Proposition 11

100. Every intelligence knows sempiternal things which are not destroyed and do not fall under time.

101. This is because if intelligence is always that which is not moved, then it is the cause for sempiternal things which are not destroyed [or changed] and do not fall under generation and corruption. And moreover intelligence is only such because it knows a thing through its own being, and its being is sempiternal because it is not corrupted.

102. Thus, since it is such, we say that destructible things are endowed with bodilyness, that is to say from the corporeal cause for a temporal thing, not from the eternal cause for an intellectual thing.

256. Now that it has been shown how the intelligence knows things other than itself, because it knows through intelligible forms with which it is full, here (100) is specifically dealt with about the cognition by which the intelligence knows eternal things.

And first, it is shown that it knows eternal or incorruptible things;

second, he shows the mode by which it knows them, at: of all the first things, certain ones are (103).

257. About the first, he posits a proposition like this (100): every intelligence knows sempiternal things which are not destroyed, nor do they fall under time. By sempiternal things he means things which are beyond time and motion, as is explained in the second proposition [48–50]. He says plainly: which are not destroyed nor do they fall under time; for certain things fall under time which yet are not destroyed, such as the motion of the sky which although it is measured in time will not be destroyed nor will it cease, according to the position of the philosophers.

258. It seems, therefore, on the face of it, that the meaning of this proof is that the Intelligence does not know things which are corruptible and which fall under time, but only incorruptible things existing beyond time. But that this is not the meaning of the proposition (here) is clear from the proposition which is added (101) in which it is not proved that intelligence knows sempiternal things and not corruptibles, but that it only causes sempiternal things immediately, whence it should be explained: every intelligence knows, that is, causes by knowing sempiternal things.

259. And this is clear from the book of Proclus, who brings in two propositions on this matter, of which one is 172: every intellect is the institutor proximately of perpetual things and of intransmutable things according to its substance; the other is 174: every intellect institutes by knowing those things which are after it. From which two propositions the author of this book has conflated one, and while he was eager for brevity, he brought in obscurity.

260. Now he proves under this sense this proposition in the very mode by which Proclus also proved it, and in this proof he makes two points:

for first, he shows that intelligence does not produce immediately things which are corruptible or which fall under time, but only sempiternal things;

second, he shows where corruptibility in things comes from (102).

261. Now, first he shows it thus (101): the intelligence produces its effect according to its own being and this because its "to know" is connatural with it and essential to it. Now, it produces nothing except by understanding, as we have shown [253] above. Whence it remains that whatever it produces, it produces by its own being. But the being of the intelligence is incorruptible and beyond time, being made similar to eternity, as is held in proposition 2 (21, 25 [57]). Therefore, the immediate effect of the intelligence is sempiternal, not falling under corruption or time.

262. Then he shows the second, saying (102) that since the Intelligence does not cause corruptible things immediately, it follows that corruptible things are not immediately from the intelligence, but are from some corporeal cause for a temporal thing. For corruption and generation in these inferior things are caused by the motion of the sky; and that very motion of the sky is not immediately from the intelligence, but from the soul, as was said above in proposition 3 (30 [86]).

263. If someone wished to reduce this process to the meaning which appears superficially from the proposition, he could say further that corruptible things are known by the intelligence as sempiternal. For they are in the intelligence as if not materially, although in themselves they be material, so not temporally but sempiternally; which is shown by the effect: because the immediate effect of the intelligence is sempiternal. For that by which the intelligence knows is the creative principle in it, just as the craftsman works by the form of art.

264. Now this proof which is brought in here (102 [263]), even if it is conceded by certain philosophers, yet does not have necessity. For when this proof is taken up, many fundamentals of the Catholic faith are taken away: for it would follow that the angels could make nothing new immediately in these inferiors, and much less God, who is not only eternal but before eternity, as was said above (20 [54–55]); and it would follow further, that the world would always have existed. For this seems to be the most efficacious reason for those who posit the eternity of the world, which is taken from the immobility of the maker: for it does not seem that it could happen that something which acts now begin to operate, when it would not have been operating before, if it holds itself immobile in every way, unless perchance some exterior mutation be presupposed; because, as Averroes continues in his commentary on Physics, 8, if some voluntary agent wanted to do something after and not before, it would at least be necessary to imagine time, which is the number of motion. And on that account he concludes that it is impossible that a new effect come forth from an immobile and eternal will, unless motion be presupposed.

265. And because this appears to be a very efficacious principle to use for proving the eternity of the world, the solution of this principle is diligently to be attended.

266. Therefore, it should be considered that one ought to speak in one way about the agent which produces something in time and in another way about an agent which produces time at the same time as the thing which is produced in time. For when something is produced in time, it is necessary to accept some proportion in time, whether only of that which is produced, or also of the producer itself; whenever an action is in time not only on the part of that which is acted on, but also on the part of the agent. For something is in time according to the fact that it is in motion, of which time is the number.

267. Therefore, when some mutation is found on the part of that which is acted on and on the part of the agent, then the action is in time according to both; think, when someone is altered by cold, he kindles a new fire to drive the cold away.

268. Now, this does not always happen: for there is something whose substance is not in time but whose operation is in time as will be said below [269]. Thus an agent of this kind without any mutation to himself produces an effect in time which would not have been before. And so also God can produce something new in time which did not exist before, according to a certain proportion of this effect to this time, just as happens in all miraculous effects which are made to happen immediately by God.

269. Nor does it stand in the way to say that he produces by his own being, because his own being is his own to know. And just as his being is one, he understands many and on account of this he can produce many, although his knowledge remains one and simple, so, although it be its own being eternal and immobile, yet it can know something to be temporal and mobile. And on that account, although his own knowledge be sempiternal, through himself he can yet produce a new effect in time. An indicator of this appears in some way in us; for man can, with a permanent immobile will, spread his work into the future, as he will make it at a determined time.

270. But if you say that as often as this happens one ought to know in advance another motion from which it would happen that something earlier was not appropriate to be done, then it was as appropriate for doing, at least the very running-down of time which cannot be understood without motion, we could say that this is indeed true in particular effects of God which he operates in time. For that he raised Lazarus on the fourth day and not before, he did this with respect held for the other preceding change of things.

271. But in the production of the universe this has no place, because at the same time as the world, time also was made and all motion universally; nor was there any time preceding or motion to which it would be necessary for the newness of this effect to be proportioned, but only to the reason of the one who made according as he knew and wished this effect not to have been from eternity but to begin after not being. For thus time is the measure of operation or motion, just as dimension is the measure of the magnitude of a body.

272. If therefore we ask about any particular body, think: about the earth, why it is confined beneath these limits of magnitude and is not extended beyond, the reason for this can be from its proportion to the whole world. And if again, we should ask about the whole universe of bodies, why it does not exceed the bounds of this determined magnitude, the reason for this cannot be from its proportion to another magnitude, but either one must say that corporal magnitude is infinite as the ancient natural philosophers posited, or it must be accepted that the reason for this determinate magnitude is from the sole intelligence and will of the maker. Therefore, just as an infinite God produced a finite universe according to the principle of his wisdom, so an eternal God could produce a new world according to the same principle of wisdom.