Proposition 22

166. The first cause is above every name by which it is named.

167. This is because neither imperfection nor perfection along pertain to it; since the imperfect is not perfect and can effect no perfect activity, insofar as it is imperfect. And what is perfect among us, although it be sufficient in and of itself, yet it cannot create anything else nor impress anything at all by itself.

168. Thus if it is such among us, then we shall say that the first is neither just imperfect nor just perfect, but rather is beyond perfection,

169. since it is what creates things and flows goodnesses over them by a perfect impression, since its goodness is that which has no end or dimensions.

170. Thus the first goodness fills all ages with goodnesses; however, every age receives from this goodness only according to the mode of its capacity.

171. Thus it has been shown and it is manifest that the first cause is above every name by which it is named, and superior to it, and higher.

376. The abundance of divine goodness having been shown, here he shows its excellence, saying: the first cause is beyond every name by which it is named (166). For the understanding of this proposition, it must be considered that that which is here collected under one, Proclus in his book distinguishes through diverse points, of which proposition 115 goes like this: every god is super-substantial and supervital and superintellectual.

377. Which indeed Proclus proved in two ways:

first by a common proof, which is like this: God is unity perfected in itself; now each and every one of the other things which are beneath God is not unity itself but is something participating in unity. Therefore, it is manifest that God is beyond all things of this kind.

Second, he proves it with a special proof: because, namely, for a substance it is not the same thing to be and to be a substance and to be one, but any subsisting substance participates in being and in one. Whence it remains that God, who is one itself and being through himself, be beyond substance and consequently beyond life and intellect, which presuppose substance, as also appears in this book from proposition 18 brought in above (143 [338]).

378. But because the author of this book brings in a proof in common, he is content with just the common proof. For in all things which are below the first cause, some are found existing perfectly, or complete, others imperfect or diminished; indeed the perfect ones seem to be those which subsist by themselves in nature, which are signified by us through a concrete name, like "homo sapiens" and things like that; but those things are imperfect which do not subsist by themselves, such as humanity, wisdom, and things like that which are signified among us by abstract names.

379. Between these two there is this difference: that that which is not complete cannot bring to perfection a perfect operation; for heat doesn't heat things, but something hot does; nor is wisdom wise, rather a wise man is wise. Now that which is complete among us, although it be self-subsisting, is sufficient to itself in this that it needs nothing else on which it leans, as on a subject below it (acting as a support); nevertheless, because form which is the principle of action is in itself limited and participated, it cannot act through the mode of creation or influx (167) just as that which is wholly form acts, because by its own participation according to itself it is wholly productive of others.

380. Since therefore it be thus among us in these things which are small and concrete, it follows that God be neither small nor simply complete, but rather supercomplete (168). For he lacks no action, as a small thing does, and he acts through a mode of one who creates and influences, which they who are complete among us cannot. And this is what he adds below (169) because it is creating things and flowing goodnesses over them with a complete influence. And on that account this is because it is goodness subsisting which has no end, that is, it is not goodness terminated at any participating incorporeal nature, as is the goodness of intelligence; nor does it have dimensions at which it be terminated, as is the case with a corporal goodness.

381. From this he concludes below (170) that, because the first cause is itself unterminated goodness, it follows that it be first goodness and that it fill all ages, that is all distinctions of things and times, with its own goodnesses, even though not all things receive in the same mode and equally its goodness, but each and every one according to the mode of its potency, as is held above (157 [363]) in proposition 20.

382. Therefore the whole power of this proof returns to this, what Proclus briefly touched, namely that God is unity itself, not a united thing just as complete things which are among us and nevertheless he is perfected per se; from which diminished things are deficient, that is non-subsisting forms which are among us.

383. From this here it is concluded below (171) that the first cause is higher than any name which is imposed by us, because every name imposed by us either signifies through a mode of a complete participant, like a concrete name, or it signifies through a mode of a diminished and formal part like an abstract name. Whence no name imposed by us is appropriately worthy of the divine excellence.