D. 41 - The act of sin in comparison to the intention and the will

Division of the text

Having shown that the external act possesses malice or goodness from the simple intention or will, here he addresses a certain question concerning what was previously settled. And it is divided into two parts.

In the first, he inquires about the act of sin in comparison to intention.

In the second, he inquires about the act of sin in comparison to will, at after these matters, it is suitable to investigate how what Augustine says . . . is to be understood. (Sent. II, 41.3(255).1, quoting Augustine, De vera religione, ch. 14, n. 27 (CCSL 32; PL 34:133).)

The first part is divided into two parts.

In the first, he raises the question.

In the second, he addresses it, at this is not unreasonably concluded by some people. (Sent. II, 41.1(253).2.)

And this latter part is divided into two parts in accord with two opinions.

The second begins at but others, who draw a threefold distinction of actions, conclude that all works which come to the support of nature are always good. (Sent. II, 41.1(253).7.)

Concerning the first, he does three things.

First, he puts forward the solution to the question that was posed according to one opinion.

Second, he objects to the contrary, at but to these statements is objected what Augustine said above. (Sent. II, 41.1(253).5, referring back to 40.1(252).6.)

Third, he puts forth the response, at to these words, they reply. (Sent. II, 41.1(253).6.)

After these matters, it is suitable to investigate how what Augustine says . . . is to be understood. (Sent. II, 41.3(255).1, quoting Augustine, De vera religione, ch. 14, n. 27 (CCSL 32; PL 34:133).) Here he addresses the act of sin in comparison to the will. And it is divided into two parts.

In the first, he inquires about sin in general in comparison to the will.

In the second, about the sin specifically that consists in the will’s internal act, at and if every mortal sin is voluntary, since an evil will is a mortal sin, it is clear that it is a voluntary sin. (Sent. II, 41.6(258).1.)

The first is divided into three parts, insofar as Augustine includes three authorities raising a doubt on this matter.

The second, at the meaning ought also be sought of that which he published in the book On the Two Souls. (Sent. II, 41.4(256).1, quoting Augustine, De duabus animabus, ch. 10, n. 12 (CSEL 25:68; PL 42:104).)

The third, at also in the same book On the Two Souls*, he teaches something else worthy of consideration*. (Sent. II, 41.5(257).1, quoting Augustine, De duabus animabus, ch. 10, n. 12 (CSEL 25:68; PL 42:104).)

Here there are two questions.

First, on comparing act to intention. (Q. 1.)

Second, on comparing sin to the will. (Q. 2.)

Question 1

The act of sin in comparison with intention

Concerning the first, two questions are asked:

first, whether faith directs intention;

second, whether any act in the faithless can be good, seeing as their intention is not directed by faith.

Article 1

Whether faith universally has the property of directing intention

To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that universally directing intention does not belong to faith.

Obj. 1: For things differing in species possess different rules and measures, as is clear from the Metaphysics 10. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.1, 1052b18–1053a24.) For the measure is homogeneous to what is measured. But the virtues are different in species. Therefore, faith cannot be directive in the activities of all the virtues.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, to that to which ordering belongs, directing belongs as well, since directing occurs by ordering to the end. But ordering belongs to reason. Therefore, directing also does. Thus, faith is not needed for direction.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to Bernard, (Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermons on the Song of Songs, serm. 49 (PL 183:386).) prudence is the charioteer of the virtues. But the office of a charioteer is to direct the chariot. Therefore, it seems that directing pertains to prudence, not faith.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a work is said to be right insofar as it conforms to the law. But assenting to the law pertains to justice. Hence it is also called “legal” by the Philosopher in the Ethics 5. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5.1, 1129b1.) Therefore, it seems that the law directs justice.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, Christ did not have faith. Therefore, if faith directs intention, Christ did not have a right intention, which is absurd.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, according to Cicero, (Cicero, De inventione, bk. 2, sect. 34.) virtue is a kind of habit consistent with reason after the mode of nature. But every nature tends by itself to its end, as fire is directed upward by its levity and earth downward. Therefore, every virtue directs its own act to the end.

On the contrary, directing belongs to that to which it belongs to show where one ought to go. But this is what faith does. For faith is the substance of things hoped for (Heb 11:1). Therefore, it belongs to faith to direct intention.

Furthermore, from the first comes rectitude in all the rest. But faith is the first of the virtues. Therefore, it belongs to faith to direct the intention of all the virtues.

I answer that “right” means that whose mean does not go beyond the extremes. (It is helpful here to note that rectus can also mean “straight,” and “direct,” and it is thus that the word is used in regard to geometric figures; the word’s cognates, the verb regere (“to rule”) and the noun rex (“ruler” or “king”), also help illuminate the various shades of meanings that rectus can have.) Now, an act is considered as being between two elements that are like its extremes, namely, the acting principle and the intended end. Hence in a work or intention, rectitude is spoken of insofar as the work proceeding from the agent does not transgress the order of the due end. Thus, directing belongs to that to which it belongs to order to the end. But ordering to the end occurs in two ways: either by showing the end, or by inclining to the end. Now, showing the end belongs to reason while inclining to the end belongs to the will, since love, wherein the act of the will is expressed, is like a kind of weight of the soul, according to Augustine. (Augustine, Confessions, bk. 13, ch. 9 (CCSL 27; PL 32:848); Epistulae, epist. 55, ch. 10, and Epistulae, epist. 157, sect. 9 (CSEL 44; PL 33:212 and 677); The City of God, bk. 11, ch. 28 (CCSL 48; PL 41:342).) But showing the end perfectly only belongs to reason insofar as it is perfected by a habit. Likewise, inclining to the end perfectly only belongs to the will insofar as it is perfected by a habit.

However, the end of human acts can be taken in two ways: either the proper and proximate end, or the common and last end. And the latter is twofold. For it is either that which surpasses the faculty of nature, as is future happiness in heaven, and this is the end to which faith directs by showing and charity by inclining (as a natural form inclines to its end), since a natural power is not sufficient to direct to this end, either by itself or as perfected by a natural or acquired habit. And because, this end being the last, all other ends are ordered to it, faith and charity are said to direct intention universally in everything.

But reason directs one to the common end proportionate to the human faculty by presenting it either when it is perfected by the habit of acquired wisdom, the act of which is contemplative happiness, as it says in the Ethics 10, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.7–8, 1177a11–1179a31.) or when perfected by the habit of prudence, the act of which is civil happiness; but it is the appetitive power that does this by inclining, insofar as it is perfected by the habits of the moral virtues.

Reply Obj. 1: Things differing specifically cannot have the same proper regulating element, but they can have the same common one. And this is how faith is directive, inasmuch as it orders to the last end.

Reply Obj. 2: Reason cannot sufficiently direct to what surpasses natural human thought. Yet this is what all our acts must be ordered to as to a last end. Thus, faith must give direction.

Reply Obj. 3: Prudence sufficiently directs to the end that is the human good, but not to that which is the divine good, the kind of good promised in heaven.

Reply Obj. 4: Law directs as what shows what kind of act is proportionate to the last end. For not every act is proportionate to every end, as was said above. Thus, the direction of faith, which shows the end, precedes the direction of the law, which teaches the act. Thus, too, it precedes the direction of justice, which performs the acts shown by the law through rectitude of inclination.

Reply Obj. 5: There are two aspects to faith: knowledge and hiddenness or obscurity, that is, imperfection. Now, faith possesses the property of being directive not by reason of its obscurity, but by reason of its knowledge. Thus, since Christ had perfect knowledge, there was in him rectitude of intention in a perfect way.

Reply Obj. 6: Natural inclination to the end presupposes an intellect that appoints nature an end and gives it an inclination to that end. Thus, too, prudence precedes the inclination of moral virtue to the end as showing and directing to the end. And this is the way in which the individual virtues direct to their proximate ends by inclining, but not to the last end.

Article 2

Whether any act of a faithless man can be good

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In IV Sent., d. 39, q. 1, a. 2, ad 5; ST II-II.10.4; 23.7, ad 1; On Evil, q. 2, a. 5, ad 7; Commentary on Romans, ch. 14, lect. 3; Commentary on Titus, ch. 1, lect. 4.) It seems that an act of a faithless man cannot be good.

Obj. 1: For, as it says in a Gloss on Romans 10, (Prosper of Aquitaine (ca. 390–455 AD), Sententiae ex Augustino, sent. 106 (CCSL 68A; PL 45:1860).) the whole life of the faithless is a sin. But a sin and a good act cannot exist simultaneously. Therefore, no act of the faithless is good.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, every good act is right. But every right act proceeds from a right intention. Therefore, since faith directs intention, it seems that where there is not faith there cannot be a good act.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, every good is pleasing to God and is acceptable to him. But the life of the faithless, which is lacking in grace, is not acceptable to God. Therefore, there is no good act in them.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, that is properly called “evil” that lacks a perfection it is naturally apt to have and ought to have. But every human act is naturally apt to be referred to the last end of beatitude, unless it is essentially evil, and it ought to be referred to it, as is clear from what has been said. (Above: d. 40, q. 1, a. 2.) Therefore, since the act of those who are faithless is not referred to the last end, to which faith gives direction, as was said, it seems that every act of the faithless is evil.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, faithlessness is opposed to faith. But the faithful are directed by faith to a given end. Therefore, the faithless are directed by faithlessness to the opposite end. But all the acts of the faithful are good by being ordered to the end to which faith directs them. Therefore, for the same reason every act of the faithless is evil.

On the contrary, counsel is only about the good. But counsel is given to the faithless to do certain things belonging to the genus of the good. Therefore, their acts are not all evil.

Furthermore, only the good is praiseworthy or is praised. But the saints, such as Jerome and Augustine, often praise certain pagans for various works. (See Jerome, Libri duo adversus Iovinianum, bk. 1, sect. 41 (PL 23:270); Augustine, The City of God, bk. 5, ch. 13, 15 (CCSL 48; PL 41:154); De spiritu et littera (PL 44:229), and many other places.) Therefore, some of their works were good.

I answer that, just as in natural things one perfection is super-added to another in such a way that some things possess one of them, other things two, and so forth, so also in moral matters we can consider in an act a perfection super-added to another. On the basis of each of these the act is called “good,” and if one of these perfections is lacking, the goodness that accords with that perfection will be lacking. For example, every act, precisely as an act, has an essential goodness insofar as every being is good. But in some acts, there is super-added a goodness from the proportion of the act to the due object; and with respect to this, the act is called “good by its genus.” Further, from due commensurability of circumstances, it will be called “good by circumstance,” and so forth until we arrive at the final goodness a human act can receive, which is from the order to the last end by the habit of grace or charity. Thus, the acts of those who do not possess grace and charity cannot be good in this way. And this is the goodness on whose basis an act is called “meritorious.” But with the posterior removed, the prior still remains, as it says in the Book of Causes. (Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 1.) Hence, even though the goodness in accord with which an act is called “meritorious” is removed from the acts of the faithless, another goodness, whether of political virtue, circumstance, or genus, still remains. Thus, every act of theirs need not be evil, only of deficient goodness, just as even though a horse lacks the rationality that a man has, it is not therefore evil, but only possesses a goodness that falls short of man’s goodness.

Reply Obj. 1: When it says that the whole life of the faithless is a sin, this should not be understood in such a way that every act of theirs is a sin, but instead that they always live with sin. For faithlessness is the kind of sin that, while it is retained, none of the others is remitted.

Or else, it should be said that this is understood of the acts to which they are impelled by their lack of faith, such as worshiping idols and abstaining from the foods forbidden in the law which were not licit for them to partake of. This seems to be what the Apostle intends.

Reply Obj. 2: Faith directs intention to its last end, but natural reason or prudence can direct to a proximate end. And because the proximate end can be ordered to the last end, even if it is not actually so ordered, there can be among the faithless, whose acts are directed to this kind of end by the power of reason, certain good acts, though they fall short of the perfect goodness on the basis of which an act is meritorious.

Reply Obj. 3: As something participates in goodness, it is accepted by God. Thus, those acts are pronounced accepted by God simply which are meritorious, possessing complete goodness, though even other acts, insofar as they are good by genus or circumstance, please God, though not as capable of receiving an eternal reward.

Reply Obj. 4: We are not obliged to have every act actually directed to the end to which only faith can direct it, since an affirmative commandment does not oblige at every moment, even though it obliges always. Thus, the act of the faithless, which is not ordered to this end, need not always be a sin. Rather, it is only one at the time at which one is bound to refer his act to the last end.

Reply Obj. 5: The faithless do not always appoint an end for themselves out of the error of faithlessness. Rather, it is sometimes from the true and right judgment of reason. Thus, they need not sin in every act, but only when they appoint an end for themselves out of error.

Question 2

The act of sin in comparison with the will

Then the question is asked about the comparison of sin to the will. Concerning this two questions are asked:

first, whether every sin is voluntary;

second, whether every sin is in the will.

Article 1

Whether sin is voluntary

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I-II.74.1.) It seems that sin is not voluntary.

Obj. 1: For evil, as Dionysius says, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 32 (PG 3:731).) is apart from the will. For the will’s object is the good. But every sin is an evil. Therefore, sin is not voluntary.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Philosopher says in the Ethics 3 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.5, 1114a12–22.) that after one has become evil by habit, it is not in him to be evil or not evil. Therefore, since man is evil by sin, and what is not in man cannot be called “voluntary,” it seems that not every sin is voluntary.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, what is unknown cannot be voluntary because will presupposes knowledge. But some people sin through ignorance. Therefore, not every sin is voluntary.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, something is called “voluntary” on account of the fact that the act of the will passes into that which is called “voluntary.” But in a sin of omission, it is not necessary for there to be an act of the will, as was said above. (Above, d. 35, q. 1, a. 3.) Therefore, not every sin is voluntary.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, nothing that is against the will is voluntary. But the first motion is against the will. This is clear from what Romans 7:19 says: the evil I do not want is what I do. This is explained in terms of the first motions. Therefore, since the first motion is a sin, it seems that not every sin is voluntary.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, what is passed down by necessity of origin is not voluntary. But there is a sin of this sort, namely, original sin. Therefore, not every sin is voluntary.

On the contrary, nothing is forbidden unless it is in the power of the one to whom it is forbidden. But all sin is forbidden. Therefore, every sin is in the power of the one sinning. But only what is voluntary is in man’s power. Therefore, every sin is voluntary.

Furthermore, what is involuntary, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics 3, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, 1110a24.) does not merit punishment, but pardon. But every sin merits punishment. Therefore, no sin is involuntary.

I answer that, insofar as sin has the account of a fault, it can only exist by being in someone’s power. For man is blamed and rebuked due to a defect that is within his power, but not due to what is not within his power, such as if he is born blind; for this kind of defect incites more toward mercy than toward vengeance. Because the power in accord with which we are the masters of our acts is the will, this is why everything established as within our power is called “voluntary.” (Or “willful,” although without the negative connotations associated with that word in English.) Therefore, every sin must be voluntary, insofar as sin and fault are the same thing. For if “sin” is taken in a broader sense, then we find it in everything that acts for an end (whether they act by will or by a necessity of nature) when their acts deviate from the due end, as it says in the Physics 2. (Aristotle, Physics 2.6, 197b22–26.)

Reply Obj. 1: Evil is not willed through itself. For no one does an action intent on evil, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, nn. 19, 31 (PG 3:715, 731).) But it can be willed incidentally, namely, when one judges what is evil as a good, or when he desires something that is good in a certain respect that has the added account of being evil simply speaking.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as a habit of political virtue is not acquired all at once, since one day does not make a spring, as it says in the Ethics 1, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.7, 1098a18.) neither is that habit destroyed all at once. Thus, the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.5, 1114a14–21; 1113b7–11.) that by the fact that one has acquired a vicious habit, it is not in his power to get rid of that habit immediately, but it is in his power immediately not to act in accord with the habit. For habit of what is voluntary does not incline necessarily to its acts. And so, too, by practicing works, the bad habit will be able to be totally used up. Thus, it is clear that the sin of one who has a vicious habit does not lose the account of voluntariness.

Reply Obj. 3: When sin is committed through ignorance, that which is a sin is not totally unknown, but it is unknown in a certain respect, since one does not know of the act that it is evil. The reason for willing it was not with respect to its being evil. Thus, this kind of ignorance does not take away its voluntariness. Furthermore, this same ignorance is in a certain way voluntary because one is ignorant of what he is bound to know and can know. On the other hand, if he could not know, then he would perform the act voluntarily, but he would not sin voluntarily. And this kind of ignorance is invincible: what one could not avoid, would be excused.

Reply Obj. 4: According to those who say that an act of the will is not required in a sin of omission, the sin is called “voluntary” not due to the act of the will’s passing into the omission, but inasmuch as the omission is in the power of the one who does the omitting, since he can omit or not omit.

Reply Obj. 5: Among actual sins, the first motion has the least of the account of sin. Thus, it has also the least of the account of the voluntary: namely, only the fact that the will can impede one in particular by anticipating it, although it cannot impede them all in general such that none arises. In this way, it is in a way in the will’s power. Now, it is said to be against the will because the will’s natural inclination is to the contrary, as was spoken of above.

Reply Obj. 6: Original sin, speaking of the essential meaning, is a sin of the nature, not the person, except by means of the nature. Thus, it is voluntary by the will of nature, not by the will of each person in which we find it, but only of Adam, who infected the nature.

Article 2

Whether every sin is in the will

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I-II.74.2; II-II.10.2; On Evil, q. 7, a. 6.) It seems that not every sin is in the will.

Obj. 1: For sin and virtue are in the same subject. But virtue is in the reason, as it says in the Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.13, 1103a4–10.) Therefore, since the will is a power distinct from the reason, it seems that sin is not in the will.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, what can receive the more worthy can receive the less worthy. But the concupiscible part can receive virtue, since temperance is in the concupiscible part. Therefore, the concupiscible part is also not impeded by its imperfection from being able to have sin in it.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, sin is in the power in whose act the deformity of sin exists. But this is not only in the act of the will, but also in the acts of the other powers, as was said above. (Above: d. 22, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1.) Therefore, sin is not in the will alone.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the will’s object is the good simply, whereas the object of the concupiscible part is the good with respect to the senses. But one sins more by turning to the pleasures of the senses than by turning to the good simply. Therefore, sin is more in the concupiscible part than in the will.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, Wisdom 11:16 says: one is punished by the very things by which he sins. But the whole man is punished. Therefore, it is not only in the will that a man’s sin exists.

On the contrary, it says in the text: sin is nowhere other than in the will. (Sent. II, 41.4(256).1, quoting Augustine, De duabus animabus, ch. 10, n. 12 (CSEL 25; PL 42:104).)

Furthermore, depraved action is to the will as false opinion is to the intellect. But false opinion is only in the intellect. Therefore, sin is only in the will.

I answer that there are two ways we can understand something to be in the will: either such that it is in it as its cause, and in this way, it is clear from the previous question that every sin is in the will inasmuch as every sin is voluntary, or else such that it is in it as its subject, and then we have to distinguish. For the subject of sin can be taken either as proximate or as primary. Sin’s proximate subject is the power that elicits the act of sin. In this way, sin can be in different powers and not only the will. But the primary subject of sin is that whereby the liability to sin exists in man. Because man is only liable to fault insofar as he is master of his own acts and this belongs to him insofar as he has a will, the primary subject of sin is the will.

Reply Obj. 1: In this passage, the Philosopher takes “reason” to mean the intellective part, which embraces the will as well as reason, since its appetite responds to any apprehension. This is clear by the fact that he calls the irascible and concupiscible parts, which are appetitive powers, rational by participation. Now, sin is in the reason as in what gives direction and in the will as in what chooses. Thus, since sin is brought to completion in choice, it is the will rather than reason that ought to be called its “primary subject.”

Reply Obj. 2: Virtue is only in the concupiscible part insofar as it participates in reason to some extent, inasmuch as it obeys reason. Thus, it need not be sin’s primary subject, but it can be its proximate one.

Reply Obj. 3: As was said above, the acts of the other powers hold the account of fault only insofar as they are subject to the will’s command. Hence it is clear that the primary subject of sin is the will.

Reply Obj. 4: What is pleasant to the senses, although not the will’s object precisely as such, can still be its object as apprehended as good simply. And this is how there is sin concerning what is pleasant to the senses.

Reply Obj. 5: Even though man can be punished in all his parts, he is only liable to punishment, if “punishment” is taken properly, inasmuch as he possesses will. For a thing is penal by being adverse to the will. Thus, the will is the primary subject of punishment as it is of fault.

Exposition of the text

For if faith directs the intention and the intention makes a work good, where there is no faith, it appears that there is neither good intention nor good work. (Sent. II, 41.1(253).1.) This argument was resolved in question 1, article 2.

This is not unreasonably concluded by some people. (Sent. II, 41.1(253).2.) If we understand this to mean that every action is evil and a sin, the opinion is unreasonable. But if we understand it to mean that, whatever they do, they remain in sin as long as they are without faith, the opinion is reasonable.

‘Nothing is good without the highest good.’ (Sent. II, 41.1(253).3, quoting Prosper of Aquitaine, Sententiae ex Augustino, sent. 106 (CCSL 68A; PL 45:1868).) Therefore, the faithless are without the highest good as regards that association which is by participation in grace, and thus the gratuitous good is not in them. Yet, they are not without the highest good as regards their participation in its goodness through natural goods.

‘There is false virtue, even with the best of morals.’ (Sent. II, 41.1(253).3, quoting Prosper of Aquitaine, Sententiae ex Augustino, sent. 106 (CCSL 68A; PL 45:1860).) That is, because it does not lead to eternal happiness, to which perfect and true virtue can lead through meritorious acts.

None of the commandments is kept without charity. (Sent. II, 41.1(253).4.) This is true as regards the intention of the one giving the commandment, but not as regards the substance of the commandment. We have this from Distinction 28. (Above, d. 28, q. 1, a. 3; see Sent. II, 28.1(181).2.)

For good is taken in many senses. (Sent. II, 41.2(254).1.) According to the Philosopher, “good” is divided into the useful, the pleasant, and the upright. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.2, 1155b20.) Therefore, since these differences are not included here, the distinction seems to be made insufficiently.

But it should be said that the Philosopher assigns the classes of good that belong to it in itself, whereas here the classes of good are assigned in an order to something else. Now, something can be called “good” in an order to three things. In the first way, in its order to the end. And in this way, it is called “useful” with respect to a given end, while with respect to the last end, which is eternal life, it is called the “good that deserves recompense,” which is the meritorious upright good.

The second way is in its order to a good like that to which it is ordered, whether as a sign, and in this case the sign of the good is called “good” as is clear in the sacraments of the law, or as presenting its likeness, and in this way, the apparent good is called “good.” This is particularly the case with the pleasant good. The third way is in an order to a commandment. And in this way, the good simply means what is commanded in the law, and this is also deserving of recompense and upright. And that which is not forbidden by any commandment is secondarily called the “lawful” good. Hence Aristotle’s modes are in a certain way included in these.

‘For that is to be regarded as a sin which is only a sin.’ (Sent. II, 41.3(255).1, quoting Augustine, Retractations, bk. 1, ch. 13, n. 5 (CCSL 57; PL 32:603).) This solution proceeds if we take “voluntary” in a simple and complete sense, which is not found in every sin. But if we take “voluntary” in any way whatsoever, then it is found in every sin, as he himself shows as the solution proceeds.

As Augustine says: ‘For what is as much in the will as the will itself?’ (Sent. II, 41.6(258).1, quoting Augustine, De libero arbitrio, bk. 1, ch. 12, n. 26 (CCSL 29; PL 32:1235).) The will is said to be in the will when the proximate act of the will exists in the control of the same power. For both are called “will,” that is, the power and the act.