D. 23 - Divine permission of the first sin

Division of the text

After the Master has determined the principle of man’s perdition both on the part of the temptation and on the part of the one committing the sin, in this part he addresses the divine permission, which is in a certain way called the “principle of sin” as a cause sine qua non. For if God had not permitted it, man would not have sinned.

It is divided into five parts, in accord with the five questions he raises.

The second begins at ‘some are also troubled.’ (Sent. II, 23.1(136).2, quoting Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 11, ch. 9 (CSEL 28.1:342; PL 34:434).)

The third begins at they also add, ‘He ought to have made man such that he would not have been willing to sin at all.’ (Sent. II, 23.1(136).3, quoting Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 11, ch. 7 (CSEL 28.1:340; PL 34:433).)

The fourth, at they also say, ‘If God willed it, these too would be good.’ (Sent. II, 23.1(136).4, quoting Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 11, ch. 9 (CSEL 28.1:342; PL 34:434).)

The fifth, at they also say, ‘God could change their will to the good.’ (Sent. II, 23.1(136).5, quoting Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 11, ch. 10 (CSEL 28.1:343; PL 34:434).)

Then we should proceed to the second part, in which he shows what perfection of soul Adam had that he could resist sin, which begins at and in respect to the spirit, man was rational. (Sent. II, 23.2(137).1.)

There it is divided into three parts.

In the first, he shows man’s quality with respect to his soul as regards knowledge.

In the second, he shows this as regards natural potential, at now it is necessary to investigate. (Sent. II, 24.1(140).1.)

In the third, he shows his quality as regards grace, at this is operating and co-operating grace. (Sent. II, 26.1(162).1.)

The first is divided into two parts.

In the first, he shows what man received knowledge of at the beginning of his creation.

In the second, he shows what sort of knowledge he had of these things, at it is very clear that man received knowledge of created things. (Sent. II, 23.3(138).2.)

Concerning this he does three things.

First, he shows what sort of knowledge he had of created things.

Second, he shows what sort of knowledge he had of God, at it is believed that the first man also had knowledge of the Creator. (Sent. II, 23.3(138).4.)

Third, he shows what sort of knowledge he had of himself, at moreover, the same man appears to have received knowledge of himself. (Sent. II, 23.3(138).5.)

Concerning this he does two things.

First, he settles on the truth.

Second, he raises a doubt and resolves it, at but if it is asked whether man had knowledge of the things that were to happen to him . . . it can be answered that the things which he ought to do were decreed to him, rather than future things revealed. (Sent. II, 23.4(139).1.)

Here there are two questions.

The first concerns the divine permission with respect to the sin of the first man. (Q. 1.)

The second concerns the first man’s knowledge as regards his first state. (Q. 2.)

Question 1

The divine permission of the first sin

Concerning the first, two questions are asked:

first, whether God could have conferred on a created nature the inability to sin from the constitution of its nature;

second, whether God should have permitted man to be tempted and to sin. For the other things that pertain to permission are treated in Book I. (In I Sent., dd. 45–48.)

Article 1

Whether a natural inability to sin could have been conferred on a created nature

To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that a natural inability to sin could have been conferred on a created nature.

Obj. 1: This is first because of what Augustine says in the text, (Sent. II, 23.1(136).3, quoting Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 11, ch. 7 (CSEL 28.1:340; PL 34:413).) namely, that the nature that cannot sin is that of the holy angels, while the nature that can sin is that of men. Nor can it be said that this belongs to the angelic nature through grace, since in this respect they would not differ from man, to whom this also belongs through grace. Therefore, it seems that the angels possess the property of not being able to sin through the constitution of their nature.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, spiritual nature is more noble than bodily nature. But there is a bodily nature in which sin or error can in no way occur, even according to the constitution of its nature, namely, the heavenly nature. Therefore, all the more is there a spiritual nature in which sin can in no way occur according to the condition of its nature.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as Damascene says, (John Damascene (ca. 675–749 AD), On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 11, ch. 7 (PG 94:795).) from the fact that a created thing is made from nothing, two kinds of variability follow in different things. One is with respect to being, as in the case of things that are corrupted. The other is with respect to choice, as in the case of those that sin. But being invariable as regards being is conferred on some natures, as in the case of spiritual substances and heavenly bodies. Therefore, the property of being invariable as regards choice can be conferred on some nature according to its natural condition.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, it is obvious that the divine naturally has the property of being unable to sin. Therefore, since he is supremely good and supremely powerful, it seems that he has conferred or could have conferred his likeness on a creature in such a way that by its nature it would not be able to sin.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, it is obvious that the inability to sin is conferred on a creature through grace. But God could have made it so that the habit of grace that creates confirmation in the good would be an essential part of some nature or even something more perfect than this habit. Therefore, it seems that if there were such a nature, then according to its natural principle it would possess confirmation in the good. Therefore, it seems that he could have conferred the inability to sin on a creature.

On the contrary, the perfection of the universe consists in the fact that all the goodnesses that can be communicated to created things have been communicated as regards their genus. But the inability to sin from one’s proper nature has not been communicated to any nature, since it has been communicated neither to man nor to the angels, as the sin of both proves. Therefore, it seems that this was not communicable to a creature.

Furthermore, confirmation in the good seems to follow from perfect adherence to the end. But the end to which uprightness of the will is ordered exceeds the power, intellect, and desire of anything created. Therefore, it seems impossible for there to be a creature that naturally has the property of being unable to sin.

I answer that the inability to sin due to the constitution of its nature has not been communicated to any creature, nor was it able to be communicated. The reason for this is that, since everything created depends on God as on the cause of its being, if left to itself it must fail, while as long as it receives the influence of the cause, it is preserved. But a thing caused can be connected to its cause in two ways: either such that it is in the power of the caused to withdraw or not to withdraw from its cause in some respect, or else such that this is not in its power. The first pertains to free decision, since it is essential to free decision that it be able to act or not to act. (Liberum aribitrum is here translated as “free decision,” though it is more commonly translated as “free will” or “free choice.” See note below at d. 24, in the division of the first part of the text.) But if it does not adhere to its cause, then it must fail. Hence Augustine says: when God is present to him, man is illuminated, but when he is absent, he falls into darkness at once. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 8, ch. 12, n. 26 (CSEL 28.1:249; PL 34:383).) Thus, it was impossible for the inability to sin according to the constitution of its nature to be conferred on a creature while free decision is preserved. For this implies a kind of contradiction. For if it is free decision, it must be able to adhere or not to adhere to its cause. And if it cannot sin, it cannot not adhere to its cause, and so a contradiction follows.

But it does befit the divine nature, which has uprightness from itself, not to be able to fail through the condition of its nature: just as it cannot fail in being, so also it cannot fail in uprightness of goodness. And whatever things have received confirmation in the good through grace have this confirmation through the gift of grace, through which they become sons of God and in a certain way partakers of the divine nature.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine does not intend to say that the angels have the property of not being able to sin through the constitution of their nature, but through the gift of grace. Even so, they are distinguished from men in that they received, as though from the beginning of their creation, the gratuitous confirmation that is given to men after a long period of time.

Reply Obj. 2: Spiritual nature is also invariable in being like bodily nature. And therefore, just as no sin can occur in the incorruptible bodies, so too in these natures, as in an angel or in a soul: they are unable to have any flaw. But a bodily nature has no choice such that there could be sin in them in this way; hence, in regard to the sin of choice, no comparison can be made between bodily and spiritual creation.

Reply Obj. 3: Any given thing has principles determined for its being and natural properties. These principles are not among the things subject to its power. Thus, a creature possesses invariance in relation to them. But choice is of the things that are in its power. Hence because in these matters the rational creature is in a way left to itself, as it is said, God left him in the hand of his own counsel (Sir 15:14), (RSV reads in the power of his own inclination.) it can fail.

Reply Obj. 4: It is not from the imperfection of the divine power that it is unable to confer its likeness on a creature in this regard, but rather from the imperfection of the creature. This is partly from the fact that it cannot receive this, and partly from the fact that there is a kind of impossibility in implying contradictories, as has been said. (Resp.)

Reply Obj. 5: Whenever an accident belongs to a nature only from the influence of a higher nature, the lower nature cannot have that accident of itself unless it becomes something of a higher nature, such as when air is actually illuminated through fire, it cannot be the case that it is actually bright by its own nature, unless it becomes fire. Therefore, I say that since confirmation in the good exists in the rational creature only through grace, which is a kind of spiritual light and a likeness to the uncreated light, it can only be the case that a creature has this confirmation from its own nature if it possesses the divine nature, which is altogether impossible.

Article 2

Whether God should have permitted man to be tempted or to sin

To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that God should not have permitted man to sin or to be tempted.

Obj. 1: For it is characteristic of a wise artisan to make each thing, to whatever extent he is able, adequate for its end. But man was made for beatitude as for an end. Therefore, since he would have been made more adequate for beatitude without sin, it seems that God should not have permitted him to fall into sin.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, to those to whom the same end is given, the same faculty to arrive at the end should be given. But man and the angels were created for a single end, namely, to participate in beatitude, as has been said. (Above: d. 1, q. 2, a. 2.) Therefore, since God made an angelic nature that could not sin, as it says in the text, it seems that he should have made such a human nature.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it pertains to the providence of one who is wise that he remove impediments to his work. Therefore, because man was impeded from his uprightness through the demon’s temptation, and divine providence oversees all created things, especially rational ones, it seems that he should not have permitted man to be tempted.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the more efficient something becomes, the more sure and good it is. Hence between two points a straight line is the shortest of all. But for man not to have sinned was a more efficient way to arrive at beatitude than for man after sin to be transferred from sin to beatitude. Therefore, it seems that God should not have permitted man to sin.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, a lesser evil should be permitted in place of a greater evil. But the lessening of some praise is less evil than sin itself, since it is opposed to a lesser good. Therefore, it seems that the reason for the divine permission that is assigned in the text (Sent. II, 23.1(136).1–5.) was insufficient, namely, that it is more glorious not to consent than not to be able to be tempted.

On the contrary, that whereby God is clearly praiseworthy should not be entirely impeded. But God appears as praiseworthy in sins, since he spares through mercy and punishes through justice. Therefore, it seems that he should not have altogether impeded sin.

Furthermore, every good is more powerful in its goodness than evil in its malice. Therefore, it is not fitting that an evil should be impeded in such a way that a good is thereby taken away. But if God did not permit man to sin, free decision would be taken away, since it undergoes no compulsion. Therefore, man was fittingly permitted to sin.

I answer that it pertains to divine providence that each thing be left in its own nature, since, as Dionysius says, providence does not corrupt nature but saves it. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4 (PG 3:734).) The reason for this is that the good of the universe exceeds the particular good of any created nature, just as the good of the nation exceeds the good of a man, as it says in the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.2, 1094b8–11.) Now, if through providence a nature is changed by being transferred from its rank to a higher one, then, even though a good accrues to that nature, something is detracted from the goodness of the universe, since not all ranks of goodness would be full, with that rank from which the nature had been transferred remaining empty.

Therefore, I say that if sin were altogether impeded, many ranks of goodness would thereby be taken away. For the nature that can sin and not sin would be taken away, which is a good. The fact of being able to rise out of sin would also be taken away, and many such things, which, if they were removed, would lead to much being detracted from the goodness of the universe. Thus, it pertains to divine providence to permit man to be tempted and to sin if he wills it.

Reply Obj. 1: A wise artisan considers what belongs to a part of the building not only taken in itself, but also in proportion to the whole building. Therefore, just as he makes one part better than another, so also God makes each thing proportionate to the end as befits its nature within the order of the whole universe.

Reply Obj. 2: Not even the angels possess the property of being unable to sin by their nature, as the sin of some of them has shown. Rather, through the grace of confirmation, which they received immediately after the beginning of their creation, they were confirmed so that they cannot sin. So also man, when he has reached the end of his way by the straight course, obtains the same confirmation. But the difference between their natures makes it so that a shorter way was assigned to angels than to man, as has been said. (Above: a. 1; d. 11, q. 2, a. 1, resp.) Nor is it necessary for all things ordered to a single end to be assigned to reach the end by the same course and in the same way. Instead, this is assigned to each according to its own condition.

Reply Obj. 3: It is characteristic of one who is wise to remove an impediment in a way that does not take away the nature of the thing, which would not be the case if he did not permit man or the angels, while in the wayfaring state, to fall into sin.

Reply Obj. 4: The shorter way is not always to be chosen, except when through it everything that pertains to the matter in question is fittingly preserved. And this would not be the case if he did not permit man to fall into sin.

Reply Obj. 5: A violent prohibition of sin would take away not only praise, but also the natural order of things, which divine providence in no way tolerates.

Question 2

The knowledge of man in his original state

Then the question of the knowledge that man in his first state had is asked. Concerning this three questions are asked:

first, whether he saw God in his essence;

second, whether he had knowledge of all things;

third, whether he could have been deceived.

Article 1

Whether Adam saw God in his essence

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.94.1; Disputed Questions on Truth, q. 18, aa. 1–2.) It seems that Adam saw God in his essence.

Obj. 1: For the vision of God in his essence is called the “immediate vision of God.” But Adam in his first state saw God without a medium, as the Master says. (Peter Lombard, In IV Sent., d. 1: homo enim, qui ante peccatum sine medio Deum videbat, per peccadum a Deo habuit ut nequeat divina capere, nisi humanis exercitatus.) Therefore, it seems that he saw God in his essence.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Augustine says that between our mind and God there is no medium according to the nature of mind. (Augustine, Book of Eighty-Three Different Questions, q. 51, n. 4 (CCSL 44A: PL 40:33).) But every medium of knowing is a medium between the knower and the known. Therefore, it seems that since man existed in the integrity of his nature in the first state, he saw God immediately and in his essence.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as the Apostle says: for now we see through a glass in an enigma, but then face to face (1 Cor 13:12). But in his first state Adam did not see in an enigma, since there was no obscurity in him. Therefore, it seems that at that time he saw face to face.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, whoever does not have what he desires is afflicted. But there was not any affliction in the first state, since punishment could not precede fault. Therefore, since man naturally desired the vision of the divine essence, it seems that he saw God in his essence.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, what is naturally ordered to something only lacks it by being impeded by something, as a stone is naturally ordered to go down. But man’s intellect was naturally ordered to see God in his essence. Therefore, since there was no impediment there because there was neither fault nor punishment, it seems that he saw God in his essence.

On the contrary, it is said: no one has ever seen God (John 1:18), and as a Gloss on Isaiah 6 says: that is, no man existing in the wayfaring state. (We have been unable to find the source for this Gloss; cf. Glossa ordinaria, at Isaiah 6:1, 4.78; John Chrysostom, Interpretatio in Isaiam prophetam, ch. 6 (PG 56:68).) But Adam was a wayfarer, since he was able to sin. Therefore, it seems that he did not see God in his essence.

Furthermore, as Augustine says, the vision of the Godhead in its essence is the whole reward. (Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, Psalm 90, sermon 2, n. 13 (CCSL 39; PL 36:1169).) But it is obvious that man in the state of innocence did not possess the reward of beatitude. Therefore, he also did not see God in his essence.

I answer that, as it says in the text, (Sent. II, 23.3(138).4.) the mode of Adam’s knowing was a mean between the wayfaring knowledge by which we now see God and the knowledge of our homeland by which the saints will see him in glory. Hence, to elucidate such a matter, we should see how many ways there are in which God can be seen.

Now, it should be known that he can be seen in three ways: first, in his essence; second, through his effect flowing down into the intellect of the one seeing; third, through an effect outside the intellect of the one seeing, in which a likeness to God is reflected. A parallel to this can be observed in bodily vision.

For light is not seen by the eye through a likeness to it that is left in it, but rather through its own essence informing the eye, and to this one may compare the first manner of the vision of God, which is through his essence. This manner of vision from the condition of one’s own nature is due to the divine nature alone, in which the knower and the known are the same.

But a stone is seen by the bodily eye through a likeness to it left in the eye, and one may compare this to the second manner, which is through an effect left in the intellect of the one seeing. This manner of seeing befits angels in accord with the condition of their nature. For, as it says in the Book of Causes, (Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 8.) every intelligence knows what is above it through the fact of its being a cause for it. Hence, knowing the very light of its own nature, which is a likeness of the uncreated light, it sees God.

Finally, a man’s countenance reflected in a mirror is seen by the eye not through a likeness to it immediately left in the eye, but through a likeness reflected in the mirror, from which it is reflected in the pupil; and the vision by which God is seen through an effect outside the intellect of the one seeing is compared to this. The effect can be a natural one, as philosophers arrived at God by natural knowledge through the knowledge of created things. Or it can be a spiritual effect, as is the case in the vision of the faith of one who adheres to the things that have been revealed to others through the influence of spiritual light. Thus, we are said to see now in an enigma , according to the Apostle. This last manner belongs to man in accord with the condition of his nature, since our intellect cannot even understand itself except through the species of things that it has with it. For it comes to the knowledge of acts through objects and to the knowledge of powers through acts.

Therefore, the angels and man are elevated to the first manner of vision, which is due to God alone from the condition of nature, through glory. Hence this is the vision of the blessed, which man in his first state did not have. However, to the second manner, which is natural to the angels and above man’s nature, man is elevated through grace, even after the state of fault. This is clear even in the case of contemplatives who merit divine revelations, and all the more was it the case in the first state through the grace of original justice. Finally, the third manner is commonly that of wayfarers, even after the state of fault. Hence it is clear that the manner in which Adam in his first state saw God is a mean between both.

However, some, saying otherwise, err by asserting that God is never seen in his essence, either in our homeland or in the wayfaring state, which is heretical and contrary to Scripture, as is clear from 1 Corinthians 13:12 and 1 John 3:2. Some say the contrary, that God is seen in his essence in every state. These, too, are opposed by the authorities of the saints. For Dionysius says (Pseudo-Dionysius, Epistles 1, “To Caius” (PG 3:1066).) that if someone who sees God knows what he has seen, then he has not seen him, but instead something of what belongs to him. And Gregory says (Gregory the Great (ca. 540–604 AD), Moralia in Job, bk. 28, ch. 54 (CCSL 143B; PL 76:91).) that no matter how much a man progresses in the wayfaring state, he still does not reach that state of contemplation where God is seen in his essence.

Reply Obj. 1: Adam in the first state is said to have seen God without medium not because he saw him in his essence, but because it was not through the medium of argumentation proceeding from sensible creatures that he arrived at knowledge of God. Rather, it was by the mediation of a spiritual effect reflected in his intellect, as angels also saw God in their first state. Thus, it is said that after sin sacramental signs were necessary that man might perceive spiritual things through sensible ones.

Reply Obj. 2: When it is said that nothing is a medium between God and our mind, this should be understood not in accord with the dignity of nature, since the nature of the angelic mind is above the nature of the human mind, as Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 4 (PG 3:179).) Gregory, (Gregory the Great, Homilies on the Gospels, bk. 2, homily 34 (CCSL 141; PL 76:1246).) and Augustine (Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John, tract. 110, para. 7 (CCSL 36; 35:1924).) expressly say. Nor is it deprived of a medium after the manner of what informs, since created charity is the medium joining our minds to God. Rather, it is understood to mean that he immediately beatifies and justifies the mind, just as he immediately creates it.

Reply Obj. 3: An enigma implies a certain obscurity of knowledge by the fact that an enigma, according to Donatus, is a riddle wrapped in obscurity. Now, three kinds of obscurity can befall an intellect. The first is from the fact that it is made from nothing, since in this it falls short of the clarity of the uncreated intellect. In this regard every created intellect sees in an enigma. The second kind of obscurity is from the fact that an intellect understands by inquiring and through the conditions of space and time. Such obscurity befalls the human intellect in comparison to the angelic intellect, which is God-like, whereas the human intellect uses reasoning and receives knowledge from sensible things in accord with the condition of its nature. In both these ways man would have seen in an enigma in the first state. Finally, the third kind of obscurity overtakes the human intellect due to sin, following from the corruption of the flesh, which aggravates the soul (Wis 9:15). And in this way, man now sees in an enigma, while at that time he would not have seen in an enigma.

Reply Obj. 4: It is not the lack of just any desired good that produces affliction or punishment, but only of that which ought to be had when it is the time to have it. Thus, Adam in the first state, even though he did not see God, which he supremely desired, was not thereby afflicted, since it was not yet the time to arrive at that vision. Otherwise, it would follow that everything that tends toward arriving at some end that it has not yet attained would be undergoing a punishment.

Reply Obj. 5: Something can impede an act in two ways. One way is by contrariety, such as when violent heat prevents water from cooling. And in this way, fault and punishment impede the vision of God, and in his first state man did not have this kind of impediment. The other way is by simple negation, such as when a country person is impeded from the act of doing geometry from the fact that he does not have the habit of geometry. And in this way, even Adam was impeded from the act of the vision of God, since his intellect had not yet been raised up to this act through the habit of glory.

Article 2

Whether Adam had perfect knowledge of things from his creation

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.94.3; On Truth, q. 18, a. 4.) It seems that Adam did not have perfect knowledge of things from creation.

Obj. 1: For, according to Anselm, (Anselm, On the Virginal Conception and Original Sin, ch. 2 (PL 158:434).) Adam would have generated children such as he himself was in the first state. But it was said above that children would not have been born perfect in knowledge, according to one opinion, to which the Master seemed to assent. (Sent. II, 20.5(120).1–2.) Therefore, neither would Adam have been made perfect in knowledge.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Augustine says (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 8, ch. 8 (CSEL 28.1:242; PL 34:379).) that Adam was placed in paradise to work in order that he might experience the natures of things. But experience is the principle of receiving knowledge from sensible things and by discovery. Therefore, it seems that he would not have had perfect knowledge of things from the very beginning.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in On the Soul 3, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 429a23–24.) before it understands, the intellect is not actually any of the things that exist. But it cannot understand without a phantasm, as is said in the same place, just as sight cannot see without color. Therefore, since it is not any of the things that exist except as actually perfected and possessing the species of a thing existing in nature, it seems that he would have received knowledge from sensible things by the mediation of the senses and imagination. And so, he would not have been immediately perfect in knowledge.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, (Perhaps this claim can be inferred from Aristotle, insofar as the intellect is a blank tablet (On the Soul 3.4) and requires habituation (Nicomachean Ethics 2.1), which is a requisite for human happiness (Nicomachean Ethics 1.7, 2.4).) and as the Master also said above, (Sent. II, 1.6.3‒6; see Aquinas, In II Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 5.) the soul was infused into the body so that in it the soul might be perfected in knowledge and virtues. This is the purpose for which the senses and members were given to it. But this would be in vain if the intellect did not acquire perfection through the activity of the senses. Therefore, because nothing is vain in the works of nature, especially in the composition of the human body, it seems that man would have received knowledge of things from sensible things as he does now and would not have immediately had perfect knowledge.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, one who is perfect in knowledge has no need to be perfected by another who illuminates him. But in his first state Adam would also have been illuminated through the angels. Otherwise the natural order of created things, in accord with which the angelic nature is placed between the divine and the human, receiving from one and pouring down into the other, as Dionysius says, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 4 (PG 3:179).) would be lost. Therefore, he would not have been perfect in knowledge.

On the contrary, names are applied to things by being taken from their properties. For each thing is named after what is most noble in it. But Adam gave names to the animals, as it is said (Gen 2:20). Therefore, at the beginning of his creation he knew the natures of the animals and, consequently, of other things.

Furthermore, the more noble something is, the less becoming it is for there to be a defect in it. But in Adam’s body there was no imperfection in the state of innocence. Therefore, much less was there imperfection in his intellect.

I answer that it is necessary to attribute to man in the first state that knowledge without which he would have been imperfect, and nothing more. Now, the knowledge of something is said to be imperfect when one does not know something that pertains to him. Thus, man in the first state would have lacked no knowledge of what pertained to him. Yet his own disposition in his proper acts pertained to him. Thus, he is said to have had perfect knowledge of the things that he was to do or to avoid. Likewise, too, other created things pertained to him inasmuch as they were made for his sake, for him to take sustenance from them or to rule over them and govern them. Thus, man had as much knowledge of each and every thing as pertained to his use. Nor is it necessary to ascribe more knowledge to him in the first state.

But Adam had this knowledge in one way and his descendants would have arrived at it in another way. For nature takes its beginning from the perfect, as Boethius says, (Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius (ca. 480–524 AD), The Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 3, prose 10 (CCSL 94; PL 63:763).) and it is said that his works are perfect (Deut 32:4). Thus Adam, as the principle of the whole human race, received in his origin every perfection that belongs to human nature, both in body and in soul, in such a way that he was able to propagate others corporeally and instruct them intellectually. But his children, because they were born with original justice, which, like any virtue, cannot exist without prudence, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 6, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.13, especially 1144b15–29.) would have necessarily had the habit of knowledge through which they could know what they should do, and what they should avoid immediately after birth. Though perhaps the use of reason would have been impeded, according to one opinion, due to indisposition of the organs. But it is not necessary for them to have had the habits of knowledge of other things at their birth. Rather, they would have developed them through discovery and being taught, so that nevertheless, together with the perfection of the body, there would also come about the perfection of knowledge. Hence the Philosopher says in the Ethics 6 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.13, especially 1144b15–29.) that prudence and the habits of the sort that pertain to the knowledge of things we should do are more natural to us than the knowledge of other things. However, some say that they would have received the habits of knowledge of all things immediately after birth. But this does not seem necessary, either with regard to integrity of nature, nor with regard to original justice.

Reply Obj. 1: As was said above, the children of Adam did not have to be made like him except in what pertained to the human species, either from the constitution of its nature or from God’s gift. But the fact that Adam from the beginning of his creation received the habit of knowing all things befitted him not as a man, but as a man who was the principle of the human race. Hence this habit need not have befitted others.

Reply Obj. 2: There are two ways in which someone can experience a thing. One way is by acquiring from sensible things a habit of knowledge by his experience of them, as happens in us who assemble a single universal out of many experiences, which is the principle of art or science. Adam did not need experience in this way. Another way is such that one also sees in things what he already possesses through a habit of knowledge, this being delightful to the knower. And in this way, Adam would have drawn experiences from the natures of things.

Reply Obj. 3: Our intellect, as has been said above, (Above: d. 17, q. 2, a. 1.) needs a phantasm as its object for two things: in receiving knowledge through the motion that is from things to the soul, and also in surrounding what it already has with phantasms as with particular examples in the motion that is from the soul to things. Therefore, I say that Adam’s intellect in the first state did not need phantasms in the first way, but it did need them in the second way, though it was not necessary for those phantasms to be received from the senses. Otherwise, he would only have been able to understand a thing that he had seen before. However, it does happen that a phantasm can be formed in the imagination that has never been received from the senses through the activity of the interior powers.

Reply Obj. 4: If Adam had not received knowledge of the things pertaining to him through the activities of the senses, they would not have for this reason been in vain, since through the activity of the senses he would have experienced externally what his intellect held internally through the habit of innate knowledge. Besides, receiving knowledge not from sensible things was conferred on him above the condition of his nature. Thus, it was necessary that what befits the perfection of nature according to its own constitution not be taken away from him, just as members fit for eating are not taken away from man in the resurrection, even though he no longer has use of food.

Reply Obj. 5: Adam was not perfect in knowledge in such a way as to know all things. Thus, he would have been illuminated through the angels about what he did not know, just as the lower angels are purged of ignorance by the higher, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 7 (PG 3:210).)

Article 3

Whether in the first state man could be deceived

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.94.4; On Truth, q. 18, a. 6.) It seems that man in the first state could be deceived.

Obj. 1: For, as the Apostle says (1 Tim 2:14), the woman was seduced. But Adam, though he was not seduced in the same way as the woman, was in a way seduced, in that he believed that what was deadly would be venial, as was said in the preceding distinction. Therefore, in the state of innocence he was able to be deceived.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Master said above (Sent. II, 21.4(125).4.) that the woman was not frightened by the serpent because she knew that it was created by God and believed that it had also received the power of speech from him. But this was false, since speaking only belongs properly to one who is intelligent. Therefore, it seems that she was able to be deceived.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it is obvious that Adam in the first state could not have known the secrets of another man’s heart, since not even the angels know this, but rather God alone. But it could have happened that someone would say that he thought what he did not think, and Adam would not have believed that he was lying, since he would not have known this with certainty. Therefore, it seems that he would have been deceived.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the senses sometimes declare something in a way other than it is, as when something appears smaller when seen from farther away. But he would have had knowledge from sensible things through the senses. Therefore, it seems that in that case he could have been deceived in a certain way, since to be deceived is nothing other than to think what is false is true.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Augustine, De libero arbitrio, bk. 3, ch. 18, n. 52 (CCSL 29; PL 32:1296).) that to approve false things as true belongs not to man as he was established in his nature, but instead he was as condemned to punishment. Therefore, since man in his first state lacked all punishment, it seems that he could not be deceived.

Furthermore, there is no deception without ignorance. But ignorance, as Hugh of Saint Victor says, (Hugh of Saint Victor, De sacramentis fidei, bk. 1, pt. 7, ch. 31 (PL 176:301).) is both a fault and a punishment. But this could not have existed in the first state. Therefore, neither was there any deception.

I answer that, as was said above, (Above: d. 23, q. 2, a. 3, resp.) the perfection of the whole man depended on the higher part of the mind by which man clung to God through the uprightness of justice. Thus, while it remained joined to God, just as there could be no defect in the body, such as suffering and death, so also could there be no deception in the soul. Hence, as was said above, Adam was in a certain way able to die, namely, if he first sinned, but was still in a certain way immortal, since the potential for dying would not have proceeded into act unless he had first sinned. So, too, man considered in the state of innocence could have been deceived, if he first sinned, but not before sin.

Reply Obj. 1: As was said above, (Above: d. 22, q. 1.) a kind of self-exaltation entered the woman’s mind after the words of the serpent, through which she believed the serpent’s persuasion. Thus, the seduction followed the self-exaltation, which was the first sin. This is likewise in the case of the man, as has been said. (Above: d. 22, q. 1, a. 3.)

Reply Obj. 2: The woman believed that the serpent had received the power of speech from God, not by the constitution of its nature, but through the ministry of a spiritual creature. She did not consider whether this happened by the power of a good or wicked angel, or whether it happened with God’s permission or at his command.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as divine providence would have preserved man’s body unharmed from all external dangers, so also it would have preserved man’s intellect undeceived in all matters that exceeded his knowledge, so that he would at once understand something to be false if someone told him some falsity instead of the truth.

Reply Obj. 4: Even if his senses had represented something to him in a way other than its real nature, he would not have been deceived at all, either with regard to the senses, which would have received in the manner appropriate to their proportion to the sensible, or with regard to the intellect, to whose judgment it would have fallen to discern between the senses and the real thing, that is, in order to know why the thing seemed otherwise than it was.

Exposition of the text

But it would not be praiseworthy for human beings, if they could live well only because none would persuade them to live evilly. (Sent. II, 23.1(136).1.) This seems to be false. For in that case, if neither angels nor man had sinned, man’s act would not have been praiseworthy, since then there would be no one persuading him to evil.

But it should be said that this is not to be understood in such a way that praise for a human act depends on persuasion to evil, but rather on the power of resisting the one so persuading. This power could have been manifested if he had been tempted and overcome it. Hence it is said as a sign of this: if they could live well only because none would persuade them to live evilly, as though the fact that there is no one persuading them to live evilly is shown as the cause of their living well.

‘And it is more glorious not to consent than to be unable to be tempted.’ (Sent. II, 23.1(136).1, quoting Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 11, ch. 6 (CSEL 28.1:339; PL 34:432).) This seems to be false. For since God and the angels cannot be tempted, there would be something more glorious in man than in God or in an angel.

But it should be said that this is to be understood on the supposition of the condition of human nature, by which man can sin and not sin. Or it should be explained as the first objection was.

Man did not lose this knowledge by sinning. (Sent. II, 23.3(138).3.) This seems false. For we do not now have the knowledge of all things that Adam had.

But it should be said that even this knowledge was in a way lessened through sin, though not to the point that man is thereby impeded from the way of salvation. Thus, he did not need to be instructed in saving doctrine of this sort.

But he did not have foreknowledge of future things. (Sent. II, 23.4(139).1.) This seems false. For since we have foreknowledge of certain future things, his knowledge would then have been more imperfect than ours.

But it should be said that we only know future things as being in a certain way present in their causes, which are determined to such effects, either necessarily or for the most part. In this way, too, Adam in the first state had knowledge of future things much more fully than we do, though not of things that do not have determinate causes, such as what depends on free decision, like his own fall or even his state.