Proposition 9

79. Every constancy and essence of intelligence exists through the pure quality of goodness which is the first cause.

80. And indeed the power of intelligence is of a stronger unity than the second things that are after it, because they do not attain its cognition. And it is only this way because it is the cause for that which is below it.

81. And an indication of this is that which we shall discuss: intelligence is what rules all things which are under it by the divine power that is in it and through it it conserves things, since through it, it is the cause of things; and it retains all things which are under it, and comprehends them.

82. This is because everything which is first among things and the cause for them is what conserves those things and rules them and none of them escapes from it, on account of its eminent power. Thus the intelligence is the leader of the things which are under it and it is what conserves them and rules them, just as nature rules the things under it by the power of intelligence. And in the same way the intelligence rules nature by divine power.

83. And indeed the intelligence is only created as the conserver of things which are after it and their ruler and that which extends its power over them because they are not the substantial power for it, but it is the power of substantial powers, because it is the cause for them.

84. And indeed intelligence comprehends the generated order and nature and the horizon of nature, that is to say, the soul, for it is above nature.

85. This is because nature contains generation and the soul contains nature and the intelligence contains the soul.

86. Therefore intelligence contains all things; and intelligence is only created such on account of the first cause which stands out above all things since it is the cause for intelligence and the soul and nature and for the rest of things.

87. And indeed the first cause is not intelligence or soul or nature, but rather is beyond intelligence and soul and nature, since it is the creator of all things. However it is the creator of intelligence without an intermediary and the creator of soul and nature and the rest of things with the intelligence serving as intermediary.

88. And indeed divine knowledge is not like intellectual knowledge nor like animal (soul-related) knowledge, but rather it is above the knowledge of intelligence and the knowledge of the soul, because it is that which creates knowledge.

89. And indeed divine power is above every intellectual and soul-related and natural power, because it is the cause for all power.

90. And intelligence is what has yliathim (determinative principle) because it is being and form, and in the same way the soul is what has yliathim and nature is what has yliathim. And indeed yliathim does not belong to the first cause, because it is being as such.

91. Because if someone should say: it is necessary that it be yliathim, we would say, its yliathim is infinite and its distinguishing mark is its pure goodness, impressing all qualities on intelligence and on the rest of things with intelligence serving as an intermediary.

209. After he has posited the mode by which the intelligence knows that which is above it and that which is below it, here he shows what is above it, bringing in a proposition to show that the intelligence depends from the first cause, which is like this: every constancy and essence of intelligence exists through the pure quality of goodness which is the first cause (79).

210. Now, Proclus posits this proposition, but universally, saying in proposition 12 of his book: the good is the first cause and principle of all beings. Now, the same thing is meant in this proposition (79) what is called pure goodness and what in Proclus' proposition is called good. For pure goodness is called not participated goodness, that is to say: the very subsisting essence of goodness, which the Platonists used to call the good itself; because that which is the first cause of all things must be essentially and purely and firstly good; because, as Proclus proves, the cause is always better than what is caused, whence it is necessary that that which is the first cause be the best. Now this is that which is the very essence of goodness, whence it is necessary that that which is essentially good be the first cause of all things.

211. And this is what Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, 1: since, then, God is the very essence of goodness, through his very being, he is the cause of all existing things.

212. Whence also the intelligences, which have a participated being and goodness, it is necessary that they depend from God who is the pure goodness itself, as an effect from a cause. And this is what he says, that the constancy and essence of the intelligence is through pure goodness (79), precisely because the intelligence has fixed being—that is, immobilely permanent—from the first goodness.

213. Now, he proves this in two ways: first (80) by the effect of the intelligence itself. And the power of this proof consists in this: because if the proper operation of something is found in another thing, it must necessarily be the case that the former thing has its operation from participation of the other, just as an effect has something from a cause; think, if heated iron makes the proper operation of fire, by setting fire, it should be said that this, the iron has from fire, as an effect from a cause. Now the proper operation of God himself is to be the universal reigning cause of all things, as is held in the third proposition (65), whence nothing can extend to this operation except insofar as it participates it from the first cause as its effect.

214. But because the first cause is one to the greatest possible extent, the more simple and unified something is, the more it participates its proper operation. But intelligences are of greater unity and simplicity than inferior things; a sign of which is because whatever things below the intelligence there are, that have a cognitive power, cannot attain to knowing the substance of the intelligence, on account of the excess of its simplicity; through which reason also the corporal sense perception falls short of knowing an intelligible thing. And that it be simpler is clear from this, because it is the cause of inferiors by the mode which was said above [81–85] in proposition 3.

215. And this is made clear by what follows (81) because intelligence rules all things which are below it, by the divine power which is in it. Now by rule is understood the ordination and motion of inferiors to an end and, through its divine power existing in itself, it maintains and preserves things from obstacles to its government; for these two, namely to rule and to maintain, are proper to the cause in comparison to the effect. On that account, therefore, the intelligence through its divine power rules things and maintains them, because by itself it is the cause of things.

216. Now how it retains inferior things, he shows by what he adds, that it maintains all causes which are below it and it comprehends them, namely by impressing its own power on them: for it is not the cause of all inferior things immediately, but only with inferior causes as intermediaries.

217. Now this which he had said, he proves consequently by this (82) because everything which is first in things and a cause for them, maintains those things and rules them, as has been said [215] and none of those things which are under some cause can be taken away from the government and maintenance of that cause by any extraneous power. And on that account, since the Intelligence be first in respect of inferiors and consequently their cause in the manner previously stated [81–85], it is consequence that it behaves with respect to inferiors, something like the duty of a leader in maintaining and ruling. For thus we see that also those things which are below the intelligence have a ruling power by the power of the intelligence, just as through nature which is the principle of motion in natural things they rule and maintain those things which are below nature. Whence similarly the intelligence rules nature and other things which are below it by a divine power. Thus therefore from the above it has been proved that intelligence, like a leader, rules and maintains inferiors by the power of the superior cause, and this is because it is their cause. And that it be their cause proceeds from the fact that it is of a stronger unity.

218. But how, from the fact that it is a cause, it should follow that it maintains those things which are caused and rules them, had not yet been proved and so he adds this proof: and indeed the intelligence is only created as the conserver of things which are after it and their ruler and that which extends its power over them because they are not the substantial power for it, but it is the power of substantial powers, because it is the cause for them (83).

219. The power of this proof is: because each and every thing is ruled and conserved by a certain power of its own through which something operates toward an end and resists obstacles; but the power of a caused thing depends on the power of the cause and not vice-versa: for since power is a principle of operating in each thing, it is necessary that the power be from the power of something from which it has that it be the principle of operating. Now, it was said in the first proposition [23, 24] that an inferior cause operates by the power of a superior cause, whence the power of the superior cause is the power of the power of the inferior cause. And in this way he says (83) that the power of the intelligence is the power of substantial powers, that is, of powers which are proper to the substances of inferior things. So, therefore, it is clear that the intelligence rules and maintains inferior things by stretching out its own power over them from the fact that it is the cause for them.

220. Now, he shows those things which are inferiors which it rules, adding (84) that intelligence comprehends generated things, that is, it contains generable and corruptible things and nature which is the principle of motion in them is found first in the first of bodies; it also comprehends the horizon of nature, namely the soul for it was said above in proposition 2 (22) that the soul is on the horizon of eternity and time, existing below eternity and above time, because it is above nature, which is the principle of motion, which is measured by time.

221. Now, that the intelligence comprehends all the aforesaid things, he proves (85) by the fact that nature contains generation, that is, generated things, because it is the existing principle of generation; indeed, particular nature is of particular generation; but universal nature which is in the celestial body, comprehends universally all generation, as its effect. But the soul contains nature: because, according to the opinion of those who posit an animated celestial body, which the author of this book supposes, the soul is the principle of the motion of the first body and consequently of all nature motions as is held in proposition 3 (30). And again, the intelligence contains the soul, as was said in the same proposition (29).

222. Whence he concludes (86) that the intelligence contains all things, because whatever is contained by that which is contained is contained by the container. And he repeats the cause why this is appropriate to the intelligence, namely, on account of the power of the first cause, to which it is proper to be super-eminent over all things not by a power of someone else, but by its own power: for it, through its own divine power, is the cause of the intelligence and soul and nature and the rest of things, that is, generable and corruptible things. So, therefore, it has been shown that the intelligence depends on the first cause because from it, it has the universal power of containing inferiors.

223. Then, when he says: and indeed the cause (85), he shows the same thing from the condition of the first cause, as if by a demonstration propter quid. For the proof detailed before (80–86) was more by sign.

And first, he sets out the proof (87–90);

second, he excludes an objection, where he says: that if someone were to have said (91).

224. Thus, he says first (87) as if proposing that he intends to prove it, that the first cause is not the intelligence nor is it soul or nature, but it is beyond all those things, just like their creator with a certain order: for it causes the intelligence immediately but the soul and nature and the rest of things, with the intelligence as intermediary. Which is to be understood, as was said above in proposition 3 [79–85], not that their being be caused by intelligence, but that they are created according to their essence only by the first cause, but through the intelligence they obtain certain additional perfections.

225. Now, he begins to prove this, that the first cause causes all the aforesaid things, where he says: and indeed divine knowledge (88).

226. For the understanding of this proof, it should be known that among the perfections arriving in things from the first cause, one is that which arrives at all things, even to generable things and corruptible things—namely, being; another is that which does not come to effects insofar as they are effects, but only to causes insofar as they are causes—namely, power, whence participation of power comes to nature which has a reason of beginning; yet another is that which comes to the intellectual soul, namely, knowledge, which nevertheless is in the soul in an inferior mode than in the intelligence; for it belongs to the intelligence without motion, insofar as it apprehends truth immediately; but it belongs to the soul with a certain motion, according as it proceeds from one thing to another. Thus therefore being and power and knowledge belong to the intelligence and the soul; being and power belong to nature; to generated things, just being. Therefore, if the first cause is the cause of all knowledge and all power and all being, it follows that all things be caused by it.

227. Now, that it be the cause of all these, he proves by the fact that that which is first and most excellent in any order is the cause of all following things in that order. But the first cause has knowledge more excellent than every knowledge, and power more excellent than all power, and being more excellent than every being. Therefore, it is the cause of all knowledge and power and being. And from this it follows that it be the creator of intelligence and soul and nature and the rest of things.

228. Therefore, first (88) he shows about knowledge, and he says that divine knowledge is not just like intelligible knowledge, because the knowledge of the intelligence is by participation of the thing understood, and much less is it like the knowledge of the soul which is not only by participation of the thing understood, but by participation of intellectual light from the intelligence, behaving in a mobile fashion concerning knowledge. Nay rather divine knowledge is beyond the knowledge of the intelligence and beyond the knowledge of the soul, because immobilely and without any participation of intelligible light or of the thing understood it has essential knowledge, understanding things through its own essence. And on this account is why it is the creator of all knowledge; whence it is necessary that it be superior to all knowledge.

229. Now, the same follows concerning power (89) and he says that divine power is beyond all intelligible power and power of souls and nature power because intelligence and soul and nature have their power participated from another, just as the power of a second cause is participated from the power of the first cause which is not participated from another, but itself is the cause of every power.

230. Also, similarly it follows with regard to being (90), showing that the first cause has being in a higher mode than others: for intelligence has yleathin, that is something material or behaving in the material mode; for it is called yleathin from yle, which is matter. And how this may be, he explains, adding since it is being and form: for quiddity and substance of the intelligence is a certain subsisting and immaterial form; but because it is not its own being, but is subsisting in participated being, the very subsisting form is compared to participated being as potency to act and as matter to form. And the soul similarly is having yleathin, not only the form itself subsisting, but also the body itself of which it is the form. Similarly also, nature is having yleathin, because the natural body is composed out of matter and form.

231. Now the first cause in no way has yleathin, because it does not have participated being, but it itself is pure being and consequently pure goodness, because anything insofar as it is being is good. Now it is necessary that every participated thing is derived from it which subsists purely through its own essence; whence it remains that the essence of intelligence and of all beings be from the pure goodness of the first cause.

232. So therefore the reason is clear why he said above (87) that the first cause is not intelligence nor soul nor nature, because its knowledge exceeds the knowledge of intelligence and soul and its power exceeds all power and its being exceeds all being.

233. Then, when he says: that if one were to say (91), he excludes a certain objection: for someone could say that if the first cause be just being, it would seem that it be common being which is predicated of all things and which would not be anything existing individually, distinct from other things: for that which is common is not individuated, except through the fact that it is received in something. But the first cause is something individual, distinct from all other things; otherwise it would not have any operation: for the universal is not to act or to be acted on; therefore it would seem that it be necessary to say that the first cause have yleathin, that is something receiving being.

234. But to this he responds that the very infinity of divine being, namely insofar as it is not terminated by anything receiving it, has in the first cause the place which yleathin has in other things. And this is because, just as in other things the individuation of a common received thing takes place through the fact that it is receiving, thus divine goodness and being is individuated from its very purity, because, specifically, it is not received in anything, and from the fact that it is individuated in this way by its own purity, it has that it can flow goodnesses over the intelligence and other things.

235. As evidence for this it should be considered that something is called individual from the fact that it is not born to be in many; for the universal is that which is born to be in many. But that something not be born to be in many things, this can happen in two ways:

in one way, because it is determined to some one thing in which it is, as white, by reason of its species, is born to be in many, but this white which is received in this subject, can only be in it. Now, this way cannot proceed into infinity, as is proved in Metaphysics, 2 (994a20, 994b17). Whence it is proper to reach something which is not born to be received in anything and have individuation from it, just as prime matter in corporeal things, which is the principle of singularity.

Whence it is necessary that everything which is not born to be in something, from that fact itself it is individual. And this is the second mode by which something is not born to be in many; because, precisely, it is not born to be in anything: just as, if white were existing separated without a subject it would be individual by this mode. And in this way, the individuation is in separated substances which are forms having being and in the first cause itself which is subsisting being itself.