D. 27 - Virtue

Division of the text

After he has distinguished grace as operating or cooperating, here he inquires about the genus to which it is traced back, namely, whether it is an act or a quality of mind, raising the same question of grace and of virtue, either because the argument about both is the same, or perhaps because he was of the opinion that grace and virtue do not differ.

Now it is divided into two parts.

In the first, he raises a doubt. (Sent. II, 26.9(170).1.)

In the second, he addresses it, at here we must examine what virtue is. In this place, according to some, Distinction 27 begins. (Sent. II, 27.1(173).1; see above, near the beginning of the division of the text of Distinction 26, where Aquinas implies that this is not where he sees Distinction 27 beginning.)

Concerning the first, he does two things.

First, he raises a doubt about the question, at in order that all this may be indicated clearly, we must first set forth that there are three kinds of goods. (Sent. II, 26.9(170).1.) There he gathers a kind of contrariety from Augustine’s statements.

First, he lays out the words where he says that the work of virtue is the good use of free decision. (Sent. II, 26.10(171).1.)

Second, at but it is asked among which goods free decision is found. (Sent. II, 26.11(172).1.) Some words are given there in which Augustine says that the good use of free decision is virtue.

These two are in conflict with each other. For the work of virtue is not virtue. Hence if the use of free decision is virtue, then it is not the work of virtue.

Here we must examine what virtue is. (Sent. II, 27.1(173).1.) Here he addresses the doubt.

First, he addresses it on the basis of one opinion that virtue or grace is not an act.

Second, he addresses it according to the opinion of others that virtue is an act, at but others say that the virtues are good uses of natural powers. (Sent. II, 27.8(170).1.)

The first part is divided into two parts.

In the first, he shows that virtue or grace is not an act.

On this supposition, he shows, second, how one is said to merit through grace. This doubt is left over from the aforementioned discussion, since every merit consists in an act, at and so, when good merits are said to be and begin from grace, either the grace that freely gives, that is, God, is meant; or better, the grace that is freely given. (Sent. II, 27.3(175).1.)

Concerning the first, he intends the following argument. God is the cause of virtue in us, not ourselves. But we are the cause of any act of ours. Therefore, no act is a virtue. Therefore, if grace is virtue or something like virtue, grace is not an act.

Concerning this he proceeds in a different way, as follows.

First, he proves the argument that God alone works virtue in us.

Second, he takes up the argument that every act in us is caused by free decision, at and so, if the grace which heals and frees the will of man is a virtue . . . it follows that virtue is not from free decision. (Sent. II, 27.2(174).1.)

Third, he concludes the case in question, at moreover, not unlearnedly, some teach that virtue is a good quality or form of the mind which informs the soul. (Sent. II, 27.2(174).2.)

He shows the first in three ways.

First, concerning virtue in general on the basis of its definition.

Second, concerning the virtue of justice on the basis of a text from Augustine, at that virtue is the work of God alone, Augustine teaches with regard to the virtue of justice. (Sent. II, 27.1(173).2.)

Third, concerning the virtue of faith, which he says is also given the name of grace, at indeed, writing to the Ephesians on the grace of faith, the Apostle similarly asserts that faith is not from man, but from God alone. (Sent. II, 27.1(173).3.)

And so, when good merits are said to be and begin from grace, either the grace that freely gives, that is, God, is meant; or better, the grace that is freely given. (Sent. II, 27.3(175).1.) Having shown that grace is not an act, here he shows how one is said to merit through it.

This is divided into two parts.

In the first, he shows the case in question.

In the second, he gathers the solution to a doubt from what was said, at from the foregoing, it can already be somewhat clear to us how prevenient grace deserves to be increased. (Sent. II, 27.6(178).2.)

Concerning the first, he does three things.

First, he shows that the principal cause of merit is grace.

Second, he shows how one is said to merit through it, to wit, inasmuch as one merits through its act, at and so, when faith is said to deserve justification and eternal life, it is taken to be said for this reason. (Sent. II, 27.5(177).1.)

Third, he concludes the case in question, at and so it is from the gifts of the virtues that we are good. (Sent. II, 27.6(178).1.)

But others say that the virtues are good uses of natural powers. (Sent. II, 27.8(180).1.) Here he addresses the question according to another opinion on the opposing side.

Concerning this he does three things.

First, he lays out their opinion.

Second, he lays out their proofs, at and they support with the testimonies of the Saints the view that the virtues are movements of the mind. (Sent. II, 27.8(180).3.)

Third, he gives responses to these proofs in accord with the first opinion, at some others, responding to these authorities, say that the foregoing words of Augustine are to be understood as follows. (Sent. II, 27.8(180).4.)

Question 1

Virtue

Here six questions are asked:

first, in which genus virtue is, that is, whether it is in the genus of act or of habit;

second, on the definition of virtue that Augustine puts forth in the text; (Sent. II, 27.1(173).1; Augustine, De libero arbitrio, bk. 2, ch. 18 (CCSL 29; PL 32:1266).)

third, whether it is the case that one merits eternal life condignly in accord with an act of virtue and grace;

fourth, whether one can merit grace for himself;

fifth, whether one can merit for himself an increase of grace;

sixth, whether one can merit the first grace for another.

Article 1

Whether virtue is a habit

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In III Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 3, resp.; ST I-II.55.1; Disputed Questions on the Virtues, q. 1, a. 1; Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, bk. 2, lect. 5.) It seems that virtue is not a habit.

Obj. 1: For the utmost of a thing is not placed in a genus other than the thing itself. But, as the Philosopher says in On the Heavens 1, (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.11, 281a15.) virtue is the utmost of power in a thing. Therefore, it is not in the genus of habit, but in the genus of power.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, natural powers are not more perfect than rational powers. But natural powers are capable of their acts without the mean of habits, as is clear in what is hard and soft. Therefore, all the more are rational powers capable of this. Therefore, virtue is either a power or an act.

Obj. 3: One might say that habits are required in rational powers in order for the powers to be determined to one thing.

On the contrary, a power determined to one thing is always in its act and cannot be inclined to the other side. But a rational power perfected through a moral virtue is not always in its act, since it is not the case that it is always acting, according to the Philosopher in On Sleep and Sleeplessness 1. (Aristotle, On Sleep and Sleeplessness 1, 454b8.) Even if it were in an act, it could still be inclined to the contrary act. Therefore, a rational power is not determined through a habit to one thing.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, reward corresponds to merit. But merit is the good act of the free decision itself. Therefore, since a reward is due virtue and grace, it seems that virtue or grace is an act.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the mean belongs to the same genus as the extremes. But virtue is the mean between passions, as is clear in the Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.6, especially 1106b6–28.) Therefore, it seems that virtue is not in the genus of habit, but in the genus of passion or act, for the soul’s actions are also called “passions,” as it says in the Book of Six Principles. (Porretanus, that is, Gilbert of Poitiers (d. 1154 AD), Liber Sex Principiorum, bk. 2, ch. 2.)

On the contrary, the Philosopher says in the Ethics 2 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.6, 1107a1.) that virtue is a habit of choice consisting in a midpoint, etc.

Furthermore, we are good by virtues. But we do not have gratuitous goodness from acts. Therefore, virtue and grace are not acts.

I answer that, since effects are proportioned to their cause, the act of a rational power must be proportionate to the power itself. Now, in the act of virtue we consider not only the substance of the act itself, but also the mode of acting. For it is not one who does chaste things in just any manner whatsoever who is chaste, but rather one who does so easily and with delight, as related in the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.3, 1104b5.) But delight is caused by fittingness, as in sensible things it is clear that the joining of the fitting with the fitting produces delight. Therefore, virtue’s act must proceed from a power adapted and likened to this act. But a rational power does not have this of itself, since it can go to either side. Therefore, something must be superadded to the power as its perfection through which it may elicit such an act, however it may be caused. This is what we call the habit of virtue.

Thus, the Philosopher says in the Ethics 2 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.3, 1104b4–14 and throughout.) that we should take pleasure following an act as the sign of an established habit.

So it is also that a power perfected by a habit of virtue tends to an act like itself, after the manner of a kind of nature. For this reason Cicero says that virtue is a habit, in the manner of a nature, consonant with reason. (Cicero, De Inventione, bk. 2, para. 30.) For just as heaviness tends downward, so also chastity performs chaste works. So it is also that in a complete nature, whose power cannot be bent toward evil, a habit by whose mediation it may act is not required because the very power is of itself proportioned to perfect act, as is clear in God. And in this way, it is clear that the first opinion holds the truth, while the second is both out of harmony with the statements of the saints and does not agree with philosophy. Rather, it arose from a bad understanding of certain authoritative texts.

Reply Obj. 1: That “utmost” that is something of a thing is not traced back to a different genus, but is in the same genus, either essentially, like the utmost part of a line, or by way of reduction, as a point vis-à-vis a line. Now, this is not the way in which virtue is the “utmost” of a power. Rather, it is called its “utmost” with respect to act. For the highest thing to which a power can be elevated is the act that virtue elicits.

Reply Obj. 2: Natural powers are determined to their acts of themselves. Hence they do not need a determining habit as do rational powers, which can go to either side.

Reply Obj. 3: Some say that the virtues have a kind of act that is continuous without interruption in it, though we do not sense this. For they do not believe that the virtues can be idle. But there are two kinds of act: there is first act, as being is a form’s act. This kind of act of virtue is continuous; for so long as chastity remains, “being chaste” remains continuously. There is also second act, which is activity. And it is not the case that this is continuous. For this act is not only that of virtue, but also of the power it perfects, just as no form that is not subsistent of itself has an activity it does not share with its subject. Nor can there be an act or activity from free decision—especially with choice, without which there can be no act of virtue—that is not perceived by us.

Thus, we must say otherwise, that habit does not take away the nature of a power, and that the nature of a rational power is that it cannot be compelled to one thing. Hence even if it is perfected by virtue, to act or not to act will be in its power, or to do this or the contrary. And it need not continuously follow the inclination of virtue. For the act of virtue has something from the power, namely, that it not be necessary, and something from the habit, namely, that it be done with ease.

Reply Obj. 4: Reward corresponds to grace and merit in different ways. For it corresponds to grace and virtue as to that whence there is the efficacy of meriting in an act. Hence the greater the grace from which an act of virtue proceeds, the more efficacious it is in meriting. But to the act itself, which is called a “merit,” it corresponds as to that whereby one merits through itself. For, as it says in the Ethics 1: as in the Olympiads it is not the best and strongest who are crowned, but those who compete, and of these only some, namely, those who win, so also those who work are enriched with what is good and what is best in life. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.8, 1099a3–5.) This also seems to fit with the Apostle’s opinion: an athlete is not crowned unless he competes according to the rules (2 Tim 2:5).

Reply Obj. 5: We speak of a mean in the case of virtue in two ways: essentially and effectively. Essentially, it is not a mean between two passions, but between two vicious habits, whereby we are in a certain way disposed as regards the passions. And this is not essential to virtue, since we do find a virtue that is not a mean in this way, namely, justice, as is clear from the Ethics 5. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.5, 1133b30.) For to justice—as if to equality and to the mean—is opposed the abundance of one who has more than is just, who by this very fact is unjust, having the vice of injustice, as well as the deficiency of one who has been defrauded, and yet this deficiency in him is not a vice. Thus, justice is not a mean between two vices. But effectively speaking, it is called a “mean between passions” because it finds a mean in the passions. Hence it need not be in the genus of passion.

Article 2

Whether the definition of virtue posited by Augustine is fitting

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I-II.55.4; On the Virtues, q. 1, a. 2. See Augustine, De libero arbitrio, bk. 2, ch. 18 (CCSL 29; PL 32:1266).) It seems that Augustine unfittingly defines virtue. (Lombard summarizes Augustine’s view by defining virtue as bona qualitas mentis qua recte vivitur, et qua nullus male utitur, quam Deus solus in homine operatur, “the good quality of the mind whereby one lives rightly, and which no one uses badly, which God alone works in man.”)

Obj. 1: For, as is said in the Topics 2, (Aristotle, Topics 2.2, 1095b5.) no genus is predicated denominatively of its species. (On denominative naming, see also the first chapter of Aristotle’s Categories. Denominative naming occurs when the ending of a name is altered in order to predicate that name of another genus; for example, we say, “a man is just” rather than “a man is justice.”) But goodness is the genus of virtue. For as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 1, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.7, 1098a16.) virtue is that by which one is good and that which renders work good. Therefore, virtue is unfittingly called a “good quality.”

Obj. 2: Furthermore, that which transcends genus should not be given as the difference of a genus. But “good” transcends the genus of quality, since it is convertible with being. Therefore, it is unfittingly given as the difference of quality when it is said that virtue is a good quality of mind.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a subject included in the definition of an accident should be convertible with it. But “mind” is not related to “virtue” in this way. For not every virtue is in the mind as in a subject. Rather, some are in the concupiscible part, some in the irascible, and so forth for the others. Therefore, “mind” is unfittingly given as the common subject of virtue in its definition.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, that which is proper to a given species should not be included in the definition of the genus. But justice appropriates rectitude to itself. Hence Anselm says that justice is the rectitude of the will kept for its own sake. (Anselm, Dialogue on Truth, ch. 13 (PL 158:480).) Therefore, it is unfitting to include the following in the definition of virtue in general: whereby one lives rightly.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, whoever is proud of a thing makes bad use of it. But many are proud of virtues. For, as Augustine says in his rule, pride ensnares even good works to their ruin. (Augustine, Regula tertia vel Praeceptum, sect. 2 (PL 32:1379).) Therefore, it is false to say: of which no one makes bad use.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, whoever lives rightly does not make bad use. Therefore, since Augustine said that virtue is that whereby one lives rightly, it was superfluous for him to add: of which no one makes bad use.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, Augustine says: he who created you without you will not justify you without you. (Augustine, Sermones ad populum, serm. 169, ch. 11 (CCSL 41Bb; PL 38:923).) But justification happens only through virtue. Therefore, what follows is false: which God works in us without us.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, what is defined befits whatever the definition befits. But grace is not virtue, as was said above, and yet this sort of definition befits it. Therefore, this is not the definition of virtue.

Obj. 9: Furthermore, a single thing should have a single definition, just as it has a single being. Therefore, if certain other definitions are assigned to virtue, and if these are fitting, then it seems that this definition is inappropriate.

I answer that Augustine here does not intend to define just any virtue, but rather infused virtue. And he defines this latter most completely by giving its formal elements, namely, its genus and difference, when he says a good quality; its subject, which is its matter-in-which, when he says of mind; its act, which is also virtue’s end, when he says whereby one lives rightly and of which no one makes bad use; and its efficient cause, when he says which God works in us without us.

Reply Obj. 1: Names that express general forms work differently than names that express specific forms. For a specific form that informs a given subject is not informed by another form having the same account, as color is not informed by color, but perhaps by light. Hence we cannot speak of a “colored color,” though perhaps we may speak of a “bright color.” Likewise, we do not speak of a “colored whiteness.” However, it is the case that what is the perfection of one thing under one account is perfected by another under another account, as light perfects color, color perfects a surface, and a surface perfects a body, whose limit it is. Thus, a perfection can be said to be perfected. And the case is likewise in all other things that express perfection in general, such as the name “good.” So it is that the virtue that is called the “goodness of the soul” as perfecting it can be called “good” as perfected by something else, such as an order to an end and the rule of reason, from which it has form and is drawn into its species.

Reply Obj. 2: Even though “good” is convertible with “being,” it is found in a certain specific way in animate things and those that have choice, as it says in the Metaphysics 5. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.14, 1020b24–25.) The reason for this is that we speak of the good by reason of the end. Thus, even though it is found in all things in which there is an end, it is more especially found in those that furnish themselves an end and know the end’s intention. And so it is that habits of choice are allotted their species from the end. This is why “good” and “evil” are the constitutive differences of these habits, not as taken in a general sense, but in the aforementioned manner.

Reply Obj. 3: Only the subject of an accident should be included in its definition. But even though a virtue can occur in a power as in a subject that is not essentially the mind, that power only has the property of being the subject of virtue inasmuch as it has some participation in the mind and reason. Hence the Philosopher says in the Ethics 1 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.13, 1102a25–1103a3.) that the rational is the subject of virtue, whether it be rational essentially or rational by participation.

Reply Obj. 4: Anselm seems to define justice not as a specific virtue but justice in general, which the Philosopher calls “legal justice,” and it is the same in subject with virtue, differing only in account, as is clear from the Ethics 5. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.1, 1129b12–1130a13.) Yet even if it is taken for specific justice, note that rectitude can be taken in two ways: either as the commensuration of thing to thing, which constitutes equality in what is given and accepted, as it says in the Ethics 5, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.5, 1134a5.) or as the commensuration of act to end and to the judgment of reason. In this latter way rectitude befits any given virtue, and this is how it is taken here.

Reply Obj. 5: We speak of using something in two ways. One way is as a form that is the principle of use, and in this way, no one makes bad use of virtue, since from the very fact that it is a use proceeding from virtue it cannot be bad. Another way is as an object, and in this way, it does happen that bad use is made of virtues, as is clear in the case of those who are proud of them.

Reply Obj. 6: Living rightly occurs by means of two things: virtue and free decision. But it can happen that bad use is made of free decision. Thus, of which no one makes bad use is added as its difference. For even though one who lives rightly does not make bad use of it, still not just any right living is such that no one makes bad use of it.

Reply Obj. 7: God does not justify us without our consenting to it. For, as Damascene says, he does not compel one to virtue. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, cc. 12, 30 (PG 94:917, 970) .) Yet he does justify us without our causing virtue.

Reply Obj. 8: If this definition is taken in a strict sense, it does not befit grace. For where it says, whereby one lives rightly, virtue is shown to be the principle of right activity. For “living rightly” is not taken here as the being of a living thing, but as the activity of a living thing. But grace is only the principle of right work through the mediation of virtue. Thus, it is not immediately that whereby one lives rightly.

Reply Obj. 9: If the definition of a thing is taken as that which encompasses the thing’s entire being, as constituted by all its causes, which is a perfect definition, then one thing can only have one definition. Now, the aforementioned definition of virtue encompasses all its causes, as has been said. But there are found others as well that express some of these causes, such as the Philosopher’s definition: a habit of choice consisting in a midpoint, etc., (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.6, 1106b35–1107a2.) which expresses the formal elements of virtue and its act. Also, one is found in the Physics 7: the disposition of the perfect to the best, expresses the order to the end. (Aristotle, Physics 7.3, 246b7‒9; 247a1–4.) And different descriptions express different conditions of virtue. So it is not unfitting if more than one definition of virtue is given.

Article 3

Whether one can merit eternal life condignly through an act of virtue

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In III Sent., d. 18, q. 1, a. 2; ST I-II.114.3; Commentary on Romans, ch. 4, lect. 1; 8, lect. 4.) It seems that one cannot merit eternal life condignly through an act of virtue.

Obj. 1: This seems to be, first, from what is said in Romans 8:18: the sufferings of this present time are not worth comparing with the glory that is to be revealed to us. But the saints merit greatly through the sufferings they endure. Therefore, it seems that no one merits eternal life condignly.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, “condign” implies equality of dignity. But it is impossible for a human act to be equal in dignity with the reward of eternal life, which is God himself. Therefore, it seems that no one can merit eternal life condignly.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, he who pays back what he owes merits no further reward. But a man working well pays back what he owes, as is said in Luke 17:10: when you have done all that is commanded you, say, ‘we are unworthy servants; we have only done what was our duty.’ Therefore, it seems that no one by living rightly merits eternal life condignly.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, he from whom anyone merits something becomes a debtor to him. For a reward is due to merit. But God cannot become a debtor. Therefore, before him we can merit nothing condignly.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, no one merits a reward before someone who is neither helped nor can be helped by his work. But God is not helped by our good works, since he has no need of our goods, as it is said (Ps 16 [15]:2). Therefore, it seems that before him we cannot merit.

On the contrary, nothing is rendered by a just judgment unless one merits it. But eternal life is called the “crown of justice” because it is rendered by a just judgment, as a deposit is rendered: henceforth there is laid up for me the crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous judge, will award to me on that Day (2 Tim 4:8). Therefore, one does merit the crown of justice.

Furthermore, the work of virtue is to glory as fault is to punishment. But fault merits eternal punishment condignly. Therefore, the act of virtue also merits eternal life condignly.

I answer that concerning this there are two opinions. For some say that one can merit eternal life not condignly but congruously. But others say that one can merit eternal life through the acts of the virtues even condignly. Now, someone is said to merit condignly when we find an equality between the reward and the merit according to a right estimation, whereas someone is said to merit only congruously when we do not find such equality, but instead a gift is given, solely according to the giver’s liberality, that befits the giver.

Now, it seems that both sides are correct in a certain regard. For there are two kinds of “equality”: equality of quantity and equality of proportion. We do not merit eternal life condignly from acts of the virtues according to equality of quantity. For there is not as much good in the quantity of an act of virtue as there is in the reward of glory, which is its end. But according to equality of proportion we do merit eternal life condignly. For we take note of equality of proportion when A is to B as C is to D. Now, to grant eternal life is not greater for God than to show forth an act of virtue is for us. Rather, as the former is congruous to him, so also the latter is to us. Thus, we find a kind of equality of proportion between God rewarding and man meriting, as long as the reward is referred to the same genus as the merit, so that if the reward is one that exceeds every faculty of human nature, as eternal life does, then the merit also is through an act of the kind that reflects the good of the habit divinely infused, configuring us to God. (The verb consignare means “to affix with a seal.” Here it has both the sense of marking off what belongs to God as well as of vouching for its value. The scriptural and liturgical imagery evoked is manifold.)

Even so, those who say that we can merit eternal life condignly seem to be more correct. For there are two species of justice, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 5, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.2, 1130b30–1131a1.) namely, distributive and commutative justice. The latter is in contracts such as buying and selling, and regards arithmetic equality, which has the intention of equality of quantity. Distributive justice regards geometric equality, which is equality of proportion. Now, rendering the reward to merits preserves more the form of distribution, since one renders to each according to his works, than the form of commutation, since God receives nothing from us, although we sometimes find it said metaphorically by the saints that the kingdom of heaven is bought by good works, inasmuch as God accepts our works as receiving them. Thus, it is more correct to say that we merit condignly than that we do not merit condignly.

Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle intends by his statement to exclude equality of quantity because the bitterness of present sufferings is not as great as the joy of future glory.

Reply Obj. 2: The condignity of distributive justice does not require equality of quantities, but only one of proportion, as has been said. (Resp.)

Reply Obj. 3: One merits even by paying back what he owes. For the same thing merits before God that constitutes one as praiseworthy in life before men. But the act of justice is praiseworthy, as are the acts of the other virtues. Hence the act of justice is also meritorious, though some at one time denied this. Yet the act of justice consists in the paying back of the debt, even one owed to a man. For although what he pays back is not his own, since it is owed to another, still the mode of the activity, on which are founded both the right of meriting and praise, does belong to the one paying back the debt, who pays it back voluntarily and for the good of justice.

Reply Obj. 4: God is not made a debtor to us, unless perhaps by a promise, because he himself has promised a reward to those who do good works. Thus, it is not unfitting if one can merit from him, so that he is in a way a debtor.

Or else we may say that in commutative justice he before whom someone merits becomes a debtor to the one meriting, as is clear in those who place their activities at the service of others, whereas in distributive justice there is no need for the account of debt on the side of the one who distributes. For he can distribute things out of liberality, and yet justice is weighed out in the distribution, insofar as he grants these things to different people in proportion to the requirement of their grade.

Reply Obj. 5: This holds in commutative justice, but in distributive justice it is not necessary.

Article 4

Whether one can merit grace

To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In III Sent., d. 18, q. 1, a. 4, resp.; d. 19, q. 1, a. 1, resp.; ST I-II.114.5; SCG III.149; On Truth, q. 29, a. 6; Commentary on John, ch. 10, lect. 4; Commentary on Ephesians, ch. 2, lect. 3.) It seems that one can merit grace.

Obj. 1: For justification only occurs through grace. But in the text it says that faith merits justification. (Sent. II, 27.5(177).1; 26.2(163).3.) Therefore, one merits grace through an act of faith.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, one who makes good use of a temporal thing that he received from some lord merits the thing previously received, such as a horse or some other such thing. But the use of grace is not less efficacious in meriting than the use of a temporal thing. Therefore, one who makes good use of the grace he has received merits it.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the prayer whereby one prays for himself and about what is expedient for salvation merits being heard favorably by God, as Augustine says. (Augustine, In Iohannis evangelium tractatus, tract. 102, para. 3 (CCSL 36; PL 35:1896).) But if someone in the state of grace prays for grace to be restored to him if he should fall from grace, he is asking for something most expedient for salvation. Therefore, he merits the recovery of grace.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, if God gives someone grace, he either gives it to one who is worthy or to one who is unworthy. If he gives it to one who is unworthy, then this is foolish and unjust, which is impossible. Therefore, he gives it to one who is worthy. But no one is worthy of having anything unless he has merited it. Therefore, whoever receives grace has previously merited it.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, before God the order of justice in distributing grace is not less than in distributing natural goods. But Plato says that the forms are only given by the giver according to the merits of nature. Therefore, grace too is only infused according to the merits of those who receive it.

On the contrary, that which is rendered to merits is not given gratuitously. But what is not given gratuitously is not grace. Therefore, grace is not rendered to merits.

Furthermore, that which is the principle of all merit does not fall under merit. But grace is such a thing. Therefore, and so on.

I answer that in everyone who merits, it is required that his act be in a way proportionate to what he merits. For one only merits what can happen to him in keeping with his own condition, as a servant does not merit from his lord that he be admitted to the children’s inheritance, but that he receive a reward of his own. But grace thoroughly exceeds the condition of human nature. This is clear from its effect, since it leads to the end that no created nature can attain of itself, for which reason it is said: that no eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart of man conceived, what God has prepared for those who love him (1 Cor 2:9). Hence the gift of grace can in no way fall under the merit of someone who is in a state of purely natural endowments, and much less that of one sunken in sin. Nevertheless, good works done before the gift of grace do not lack a reward proportionate to themselves. For they cause a kind of aptitude for grace and even entail a certain uprightness, joyfulness, and beauty, in which their reward especially consists. They also cause certain things incidentally, such as an increase of temporal goods or other such things. For frequently, as Gregory says, (Gregory the Great, Moralia in Job, bk. 5, ch. 1 (CCSL 143; PL 75:679).) God remunerates in this world one who does not merit the reward of future glory so that no good is found without remuneration.

Reply Obj. 1: Faith is said to merit justification inasmuch as the motion of faith is what appears first in justification: whoever would draw near to God must believe that he exists and that he rewards those who seek him (Heb 11:6). But this is not in such a way that justification falls under merit.

Reply Obj. 2: In commutative justice it sometimes happens that the reward, or what holds the place of a reward, precedes merit, as is clear in buying and selling. For one who receives a bought thing before paying the price is in a certain way receiving the reward before the merit. This is even more clear in one who receives the reward for his labor prior to beginning that labor in service to someone else. But this cannot happen in distributive justice, due to the fact that here the reward is rendered in accord with the grade and dignity of the person. Thus, we must consider reward with reference to what precedes merit, from which one is constituted in such dignity. Hence, since grace is given to men by God after the manner of distributive justice, it cannot be the case that from subsequent acts one merits a grace previously received.

Reply Obj. 3: One who prays in this way does not merit for himself the grace to be restored after a loss. For the preceding prayer is put to death through the subsequent sin, as are also other good merits. Nor is the prayer efficacious because he does not pray insistently, but instead interrupts the prayer by sinning.

Reply Obj. 4: “Unworthy” can be taken in two ways. Either it is taken negatively, and in this way, God gives grace to those who are unworthy, since he gives it to those who are not sufficiently worthy for it, yet have a disposition for receiving it, from which they are said in a certain way to merit grace congruously. Nor does it follow from this that God is unjust, but rather that he is liberal. Or it is taken as contrary, such that those are called “unworthy” who have a will that resists grace. And in such people God does not infuse grace, since, as Damascene says, he does not compel anyone to virtue.

Reply Obj. 5: The potency of matter is proportionate to the reception of form. Thus, its dispositions and aptitudes can fittingly be given the name of merits. But grace exceeds all proportion to nature. Hence, with respect to grace, natural acts cannot be called “merits,” but only remote dispositions.

Article 5

Whether one can merit an increase of grace

To the fifth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I-II.114.8; Commentary on John, ch. 10, lect. 4.) It seems that one cannot merit an increase of grace.

Obj. 1: For we consider efficacy for meriting with reference to the quantity of the root. But if one merits a greater grace through an act of less grace, then the efficacy for meriting would exceed the root of grace. Therefore, it is not the case that one merits an increase of grace.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, any meritorious act merits what falls under merit. So if it is the case that one merits an increase of grace, it follows that grace will be increased by any meritorious act, which is false.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it is from the same principles whereby something is engendered that it grows. Therefore, since the principle of grace does not fall under merit, it seems that neither does its growth.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, no one merits what is in his power. But it is in the power of one possessing grace not only to persist in it, but also to make better progress in it. Therefore, it is not the case that one merits progress in grace itself.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, an act that has received remuneration looks for no further reward. But if it were the case that one merits an increase of grace, then that increased grace would be that act remunerated. Therefore, it would be due no further reward, which is unfitting.

On the contrary, Augustine says that grace merits to be increased so that, once increased, it may also merit to be perfected. (Augustine, Epistulae, epist. 186, “Ad Paulinum,” para. 10 (CSEL 57:53; PL 33:819).) Thus, the increase of grace falls under merit.

Furthermore, it is more for grace to be perfected than for grace to be increased. But glory falls under merit, which is nothing other than grace perfected. Therefore, the increase of grace, too, falls under merit.

I answer that two kinds of punishment are rendered to a fault: one that accompanies the fault itself, such as the sting of conscience and so forth, for as Augustine says in the Confessions, (Augustine, Confessions, bk. 1, ch. 12 (CCSL 27; PL 32:669).) the disordered spirit is a punishment to itself; another kind is inflicted externally by the judgment of God or man. So too, there are two kinds of reward corresponding to merit: one that accompanies the meritorious act itself, such as delight in a good work and similar things, and another that is rendered by God or man for a good work.

However, the meritorious act is ordered to these two kinds of reward in different ways. For it is proportionate to the first reward according to its own form. For example, from the fact that it is an act proceeding from a perfect habit, it is delightful. Hence the reward is traced back to the principle of the act as to its cause. But the act is ordered to the reward that is rendered externally only according to a proportion of dignity, in such a way that one who has merited so much might be remunerated so much, and one who has sinned so much may be punished so much. Therefore, in this regard I say that through a meritorious act it is the case that one merits an increase of grace as the reward accompanying the nature of a meritorious act, since it is natural that every act be capable of the acquisition or increase of its like habit, either efficiently or dispositively.

Reply Obj. 1: Even though the reward one merits is greater than the grace whereby he merits, it does not follow that there is greater efficacy for meriting in the act than the grace informing the act requires. For it is obvious that, through a meritorious act informed by charity, one merits perfect charity, the kind of charity belonging to heaven, which is greater by far than the charity of the wayfaring state that elicits the meritorious act. For when we say that the efficacy for meriting in a meritorious act corresponds to the quantity of grace, there is not understood to be a commensuration of the quantity of the reward to the principle of meriting according to equality, but instead a kind of proportionality of the meritorious act to the principle of meriting. For the greater charity and grace are, the more a greater reward is merited through the meritorious act.

Reply Obj. 2: When a meritorious act is related to the reward only in the account of merit, then it is true that as one merits the reward through one act of the same account, so also he does through another. But the case is otherwise when the meritorious act is related to the reward not only as a merit, but in a certain way as a cause. And this is the way in which the meritorious act is related to the increase of grace. Hence it is not necessary for just any meritorious act to merit an increase of grace. For the condition, through which an increase of the habit follows from the act, is not found in every meritorious act (Aquinas says otherwise in ST I-II.114.8, ad 3: by every meritorious act a man merits the increase of grace equally with the consummation of grace which is eternal life.) but only in the act whereby one uses the grace received according to the proportions of his own powers, so that it does not through negligence lack anything pertaining to God’s grace, as was said in Book I. (In I Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 1; q. 2, a. 3.)

Reply Obj. 3: The increase of grace, as also its infusion, is from God. But our acts are related differently to the infusion of grace and to its increase. For before the infusion of grace a man is not yet a partaker in the divine being. Hence his acts are altogether disproportionate to meriting something divine, which exceeds the faculty of nature. But through infused grace he is constituted in divine being. Hence his acts already become proportionate to merit the increase or perfection of grace.

Reply Obj. 4: A man who has grace is not said to be able to progress to the better as if increasing grace for himself, since the increase of grace is from God. Rather, this is said because through grace received a man can merit the increase of grace by disposing himself to be more capable of greater grace.

Reply Obj. 5: The reward accompanying the act does not exclude a further reward rendered through the act, as the fact that someone feels delight from an act of virtue does not mean that he loses the reward of eternal life, since the account of reward is not the same in both cases. So too, the remuneration consisting in the attainment of glory is not impeded by the fact that an increase of grace follows on a meritorious act.

Article 6

Whether one can merit the first grace for another

To the sixth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In III Sent., d. 19, q. 1, a. 5, resp. and ad 5; In IV Sent., d. 45, q. 2, a. 1, resp.; ST I.114.6; 7, ad 2; On Truth, q. 29, a. 7; Commentary on 1 Timothy, ch. 4, lect. 2.) It seems that one cannot merit the first grace for another.

Obj. 1: For an accident does not extend beyond its own subject. But grace, which is the principle of meriting, is an accident. Therefore, the efficacy for meriting does not pass to another, that is, in such a way that one can merit grace for another.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the merit of Christ was most perfect. Therefore, if grace is acquired for someone through the merit of another, much more will this be the case through Christ’s merit. Therefore, since Christ’s merit is most sufficient, it seems that for those for whom grace is not acquired through Christ’s merit, grace is not acquired by anyone’s merits, especially because he suffered for all and wills that all men be saved.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, among other acts, prayer seems to be most meritorious. But one condition for prayer that Augustine lays down is that a man pray for himself. (Augustine, In Iohannis evangelium tractatus, tract. 102, para. 3 (CCSL 36; PL 35:1896).) Therefore, it seems that merit only has force for the one meriting.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a man’s act profits the one who does it more than others. But a man cannot merit the first grace for himself. Therefore, much less can he do so for others.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, if something would happen whether something else is added or removed, then the latter is not the cause of the former. But if a person is prepared for grace he will obtain it, and if he is not prepared he will not have it, whether someone else merits it or not. Therefore, it seems that the good act of one is not the meritorious cause of another’s grace.

On the contrary, Augustine says, in On the Predestination of the Saints, that one merits the first grace for another. (Augustine, De praedestinatione sanctorum, bk. 1, ch. 8 (PL 44:972).)

Furthermore, James 5:16 says, pray for one another, that you may be saved. (RSV reads that you may be healed.) But salvation is not without grace. Therefore, since the Church’s prayer cannot be useless, it seems that one can merit grace for another.

I answer that the insufficiency of a cause can arise from two things. Either it arises from the imperfection of the cause, as when a fire is too small to heat, or else from an impediment that occurs concerning the effect, as when wood is soaked in water. Thus, since merit is in a certain way the cause of reward, there are two ways in which it can be the case that a meritorious act is not sufficient for the attainment of the reward: either from the imperfection of the act, or from an impediment in the one who should obtain the reward.

But the imperfection of an act can be of two sorts. Either it is such that the act is outside the genus of such perfection as causes merit, as are acts that precede grace. And this is the way in which it is said that by such acts one does not merit grace for himself condignly, but only congruously. Or else, it is in the genus of this kind of perfection, yet because of its smallness it does not suffice for meriting. And this is the way in which I say that the act of one who possesses grace is related to the acquisition of grace for another. For grace suffices that a man merit for himself by it, but it does not suffice for him to merit for another, unless it be the most perfect grace as would in a certain way overflow to others. For this reason it is said that Christ, from whose fullness we have all received (John 1:16), merited for all condignly. But no one else merits condignly for another, but instead only congruously. Yet in this case there is more of the account of merit than when someone is said to merit grace for himself congruously.

But however perfect is the grace that causes the meritorious work, the effect of merit or of the reward can be impeded, as long as we are speaking of one’s meriting for another. But we can speak of someone as “other” or “another” in two ways. Either we speak with reference to the subject, as being different persons, and in this way, it is obvious that even Christ’s merit, not to mention the merits of others, does not obtain an effect in many due to their indisposition. Or else we speak with reference to an accident or account, as we say that Socrates in the forum is other than himself in his house, as he is today other than himself tomorrow. And so it is that when someone today merits eternal life that he may have it at the end of his life, granted that the merit in and of itself is sufficient, it can still be impeded such that it does not obtain its effect through a sin that intervenes tomorrow and after tomorrow, by reason of which the preceding merit is said to have been put to death. But the reward that one merits for himself that accompanies the merit cannot be impeded.

Therefore, in this regard it is clear from what has been said that one can merit grace for another congruously, but not condignly. Nor is it necessary that someone receive grace when someone else merits grace for him.

Reply Obj. 1: When we say that an accident does not exceed its subject, the understanding is not that an accident cannot be the principle of an action that tends to another subject, since this is even false in all natural actions. Rather, it is because an accident does not have being outside its proper subject and only has the power to act according to the condition of its subject.

Reply Obj. 2: Christ’s merit is like the root of all merits, from which the merits of all draw their efficacy. Hence it is in a certain way like a universal cause that needs to be applied to determinate effects through particular causes, such as the sacraments and the Church’s prayers. So it is that we pray not only to Christ but also to his saints, by whose merits and prayers we receive his help.

Reply Obj. 3: Augustine is laying out the conditions of a prayer that must necessarily be heard in all ways. Because a prayer made for another can be impeded by the other’s indisposition, he lays down the condition that one pray for himself. Nor does it follow that the prayer of one does not help another if an impediment does not intervene.

Reply Obj. 4: Even though one’s own work profits him more than the work of another, as long as there is equality in both, the work of another informed by grace approaches condign merit more, inasmuch as it proceeds from the root of grace, than one’s own work caused by purely natural endowments.

Reply Obj. 5: It frequently happens that, through the saints’ prayers, men are offered occasions to turn themselves to God and to prepare for the reception of grace, and with that preparation made, grace is also infused in them. But even though men would be saved if the saints did not pray, if they prepared themselves for grace, it does not follow that the suffrages of the saints do not confer anything even on those who are prepared. For God has foreseen and ordained this in such a way that the latter receive grace through the merits of the former.

Exposition of the text

We must first set forth that there are three kinds of goods. (Sent. II, 26.9(170).1. Note that Aquinas considers this to be the beginning of Distinction 27; see beginning of the division of the text of Distinction 27.) Note that this division of the good is with reference to its quantity, not absolutely, but in comparison to man. Hence it happens that the same thing falls under different classes according to different comparisons. For man’s natural powers, when compared to him whose means they are, are good, since without them one cannot live rightly. Yet it can happen that one does not use them rightly. But when compared to another, they fall under the least goods, since a man can live well without the help of another man.

This division is taken with reference to different grades of approximation to man’s ultimate perfection, which consists in perfect activity, in accord with which it comes to pass that he lives rightly. To this man is helped by some things organically and instrumentally, as it were, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.8, 1098b11–14; 1099a32–b7; 1.9, 1099b26–28.) such as goods of fortune, which do not pertain to what is necessary for living rightly, since there can be an upright life without them; they are instead like expediencies for an upright life, so that sustained by these aids man may work with greater ease. Now, there are other things that of themselves bestow something for an upright life as supplying the substance of the act. And such things are reckoned among middling goods, without which no one lives rightly, though one can live perversely even with them. But there are others that confer something for an upright life as giving the perfection of the act itself by rightly informing it, such as the habits of virtues and of graces. These are called “great goods,” since they are nearest to the perfect activity in which is man’s ultimate perfection.

No one uses virtue evilly. (Sent. II, 26.10(171).1.) This is true as by a habit informing the use, though one can use them evilly as an object.

‘And the good use of free will, which is a virtue,’ (Sent. II, 26.11(172).1, quoting Augustine, Retractationum libri duo, bk. 1, ch. 9, para. 6 (CCSL 57; PL 32:597).) that is, the act of a virtue, as the Master explains below. (Sent. II, 27.8(180).1.)

And so, if the grace which heals and frees the will of man is a virtue . . . it follows that virtue is not from free decision. (Sent. II, 27.2(174).1.) Here the Master seems expressly to be of the opinion that grace and virtue are the same thing, unless, perhaps, we were to explain that grace proceeds to activity only by the mediation of virtue. Yet even on the supposition that grace is not virtue, the force of the Master’s argument will be the same, for it is no less manifest in the case of grace than of virtue that it is in us from God alone.

Hence it truly seems that charity is the Holy Spirit. (Sent. II, 27.5(177).1.) Here the Master is speaking with reference to his opinion that he supposed in Book I, (Sent. I, 17.2(61).1; 5(64).1; 6(65).9.) namely, that charity in us is nothing other than the Holy Spirit. But we need not hold this opinion concerning charity because it informs and sanctifies the virtues, as he seems to conclude here. For this occurs from the fact that the object of charity is the last end. Hence all the virtues are ordered to the last end by its mediation.