317).) we consider the distinction between the first days according to the order of nature, not the succession of time, so also the state of man in pure natural endowments is compared to his state in grace in accord with the order of nature, not according to an order of time. And so, when he says that man in the state of natural endowments did not have that whereby he could make progress, we should understand this to mean that even while he has grace, he does not have this from natural endowments, but from gratuitous ones.

Or else we may say that man was not able to progress by himself, even having grace, such that he would obtain beatitude; and this is what the Master above called “progressing to the merit of life.” (Sent. II, 24.1(140).2.)

Reply Obj. 2: According to the third opinion, both men as well as angels were created with gratuitous gifts. Thus, this sort of objection is not against the third, but against the second opinion. If we were to maintain the second opinion, we say that a natural power is related to grace as providing it the substance of the act, and grace affords the efficacy to merit by informing the act. And just as the form of an act has greater perfection than the act’s substance, so, conversely, there is greater deficiency in failing in the very substance of an act than in failing in its form. But even though man is being posited to have had grace and in this to have been superior to angels, he was still weaker in natural power. Thus, the deficiency of natural power more excuses man’s sin than the deficiency of grace excuses the sin of the angels. Hence we find man’s sin to be simply less than the sin of the angels.

Reply Obj. 3: Through grace one merits glory, and thus, grace fittingly precedes glory in time. But through nature one does not merit grace. Hence nothing prevents grace from being infused at once together with nature.

Reply Obj. 4: In things that act through a necessity of nature, the agent must of necessity act according to the requirement of the form that is in it, as heating through heat. But this does not hold with voluntary agents. Hence even if man had grace, he is nevertheless able to pass to a contrary act.

Reply Obj. 5: Personal acts touch not the nature but the person. Thus, through the penance that he did for sin, Adam was able to recover the goods that had been given to him for personal acts, such as grace and the virtues, but not those which had been conferred on the whole nature, such as immortality of the body, obedience of the lower powers to reason, and so forth.

Article 3

Whether man in the first state would have had as much grace as he had after sin

To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that in the first state man would not have had as much grace as after sin.

Obj. 1: For, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.8, 1178b10–18.) it is ridiculous to posit temperance and fortitude in the gods, since in them the passions are not innate nor enter in, concerning which fortitude and temperance partake in a mean. But in the first state Adam would have lacked passions of this sort. Therefore, he consequently would have lacked these virtues, which man had after sin. Therefore, man would not have had as many graces before sin as he had after sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, perseverance is a kind of virtue, which many possess after the state of sin. But Adam lacked this, as his fall shows. Thus, he did not have as many virtues as men born in sin have. And so, the same follows as before.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, God gives more to one who needs more. For mercy attends to misery, as Bernard says. (Bernard of Clairvaux, Epistulae, ch. 12 (PL 182:49).) But man needs the help of grace more after sin than before, since he is more weakened in natural endowments. Therefore, God confers more grace on man after sin than he would have conferred before.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, since he is good to the utmost, as Augustine says, (Augustine, Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate, ch. 11 (CCSL 46; PL 40:236); De continentia, ch. 6, para. 15 (CSEL 41:158; PL 40:359).) God would not permit evils to exist unless he were so powerful that he could draw good from evils. But the divine goodness would not be perfectly shown unless the good that God draws out from evil exceeded the good that suffers deprivation through the evil. Therefore, man’s good, which God draws from his sin, exceeds the good that existed before sin and afterwards suffered deprivation through sin. And so, grace is greater after sin than before.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the whole fullness of the human race’s grace proceeds from the power of Christ’s Incarnation and Passion. Hence it is said: from his fullness we have all received (John 1:16). But if Adam had not sinned, Christ would not have been incarnate, as some say, or at least he would not have suffered, as all say. Therefore, there would not have been as great a fullness of grace in the human race before sin as there is after.

On the contrary, he gave . . . to each according to his ability (Matt 25:15), and a gloss explains this as meaning the conferral of graces. (Jerome, Commentary on Matthew, bk. 4, ch. 25 (PL 26:186).) But the natural ability of men was greater before sin than after. Therefore, they would also have received more grace before sin than after.

Furthermore, no one gains an advantage from sin. But if man had greater grace after sin than before, he would gain an advantage from evil. Therefore, and so on.

I answer that among the gratuitous gifts some are ordered absolutely to the perfection of the one on whom they are conferred, whereas others are ordered to the benefit of others, as is said in 1 Corinthians 12:7: the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit. Now, it is a kind of benefit to come to the aid of the deficiencies of one’s neighbors, just as, through the working of signs, help is afforded to infidelity because signs are not given to the faithful but to the unfaithful (1 Cor 14:22). The case is likewise in varieties of tongues and other such gifts. Because such deficiencies would not have existed in the first state, such gifts as are ordered against these deficiencies would not have been conferred on man. But gifts absolutely ordered to the perfection of the receiver are those whereby man is perfected in his proper acts both in soul and in body, such as sanctifying grace, the virtues, the gift of knowledge and wisdom, and so forth, as well as impassibility of the body. And man in the first state would have abounded more in this, speaking simply, than in the second state after sin.

But this excess can be considered in two ways: either in intension or in extension. In extension: man would have had more such gifts in the first state than in the second. For he had impassibility of body, perfect obedience of the lower powers to reason, and so forth, which are not found in men after sin. But it is also true that some of the gifts after sin have imperfection connected with them, which in the first state either would not have existed at all or, if they would have existed, would have existed according to another mode and other acts, as long as we understand this not of the imperfection that follows on nature but instead that which has resulted from sin. For faith has an imperfection following on nature, since it belongs to faith to perceive divine things as if in a mirror. This, too, would have been appropriate to man in the first state, though he would have seen the divine things more clearly, as was said above. Thus, faith in the first state also would have concerned an act of the same genus, though more perfect than it now is. However, continence, which implies imperfection in the opposition of the passions caused by sin, as the Philosopher takes continence in the Ethics 7, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7, throughout; but see especially 7.2, 1146a10.) would not have existed in the first state. So too for penitence, if we posit it as a specific virtue, at least concerning the same acts it now has. And the reasoning is similar in other similar cases.

However, if we consider excess in intension, particularly as regards the sanctifying gifts, then considering state in comparison to state in this way, man before sin generally would have been endowed with fuller grace than after. But it is not so unfitting that someone after the state of sin may have much greater grace than some would have had even in the first state, by the fact that graces are not only given according to the measure of natural power or capacity, but according to effort, which it does so happen is greater in one who has less virtue, as is also said of the comparison between men of the New and Old Testament.

Reply Obj. 1: Even though the angels, whom the Philosopher calls “gods,” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.8, 1178b9.) as does Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 12 (PG 3:294).) do not have cardinal virtues of this sort with respect to the same acts whereby they are in us, they do have them with respect to certain more eminent acts, and especially insofar as they establish their acts in reference to the end. This is the way that fortitude and temperance could have existed in man even before the state of sin.

Yet it should be known that the situation is different with man before sin, with angels, and with glorified man. For man in the first state, although not actually subject to passions of this sort, did have a nature that, in and of itself, was prone to subjection to these passions and was able to be subject to them if man sinned while he was not yet confirmed. But in the case of glorified man, even if he has a nature in which, considered in itself, passions of this sort are naturally apt to exist, the venue for these passions is completely taken away through the habit of glory. However, angels possess neither the nature nor the passibility relative to these passions. Hence it is clear that virtues of this sort, as regards acts belonging to the wayfaring state, are in us now more removed from the angels than from glorified men and from glorified men more than from those in the first state.

Reply Obj. 2: We speak of perseverance in two ways. In one way, it is a specific virtue whose act is to have the resolution of always remaining in the good. Adam had this sort of virtue, as did many who fell later on. In another way, it is a kind of circumstance consequent upon other virtues. In this way, it entails not a specific virtue, but a certain continuation of virtue till death. And in this way, Adam did not possess perseverance in the first state.

Reply Obj. 3: God grants more to one who needs more so long as he is more disposed to receive. Otherwise, this is not true. Yet it should be known that since need is spoken of with respect to the end, as has been said, (Above: a. 1, resp.) we must not say that man needed grace more after sin than before. For that to which grace is ordered through itself, namely, glory, is above man’s powers, whether before sin or after sin. Hence in this regard he does not need it more after than before, but as regards that to which grace is ordered incidentally, which is the removal of evil, man needs it more after sin. And it is with respect to glory that we consider the measure of grace, since through greater grace one merits greater glory, not with respect to the removal of sin or infirmity, since the least grace is sufficient to wipe out all sins. Hence man does not need greater grace after sin than before. However, it is true that he needs grace for more things, though any amount of grace is able to do these more things.

Reply Obj. 4: God always draws greater good out of evil, not necessarily for him in whom he permits the evil to exist, but in comparison to the universe, whose beauty consists in the fact that evils are allowed to exist. But the good of the universe outweighs the good of a particular thing, as the good of the nation is more godly than the good of a man, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.2, 1094b7.)

Reply Obj. 5: Christ suffered to repair man’s nature. Hence it is not apparent that through the Passion of Christ man has received greater grace after sin than there would have been before without the Passion, speaking of grace as ordered to the essential reward; for there is an incidental reward that man obtains through Christ’s Passion that he would not have had before sin, namely joy at Christ’s victory.

Article 4

Whether man’s works are more efficacious for meriting grace after sin than before sin

To the fourth we proceed as follows. It seems that after sin man’s works would have been more efficacious for meriting than before sin.

Obj. 1: For in the first state, just as man had nothing impelling him to evil, so also he had nothing drawing him away from the good. But the Master said above (Sent. II, 24.1(140).7.) that the first man would not have merited by resisting temptation because there was nothing to impel him to evil. Therefore, by doing the good he likewise would have merited either nothing or very little, since there was nothing to impede him from the good.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Apostle says: an athlete is not crowned unless he competes according to the rules (2 Tim 2:5). But man in the first state was not fought against as he was after sin. Therefore, neither did he merit a crown as efficaciously.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 2, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.3, 1105a9.) virtue concerns what is difficult. But it is more difficult for man to do good works after sin than before. Therefore, since efficacy for merit proceeds from virtue, it seems that before sin man’s acts were less efficacious for meriting than they are after.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, man in the first state was, as it were, in the middle between the state of the angels and our own state, as is clear from what was said in Distinction 23. (Above, d. 23, q. 2, a. 1.) But angelic activities are not as efficacious for meriting, just as man’s activities. This is clear from the fact that a lower angel cannot merit the rank of a higher one, but man can merit to rise to the highest order of angels, as is clear from what Gregory says. (Gregory the Great, Homilies on the Gospels, bk. 2, homily 34, sect. 11 (CCSL 141; PL 76:1252).) Therefore, man in the first state, too, had works less efficacious for meriting than after sin.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, as the Master said in Book II, Distinction 1, (Sent. II, 1.5.) man was made to repair the ruin of the angels. But some angels fell from every order, as was said above. (In II Sent., d. 6, q. 1, aa. 2, 4.) Therefore, however human nature may go, whether in the state of innocence or in the state of sin, some men must be transferred to each of the orders of the angels. Therefore, since this only happens by virtue of merit, it seems that man’s works at least did not have greater efficacy for meriting in the state of innocence than after sin.

On the contrary, the more pure something is in a genus, the more it possess the power of that genus, as pure fire is more powerful than mixed fire. But our merits are mixed with some demerit, which is clear from what is said in Isaiah 64:6: all our righteous deeds are like a polluted garment. Therefore, since in the first state they would have been without any mixture of demerit, it seems that they would then have been more efficacious for meriting.

Furthermore, the more prompt the will is to work, the more man merits: if the readiness is there, it is acceptable according to what a man has, not according to what he has not (2 Cor 8:12). But in the first state the will was more prompt to act well because it was less impeded. Therefore, man’s works were more efficacious for meriting.

I answer that, since merit consists not in a habit but in an act, and not in just any act, but in that which is informed by the habit of grace, and every meritorious act proceeds from the will, merit must have something from grace, something from the will, and also something from the object of the act, from which the species of the act is derived. Thus, the efficacy for merit can be measured from the three elements of grace, the will, and the object. For the greater the charity and grace with which an act is informed, the more meritorious it is. Likewise, too, the more voluntary it is, the more it has the account of merit and praiseworthiness. Likewise, too, the more arduous the object is, the more meritorious the act is, since we always understand the comparison to be made of one aspect, all else being equal. But arduousness has the property of increasing the account of merit, not from the difficulty of the effort, but from its goodness. For the better something is, the more elevated it is above the powers of the man working.

Thus, because man would have had more grace in the first state in general than after sin, as has been said, (Above: a. 3, resp.) and his will would have been more prompt to work, not having resistance, it follows that man’s works in the first state were more efficacious for meriting simply than they are after, as long as we consider the activity with regard to the same object in both cases, although man works with greater difficulty regarding this object after sin than before. For arduous work increases the aspect of merit only by reason of goodness, not by reason of difficulty—except incidentally, to wit, inasmuch as one rises to what is difficult with greater attention and greater effort of will.

Reply Obj. 1: It would not have been meritorious for man not to consent to temptation in the first state, if man is considered only in his natural endowments, as the Master is speaking of him here. But this occurs from his not possessing grace as from a cause through itself, not from his being impelled to evil only incidentally, to wit, inasmuch as from the fact that man had nothing impelling him to evil he was more able to be preserved from a fall into sin without grace than he is afterwards.

Or we may say that we speak of not consenting to temptation in two ways: in one way, such that only a negation is implied; and in this way, since some act is not given up, the account of merit will not remain. This could have occurred in the first state because of the fact that man was not compelled to shake off external temptation, since he was not troubled by internal temptation. In another way, it implies the act of the will contrary to the temptation. And in this way, resisting sin is always meritorious for someone who possesses grace.

Reply Obj. 2: Even though man in the first state did not have an internal struggle, he did have an external struggle. Hence he was also able to have victory whereby to merit a crown. Nor is struggle against someone fighting against oneself necessary for merit, because then we would not find merit in the angels. Rather, what is necessary for merit is the struggle wherein one strives to lay hold of something that is above himself, as one wrestling, as it were, with his own power. Nor is it necessary that where there is a greater struggle there be greater merit. Rather, there is greater merit where the struggle is more legitimate. Now, it can happen that in a lesser assault there be a more legitimate struggle.

Reply Obj. 3: Something can be called “difficult” in two ways. Either it is from the arduousness of the work, and this is the way in which virtue is understood to concern what is difficult, namely, what is difficult and arduous in itself. Or it is from the imperfection of the worker, and in this way, virtue does not concern what is difficult, but rather virtue takes away such difficulty. Yet we should not say that the more virtuous one is, the less he merits. And in this way, there is greater difficulty in man’s works after sin from the imperfection of the worker.

Reply Obj. 4: When the works of a given angel are less meritorious than those of a given man, this occurs not from the imperfection of angels, but from the condition of grace. Although grace in the angels is greater with reference to state because it is nearer to the end, since a shorter wayfaring state was given to angels than to man, as was said above, man’s grace can be greater in its power to merit. For grace was given to angels to merit a determinate rank in accord with a determinate order. Thus, they can merit no further reward through this grace. However, since from the condition of nature man is not determined to any order, but is related to them all indifferently, he also receives grace as indifferently ordered to merit the rank of any order according to its genus. Thus, it is not necessary that for this reason man would have been able to merit less in the first state than after sin.

Reply Obj. 5: Even though man now reaches the same term he would have reached before sin, his acts need not have equal efficacy for meriting. For what he was able then to merit from few acts, he now must merit from many acts, such that through carrying out the acts he grows to a kind of perfection, in accord with which the merit of a reward as great as he would previously have had belongs to him.

Article 5

Whether the expulsion from paradise and the privation of original justice is a fitting punishment for the first transgression

To the fifth we proceed as follows. It seems that man’s punishment for the sin of the first transgression is unfittingly determined in the text. (Sent. II, 29.3(187).1.)

Obj. 1: For what was made for the sake of man should be of service to some man. But the earthly paradise was made for man’s sake, as were the other creatures. Therefore, since it is of no service to man after he has been cast out, it seems that he should not have been expelled from there.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, on account of man’s sin, all of nature, which was made for man’s sake, has fallen into decline, as a Gloss on Romans 8 says. (See Ambrosiaster, Commentaria in Romanos, ch. 8 (PL 17:497).) Therefore, much more should that place in which the sin was committed, namely, the earthly paradise, have been spoiled. But spoiled man is due a spoiled place. Therefore, after sin he should not have been expelled from the earthly paradise.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as the Master said above, (Sent. II, 17.5(100).4.) the earthly paradise is of itself an inaccessible place. Therefore, in vain are the guards stationed there to prevent man’s approaching it, since even without them he would not be able to reach it.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, after sin, man was immediately afflicted with the necessity of death. But from his having the necessity of dying, he was not able not to die. Therefore, in vain did the Lord say: lest he put forth his hand and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever (Gen 3:22).

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the tree of life would not have had a greater effect in man after sin than before. But man ate of the tree of life before sin, as it says in the text, (Sent. II, 29.6(190).1–2.) yet he did not live forever. Therefore, even if he had eaten of it after sin, he would not have lived forever.

Obj. 6: One might say that the tree of life only had this effect when eaten from frequently.

On the contrary, a multiplied cause does not vary the effect in species. Therefore, if the tree of life was not the cause of immortality when eaten from once, it seems that neither would it be so if eaten from frequently.

On the contrary, that which was owed to innocence should not have remained when innocence was lost. But that place and food were owed to innocence. Therefore, after sin man should have been deprived of both.

Furthermore, the empyrean heaven, in which the angels were created, was a more proper place to them than the earthly paradise, wherein man was placed after being created outside of it, was to him. But after sin, angels were cast out of the empyrean heaven. Therefore, man, too, should have been expelled from the earthly paradise after sin.

I answer that, as regards happiness or beatitude, there is something that pertains to it that is of its substance, such as the vision of God, joy, and so forth; but there is also something that corresponds to it after the manner of appropriateness, such as that the most excellent place, which is the empyrean heaven, should correspond to the saints’ beatitude. So, too, as regards the state of innocence, in which man was in a certain way blessed, as Augustine says, (Augustine, The City of God, bk. 22, ch. 21 (CCSL 48; PL 41:783).) some things pertained to it as though essentially, such as immortality, obedience of the lower powers to reason, and things of this sort. But some others pertained to it after the manner of appropriateness. For to immortal life was due a most temperate place, separated from all disquiet and full of delights, such as the earthly paradise is. Hence just as after sin man was cast down from that state of innocence, to which he had been elevated above the condition of his nature when considered absolutely, so also he lost the place that was due to that excellence and was cast into the place where he had been formed.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the earthly paradise does not serve man as coming into his usage, it does serve him by furthering his instruction, as man, by knowing in Scripture that he was deprived of such a place through sin, is incited to avoid sin and to come to knowledge of his own wretchedness.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as the infection of sin only comes to other creatures through the sin of the rational creature, so also this infection or corruption is not ordered to punishment except for the rational creatures. Hence the place in which man and the angels sinned, namely, the earthly paradise and the empyrean heaven, need not be spoiled, but instead those places that have been appointed for sinners after sin.

Reply Obj. 3: The impediments by reason of which the earthly paradise is said to be inaccessible are perhaps here called the “flaming sword.” For that place seems to be inaccessible particularly because of the intemperate heat in the intervening places. Thus, it does not follow that such impediments are superfluous.

Reply Obj. 4: Even if man after sin had eaten of the tree of life, he would not have been able to escape death, though he would have been able to defer death such that his life would be prolonged by the help of the tree, as is believed of Enoch and Elijah. And it was not expedient for man that he should remain for so long in this wretched life. These words of the Lord are more to be understood by way of compassion than insult. Or else we may say what the Master says in the text. (Sent. II, 29.4(188).1.)

Reply Obj. 5: Even if man had eaten of the tree of life before sin, he would not have received immortality, since the tree of life was only able to confer this when eaten of frequently.

Reply Obj. 6: Thus, to the sixth objection we should say that the tree of life was not through itself the cause of immortality, as is clear from the aforementioned, but was rather like a kind of disposition. But a disposition only leads to the effect when multiplied, as is clear in active and passive qualities, which are dispositions to the form of an element. For the form of the element is only induced when the matter is brought to an intensity of these qualities.

Exposition of the text

It operates by freeing and preparing the will of man to the good. (Sent. II, 29.1(185).2.) Freeing refers to expelling sin, and preparing to informing the soul.

‘Yet the same free decision was not sufficient to have or retain righteousness without the imparting of divine aid.’ (Sent. II, 29.1(185).2, quoting Augustine, Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate, ch. 106 (CCSL 46; PL 40:281).) On the contrary, it was said above that, although man did not have that whereby he could make progress, he did have that whereby he could stand. Therefore, free decision was sufficient to retain righteousness.

And it should be said that a thing’s being and its preservation are from the same cause. Hence just as the being of gratuitous righteousness is only from God, so also is its preservation. But it is true that a man having grace does not need another grace for its preservation. And this is the reason why it is said that a man can stand by himself.

In response to these, we say that he certainly did not have these virtues when he sinned, but that he had them before, and then he lost them. (Sent. II, 29.2(186).1.) This seems false. For if when he sinned he did not have them, he would have then lost them prior to sinning, which seems false.

But it should be said that he had the virtues before the beginning of the sin. But these two, the commission of sin and the loss of virtue, were simultaneous, even as there is a single instant in which blackness is expelled and whiteness brought in.

‘Man was most blessed before sin and tasted the ethereal air.’ (Sent. II, 29.2(186).2, quoting Ambrose, Expositio in Psalmum XCVIII, serm. 4, v. 25, n. 3 (PL 15:1237).) This should be understood not of the blessedness of heaven, but instead as blessedness including such perfection as was appropriate to that state. And he tasted the ethereal air inasmuch as he remained fixed on the contemplation of divine things.

‘And to have made use of what was allowed to them.’ (Sent. II, 29.6(190).1, quoting Augustine, De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo parvulorum, bk. 2, ch. 21, para. 35 (CSEL 60:106; PL 44:171).) From this it is not sufficiently proved that man in that state ate of the tree of life. For an affirmative precept does not oblige at every moment. Hence even if he were commanded to make use of all the trees allowed to him, he could have deferred the eating of any one of them until the limit predefined for him by God. Thus, some do not grant how the Master settles the matter here. But we cannot settle on which is more true, since Scripture does not settle the matter and it cannot be proved by reason.