D. 26 - Grace

Division of the text

Having shown what knowledge and power man had in the first state, here he shows what grace he received. This is divided into two parts.

In the first, he addresses grace in itself.

In the second, he addresses it in comparison to the state of the first man, at after these matters, it is to be considered whether man before sin was in need of operating and co-operating grace. (Sent. II, 29.1(185).1.)

The first is divided into two parts.

In the first, he gives what he considers to be a truthful treatment of grace.

In the second, he removes certain errors concerning grace, at but let us hold firmly and unhesitatingly that free decision . . . does not suffice for the obtaining of justice and salvation. (Sent. II, 28.1(181).1; again, here and throughout, the translation departs from Silano so as to read decision rather than choice in place of the Latin word arbitrium. On the translation of liberum aribitrum as “free decision,” see the note at d. 24 above, in the division of the first part of the text.)

The first is divided into two parts.

In the first, he addresses grace’s power, distinguishing it by comparison to free decision.

In the second, he inquires as to the genus of grace and how grace is said to merit, at but if it is asked how this prevenient grace may deserve to be increased . . . in order that all this may be indicated clearly, we must first set forth that there are three genera of goods. (Sent. II, 26.9(170).1; note that Aquinas here indicates that this is the beginning of Distinction 27. Below, at the beginning of the division of the text of that distinction, he notes the ambiguity about where the distinction begins, according to some.)

The first is divided into two parts.

In the first, he divides grace into operating and cooperating, this division being taken with reference to the effect that grace has on free decision.

Second, he inquires about the parts of the division, whether they divide grace essentially or only according to account, at we must consider here. (Sent. II, 26.8(169).1.)

The first is divided into two parts.

In the first, he posits a distinction between graces.

In the second, he removes certain doubts, at and yet we must not ignore that elsewhere Augustine appears to signify. (Sent. II, 26.4(165).1.)

The first is divided into two parts.

In the first, he distinguishes grace as operating or cooperating.

In the second, he shows the order of grace to good will, at and so good will goes with grace, not grace with the will. (Sent. II, 26.2(163).3.)

Concerning the first, he does two things.

First, he divides grace into operating and cooperating.

Second, he explains the classes of the division, at for operating grace prepares the will of man to will the good. (Sent. II, 26.1(162).1.)

And so good will goes with grace, not grace with the will. (Sent. II, 26.2(163).3.) Here he shows the order of grace to good will.

Concerning this he does two things.

First, he shows that one grace, which is called “operating” or “prevenient,” precedes the good will.

Second, that another grace, which is called “subsequent” or “cooperating,” is preceded by the good will, at and yet it itself precedes some gifts of grace. (Sent. II, 26.4(165).1.)

Concerning the first, he does two things.

First, he shows that grace precedes good will.

Second, he shows what this grace itself is, at and if you contemplate it with diligence, it will likewise be shown to you what the grace that goes before and prepares the will is. (Sent. II, 26.3(164).1.)

And yet we must not ignore that elsewhere Augustine appears to signify. (Sent. II, 26.4(165).2.) Here he resolves what seems to contradict what had been said before. This is divided into two parts, according to how he cites two authorities that seem to be against what had been said before.

The second begins at moreover, the words of Augustine make this question more pressing and pointed. (Sent. II, 26.4(165).4.)

Both are divided into an objection and a response.

Question 1

Grace

Here six questions are asked:

first, whether grace entails something created in the soul;

second, if it does, whether this is as a substance or an accident;

third, if it is an accident, in what does it exist as in its subject, whether it is in the soul’s essence or in a power;

fourth, whether grace is a virtue;

fifth, on the division of grace into operating and cooperating, or into prevenient and subsequent;

sixth, whether grace is divided essentially among different virtues, gifts, and so forth.

Article 1

Whether grace is something created in the soul

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I-II.110.1; SCG III.150; On Truth, q. 27, a. 1.) It seems that grace entails nothing created in the soul. (“Entail” here translates the verb ponere (literally, “to put”); the question is both whether grace is a real characteristic in the soul and whether the word “grace” in theological contexts asserts the presence of this characteristic.)

Obj. 1: For grace entails a kind of reception (Acceptatio can be translated most generically as “reception” but also more narrowly as “acceptance” or “welcome.” The word “acceptance” seems somewhat sterile and might connote mere tolerance, but the word “welcome” might be susceptible to a more Pelagian interpretation; hence, here and in subsequent articles, we have settled on the less determinate “reception.”) in the one who is said to have grace, namely, his being receptive to the one in whose good graces he is. (This objection arises because of an ambiguity in the meaning of the Latin word gratia; in particular, the phrase gratiam habere (“to have grace”) can mean both to possess something that is a quality of oneself and to possess the favor of another, that is, “to be in his good graces.”) But the fact that someone is said to be receptive to someone else does not entail anything in the one who is received, but instead in the one receiving. Therefore, man’s being said to have the grace of God does not entail anything in man.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, as Wisdom 11:24 says, God loves all things that exist. But grace signifies nothing other than the reception of love. Therefore, if the fact that man is said to have grace entails something in him above his natural endowments, it seems that the fact that all created things are said to be loved by God must entail something in them above their natural endowments.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the more perfect a nature is, the more expeditiously it can obtain its end. But human nature is the most perfect among the other created things, at least lower ones. Therefore, if other created things can obtain their proper end by God’s providence without anything superadded to their natural endowments, it seems that all the more can the rational creature do this. Therefore, it needs nothing superadded to its natural endowments that can be called “grace.”

Obj. 4: Furthermore, to the one to whom it belongs to create, it belongs also to re-create. But only God himself created the soul without a medium. Therefore, re-creation is his alone. Therefore, if grace is said to re-create, it seems that “grace” does not indicate anything created.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, just as the soul is the life of the body, so also God is the life of the soul. But the soul vivifies the body without any intermediary. Therefore, grace is not something created in the soul because souls are said to live by grace.

To this effect, too, we can cite certain arguments that were given above in Book I, on charity. (In I Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 1.) Hence we omit them here.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Isidore, De differentiis verborum, bk. 2, sect. 115 (PL 83:87).) that grace is a gift of divine mercy, through which a procession of good will occurs. But the gifts that we receive from God entail something created in the soul. Therefore, it seems that grace is something created in the soul.

Furthermore, no one is said to be pleasing to someone else—if the person does not err in loving the other—unless there is some good in him. But God does not err in loving. Therefore, the fact that someone is said to have the grace of God signifies something in him in distinction from others.

I answer that the term “grace” indicates a kind of liberality. Hence we speak of grace from the fact that it is given gratuitously. Now, the principle of liberal donation is love, as was said in Book I. (Aquinas, In I Sent., d. 10, q. 1, a. 1, resp.) So it is that the term “grace” is taken in two ways. In one way, it is taken for the very receiving of love, insofar as someone is said to be in the “good grace” of someone else who loves him. In the other way, it is taken for the gift itself that is liberally given out of love. Hence the gift that is given gratuitously is called a “grace.”

Now, in either way that “grace” is taken, something created in the soul must be signified. For if “grace” is taken to mean the divine love itself, it is clear that this entails some effect of it in the soul. For just as God’s knowledge differs from ours in this, that our knowledge is caused by things, whereas his knowledge is the cause of things, so also our love is caused by the goodness of the beloved, which draws us to love of it, whereas the divine love pours forth goodness into things. Hence Dionysius says that the divine love did not allow him to be without fruit. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4 (PG 3:694).) Hence God’s being said to love someone signifies that there is an effect of divine love in the beloved. Likewise, too, if grace is taken as a gift given gratuitously, it must be understood as something created. For there is a gift given gratuitously that is indeed uncreated—namely, the Holy Spirit. But the fact that this gift is now possessed when it was previously not possessed occurs not from the changing of the gift but from the changing of the receiver. Hence, from the very fact that the Holy Spirit is given to someone, something accrues to the creature himself that he previously did not possess, in accord with the reception of which the creature is said to possess the Holy Spirit. Hence grace, howsoever it be signified, shows that there is something created in the soul that is being given gratuitously, even though the term “grace” can signify something uncreated, whether the divine reception itself or even the uncreated gift, which is the Holy Spirit.

Reply Obj. 1: When someone is said to be received by a man, this signifies something in the man whereby he is received. But this is not always caused by the reception but is, rather, the cause of the reception. But when someone is said to be pleasing to God or received by God, this signifies something in that person that is caused by God’s receiving of him.

Reply Obj. 2: Since God’s love causes the goodness of his creatures, God is said to love some things in different ways according to the different degrees of goodness in creatures, and this without having any differentiation understood to be in God himself. Hence he is also said to love all created things insofar as he imparts the good of nature to all. But that is love simply and perfect, as it were, a love like friendship, whereby he not only loves the creature as a craftsman loves his work, but he also loves him by a certain friendly fellowship as a friend loves a friend. He does this insofar as he draws them into the fellowship of his enjoyment, so that in this fellowship the glory and beatitude whereby God is blessed may be theirs. This is the love whereby he loves the saints, which is called “love” by antonomasia. (In medieval usage, antonomasia is a figure of speech whereby a species is given the name of its genus or whereby a special case of something is given the more general name because it possesses the general characteristics in a superlative way. For example, Philosophus is the antonomastic title for Aristotle, even though he is not the only philosopher. In English, antonomastic naming is most clearly indicated by the addition of the definite article and the use of a capital letter: for example, “the Philosopher.” Latin, however, has no articles and the distinction of upper and lower case was used only rarely, so antonomasia is sometimes easier to miss.) Thus, too, the effect of this kind of love is called “grace” by antonomasia, even though all natural goodnesses can also be called “graces” because they are given by God gratuitously.

Reply Obj. 3: If man’s end were not higher than the end at which the other created things arrive, it would follow that man would be more imperfect than the others, if he could not obtain his end through his nature, which the others are able to do. But because the end to which man attains is more excellent than every end that other created things obtain, and it exceeds every faculty of nature, by the very fact that man can obtain such an end, granted that it is not by himself, but instead by means of certain helps divinely conferred, he is found to be of greater worth than the rest. So too one who obtains perfect health by many exercises has a better nature than one who obtains only meager health by little exercise, as it says in book 2 of On the Heavens. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 2.12, 292b11–20.)

Reply Obj. 4: To create and to re-create efficiently belongs to God. Hence just as by creating he confers on a thing the substantial form through which it subsists in natural being, so also by recreating he confers the form of grace, through which it abides in the being of grace. For it cannot be understood that someone is an agent if he does not produce something in his effect or introduce some form, whether substantial or accidental. Hence grace is said to re-create formally, whereas God re-creates efficiently.

Reply Obj. 5: The soul relates to the body like unto how God relates to the soul, and in another way unlike. For it has likeness in the fact that both have the account of efficient cause, but it differs in the fact that the soul is also the formal cause of the body. Hence it vivifies the body directly, since nothing comes between matter and form, as the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics 8. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 8.6, 1045a23–b25.) But God is not the form of the soul, except as exemplar. Hence he must give it life in gratuitous being by the mediation of some form.

Article 2

Whether grace is an accident

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: below, a. 4, ad 1; ST I-II.110.2; SCG III.150; On Truth, q. 27, a. 2, ad 7.) It seems that grace is not an accident.

Obj. 1: For an accident does not pass from subject to subject since it possesses individuation from the subject. But grace passes from subject to subject, as it is said: I will take some of the spirit which is upon you and put it upon them (Num 11:17). And again: the spirit of Elijah rests on Elisha (2 Kgs 2:15). Therefore, it seems that grace is not an accident.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, every accident has some subject of which it is the accident through itself, since everything accidental (or incidental) is traced back to what is essential. But in the case of grace we cannot assign a subject through itself, since every accident through itself is caused by the principles of the subject, but in the case of grace nothing caused is its cause, but only God alone. Therefore, it seems that grace is not an accident.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, no accident is of greater worth than its subject. But grace is of greater worth than the soul itself, since it is through grace that the soul is joined to the highest good. Therefore, it seems that grace is not an accident.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, no accident acts on the subject in which it is, even if it acts externally on another. But grace acts on the soul itself by making it pleasing (It does not come through in English, but the noun gratia (“grace”) and the verbal noun gratificando (“making pleasing”) have the same root; one is tempted to translate the latter as “gracing.”) and moving it to work. Therefore, it seems that grace is not an accident.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, every accident that can be lost can also be corrupted. But grace can be lost yet cannot be corrupted, since it is a more express likeness to God than even the soul’s natural likeness, by reason of which the soul is called “incorruptible.” Therefore, it seems that grace is not an accident.

On the contrary, on the passage: oil to make his face shine (Ps 104 [103]:15), a Gloss says: grace is the luster of the soul, producing holy love. (Glossa ordinaria, at Psalm 103:15, 3.1231 (PL 113:1016); from Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, Psalm 103, serm. 3, para. 13 (CCSL 40; PL 37:1369).) But “luster” is the name of an accident. Therefore, it seems that grace is an accident.

Furthermore, everything that is rendered more or less intense is an accident, since a substance does not admit of greater or lesser degree, as it says in the Categories. (Aristotle, Categories 5, 3b33.) But grace is such a thing, as is clear in the text. (Sent. II, 26.9(170).1.) For it merits to be increased so that, once increased, it may also merit to be perfected. (Augustine, Epistulae, epist. 186, “Ad Paulinum,” para. 10 (CSEL 44; 33:819): cum fides impetrat justificationem, sicut unicuique Deus partitus est mensuram fidei, non gratiam Dei aliquid meriti praecedit humani; sed ipsa meretur augeri, ut aucta meretur et perfici, voluntate comitante, non ducente; pedisequa, non praevia; quoted in Sent. II, 26.2(163).3.) Therefore, it is an accident.

I answer that, because grace is held to be something created, it must be included in the genus of accidents. The reason for this is that everything that comes to something after complete being is related to it incidentally. Hence, since grace comes to the soul after its being, it is not something belonging to its essence. Hence it must be related to the soul incidentally. (That is, as an accident.)

But even so, something can be related to something else incidentally that is still a substance in itself, just as clothing is related to the body; so too, vice versa, something can be related to another substantially that is in itself an incidental or accident, such as color is related to whiteness. This cannot occur in the case of grace. For since grace is conferred as what joins the soul to the last end, this can only be understood either by way of formal cause or by way of efficient cause. If it is by way of efficient cause, then in this case there would have to be a created substance as a mean between the soul and God that would join it to God. In this case the soul would not be graced and glorified immediately by God, which is foreign to the faith. For it must be that just as the soul is created by God immediately by way of efficient causality, so also it is re-created by him immediately. However, if it is understood formally, then grace must be a form of the soul. Since it comes after complete being, it will necessarily be an accident. For no form is found in the genus of substance that comes to another thing as an accident.

Reply Obj. 1: The same grace numerically does not pass from subject to subject. But such a manner of speaking in the Scriptures should be understood on the basis of the likeness of grace to acts that are similar in species.

Reply Obj. 2: There are some accidents that exist through themselves, such that they always actually follow on their subject, but there are others that are not always in act, though they are always in aptitude. Hence, since what through itself exists in its subject is always in it, the subject is sometimes said to be through itself a subject relative to the accident itself, as fire is through itself the subject of heat. An accident of this kind is caused from the principles of the subject, not only as regards aptitude but also as regards the accident’s essence. This is sometimes the case in regard to aptitude alone, just as air that is not always actually illuminated is always capable of being illuminated, and this ability to be illuminated is caused from the principles of the subject, even though the light is from without. Likewise, I say that the light of grace is from without, but the ability to receive grace always follows on the subject and is caused from the principles of the subject, as is also clear from its being capable of learning.

Reply Obj. 3: Considered simply in its being, the subject is more noble than the accident, but in a certain respect nothing prevents the accident’s being better than the subject as regards incidental being. For that which exists after the manner of act is always more noble than that which exists after the manner of potency, under this precise aspect. Now, just as substantial form is the act of matter in substantial being, so also an accident is the act of the subject in accidental being. Hence in this regard whiteness is more noble than the body, and grace more noble than the soul.

Reply Obj. 4: To act on something is spoken of in two ways. One way is formally, just as whiteness makes a wall white. And in this way, an accident can act on the subject. This is the way grace acts on the soul, by cleansing and making it pleasing. The other way is efficiently, just as a painter makes a wall white. And in this way, neither grace nor any other accident acts on its subject.

Reply Obj. 5: The image and likeness of God are said of the soul and of grace, but in different ways. For the soul is called the “image” with respect to the fact that it imitates God. But grace is called the “image” as that whereby the soul imitates God, as a body that has been shaped is called an “image” in a different manner than the shape itself. Hence since the soul and grace are not called the “image” in the same way, it does not follow that, if the soul is incorruptible, then grace cannot be corrupted. In fact, when it is corrupted it also returns to nothing.

Article 3

Whether grace is in a power of the soul as in a subject

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In IV Sent., d. 4, q. 1, a. 3, resp. and ad 1; ST I-II.110.4; On Truth, q. 27, a. 6.) It seems that grace is in a power of the soul as in a subject.

Obj. 1: For that which is superadded to natural endowments does not fall as a mean between natural cause and effect. But grace is superadded to natural endowments. Therefore, since a power is a natural effect of the essence itself, it seems that grace does not fall as a mean between the essence and the power. Thus, it is not in the essence as in a subject, but rather in a power.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, that which is the immediate principle of an act is a power. For as a power proceeds from the essence, so also activity proceeds from the power. But grace orders one immediately to act, as is clear from its definition. For “grace” indicates a gratuitous gift of God that makes one who has it good and renders his work good. (The objection applies Aristotle’s initial definition of virtue (in Nicomachean Ethics 2.6, 1106a16) to grace.) Therefore, it seems that grace is in a power as in a subject.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Augustine says in the text that grace prepares the will, but only as an accident prepares the subject. (Sent. II, 26.1(162).1, quoting Augustine, De gratia et libero arbitrio, ch. 17 (PL 44:901).) Elsewhere, too, he says that grace is related to free decision as a rider to a horse. (Pseudo-Augustine, Hypomnesticon contra Pelagianos et Coelestianos, bk. 3, ch. 11 (PL 45:1632).) Therefore, since the will or free decision is a power, it seems that grace is in a power as in a subject.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, grace is opposed to fault. But every vice, at least actual vice, is in a power as in a subject. Therefore, since opposites concern the same thing, it seems that grace is also in a power of the soul as in a subject.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, infused and acquired habits differ only according to their efficient principle. For it is obvious that they are ordered to the same acts specifically. But acquired habits are more primarily in a power than in the essence. For they are only in the essence by the mediation of the power. Therefore, so are infused habits. Thus, grace is not in the soul’s essence as in a subject but rather in a power.

On the contrary, grace is said to be the life of the soul. But living is being to living things, as the Philosopher says in On the Soul 2. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.4, 415b12.) Yet being regards the essence. Therefore, grace, too, regards the essence more primarily than a power.

Furthermore, no accident extends in acting beyond the action of its subject, since it is not the accident that is properly called the “agent,” but rather the accident’s subject. But grace is not determined to a given act, since every human act can be meritorious, and this can only be the result of grace, which causes good merits in us, as it says in the text. (Sent. II, 26.2(163).3.) Therefore, since every power is related to determinate acts, it seems that grace is not in a power of the soul as in a subject.

I answer that all commonly say that grace has to do with the soul’s essence, but that virtue has to do with a power. But different people hand down different explanations as to how we should understand this.

Some wish to take this as a kind of appropriation, not a proper statement. For since that which is the principle of an activity is called a “virtue,” and an activity follows on a power, virtue is fittingly referred back to a power. However, the effect of grace is to render one acceptable to God. This more primarily regards the soul itself than an activity of it. Hence it is said (Gen 4:4) that God regarded both Abel and his offerings, as if accepting the one doing the offering more primarily than the gifts that were offered. (As the Church prays in the Quam oblationem of the Roman Canon, a sacrifice pleasing to God is one that is “acceptable” to him, as was Abel’s offering. Here Aquinas makes explicit the connection between the acceptability of the sacrifice offered and the offerer himself. In the case of the Eucharist, Christ is both the offerer and the one offered.)

Others take it as a proper statement, saying that the proper and primary subject of grace is the soul’s essence, whereas the subject of virtue is a power. And this is more reasonable, and consonant with the statements of Dionysius. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 2 (PG 3:135).) For since nothing’s activity extends above the faculty of the nature of the one working, if someone’s activity extends above that of which he is naturally capable, the nature, too, must in a certain way be elevated above itself. Therefore, since meritorious acts exceed the faculty of human nature because man is not capable of them by merely natural endowments, these acts cannot proceed from man if human nature is not also raised up in a certain way to a higher level. Thus, Dionysius says that just as it is the case in natural things that what does not possess the species by a fit generation cannot have the activities due that species, so also one who is not fitted to be divine by spiritual regeneration cannot participate in divine activities.

Therefore, the first gift that is infused into man gratuitously must have the effect of elevating the very essence of the soul to something divine so that it may be fit for divine activities. Thus, because what is said more primarily of each thing is said of it simply speaking, just as a substance is called a “being,” the sort of gift that ennobles the soul’s essence is called “grace” principally. This is also the case because it is not determined by a special act by which to be allotted a special name. Thus, grace properly and through itself regards the soul’s essence as its subject.

Reply Obj. 1: Even though grace is in the soul’s essence as in a subject, it does not follow that it is interpolated as an intermediate between a power and the essence, unless it were of the same order, that is, such that the grace would be from the essence and the power from the grace; in this way a power falls as an intermediate between the essence and an activity. But this is not the case. For a power is not by grace, but by nature. Hence the objection does not proceed.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as a power only has the property of being the principle of such an activity insofar as it emanates from the principles of such an essence, so also a power’s perfection has the property of informing an act from the power of the grace perfecting the essence. Thus, grace is said not only to grace the soul’s essence, but also to render one’s work pleasing, not as the proximate informing principle, but as the primary one that elevates the nature to higher being.

Reply Obj. 3: Among the soul’s powers, the will or free decision is the most general by the fact that the acts of the other powers are subject to its command, as has been said. (Above: d. 24, q. 1, a. 2.) Because grace does not regard a determinate act, since it is in the essence, which is not determined to any activity, grace regards the will or free decision more immediately, since all acts informed by grace in a certain way belong to the will and free decision. Yet it does not follow that it is in the will or free decision as in a subject. Rather, the will and free decision have the ability of eliciting from grace a meritorious act.

Reply Obj. 4: Actual fault is not through infusion or insertion, but comes to us through a determinate act. Because every activity has to do with a determinate power, which is its principle, so it is that fault is more primarily in the power than in the soul’s essence. But grace is not acquired through our acts but is infused by what is higher. Hence it more primarily regards that which is higher in the soul, namely, the essence, which is the origin of all the powers.

Reply Obj. 5: And in this way, the reply to the fifth objection is clear. For acquired habits are engendered through our acts and so pertain immediately to a power. Hence they are more proportioned to virtue than to grace. Likewise, too, fault, as consisting in act, is more immediately opposed to virtue than to grace.

Article 4

Whether grace is a virtue

To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I-II.110.3; On Truth, q. 27, a. 2.) It seems that grace is a virtue.

Obj. 1: For since it is in the genus of accident, it can only be traced back to the genus of quality, and among the species of quality, only to the first, as is clear by going through them individually. Therefore, grace will be either a science or a virtue, for it is not reckoned among bodily habits or dispositions. But it is obvious that grace is not a science. Therefore, it is necessarily a virtue.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Physics 7.3, 246a14–15, 247a1–3.) that virtue is nothing other than the disposition of the perfected to the best. But this especially belongs to grace, which disposes the soul that it perfects to what is best: namely, to the last end. Therefore, grace is a virtue.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, in the Ethics 2, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.6, 1106a15–22; 10.9, 1179a35–b3.) the Philosopher says that the virtue of each is that which makes the one who has it good and renders his work good. But grace makes the soul and its work good, since it makes both of them pleasing, and something can only be rendered received by God through being good. Therefore, it seems that grace is a virtue.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, Augustine is quoted in the text as saying that prevenient grace is faith working through love. (Sent. II, 26.3(164).1, quoting Augustine, Epistulae, epist. 186, “Ad Paulinum,” para. 10 (CSEL 57:53; PL 33:819).) But faith is a virtue. Therefore, so is grace.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, charity is said to be the form and mother of all the virtues. Therefore, since the virtues are informed by grace, by which works are rendered meritorious, it seems that grace is the same as charity. But charity is a virtue. Therefore, so is grace.

On the contrary, every virtue is in a determinate power as in its subject. But grace regards not a power but the soul’s essence. Therefore, it seems that grace is not a virtue.

Furthermore, that in which specifically different things agree, and that in which these same are distinguished, cannot be essentially the same. But all the virtues agree in rendering works meritorious, while they are distinguished in eliciting determinate acts. Therefore, that which is the principle of meriting is essentially different from that which is the principle of the distinction of acts. But the principle of meriting is grace, as it says in the text, (Sent. II, 26.2(163).3; 3(164). 2.) whereas the principle of distinction in an act is the determinate species of virtue. For, as the virtue is, so also are the habits it yields. Therefore, grace and virtue are essentially different.

I answer that there are different opinions concerning this. Some say that grace and virtue are completely identical in reality and differ only in account, in that we speak of “grace” as rendering man received by God and “virtue” as the principle of right work. But this does not seem fitting. For if virtue has it, from the same thing, that it is virtue and also that it renders something pleasing to God, then every virtue would have to do this. Since some virtues are acquired through acts, it would follow, in keeping with the heresy of Pelagius, that man could become pleasing to God from his free decision. However, if it has it, from different sources, that it is virtue and that it renders something pleasing to God, grace and virtue must not be completely identical in reality. For different principles correspond to different effects found divided from each other.

Thus, others say that virtue and grace differ in reality, not such that they are essentially different, but rather that a single unit comes from grace and virtue as from form and that to which the form belongs. For they say that grace is to virtue as a light manifesting color is to the color. Hence just as a light becomes in a certain way one with color, being in the same subject with it, so also they say that grace is united to virtue in the same subject, as informing it. For they posit that, properly speaking, the subject of grace is a power. But this, too, does not seem fitting. For when we say that from a light and color a single unit is formed, then either light is taken as that which pertains to the composition of color (since light is the hypostasis of color, and in this case we would return to the first opinion, namely, that grace and virtue are identical in reality, for the light that pertains to the composition of color does not differ really from color), or else “light” is taken as that which is in the surrounding air, and it is obvious that this light is in a different subject from the color and differs essentially from it. Likewise, too, if “light” is taken insofar as it is participated in by the surface of the terminated body in which the color is, it necessarily differs essentially from the color. This is clear from the fact that, when the light comes and goes, the color remains the same, which would not be the case if it did not differ from the color essentially.

Likewise, too, virtues must either become pleasing to God through something infused by God, and in this case this thing must differ essentially from virtue, since even infused virtues, such as faith and hope, remain as formless when grace withdraws, or else virtues must be pleasing to God without the addition of anything infused by God, and in this case either grace entails nothing created in the soul or it entails nothing else really distinct from virtue.

Thus, others say that grace and virtue differ essentially. For perfections must be proportionate to what is perfectible. Hence just as powers essentially different from the soul’s essence flow from it, as an accident does from its subject and yet they are all united in the soul’s essence as in their root, so also the perfection of the essence is from grace, as has been said. (Above: a. 3, ad 2.) And from this perfection flow the virtues, which are the perfections of the powers, differing essentially from grace itself, but joined together in grace as in their origin, after the manner wherein different rays proceed forth from the same shining body. And in accord with what was said before, this seems more fitting.

Reply Obj. 1: Grace is traced back to the genus of quality and to the first species of quality, though it does not properly have the nature of a habit, since it does not immediately order to act but is, rather, like a kind of habitude, as health is to the body. Thus, Chrysostom says that grace is the mind’s health. (Both Albert the Great and Bonaventure cite John Chrysostom (ca. 347–407 AD), but Chrysostom does not seem to say this in so many words. It may be gathered, however, from his Commentary on the Psalms, Psalms 4, para. 12 (PG 55:58); Psalm 6, para. 3 (PG 55:74–75); On Penance, homily 4 (PG 49:299–306); Homilies on the Letters to the Philippians, homily 9, on Philippians 2 (PG 62:245–56).) Hence it is reckoned neither among the sciences, nor among the virtues, nor among the other qualities that philosophers have enumerated, whose purview it was only to treat of natural and acquired habits.

Reply Obj. 2: Virtue is said to be the disposition of the perfect to the best inasmuch as it elicits the activity through which a thing obtains its end. Hence grace is not a disposition of the perfect to the best in this way, since it does not primarily regard activity as its proximate effect, but rather regards a kind of divine being, which it confers on the soul.

Reply Obj. 3: The goodness that virtue confers on the one who possesses it is the goodness of perfection in comparison to work. But grace confers perfection on the soul in a kind of divine being and not only with respect to work, insofar as it constitutes those who have grace in a certain way as God-like, for which reason they are said to be pleasing to God, like sons.

Reply Obj. 4: Prevenient grace is called “faith” not as if grace does not differ from faith essentially, but because it is in the justification that grace causes that the first motion of faith is found. Thus, since habitudes and habits become known to us through their effects, that in which grace is first made manifest is faith. This is the reason why he calls prevenient grace faith.

Reply Obj. 5: Charity is called the “form of the virtues” in a different way from grace. For charity is the form of the virtues on the part of the act, namely, inasmuch as it calls all the acts of the virtues together to their end by the fact that its object is the last end. For in all ordered powers and acts, it is the case that the art that regards a higher end bestows form on the art beneath it, whose act is ordered to its end. Thus, it is clear that the pilot shows the maker of a ship what sort of form the rudder should have. (The example of a ship will be expanded upon in the Thomistic tradition. For instance, John of St. Thomas compares the gifts of the Holy Spirit to the sails of a ship, allowing for propulsion and direction not only by the skill of the captain and the crew but by a higher power; see John of St. Thomas, The Gifts of the Holy Spirit, ch. 2, para. 29.) Hence charity informs the other virtues as a virtue forms a virtue, but grace informs after the manner of origin, namely, because the habits of the virtues, spread throughout different powers, originate in a certain way formally from grace itself. Now, that which originates from another draws form and species from it and is held fast in its strength as long as it is continuous with the origin. Thus, grace need not be the same as charity, even though charity can never exist without grace.

Article 5

Whether grace is fittingly distinguished into operating and cooperating grace

To the fifth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I-II.111.2, 3; On Truth, q. 27, a. 5, ad 1, 2; Commentary on 2 Corinthians, ch. 6, lect. 1.) It seems that grace is unfittingly distinguished into operating and cooperating.

Obj. 1: For, as has been said, (Above: a. 3.) grace does not regard action through itself. But each thing should be distinguished in accord with what befits it through itself, as is said in the Metaphysics 7. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.12, 1038a29.) Therefore, it seems that since we speak of operating and cooperating with respect to action, grace is unfittingly distinguished by way of these two.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, if grace is operating, it must work something in the soul. Therefore, it will either work itself or something else. But it does not make itself, since nothing is the cause of itself, and yet we cannot identify anything else that it works in the soul. Therefore, it seems unfitting for there to be any grace called “operating.”

Obj. 3: Furthermore, no work belongs so much to grace that it does not also belong to free decision. Therefore, if cooperating grace is so called through the fact that it works together with free decision, it seems that any grace should be called “cooperating.”

Obj. 4: Furthermore, that which cooperates with something does not exist as the principal in the activity. But in every activity in which free decision and grace come together, grace holds the principal place. Therefore, cooperating grace is unfittingly named.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, Augustine says in On Nature and Grace that grace comes before that we may live piously and follows after that we may always live with him. It now comes before that we may be called and then follows after that we may be glorified. (Augustine, De natura et gratia, ch. 31, para. 35 (CSEL 60:259; PL 44:263).) He says that prevenient grace regards the state of the present life and subsequent grace the state of glory. Therefore, since operating and cooperating grace pertain to the present life, it seems that operating and cooperating grace are not the same as prevenient and subsequent grace, as the Master suggests. (Sent. II, 26.8(169).1.)

I answer that grace has different ordered effects in us. For the first thing it does is give us a kind of divine being. Its second effect is meritorious work, which cannot exist without grace. Then, its third effect is merit’s reward, namely, the blessed life itself, which we reach through grace. In acts, too, there is a certain order, for first there is the internal work of the will, and second, the external work whereby the will is accomplished.

Augustine sometimes seems to take “prevenient” and “subsequent” grace in diverse ways, since considering the order of merit to the reward that follows it, he gives the name “prevenient” to grace that is the principle of meriting and “subsequent” to grace that is the habit of glory itself, which effects the blessed life in us, as is clear in the authority cited. (Augustine, De natura et gratia, ch. 31, para. 35 (CSEL 60:259; PL 44:263).) Now, with reference to the order of the internal act to the external, he posits that grace that causes the motion of the good will is prevenient, and grace that accomplishes the external work is subsequent. Hence he says that it comes before the will that it may will good and follows after that it may accomplish, or perfect, it. (Sent. II, 26.1(162).1; 2(163).2; and elsewhere.) This is the way he seems to take “prevenient” and “subsequent” in the text, almost throughout. But with reference to the order of the being it gives to the act that is activity, he posits that the grace that confers a kind of healthy being on the soul is prevenient and the grace that causes meritorious work is subsequent. Hence he says that it comes before that we may be healed and follows after that we may carry out our business as healed. (Sent. II, 26.7(168).1, quoting Augustine, De natura et gratia, ch. 31, para. 35 (CSEL 60:259; PL 44:263).)

But the distinction between operating and cooperating grace is properly made as pertaining to the state of the present life. Hence the distinction can be made in two ways. In one way, “operating” grace signifies grace as working divine being in the soul, insofar as it makes the one who possesses it pleasing, and “cooperating” grace signifies grace as causing meritorious work, insofar as it renders man’s work pleasing. In the other way, grace is called “operating” as causing the will’s act and “cooperating” as causing the external act in which the will is accomplished or causing the will to persevere in it. In both ways “cooperating” and “operating” indicates the same as “prevenient” and “subsequent.”

Reply Obj. 1: Even though grace does not immediately refer to action, it is through itself the cause of meritorious action, though by the mediation of virtue. Thus, it is not unfitting to distinguish it as “operating” and “cooperating.”

Reply Obj. 2: According to one way of taking it, operating grace is said to “work” (operari) in the soul, not efficiently but formally, insofar as any form makes something to be in the subject, just as whiteness makes the subject to be white. Hence grace is called “operating” (operans) after this manner because it makes man pleasing to God formally. But according to the other way of taking it, it is called “operating” efficiently, insofar as a habit causes a work efficiently. For in this way, grace works the meritorious motion of the will by eliciting it, though by the mediation of virtue, for which reason it is called “operating.”

Reply Obj. 3: If we take “operating grace” in the first way, then it is plain that it alone works the effects it works formally. For just as whiteness alone formally makes a wall white, so also grace alone formally makes one pleasing. But if we take “operating grace” in the other way, then it is true that the motion of the will is not from grace without free decision. Yet, because grace exists as principal, since it inclines to such an act after the manner of a kind of nature, it alone is said to work the act, not that it works it without free decision, but rather because it is the more principal cause, as heaviness is said to work downward motion.

Reply Obj. 4: If grace is called “cooperating” as causing any motion, whether external or internal, then we call it “cooperating” not because it is not the principal cause in acting, but because free decision supplies the substance of the act, and from grace comes the form whereby it is meritorious. Hence what grace supplies is like the final completion. For this reason it is called “cooperating,” as if completing what is furnished as available to it through free decision. However, if “cooperating” is taken as regarding the external act alone, then we call it “cooperating” not because of some priority of free decision before grace, but because of the priority of act before act. For internal acts are of greater account in moral matters than external acts, as the Philosopher says. (This teaching may be gathered from the fact that the definition of virtue is concerned with choice and reason; see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.6, 1107a1; 3.3, 1113a11; 10.8, 1178b24–32.) Hence it is fitting that, when grace causes the principal act, it is called “operating,” and when it causes the secondary act, it is called “cooperating.”

Reply Obj. 5: Even though “operating” and “cooperating” do not correspond to “prevenient” and “subsequent” as regards this way of taking prevenient and subsequent grace, according to other ways of taking these terms, they are totally identical. And this is how the Master takes them in the text.

Article 6

Whether grace in the soul is manifold

To the sixth we proceed as follows. It seems that grace in the soul is multiplied.

Obj. 1: For there are divisions of graces, as is said in 1 Corinthians 12:4. But division is the cause of number and multitude. Hence, according to Isidore, “number” is said as if indicating nutus memeris, the command of division. (This definition does not seem to be in Isidore, but see his The Etymologies, bk. 3, ch. 3 (PL 82:155) for his discussion of number.) Therefore, it seems that in one soul many graces are found.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, prior and posterior, preceding and subsequent, cannot be the same. Therefore, since in one man prevenient and subsequent grace are found, it seems that there must be more than one grace in one and the same man.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, every form is multiplied on the basis of the difference among the things it informs, since different things have different forms. But grace is the form of the virtues. Therefore, it seems that since the virtues are different, grace must be multiplied.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, things that differ in genus are not traced back to the same principle. But the virtues differ from the gifts in genus, and differ likewise from sacramental graces. Therefore, it seems that they originate from different graces.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, grace is given in the different sacraments, and the grace that one sacrament has, another does not. But whatever things exist such that there is one without the other must be numbered and distinguished. Therefore, it seems that grace does not remain only one, but is essentially multiplied.

On the contrary, perfection is proportioned to the perfectible. But grace immediately perfects the soul’s essence, as has been said. (Above: a. 3, ad 2 and 3.) Therefore, since the soul’s essence is one, not multiplied in its powers, it seems that grace too is one, not multiplied in the virtues.

Furthermore, what befits different things for the same reason must proceed from one principle. But the reason for meriting is the same in all meritorious acts. Therefore, since grace is the principle of meriting, it seems that grace is only one, not multiplied.

I answer that, according to those who say that grace and virtue differ not really, but only in account, it is necessary to posit that grace is multiplied essentially after the number of the virtues. For even though they are able to say that no multiplication occurs in the virtues precisely as having the account of virtues, they must nevertheless say that there is more than one grace differing in being.

But according to the opinion that posits that grace differs from virtue, there are many ways of speaking.

For some who posit that grace is not in the soul’s essence as in a subject necessarily have to posit that there are several graces distinguished according to the number of the virtues. For it cannot be the case that the numerically same accident is in different subjects. But if grace, from the fact that it is the form of the virtues, is put in the same subject in which virtue is, then it is necessary for it to be in every power in which there is a virtue, either as prior or as subsequent, insofar as some virtues are informed by grace more primarily than others. For it cannot be said that numerically the same light informs the colors of different bodies, except as understood in a single continuous subject, which is air. For if it is considered as received in the surfaces of different bodies, it must necessarily be multiplied numerically, since an accident is multiplied when the subject is multiplied.

However, others say that grace, just as it is in its subject, is in the soul’s essence, in which all the powers are gathered together as in their center. Hence just as lines and rays are united in the center and become more distinct from one another the more they stretch out from the center, so also grace as remaining in the soul’s essence is one, but is multiplied as diffused into the different powers, in which it receives the account of virtue.

But this opinion seems to suppose that grace and virtue do not differ in species or account, but only according to the differentiation of the subject. For if virtue is of a different account than grace, then the multiplication of grace would not follow from the multiplication of the virtues in their powers. For the diffusions of grace among the powers would lose the name and account of grace. This is like how, if light is diffused from the center through different rays, it is said to be multiplied and divided so long as it persists in the account of light. But if the lines received the accounts of the different colors following on different lines of the light’s diffusion, then we would say that the light, namely, that in the center, is only one, and that the colors caused along the different lines are many. This is unless, perhaps, they say that the diffusion of grace into the powers is apart from the essence of the virtues, as the diffusion of light upon colors that then become actually visible through it, according to the opinion of some, is apart from the essence of color, as has been said. (Above: a. 4, resp.) This is such that, just as light diffused upon colors furnishes the colors with the property of being actually visible, so also the diffusions of grace, like rays from it, furnish the virtues with the efficacy of meriting. For in this way, the ray of grace received in a power would retain the account of light and would differ from the grace that is in the soul’s essence as luminosity does from light. Thus, grace as existing in the soul’s essence would be one, but the graces diffused into the powers would be many.

But this cannot stand. For only two things are required for a meritorious act: one is that the one doing the act be held worthy of eternal life, and for this the grace in the soul’s essence making it pleasing suffices. The other is that the act itself be related to the due end and invested with the due circumstances, and virtue suffices for this. Hence nothing is required to elicit a meritorious act other than the grace in the soul’s essence and the virtue in the soul’s power, as if a diffusion of grace from the soul’s essence reaches to the power apart from the virtue.

Thus, others say it better—namely, that grace is only one, not multiplied. But the virtues are many, with the virtues falling into another genus, although they proceed from grace, just as the powers of the soul proceed from one essence, and yet power and essence do not have the same account. Thus, the powers are multiplied, but the essence remains only one. Thus all the powers agree in what befits them as being in such an essence and are distinguished according to their different accounts. So also the virtues, too, agree in the aspect of meriting that befits them as arising from grace, but differ according to their proper accounts, inasmuch as they are virtues.

Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle is taking “grace” in a broad sense as meaning any gift that is conferred on us gratuitously by God. These gifts are indeed several and distinct. But here we are speaking of grace as the first gift, making the soul pleasing.

Reply Obj. 2: In whatever way we distinguish between graces, especially as regards the two distinctions of “operating and cooperating” and “prevenient and subsequent,” the graces do not differ essentially, but only in account. For there is one form that gives being and that is the principle of action. One, too, is the habit that elicits the external and internal act. Hence the same grace is operating and cooperating. Nor do we speak of prevenient and subsequent due to the order of grace to grace, but instead on account of the order of effect to effect.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument proceeds concerning the form that is intrinsic to a thing and, as it were, constitutive of it. But this is not the way in which grace is called the “form of the virtues.” Rather, it is so called as being the principle from which the virtues formally originate.

Reply Obj. 4: The diversity of virtues and gifts is gathered only from the diversity of acts. But acts agree in the aspect of meriting. Hence the first principle from which they have the aspect of meriting must be one, and their differences in genus and species must be from the differences of acts and objects.

Reply Obj. 5: In different sacraments grace is given to different effects insofar as several infirmities result from sin, against which sacramental graces are especially ordered. Thus, just as virtue differs from virtue through being ordered to a different act, so also one sacramental grace differs from another through being ordered to different effects. Hence just as a multiplication of grace does not follow from the multiplication of virtues, so also a multiplication of the grace of which we are now speaking does not follow from a multiplication of sacraments. For the perfections that are conferred in the different sacraments, too, are emanations of the grace of which we are now speaking, as are also the virtues. But because they do not have proper names, they are called by the name “grace” in common.

Exposition of the text

This is operating and co-operating grace, (Sent. II, 26.1(162).1.) namely, that which he mentioned above when he said: grace comes before that we may live faithfully and follows after that we may live forever with him. (Augustine, De natura et gratia, ch. 31, para. 35 (CSEL 60:259; PL 44:263).)

‘The will is a movement of the spirit, without the compulsion of anyone, toward not committing something or toward gaining it.’ (Sent. II, 26.2(163).1, quoting Augustine, De duabus animabus, para. 14 (CSEL 25:68; PL 42:104).) Note that here he is not defining the will that is a power, but the will that is an act. For it is common that in nearly all the soul’s powers, the power and act are called by the same name. This is the way in which “will” is taken almost throughout.

‘But that grace itself deserves to be increased so that, once increased it may deserve to be perfected.’ (Sent. II, 26.2(163).3, quoting Augustine, Epistulae, epist. 186, “Ad Paulinum,” para. 10 (CSEL 57:53; PL 33:819).) The increase of grace can be disputed about in the same way as the increase of charity, spoken about above in Book I. (See In I Sent., d. 17, q. 2, aa. 1–5.)

‘Man can do other things unwillingly, but he cannot believe unwillingly.’ (Sent. II, 26.4(165).2, quoting Augustine, In Iohannis evangelium tractatus, tract. 26, para. 2 (CCSL 36; PL 35:1607).) This should be understood of external acts, not of internal ones. For one can only love willingly.

‘Our affection follows late or not at all.’ (Sent. II, 26.6(167).1, quoting Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, Psalm 118:20, sermon 8, para. 4 (CCSL 40; PL 36:1520).) This affection is after the manner of an activity preceding the habit of virtue. For it proceeds from reason’s deliberation alone. But there is a perfect affection that has delight in the activity that follows the habit, for, as the Philosopher says: we should take as a sign of a habit the delight occurring in its work. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.3, 1104b4.)