Proposition 1

1. Every primary cause has more influence on its object than a universal second cause.

2. Thus, when a universal second cause removes its power from a thing, the universal first cause does not take its power from it.

3. This is because the universal first cause acts on the object of the second cause, before the universal second cause, which follows it, acts on that same object.

4. Thus, when the second cause, which follows, acts on an object, its action does not exclude the object from the first cause which is above it.

5. And when the second cause is separated from the object, which follows it, the first cause is not separated from it, which is above it, because it is the cause for it.

6. And indeed we exemplify this through "being" and "living" and "man."

7. This is because first of all there has to be a thing being, then living, and after that, man.

8. Thus living is the proximate cause of man; and being, his remote cause.

9. Thus being is more strongly a cause for man than living, because it is the cause for living, which is the cause for man.

10. And similarly, when you posit rationality as a cause for man, being is more strongly a cause for man than rationality, because it is the cause of that cause.

11. And the significance of that which we are saying is that when you remove the rational power from man, man does not remain but living does remain, and so do breathing and sensible. And when you remove living from him, living does not remain but being does remain, because being is not removed from it, but living is removed; because the cause is not removed by the removal of its object, Thus man remains being. Thus when an individual thing is not man, it is an animal, and, if it is not animal it is only being.

12. Therefore it is now manifest and plain that the first remote cause is more comprehensive and more strongly the cause of a thing than the proximate cause.

13. And because of this its operation is of a stronger adherence with the thing than the operation of the proximate cause. And indeed this only happens in this way because a thing is first affected only by the remote power, only then in the second place is it affected by the power which is subordinate to the first.

14. And the first cause assists the second cause in its operation, because every operation which the second cause effects, the first cause also effects; in truth, however, it effects it in a different way, higher and more sublime.

15. And when the second cause is removed from its object, the first cause is not removed from it, because the first cause is of a greater and stronger adherence with the thing than the proximate cause.

16. And the object is made by the second cause only by virtue of the first cause.

17. This is because when the second cause makes a thing, the first cause which is above, flows its power over the thing, because of which it adheres to it with a strong adherence and preserves it.

18. Thus it is now manifest and plain that the remote cause is more strongly the cause of a thing than the proximate cause which follows it, and that it flows its power over it and preserves it, and it is not separated from it by the separation of its proximate cause, but rather remains in it and adheres to it with a strong adherence, in the way which we have demonstrated and expounded.

Every primary cause has more influence on its object than a universal second cause (1).

11. To the expression of this he brings to bear one corollary through which he manifests the first principle as though through some sign, whence he adds: thus, when a universal second cause removes its power from a thing, the universal first cause does not take its power from it (2).

12. And to this proof he adds a third, saying: this is because the universal first cause acts on the object of the second cause, before the universal second cause acts on that same object (3).

13. And from this he concludes (4–5) that it is placed second and where it really belongs; it is necessary that that which comes earlier leaves last; we see that those which are prior in composition are last in resolution.

14. Thus therefore the intention of this proposition consists in three things: of which the first is that the first cause has more influence on the effect than the second; the second is that the impression of the first causes leaves the effect more slowly; the third is that it comes to it early.

15. Which three things Proclus proposed in two propositions: the first in proposition 56 of his book which is thus: everything which is produced from second causes is also produced more eminently by prior and more causal causes, from which the secondary causes are also produced; but he posits the others in the following proposition, which is thus: every cause both operates before its effect and after it is subsistive of more things (Elements of Theology, 57).

16. These three things being admitted as premises, he proceeds to clarifying them:

first, through example (6–13),

second, through argument, where he says: and the first cause assists (14).

17. The example seems to pertain to formal causes in which a form is more universal to the extent that it seems to be prior.

18. If then we take some man, the form which is specific to him is focused on insofar as it is rational. The form is attended of its genus insofar as it is living and animal. Further, that which is common to all is being.

19. Thus it is clear that in the generation of one particular man being is found first in the subject matter, then living is found, after that is man (6–9); he is animal before man, as is said in On the Generation of Animals, 2.

20. Again: since in the way of corruption the use of reason goes away first and living and breathing remains; second, living and breathing go away and being itself remains (10), because it is not broken down into nothing. And thus this example can be understood according to the way of generation and corruption, which is clear from what he says (11): thus when an individual thing is not man, that is, according to the act proper to man, it is animal, because it remains at that point in that operation of the animal which consists in motion and sensation; and, when it is not animal it is just being**,** because a body not at all animated remains.

21. This example is verified in the very order of things; for existing things are prior to living things and living things are prior to men, since, when man is taken away, animal is not taken away as a consequence, but the converse is true, because if it is not animal it is not man. And this argument is valid for both that which is possessed of soul and that which is possessed of being.

22. Then when he says: and the first cause (14), he proves the three things said before by argument.

23. First, to be precise, he proves that the first cause has more influence than the second in this way (14): something accrues more outstandingly to the cause than to the caused. But the operation by which the second cause causes the effect is caused by the first cause; for the first cause aids the second cause making it to be operated. Thus the first cause is more of a cause of this operation, by which the effect is produced by the second cause, than the second cause.

24. Proclus in more detail proves it thus (Elements of Theology, 56): since the second cause is the effect of the first cause, it has its substance from the first cause. But from that which something has its substance, that's what it has its potency or power of operating from. But the second cause is the cause of the effect through its potency or power. Therefore, the very fact that the second cause is the cause of the effect comes from the first cause. To be the cause of an effect belongs primary to the first cause, and secondarily to the second cause. What is prior in all things is greater because the more perfect are prior in the order of nature. Therefore, the first cause is more the cause of the effect than the second cause.

25. Second, to be precise, he proves that the impression of the first cause recedes later from the effect, where he says: and when it is removed (15), and he brings in such an argument:

26. That which is in something more strongly inheres in it more. But the first cause makes a stronger impression on the effect than the second cause, as has been proved (14; [23–24]), therefore its impression inheres more; therefore it recedes later.

27. Third, to be precise, he proves that it arrives earlier, when he says: and it is only made (16), with such an argument:

28. The second cause acts on its effect only by the power of the first cause. Therefore also the effect proceeds only from the second cause by the power of the first cause. Thus therefore the power of the first cause gives to its effect that it is touched by the power of the second cause. Therefore, it is first touched by the power of the first cause (17–18).

29. Proclus proves these things thus (Elements of Theology, 57) by one means: the first cause is more a cause than the second. Therefore it is of a more perfect power. But as much as the power of any cause is more perfect, so much it extends itself to more things; therefore the virtue of the first cause extends itself to more things than the virtue of the second cause. but that which is in more things is prior in arriving and last in leaving. Therefore the impression of the first cause arrives first and leaves last (cf. Elements of Theology, 70).

30. One ought to consider in which causes this proposition may have truth.

31. And if indeed the question is seen in regard to kinds of causes, it is clear that it has truth in any kind of causes in its own mode.

32. And the example is brought in to bear in formal causes (6–11).

33. In material causes a similar argument is found. For that which first is strewn around as matter is the cause of more proximate matter so that the thing itself also underlies materially just as prime matter underlies the elements which are in some way the matter of mixed bodies.

34. Each of these he shows to be the same in efficient causes. It is clear that insofar as any efficient cause is prior, just so far its power extends itself to more things. Whence it is fitting that a proper effect be more common to the effect. But a proper effect of a second cause is found in fewer cases, whence it is also more particular. The first cause itself produces or moves an acting cause secondarily and thus is the cause for it that it act.

35. Therefore the three aforesaid things are found (14) which are touched primordially in efficient causes and from this is manifest what is derived for formal causes, whence also the word of influencing is put here and Proclus uses the word of production which expresses the causality of an efficient cause.

36. What is derived from efficient causes to material causes is not at this point clear, because efficient causes which are available to us produce not matter but form.

37. But if we consider universal causes from which the material principles of things also proceed; it is necessary that this order is derived also to material causes from efficient causes.

38. Because the efficacy or causality of the first and supreme cause extends itself to more things, it is necessary that that which subsists first in all things be from the first cause of all things. Thence from second causes are added dispositions by which matter is distributed in single things; which indeed appear to the extent that those things are present to us. For nature exhibits prime matter in all artificial things; thence through whatever prior arts natural matter is disposed so that it conforms to particular artificial things. Moreover, the first cause of all things is compared to the whole of nature, just as nature to art; whence that which subsists first in the whole of nature is from the first cause of all things, which is distributed to each individual thing by the office of secondary cause.

39. In final causes also it is clear that everything said before is verified. For on account of the ultimate end which is universal, all ends are sought, appetite for which arrives after the appetite for the ultimate end and ends before it. But also the reason of this order is reduced to the genus of efficient cause; for the end-in-such is a cause inasmuch as it moves an efficient cause to act and thus inasmuch as it is a reason for something moving, it pertains in some way to the genus of efficient cause.

40. If it is sought in whatever genus of causes, whether the aforesaid are verified in all causes ordered in whatever way, it is clear that the answer is no.

41. We know causes are ordered in two ways: in one way per se; in another way, per accidens. Per se when the intention of the first cause looks toward the ultimate effect through all the mediate causes. Just as when the art of the smith moves his hand, the hand moves the hammer which flattens the beaten iron, to which the intention of the art is brought. Per accidens when the intention of the cause only proceeds to the proximate effect. What is effected by that effect is something else again besides the intention of the first one effecting, just as when someone lights a candle, besides his intention is that again the lit candle lights another, and that one, yet another. That which is besides the intention, we say is per accidens.

42. Thus in causes ordered per se this proposition has truth in cases where the first cause moves all mediate causes to the effect. But in causes ordered per accidens the converse is true: for the effect which is produced per se by proximate cause is produced per accidens by the first cause, existing in addition to its intention. That which is per se is stronger than that which is per accidens. And on account of this he said significantly: universal cause, which is a cause per se.