Proposition 16

129. All powers which have no end are depending on the first infinite thing which is the power of powers, not because it is self-acquired, fixed, and stable among things that are, but rather because it is the power for existing things that have constancy, stability.

130. Because if someone should say that the first created being, that is to say, intelligence, is the power which has no end, we would say that created being is not a power, but rather that it has a certain power.

131. And moreover its power is only infinite in an inferior way, not in a superior way, since it is not pure power which is not power except because it is power, and it is a thing which does not end in an inferior, not a superior way. Yet, being which is created first, that is to say intelligence, has an end and its power has a limit, according to which it remains its cause.

132. Yet the first being which creates is an infinite pure first thing.

133. This is because, if strong beings have no end because of their acquisition from the first pure infinite being, because they are beings, and if first being itself is what makes things which have no end, then doubtless it is beyond the infinite.

134. Now the first created being, that is to say, intelligence, is not infinite; rather it is said that it is infinite and it is not said that it by itself is what is infinite.

135. Thus the first being is the measure of first intellectual beings and of secondary sensible beings, that is to say because it is that which has created beings and measured them by a measure appropriate to every being.

136. Thus let us return and say that the first being that creates is beyond infinity, but second, created being is infinite; and that which is between first creating being and second created being is not finite.

137. And the rest of the simple qualities such as life and light and those things which are similar to them, are the causes of all things which have qualities, that is to say because the infinite is from the first cause and the first thing which is caused is the cause of all life and similarly the rest of the qualities, descending from the first cause to the first caused thing in the first place, and that is intelligence, from which [the qualities] descend to the rest of intellectual and corporeal objects, with intelligence serving as an intermediary.

314. When the distinction of superior causes has been made and the division of the consequent single parts, here he accedes to showing the comparison of them to one another. And concerning this, he makes three points:

first he shows how the inferiors depend from the superiors;

second, he shows how the superiors influence the inferiors, in proposition 20, where he says: the first cause rules (155);

third, he shows how the inferiors receive in different ways the influx of the first which influences them, in proposition 24, where he says: the first cause exists (176).

315. About the first point, he makes two subpoints:

first, he shows how the inferiors depend from the superiors according to power;

second, how they depend according to their substance and nature, in proposition 18, where he says: all things have essence (143).

316. About the first of these subpoints, he makes two subpoints:

first, he shows that all infinite powers depend from the first infinite power;

second, he shows how they are assimilated more or less to it, in proposition 17, where he says: every united power (138).

317. About the first, he posits this proposition: all powers which have no end are depending on the first infinite thing which is the power of powers, not because it is self-acquired, fixed, and stable among things that are, but rather because it is the power for existing things that have constancy, stability (129). Now this second part seems to be corrupt in all editions. For it ought to be said in the singular: not because it be acquired, fixed, standing in things which exist, but rather it is power, as this is referred to the power of powers. And this is clear in the book of Proclus, whose proposition 92 goes like this: every multitude of infinite potencies is suspended from one first infinity, which is not like a participated potency nor does it subsist in potencies, but according to itself, not being the potency of anything which participates, but the cause of all beings.

318. Where, first, it is to be considered that infinite potency is said of anything whatever that is always existing, just as above [107-108] it is said in proposition 4, insofar as, that is, we have seen that those things that can last longer have a greater power of being; whence those things that can last into infinity have, so far as this is concerned, infinite potency.

Now, according to the Platonist positions, everything which is found in many things must reduce to some first thing which is such through its own essence, from which the others, by participation, are called such. Whence, according to them, infinite powers are reduced to some first one which is essentially infinite in power; not because it is the power participated in any one thing subsisting, but because it is subsisting through its own self.

This then according to the Platonists is not the idea itself of being, because separated being of this kind has indeed an infinite potency, but since this has also finity, just as above (42 [109]) is held in proposition 4. Whence it remains that it is not first potency which is essentially infinity itself. Nor yet did they posit that that ideal infinity be first simply, because infinity itself participates unity and goodness; whence the simply first is one and good. This ideal infinite, then, from which all infinite powers depend, is an intermediary between one and good—which is simply first—and being. And thus Proclus explains this proposition.

319. But because the author of this book does not posit a real diversity among ideal abstract forms of this kind, which are said to be through their own essence, but he attributes all to the first one which is God, as above [72-75] it also appears from the words of Dionysius, on that account according to the intention of this author, this first infinite from which all infinite powers depend is the simply first, which is God.

320. But by being, of which Proclus makes mention (Elements of Theology, 92), which is below the infinite, he does not mean the idea of being, but rather first caused being. And what Proclus proved about the idea of being, is proved here (130) about first being which is intelligence. Therefore he says, if someone wishes to say that the first caused being, which is intelligence, be infinite power, nevertheless it should not be said that it be essentially power; rather it is having power. Whence it is not the first infinite, from which all infinite powers depend.

321. And that it is not the first infinite power he shows (131) because it is not infinite in all ways and in every respect whatsoever, but it is only infinite in an inferior way, not in a superior way. Now, the power of the Intelligence is called infinite in an inferior way because it is not comprehended by those things which are below it; now it is not infinite in a superior way, because it is exceeded by that which is superior to it, by whose comprehension it is limited.

322. Whence Proclus says in proposition 93: everything infinite among beings is not infinite with respect to the things positioned above it nor to its own self. Because, just as he proves at that place, each and every one is circumscribed and terminated by itself and by its superiors; but it cannot be circumscribed by inferiors.

323. On that account the power of the intelligence is not infinite with respect to all things, because it does not have pure power, that is to say, it is not essentially power, as, that is to say, subsisting power would be. For such a thing, which is essentially power, is defined neither in an inferior nor a superior way: for it does not have anything prior to it by which it could be circumscribed. But intelligence which is the first created being has an end and its end is that according to which it remains, that is to say, according to which it is deficient from its superior, as if remaining after it, just as being unworthy to follow it.

324. Thence (132), he shows that the first infinite is that from which depend all infinite powers; and this indeed is accepted here: first creating being, that is to say, God, who is the first pure infinite, as if essentially existing infinite power.

325. And this he proves (133) because the intelligences, which he calls here beings and strong on account of the magnitude of the power which they have, are infinite on account of their acquisition, that is to say their participation from the first which is the pure infinite, that is to say essentially, from which they have not only infinity, but also being. And if the first creating being is that which by his participation makes things to be infinite, then it is necessary that it itself be beyond the infinite. Which indeed, according to those things which are said here, ought to mean that the first being is beyond the infinite which is participated and created.

326. But, according to Proclus, this is said about the idea of the one and the good, which is according to the Platonists beyond the idea of the infinite. And on that account, explaining that he had said that the first being is beyond the infinite, he adds (134) that the intelligence is infinite, that is to say in a participated fashion, but not essentially, so that what it itself is would be that which is infinite.

327. Therefore it is concluded from the premises (135) that, since first being gives being and infinite to the intelligences, it itself is the measure of the first beings, that is, intelligibles and consequently of secondary beings, that is, sensibles, because the first in any genus whatever is the measure of that genus, insofar as, through accession to it or recession from it, something is known to be more or less perfect in that genus. But he explains that the first being is the measure of all beings, because it created all beings with the measure owed, which is appropriate to each and every thing, according to the mode of its nature. For that which in some way more or less accedes to it, is from its disposition.

328. Now at last he collects from the premises, as if making an epilogue for the principal intention, and he says (136) that first creating being is beyond the infinite, namely, that which is infinite by participation. But second being, which is created, that is to say, intelligence, is infinite in a participative fashion. Now that which is intermediary between first created being, which is Intelligence, and second created being, which is corruptible body, is infinite, that is to say the celestial body. But Proclus posits that such an idea of the infinite is intermediary between the idea of good and the idea of being.

329. Now this ordering of things having been established concerning the infinite, he adds similarly concerning other things, and says (137) that all other simple goodness, namely, life and light and suchlike, are the causes of things which have goodnesses of this sort. For just as the first cause is itself infinite and all things have infinity from it, so too the first cause is life itself and light itself and from it the first caused, namely the intelligence, has life and intelligible light. And similarly also the other goodness descend from the first cause: first, indeed, over the first created thing which is intelligence and then over others, with the intelligence as an intermediary whether these others receive intellectual souls or spiritual things.