Proposition 17

138. Every united power is more infinite than a multiplied power.

139. This is because the first infinite thing which is intelligence is near to the one, the pure truth. Because of this, then, it so happens that in every power near to the one truth there is more infinite than in a power far from it.

140. This is because power, when it begins to be multiplied, its unity is then destroyed, and when its unity is destroyed, its infinity is destroyed. And its infinity is destroyed only because it is divided.

141. And an indication of this is divided power, and that it, when it is more collected together and unified, it is greater and is stronger and it performs remarkable activities; and when it is more separated and divided, it is diminished and weakened and it performs activities of little value.

142. Now it is therefore manifest and plain that power, to the extent that it comes closer to the one, pure truth, its unity is stronger, and to the extent that its unity is stronger, the infinity in it is more apparent and more manifest and its operations are great operations, remarkable and noble.

330. After, in the preceding proposition, it has been shown that all infinite powers depend from the first infinite power, in this proposition, consequently, it is shown how one power accedes more to the first infinity than others. And he says (138) that every united power is more infinite than a multiplied power. This very same proposition is posited in the book of Proclus under these words: every more united potency is existing in a more infinite fashion than a plurified.

331. Now it is proved doubly in both places: first indeed through reason by this mode (139): just as from the aforesaid proposition it was held (129), all infinite powers depend from the first infinite which is the power of powers. Therefore, it is necessary that, to the extent that a power were closer to that first power, to that extent it participates from its infinity. Now that first power is essentially one. Therefore, it is necessary that to the extent to which something is more one, to that extent it has more infinite power. And, thence it is that the power of intelligence, which is first among the infinite caused powers, is most infinite insofar as being closer to the first one. But powers which are multiplied, from this itself they fall short of unity and on that account their power is diminished.

332. And an example of this appears in cognitive powers: for the intellect, which is not divided in many potencies, is more efficacious in knowing than the senses, which are diversified through many potencies. And, by that same reason, the cognitive power of the Intelligence, which is not divided by sensitive and intellective, is stronger than the human cognitive power, as much concerning sensible singulars as concerning intelligibles to be understood.

333. Second, it is proved through a sign (141): for we see in corporeal particular things that, when many are aggregated and united, their power is made more strongly, from which marvelous operations follow, such as is clear in many men at the same time, dragging a ship which individually could not drag it, nor its proportional parts. And to the extent that the power of a corporeal thing is more divided, to that extent it is made weaker and it makes baser operations, just as a whole home is heated by a great congregated fire, which could not come about if the fire is divided through different parts of the home.

334. From which two proofs, he concludes (143) the proposition, as is clear in the text.