Proposition 12

103. Of all the first things, certain ones are in certain others according to the mode by which it is permitted that one of them be in another.

104. This is because life and intelligence are in being, and being and intelligence are in life, and being and life are in intelligence.

105. However, being and life in intelligence are two alachili, that is, intelligences, and being and intelligence in life are two lives, and intelligence and life in being are two beings.

106. And indeed it is only such because every one of the first things is either cause or effect. The effect, then, is in the cause according to the mode of the cause, and the cause is in the effect according to the mode of the effect.

107. And [indeed] we summarize and we say that a thing acting upon a thing according to the mode of a cause is only in it according to the mode by which it is its cause, just as sense perceptions act on the soul according to the mode of the soul, and the soul acts on the intelligence according to the intellectual mode, and intelligence acts on being according to the essential mode, and first being acts on intelligence according to the intellectual mode and intelligence acts on the soul according to the mode of the soul, and the soul acts on sense perception according to the sensible mode.

108. Let us go back and say that the sense perception in the soul, and intelligence in the first cause, are through their modes, according to what we have shown.

273. After he shows that the intelligence knows sempiternal things, here (103) he brings in a proposition to show how the intelligences, which are sempiternal things, know one another. Through this, then, something is understood that is in the one knowing and on that account he shows in this proposition how one of the superior beings may be in another. And the proposition is such: of all first things, certain ones are in certain others by the mode by which it is permitted that one of them be in another.

274. This proposition is also put forth as 103 in the book of Proclus, under these words: all are in all, but properly in each one. Now it is the same, what Proclus says: but properly in each one, and what is said here, by the mode by which it is permitted that one of them be in another. For in each place it is meant that one is in the other according to the mode which is appropriate to that in which it is.

275. But by Proclus indeed is brought in this proposition according to the Platonist positions, by which are posited separate subsisting forms of which as was said above [53, 66, 98] each is higher by as much as it is more universal and extending its participation to more things. And according to this, being itself is superior to life itself and life is superior to intellect itself. And on that account, Proclus, determining this in his proposition (Elements of Theology, 103), adds: for life and intellect are in being, and being and knowing are in life, and being and living are in intellect. And so also the author of this book seems to speak, naming separated things of this kind "first"; for he adds below (104) as if explaining: that is: because life and intelligence are in being and being and intelligence are in life and being and life are in intelligence, which is in every way the same with the words of Proclus.

276. Now, Proclus adds in his proposition (Elements of Theology, 103) an exposition of the mode by which one of these may be in another, saying: but in one place intellectually, in another vitally, but in another beingly, that is by the mode of a being, all beings; as if to say that all three of the aforementioned are in the intellect intellectually, in life vitally, in being essentially.

277. But this which is posited in place of this in this book, seems to be corrupt and to have a bad meaning. For it follows (105): nevertheless being and life are two intelligences in the intelligence. For it should be understood that these two—namely being and life—are in the intelligence intellectually. And being and intelligence in life are two lives, that is, both are in life vitally. And intelligence and life in being are two beings—that is, both are in the very being essentially.

278. Now, if it is understood according to what the words sound like, they would contain a false understanding: for the "to live" of a living being is its very being, as is said in On the Soul, 2, and the "to know" itself of the first knower is its life and its being, as is said in Metaphysics, 12. Whence Proclus also excluding this says that the being of intellect is cognitive and its life is cognition (Elements of Theology, 103). Otherwise it would follow inconveniently what Aristotle brings in in Metaphysics, 3 (1003a11) against the Platonists that, to be exact, Socrates would be three animals because he is animal and the common idea of animal, which he participates, is predicated about him and similarly also the idea of man, which is the same animal. For it would follow that each of these three would be not one, but many [83].

279. Now, Proclus appends a clear proof to those things which are said (Elements of Theology, 103), distinguishing that something is said about something in three ways: in one way causally as heat is said of the sun; in another way essentially or naturally, as heat is said of fire; in a third way according to a certain post-habition, that is consequence or participation, when, namely, something is not had fully, but in a posterior and more particular mode, just as fire is found in elemental bodies not in that plenitude according to which it is in fire. Thus therefore that which is essentially in the first is in a participatory way in the second and third; but what is essentially in the second, is in the first indeed causally and in the last participatively; but that which is essentially in the third, is causally in the first and second. And through this mode, all are in all.

280. But because the author of this book does not seem to posit separate forms, that here (104) being and life and intelligence are said to be in one another is to be understood according to the fact that they are found in things having being, life and intelligence: because in being itself is found according to the proper definition "to live" and "to know" causally, according to that mode by which it was said in proposition 1 (9) that being is the first cause, to live and to know, posterior causes.

281. So it should not be understood as the words sound (105), that the intelligence and life be two beings in being itself, but because these two, according as they are in being, they are not anything other than being; and similarly being as it is in life is life itself, since life adds nothing beyond being except a determinate mode of existing or a determinate nature of a being. And the same should be understood in the other comparisons, according to which one of them is said to be in another.

282. But because, according to the meaning of this author, these three are not certain subsisting things, as has been said [75, 280], consequently he applies this proposition to things which subsist through themselves which are: first being, which is God; intelligence; the intellective soul; and the sensitive soul. And he says (106) that in this way the cause is in the effect and vice versa, according to the fact that the cause acts on the effect and the effect receives the action of the cause. Now, the cause acts on the effect through the mode of the cause itself, but the effect receives the action of the cause through its own mode: whence it is necessary that the cause be in the effect through the mode of the effect, and the effect be in the cause through the mode of the cause.

283. So therefore (107) those things which are in the sense sensibly, are in the intellective soul through the mode appropriate to it. And those things which are in the soul through the mode of the soul are in the intellect through the proper mode and those things which are in the intelligence intelligibly are in the first cause essentially, according to its mode. And vice-versa, priors are in posteriors, according to the mode of the posteriors.

284. From which it can be accepted how (108) the intelligences may know one another and the first cause: for each knows the other according to the fact that the other is in it through the mode of that in which it is; because also inferiors are in superiors according to certain more excellent similitudes or species; but superiors are in inferiors according to certain more deficient similitudes or species.