Proposition 7

64. Intelligence is a substance which is not divided.

65. This is because if it is not endowed with magnitude, is not body and does not move, then doubtless it cannot be divided.

66. And again, everything divisible is divided only either with respect to number or size or its motion.

67. Thus, when a thing is according to this disposition, it is subject to time, since it only receives division in time. And indeed intelligence is not in time, rather it is on the level of eternity; on account of which it is made higher and superior to every body and every multitude. Because if multitude is found in it, it is only found as if it were a single existing thing. Thus since intelligence is this way, it receives no division internally.

68. And the indication of this is its return on its own essence, that is to say because it is not extended with an extended thing, so that there would be one of its extremities following from another.

69. This is because when it desires knowledge of a corporeal thing it is not extended with it, but remains fixed according to its disposition; since it is a form from which nothing passes away. And indeed bodies are not like this.

70. And the proof that intelligence is not a body, and its substance and its operation are not divided, is that both are one thing. And indeed intelligence is many on account of the qualities which come to it from the first cause. And although it is multiplied in this fashion, yet, because it approximates unity, it is one and is not divided. And indeed intelligence does not admit of division because it is the first created thing which was created by the first cause, and unity is more worthy of it than division.

71. It is therefore now verified that intelligence is a substance that is not endowed with magnitude nor body nor is moved by any of the modes of motion for a body: because of which it is created beyond time [and on a level with eternity] as we have shown.

179. After he has said about the first level of superior being, that is, the first cause, that it cannot be described, now (64) he goes on to the second level, that is, to the intelligences.

And first, he determines about the intelligences, as far as its substance;

second, as far as its cognition, in proposition 8, where he says: every intelligence knows (72).

180. About the first, it should be known that those things which are of a superior order cannot be sufficiently known by those which are of an inferior order, because superiors exceed the mode and power of inferiors. But because human cognition takes its beginning from the senses, those things which are offered to our senses we can know sufficiently, but we cannot arrive at superior cognition from them, except according to those things which have something in common with sensibles that are known by us. But those things which are totally offered to our senses are inferior bodies, with which superior bodies do not come together in the type of essence or the condition of nature; but they do come together in the reckoning of quantity, of light, and of those things which follow on these. And on that account we can extend to knowing about superior bodies and their clarity according to which they are visible to us both the quantity of magnitude and their motions and shape and also their genus according to the mode by which it comes together in genus with inferior bodies; now we can know their proper nature according to the definition of their species only through negation, inasmuch as it transcends the nature of inferior bodies, whence Aristotle in On the Heavens, 1, proves that the celestial body is neither heavy nor light nor generable nor corruptible.

181. Similarly, intelligence transcends the whole order of corporal things. Because nevertheless its quiddity or essence is not itself its own being, but it is a thing subsisting in its own participated being, on that account it comes together in some way in genus with bodies, which also subsist in their being; and thus, according to logical intention each is placed in the genus of substance. And on that account the intelligence indeed can be made known in a narrative or affirmative fashion insofar as its genus, as it may be said to be a substance; but as for the specific difference it cannot be described, but it is necessary that it be made known to us through negation, insofar as it transcends the whole order of corporal things, to which divisibility belongs.

182. And on that account making the essence of intelligence known, as far as it can be made known to us, he proposes this proposition: intelligence is a substance which is not divided (64). Now the first cause is not nature subsisting in its own being as if participated, but itself subsisting being is stronger and on that account it is super-substantial and simply indescribable.

183. Now, Proclus also posits this proposition in his book (Elements of Theology, 171) in these words: every intellect is an indivisible substance.

184. Now, what has been said is proved through division and as it appears from the words posited here (65–66), a double division is premised: of which the first is from the part of the very thing to be divided which has a stable magnitude and a flowing quantity, as it is in time and motion. And this is what he says (65): that is: because if it is not with magnitude, nor is it a body nor is moved, then doubtless it is not divided. For when he says if it is not with magnitude nor is it a body, he excludes stable magnitude, that is, what has place; and he says neither with magnitude nor a body, because body is a complete divisible magnitude according to every dimension, but a surface and a line are incomplete magnitude according to one or two parts. Or this which he says: if it is not with magnitude, is posited to exclude those things which are such by accident, such as whiteness and things like that.

185. He posits another division from the part of the division itself and he says (66) that everything which is divided is either divided according to multitude that is, according to a discrete quantity or according to magnitude which is a division according to a continuous quantity having a single location, or according to motion which is a division of continuous quantity not having a single location. For the division of time and of motion is the same, as is proved in Physics, 6.

186. Now in the first division he sets aside the question of multitude, because division which is according to number follows on the division of the continuous as is clear in Physics, 3, and on that account, in those things in which there is no division according to magnitude there is no division according to multitude.

187. Now, once these divisions have been posited, he shows (67) that the intelligence is divided by none of the aforesaid modes and the proof seems to be like this: everything which is divided, is divided in time; for division is a certain motion from unity into multitude. But intelligence is not in time, but it is wholly in eternity, as was held above in proposition 2 (21). Therefore, it exceeds every aforesaid mode of division. And indeed this is the exposition of this proposition, according to what appears from the words put here (65–67).

188. But it should be known that the words put here are corrupted from a defect of the translation, as is clear through the text of Proclus which is like this (Elements of Theology, 171): for if it is without magnitude and incorporeal and immobile, it is indivisible. But what follows is not brought in through the mode of another division, but through the mode of a proof, for thus he adds: for everything which is divisible in any way, whether according to magnitude or according to multitude or according to operations is divisible. And he proves immediately that it is not divisible according to its operations, for he adds, carried out in time, as if he were saying: all divisible operations are in time. And he adds: now the Intellect is eternal in every respect and beyond bodies and that which is a multitude in it is united. Therefore it is indivisible. He shows the aforesaid things posited above one at a time.

189. And first he follows up on incorporeity, saying thus: that therefore indeed the intellect be incorporeal, which the conversion upon itself shows. Now, it is the conversion of the intellect on itself in which it knows itself. For no body is converted on itself.

190. And indeed he had proved this above, setting forth proposition 15 as such: everything which is conversive on itself is incorporeal. Which he proves thus: for no body is born to be converted on itself. For if that which is converted on something is linked to that on which it is converted, then obviously also all parts of the body which is converted on itself will be linked to all other parts. Which is impossible in all divisible things because of the separation of the parts, some of them lying elsewhere than others.

191. And indeed this proof is added here in a pretty confusing manner, when he says (68): and the proof of that (namely, that the intelligence is not a body) is the return upon its own essence, that is, because it is converted on itself by knowing itself; which is appropriate to it because it is not a body or a magnitude having one part distant from another. And this is what he adds, precisely because it is not extended, with an extension that is to say of magnitude, with an extended thing that is to say, a thing having magnitude, so that one of its extremities would be following from another, that is, in a distinct order of location from one another.

192. And because someone could believe that the intelligence be extended by knowing bodies as if by touching on them, he excludes this, adding (69): which is: because when it wants knowledge of a corporeal thing it is not extended with it, as, to be precise, it would understand magnitude by means of its own magnitude, as Empedocles wished it, but it stands fixed, according to its own disposition, that is, it is not drawn away into different parts. And he proves this through what he adds: since it is a form through which nothing passes. For magnitude is only in matter, but intelligence is an immaterial form through which nothing passes either because one part of it does not stand apart form the others or because, though it be indivisible, nothing about a thing having magnitude escapes its cognition. Now he adds: and indeed bodies are not such. From which it can be concluded that the intelligence is not a body.

193. Then (70) according to what appears from the words here posited, another proof is brought in to show that the intelligence is not a body; because, namely, its operation as well as its substance is indivisible and both have a unity of indivisibility which cannot be in bodies according to its substance; for it is divided both with a division of magnitude and with a division of time according to its operations, neither of which is appropriate to the intelligence.

194. But in the book of Proclus this is brought in to prove another member; that is, to show that the intelligence is not divided according to motion. For he says thus (Elements of Theology, 171): the identity of its operation to its substance makes it plain that the intellect be eternal. And this is the power of this proof: because that thing to whom its operation comes accidentally, receives variation according to that operation, as sometimes it acts and sometimes doesn't, or sometimes does more, sometimes less. But that thing to whom its operation belongs according to its own essence, operates invariably. And such is the intelligence to which the intellectual operation belongs, according to the nature of its essence.

195. Then, he shows the third member, namely that the Intelligence is not divided according to multitude, and to make this clear he brings in the fact that one ought to posit some multitude in the intelligence: for many goodnesses come to it from the first cause, the reason for whose multiplication is because the intelligence cannot attain to the simplicity of the unity of the first cause and on that account the perfection of goodness which in the first cause is united and simple, is multiplied in the intelligence into many goodnesses. And yet, although there be a multitude of goodnesses in the intelligence, those many things cohere indivisibly with one another: for it cannot be that it would retain being and let go of life, or that it would retain life and let go of cognition, as happens in inferior things. And this on that account, because since the intelligence is the first caused thing, it is closest to the first cause and on that account those things which are in the intelligence belong to it in the noblest mode after the first cause: for unity and indivisibility are nobler than division, which the intelligence has indivisibly a multitude of goodnesses which it participates from the first cause.

196. And the proof which Proclus brings in also returns to the same point (Elements of Theology, 171).

197. Finally, then, he concludes the proposition as if it is already proved when he says: now, therefore, it has been verified (71).